# THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National	Intelligence	Council

DDI #1383-82/1 18 February 1982

	18 February 1982	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
THROUGH :	National Intelligence Officer for Warning	
FROM :	L. Gray Cowan National Intelligence Officer for Africa	
SUBJECT :	Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa	25X1
l. Action I	Requested: None; the attached report is for your	25 <b>X</b> 1
16 February 1982 been coordinated them. If they fo	with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not with the other participants, but is being circulated to eel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have tional concerns, I'll report further to you.	25 <b>X</b> 1
Attachment DDI #1383-82		
		25 <b>X</b> 1
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 40

## ANGOLA-SOUTHERN AFRICA

Analysts do not discount recent rumors of a possible coup in Angola. However, they are generally agreed it is more probable that we may see in the coming weeks a reshuffling of government leaders that will leave individuals who are dependent on the Soviets more firmly in positions of power, with a consequent weakening of Dos Santos' position. This would indicate clearly the importance Moscow attaches to its place in Angola as a key locale from which to take advantage of opportunities to impede a Namibia settlement in ways that would discredit the US. Recent reports (as yet unconfirmed) that a high-ranking Soviet official will shortly visit Mozambique highlight Soviet attempts to pressure the Frontline states into support of Soviet efforts.

# MOZAMBIQUE

The recent visit of a high level Cuban delegation to Maputo indicates that pressure is being applied to Machel to accept more Communist military aid, in view of the threat posed by the insurgent NRM supported by South Africa. Analysts agreed that Machel's position is being threatened by the strains within the ruling group produced by the insurgency. The danger of greater Soviet-Cuban involvment is growing.

we are unable to analyze with any 25×1 confidence the relations of the top leaders with Machel or to determine which of them might be working with the Soviets and Cubans to replace him. There was clear agreement that the collection effort on Mozambique needs to be intensified.

#### **GHANA**

The degree of Libyan involvement is still unclear, but we do know that Libyan planes have been flying into Accra with unknown cargo. Analysts agreed that the continued inability of the Rawlings regime to get its house in order raises the potential for further instability and increases the openings for Libyan exploitation of the situation. The internal situation is clearly

\*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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deteriorating and, should disorders break out, there could be a danger to US citizens in Ghana.

## LIBERIA

Failure to find stop-gap financial support over the next three to four weeks may require further austerity measures resulting in increased internal instability.

### SUDAN

While Nimeiri's internal political position appears to have become firmer over the past three weeks, there are continuing reports of Libyan efforts to destroy his regime. Concern was expressed that current Ethiopian military operations in Eritrea could spill over into Sudan in the form of hot pursuit raids.

