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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 875-81

19 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign AssessmentRichard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for WarningFROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EESUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 17 February 1981)Polish Situation:

1. Tensions in Poland have eased at least temporarily. A new mood of conciliation is being exhibited by the unions following the appointment of General Jaruzelski as Prime Minister. That appointment has had a sobering effect on the unions, but how long this relative calm will last is problematic. The pattern of the past months -- sporadic disputes over local and national issues associated with fulfillment of the Gdansk Agreements -- is likely to reassert itself. It is doubtful that the present calm will last for the ninety days for which the regime has asked. The National Solidarity Organization has refused to give an unconditional three-month guarantee of no strikes; it is in any case incapable of doing so since it remains the right of local union organizations to call strikes at their own initiative. The moral and political suasion of the national Solidarity, however, if combined with a more conciliatory stance by the regime, could have the effect of dampening regional pressures for strikes. The apparent settlement of the student strike, and the registration of an independent student union, bodes well for a period of continued calm in the near-term. The desire to maintain calm before and during the forthcoming CPSU Congress is an additional reason for the regime to adopt a placatory stance and for the Soviets to forebear, at least in the near-term. All of this suggests that there will be no early crackdown by the

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DIA review completed.

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regime against dissidents and union organizers. The critical issue is whether or not over the next few months the regime or the unions can work out a modus vivendi which channels worker frustrations and substitutes negotiations for strike action. In the event of renewed and widespread strike action, we believe the regime will use coercive measures, but it will seek to limit the extent of such measures. On the military side, we are at a high point in the training cycle of Warsaw Pact armies. On balance the level of military activity is consistent with the pattern of previous years. There have been some anomalous military activities, but neither their nature nor their scale suggest that they are associated with preparations for an intervention into Poland. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Support for Revolutionary Movements in Latin America:

2. DIA representatives presented a briefing on Soviet-supported activity in Latin America. The view was offered that the Soviet perception of the erosion of US resolve to defend its interests in the region has resulted in greater assertiveness of Moscow in undertaking political and military support for leftist movements. The briefing was confined for the most part to El Salvador. DIA concluded that the Soviet Union has supported and orchestrated the leftist insurgency since at least the beginning of 1980, but has made a careful effort to obscure the Soviet role. There is no evidence that the Soviets have supplied weapons directly to the insurgents, but there is evidence that they have acted through third parties to supply weapons. Moscow has arranged for weapons to be shipped via Vietnam, Ethiopia, Cuba and Nicaragua. The Cubans and the PLO have provided training for Salvadoran insurgents, and Cuban advisers are actually serving in El Salvador. DIA speculated that Guatemala would be the next Soviet target, and there is some evidence that the Soviets are seeking to unite leftist factions in that country, even while seeking once again to conceal the USSR's involvement. A National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet role in Central and Latin America is in preparation.

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