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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #5979-81/1  
24 September 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa  25X1

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.  25X1

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 22 September 1981 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.  25X1



L. Gray Cowan

Attachment  
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* NO. 35

ETHIOPIAN/LIBYAN/PDRY COOPERATION TREATY (ADEN TREATY)

While there is no hard evidence that the Soviets instigated the pact, analysts felt that the Soviets actively encouraged the negotiations and expect to benefit directly from the treaty. Analysts questioned the point made in a paper by the Strategic Warning Staff that the treaty marked the appearance of a new and more active direction of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, maintaining that it was too soon to reach this conclusion. They were doubtful of the chances of implementation of the aid provisions of the treaty in the face of substantial evidence that Qadhafi has not lived up to his previous pledges.

The existence of the treaty may, however, lead to an increased threat by the Ethiopians in view of what they may regard as a provocative action in the landing of American troops in Somalia in mid-November in connection with Operation Bright Star. This action may take the form of increased terrorist activities in Somalia and even against American personnel.

The question of whether Nimeiri perceived the treaty to be aimed at him was raised, but the analysts had no firm conclusions as to Nimeiri's view. (Since the meeting I have been informed by Ambassador Kontos that Nimeiri feels that he has been assured by Mengistu that the treaty is not aimed at Sudan. In any case, Nimeiri has always the trump card of the encouraging activity by the Eritreans to play against Mengistu.)

SOMALIA

Continuing concern was expressed regarding internal threats to the Siad regime. The main threat does not seem to be the question of subversion by Omar Haji, the acting defense minister, but rather that there may be other centers of opposition to Siad which have not yet surfaced.

SUDAN

While Nimeiri is disturbed by recent overflights and air attacks by the Libyans into Sudan from Chad, analysts felt that this was not sufficiently serious to induce him to call upon the Egyptians for assistance.

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\*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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CHAD

The prospect of an OAU force in Chad constitutes a possible complication for American interests in the next three months in that, if we are asked for financial support of such a force, Goukouni may very well argue that the force would be unacceptable because the U.S. is in effect siding with Habre, in that Habre is supported by Sadat who is supported by the U.S.

BENIN

Analysts indicated growing concern with recent unconfirmed reports that Libyan pilots have been assigned to Benin and that Libyans are training more guerrillas to undertake an attack on Niger. Libyan activities constitute a continuing threat to Niger which will undoubtedly be brought up by President Kountche in his forthcoming visit to the U.S.

ZAIRE

The visit of Nguza to the U.S. has heightened Mobutu's nervousness. He appears more worried now than he has in some time, and he will be looking to the U.S. for greater reassurance, particularly security aid.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

In view of the growing strength of the NRM in Mozambique, analysts raised the question as to whether South Africa may now consider the NRM as a successor regime to Machel and not just as a check on him. Some analysts believe that the risk of NRM attacks on Zimbabwe may be higher in view of NRM suspicions that Zimbabweans are assisting Mozambican forces in defense against the NRM. It is possible, moreover, that South Africa may participate with the NRM in joint actions against the Beira-Umtali pipeline in Mozambique as a way of getting at Zimbabwe. The NRM leadership appears increasingly confident and is searching for additional supporters. The situation requires close watching over the next three months.

ANGOLA

Analysts felt that a close watch should be kept on the resupply situation in Angola both in terms of Soviet resupply of Cuban and Angolan forces and possible South African transfers to UNITA and NRM of captured Angolan equipment.

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