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#### THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

25X NFAC-0684-80/1 28 January 1980 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America FROM : Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America SUBJECT 1. Attached is a copy of the Latin America Warning Assessment based upon our discussion of 23 January 1980. 2. The next warning meeting will be held on 20 February 1980 at 1100 hours in room 5GOO at CIA headquarters. Please call by noon on 19 February to give her the name of the individual participating from your office. att: (1) 25X1

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# THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National	Intelligence	Officers
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NFAC-0684-80 28 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: [	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
	Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment National Intelligence Officer for Warning	
FROM : N	National Intelligence Officer for Latin America	
SUBJECT : N	Monthly Warning Assessment: Latin America	25 <b>X</b> 1
<ol> <li>Action Re</li> <li>El Salvac</li> </ol>	none, for your information only.	25 <b>X</b> 1
The parti agreement that	icipants of the monthly warning meeting were in general	
a. the popular suppo	extreme left was gaining in military strength and ort,	
b, the survive for l	center-left Junta was ineffective and not likely to long,	
c. the was possible.	military establishment was split and a rightist coup	
leftist extremists	eral feeling was that a major thrust for power by the scould come at any timethrough preplanned military demonstrations, or as the result of some development, military coup.	25X1
3. <u>Cuba</u>	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
The parti throttle the rise	icipants generally agreed that the Castro regime would in popular unrest with its current get-tough policy.	<u>.</u> 25 <b>X</b> 1
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The impact of Castro's domestic problems on his foreign policy was discussed, with the following judgments expressed:

- a. There would probably be no impact on his low-cost, low-risk activities in support of Central American and Caribbean revolutionaries.
- b. Castro would probably be more hesitant to undertake a major military deployment in Africa or the Middle East, because of popular grumbling about costs and casualties.

c. There w	as, however, an	outside chance	that he would seek
			content. This was
judged somewhat	more likely if	the US could be	effectively posed
as "the enemy".		4	

#### 3. Jamaica

The participants agreed that there was a considerable prospect for the outbreak of major disorders, because of intensifying economic deprivations (food shortages, layoffs). The ability of the security forces to maintain order was questionable at best, very poor if the disorders are prolonged and widespread. The chances for politically-inspired action against US personnel, companies, or tourists was judged small. But the danger of crimes against US citizens or physical harm to those caught in the midst of mob actions was high.

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Jack Pavis

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