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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #1271-80/1

21 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

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Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment


National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 19 February with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.


V. Gray Cowan

Attachment
NFAC #1271-80

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NFAC #1271-80
20 February 1980

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 16

USSR, CUBA, ET AL 25X1

area. It was pointed out that an Ethiopian air strike has been carried on as far into Somalia as Ischia Baidoa and somewhat increased activities by the Somali Salvation Front along with the air strike might indicate increased Ethiopian and thereby Soviet pressure on Siad. It was agreed, however, that the Ethiopians/Soviets could, if they wished, step up pressure on Siad through military means as well as by meddling in Somali tribal rivalries.

2. It was agreed that there was no evidence of a drawdown of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. The question of Cuban presence in the Western Sahara was raised; concomitant was the point whether or not the Algerians really want Cubans in the Western Sahara at all. They may be contented only with advisers but are not interested in troop support for the Polisario which would reduce Algerian influence.

3. The Cubans are improving their entree into Uganda, although not to an alarming degree. There is continued evidence of a drift toward a more anti-Western non-aligned position within the government of the Seychelles which may place the continued use of the US tracking station there in jeopardy. It was reported that the Seychelles is preparing to send eight officers to Cuba for military training and last week received over 100 tons of small arms from the Soviet Union.

ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

4. The increased level of violence in the pre-election period was a matter of concern; possible developments in the post-election period were a matter of very substantial concern given the extent of uncertain variables. It was agreed that there was some risk that the elections might not be held at all but that if they were, Soames might well ask Nkomo to form a government. If the British follow their present determination to pull out immediately after the election there will be a strong possibility of chaos.

* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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There have been reports that the Rhodesian forces might attack the Mugabe forces at the collection points but no firm evidence to this effect has been seen. There is, however, undoubtedly contingency planning. General Walls is the key actor in the scene since if he were to pull out of the Lancaster House agreement, violence would become widespread. It was agreed that the South African reaction to any electoral result could not be evaluated yet but that the South Africans were operating on a hair trigger basis. The South Africans were very concerned over maintaining the integrity of the Rhodesian security forces and there was some risk that South Africa might participate in a preemptive move against ZANU.

5. It was felt by most analysts that the Frontline continues to be deeply interested in a "successful" settlement. It is unlikely that a resumption of the war by ZANU would take place without the approval of Machel.

6. The Soviets would probably be ^{un}happy with an Nkomo-Muzorewa deal, but the Soviets would probably follow everyone else's lead as a way of playing to the other African countries.

NAMIBIA

7. It was agreed that there would be no substantial change in the Namibian situation until after the South African Government had developed a feel for the situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after the elections. As a result, diplomatic tensions are likely to rise as a consequence of the slow pace of UN negotiations. South Africa feels comfortable with the Thatcher government and we would expect Pretoria to work toward establishing the UK as first-among-equals in the Contact Group. There has been some stepped up fighting in Namibia but not of a serious nature.

ANGOLA

8. Further information was being developed regarding the Catete group but little was known regarding the potential strengths and weaknesses of this key actor in the ongoing power struggle. It was felt that there was a real potential that the power struggle would result in some changes in the regime during the course of this year. It was noted that UNITA has apparently weathered the latest government/Cuban sweep operation and the view was expressed that increased UNITA activity in central and north Angola could be expected.

9. The Cubans and Soviets seem nervous about developments in Angola. Their understanding of the process of Angolan internal politics should not be overstated.

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SOUTH AFRICA

10. There was some question as to whether the Silverton Bank raid marked the beginning of increased organized activity by the ANC. There is not sufficient evidence to warrant this conclusion at the moment, but further evidence of this nature should be expected and watch should be kept to see if a pattern is emerging.

HORN OF AFRICA

11. The meeting recorded the apparent presence of Somali regular units inside the Ogaden. Siad is attempting to bolster up his internal position by dividing up official appointments among tribal groups. The question of collusion between the Soviet and Libyan interests in Djibouti was raised. The Libyans are clearly pursuing the French at every point possible and make no secret of the fact that their recent support in arms for Djibouti was an attempt to reduce French influence there.

CHAD

12. The situation in Chad remains as complicated as it was in the past month but it was agreed that the Chadian government is going to have to choose between the Libyans and the French. If the French leave, the ramifications of their departure would go far beyond Chad. Chad is not only the scene of a civil war but also the scene of conflict between the Libyans and the French. Other African leaders in surrounding countries are seriously worried about the possibility of a French departure as a reflection of French resolve. It was agreed that a French departure is unlikely but in that event the African peacekeeping force would be in no position whatever to maintain the peace and Libya would have a free hand.

WEST AFRICA

13. Attention was drawn to the continuing bickering among the political parties in Nigeria and the use of strong arm tactics by the Shagari supporters. This is symptomatic of the earlier problems of civilian governments in Nigeria, but it was not felt that this was of an immediately serious nature.

14. The Nigerian government is insisting upon immediate US agreement on future purchases of liquid natural gas. The development of LNG facilities in Nigeria has a high priority for the Nigerian government and the US decision on LNG probably would affect continued US access to Nigerian oil.

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15. In Ghana the threat of strikes is ever present as a disrupting factor and the government continues to be worried about the future activities of Rawlings.

WEATHER AND CROPS

16. It was agreed that the food situation in Africa is becoming more serious and it was suggested that a representative of OGCR's Food and Population Branch be asked to come to next month's warning meeting to discuss the situation in greater detail.

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