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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NFAC 6757-81  
23 October 1981MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - October 1981

1. Egypt. Community representatives conclude that Moubarek has firmly grasped the reins of power and is well along the road to consolidating his position as Sadat's successor. Despite some longer term concerns about the new president's lack of charisma and his ability to deal with the economy, little apprehension was expressed for stability in the immediate future. The Egyptian military remains the single most powerful engine for political change and Moubarek appears to have its present loyalty. [REDACTED] 25X1

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2. Exercise BRIGHT STAR was discussed at some length. The DIA and RDJTF attendees indicated that while the outline of the exercises is firm, many specifics remain to be worked out. The overall risk assessment for BRIGHT STAR is "low," but there is some concern for the potential terrorist threat to the small component scheduled to deploy to Berbera. Similarly, the Air Force representative noted that the international flight corridor which passes through the Bab el Mandeb airspace is very near South Yemen's Perim Island. French reconnaissance aircraft have reportedly been fired on from Perim in the past. Hostile military reactions to BRIGHT STAR from Libya, Ethiopia, or Iran are possible but unlikely. Qadhafi may seek to conduct a concurrent "defensive" exercise possibly in concert with Syria. Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Libya will probably conduct intelligence collection against US units participating in BRIGHT STAR. [REDACTED] 25X1

3. There is no persuasive evidence of an increased external threat to Sudan from Libyan forces in Chad. Analysts continue to believe that Libyan

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meddling with both Cairo and Khartoum will take the form of deniable terrorist operations. [Redacted] 25X1

4. In the Western Sahara there is a growing body of reports which lend credence to Moroccan claims that Polisario forces may have received and employed the Soviet-built SA-6 mobile SAM system. Although Moroccan claims that the introduction of the SA-6 robs them of air superiority in the area are overstated, the development is worrisome and bears continued watching.

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[Redacted] We would expect the Moroccans to make this a policy issue with the USG, probably seeking to link the Polisario more closely with Qadhafi, Cuba, East Germany or the Soviets. [Redacted] 25X1

5. Speculation concerning an Army instigated coup in Bangladesh continues. In the event, such an action by the military leadership is unlikely to have much immediate effect in the region. [Redacted] 25X1

6. Iran's recent airstrike against a Kuwaiti petroleum facility is subject to repetition at any time. The Kuwaitis are manifestly incapable of defending against any future Iranian attack and their position as a funnel for Iraq-bound Soviet military equipment provides Tehran with ample reason to attack again whenever it wishes. [Redacted] 25X1

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