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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

25 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESAs

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - January 1982

1. Southern Lebanon. A clear consensus exists that a significant Israeli incursion into South Lebanon, aimed at inflicting major damage on the PLO, remains probable. This judgment is made despite high level Israeli assurances they will not act without significant provocation, and rests on the following:

- Continued presence [redacted] of troops in northern Israel, including the northwest border area with Lebanon. 25X1
- Israel's perception of Palestinian rearming activities, particularly the obtaining of heavier caliber weapons, including 130mm artillery.
- Continued Israeli military activity in Haddad's enclave.
- Sentiment within the IDF and specifically of Defense Minister Sharon for such action.

Two new elements in the situation portend a larger-scale operation than that which occurred in spring, 1978: 25X1

- The possession by the Fedayeen of 130mm artillery with a range of 27.5 km extends the northernmost point from which Israel could be hit to beyond the Litani River, just south 25X1

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of the Zahrani River. Hence, an Israeli operation which would provide security for its territory under current conditions requires securing territory well beyond Israel's historic northern border at the Litani.

[redacted] to eliminate the PLO as a military force. This would require blocking Palestinian retreat lines northward and eastward. It may also require operations inside Beirut and possibly Tripoli in an attempt to eradicate the PLO top leadership.

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
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Since sufficient troops are already in place to initiate operations, US intelligence would probably not detect an intention to move into southern Lebanon until it had commenced. [redacted]

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3. Soviet Equipment Upgrading in Afghanistan. Opinion was divided in the Community on whether Soviet equipment changes in Afghanistan portend a more aggressive policy towards Pakistan. Specifically:

- A communications upgrade enhances Soviet capability to operate outside Afghanistan.
- Delivery of SA 8's and a more capable IFF radar could be regarded as a normal upgrading. Why Soviet forces in Afghanistan, where no air threat exists, should take precedence is troublesome, however. It could enhance Soviet capability, both inside and outside Afghanistan's borders.
- The presence of MIG-23 aircraft, although a permanent presence has not been verified, would enhance capabilities outside the borders.
- Significant truck shipments, while possibly mere replacements for extensive losses, have been noted.

These changes, combined with the recent entry of security troops to release combat units from static duty, add up to a greater capability for offensive operations into Pakistan than three months ago. Should such an operation occur, it would probably target on Mujahidin training camps and supply points, be comprised of one regiment plus, and be a rapid entry and exit operation designed to avoid contact with Pakistani forces. [redacted]

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4. Libya. No new significant reports on Libyan terrorist planning against US officers have been received, nor has conclusive evidence of a standdown. The reason for Qadhafi's surprise trip to Algiers and later Tunis is unknown. [redacted]

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5. Sudan. Nimeiri is clearly more threatened than at any time in recent years, and his future to a large extent rests on Saudi, Kuwaiti, and European donor assistance in meeting IMF requirements. On the more positive side, Nimeiri's opposition has not coalesced, the Muslim Brotherhood is still backing the regime, and Libyan subversion has not had significant impact. [REDACTED]

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
6. Iraq-Iran War. Despite three recent small Iraqi successes on the ground, what momentum there is in this war remains with Iran. There are strong indications of Iranian preparations for an attack in the Dezful-Shush area, while the Iraqis are anticipating an attack at Khorramshahr, further to the south. Other pertinent observations are as follows:

- There is now evidence of three new Iraqi divisions having been formed.
- A normally reliable human source has reported the charging by the Iraqis of 250 81mm mortar rounds with mustard gas. This quantity would not be sufficient to change the course of the war.
- Although the revolutionary guards are increasingly engaged in the war effort, command and control remains with the regular military. This situation could progressively evolve, however.
- No recent reports of unrest in Iraq have been received.

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7. Bangladesh. A consensus exists that, while President Sattar's national security council and other policies do not satisfy General Ershad's perception of desired military influence, there are significant disincentives to a declaration of martial law. The feasibility of imposing martial law, possibly in February, has been enhanced by movement of units loyal to Ershad into the Dacca area. With or without martial law, long-term economic problems would remain, and Sattar does command popular support. [REDACTED]

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Charles E. Waterman

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