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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3757-80
22 May 1980MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign AssessmentRichard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for WarningFROM : 25X1
Acting, National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EESUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE 25X1
(Meeting held on 20 May 1980) 25X1

1. Warsaw Pact PCC Results. No developments with warning implications emerged from the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. 25X1

2. Afghanistan. A CIA analyst stated that another Soviet division may be on its way into Afghanistan but agreed that the evidence for this was only circumstantial. There was also general agreement that the Soviets could expect no quick improvement in their posture in Afghanistan, although they could keep the insurgents at bay while they attempted to rebuild the Afghan army and police and to gain public support in the cities. 25X1

It was also agreed that there was no evidence that the Soviets were seriously interested in negotiating the neutralization of Afghanistan. It was noted that the Soviets have in fact been making increasingly intransigent demands in their statements dealing with the neutralization issue. 25X1

The question was posed of what the Soviet response would be to an upsurge in the insurgency. There was general agreement that a substantial improvement in the military effectiveness of the insurgents would lead to greater Soviet efforts to seal the Afghan-Pakistani border and to subject Islamabad to political-military pressure. Any serious attempt to seal the Afghan-Pakistani border would, of course, require a large augmentation of Soviet troops. At the same time, most analysts agreed that the insurgents could not significantly increase their military effectiveness without a much higher level of training. And it was felt that only a qualitatively

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higher level of damage inflicted by the insurgents would be likely to produce a shift in Soviet policy toward Pakistan. 25X1

3. Iran. It was noted that Iran had approved a trade protocol with the USSR this week, but that its terms were very general. The Soviets were building a new rail transshipment facility and upgrading another on their side of the border with Iran, but -- given problems within Iran -- this was unlikely to have a large impact on the transportation of goods to Iran via the USSR. 25X1

The issue of trucks and tents observed in the Transcaucasus was discussed at length. There was agreement that this activity was harvest-related and normal. At the same time, it was agreed that recent increases in military transport flights into the area were probably related to an on-going, long-term effort to raise the preparedness of armed forces in the Transcaucasus. 25X1

4. Yugoslavia. So far the transition from Tito's rule has gone smoothly; the collective leadership arrangements set up before Tito's death and calling for a rotation in the occupancy of top governmental posts are being put into practice. Political struggles might arise later in the year, however, that could strain these arrangements. The Yugoslav leaders are making a concerted effort to get out into the various republics and emphasize the unity of the different nationalities, and -- despite some potential unrest among Moslems in Bosnia-Hertegovina and Albanians in Kosovo -- ethnic tensions in the country appear to be under control. The Yugoslavs are procrastinating in the face of tough economic choices (which have nationality dimensions), but for the time being the economic situation is nevertheless tolerable and is unlikely to deteriorate sharply within the next several months. 25X1

5. The Soviet Leadership. There was no dissent from the view that Ustinov's absence would not make much difference in the operation of the leadership. The Soviet leadership appears to be conducting business as usual, and nobody in the leadership seems interested in shaking things up. There are a few reports of second thoughts within the leadership about the wisdom of the invasion of Afghanistan, but we see no signs of high-level factional infighting. A Central Committee plenum is likely to be convened in late May or in June to discuss the directives for the 1981-85 economic five-year plan and possibly the agenda for the XXVI Party Congress. Political activity will probably increase as the Congress approaches and decisions have to be made on the Politburo membership -- perhaps including the replacement of Ustinov. 25X1

6. Overall. No warnings of imminent serious problems were indicated in any area. 25X1

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