

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #2482-82/1
26 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa 25X1

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. 25X1

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 23 March 1982 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. 25X1


L. Gray Cowan

Attachment
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 41

HORN OF AFRICA

Analysts are concerned about the continuing deterioration in Ethiopian-Sudanese relations. We do not expect that Mengistu will be responsive to Sudanese objections to Ethiopian support for Libyan efforts to destabilize Sudan. The Sudanese threat to support Eritrean insurgent troops threatens to prolong the current Ethiopian campaign in Eritrea. The mood is one of growing irritation on both sides. The Sudanese may lose patience with Mengistu if he fails to commit himself to refrain from assisting in toppling Nimeiri. 25X1

SOMALIA

Increased Libyan aid will permit the SDSF to step up its campaign to destabilize the Somali regime. Recent bombing incidents in Mogadishu and Berbera--the one in Berbera coincided with a US ship visit--highlights this enhanced threat. The SDSF terrorist campaign poses growing risk to American personnel in Berbera and Mogadishu, although the incidents in the two cities appear not to have been targeted specifically against Americans. 25X1

MOZAMBIQUE

Growing activity of the South-African-backed NRM within Mozambique continues to cause serious problems for the Machel regime. The insurgents seem to be aiming to move closer to the major cities of Beira and Maputo. If a serious threat to these urban areas develops, it may prod Machel into seeking more external aid, probably from the Cubans. Mozambique's rail lines are becoming more unreliable for the inland countries who use them, especially Zimbabwe. 25X1

ZAMBIA

Kaunda's concern about his own and the internal security of the country is mounting. He seems to have been listening to fears expressed to him by the Cubans and others in his regime. There is a possibility that in the next three months South Africa may well engage in raids either on Lusaka or in western Zambia to punish Kaunda for Zambia's continued aid to the ANC. The projected meeting between Kaunda and Prime Minister Botha--if it takes place--would not lessen Kaunda's paranoia about South African intentions. 25X1

*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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ANGOLA

Recent fragmentary intelligence suggests that the Cubans are taking a more active part in operations against UNITA in southern Angola. There is as yet insufficient evidence to indicate the nature of Cuban activity, but Cuban casualties may have increased. 25X1

CHAD

Continuing efforts to resolve the internal Chadian situation are leading nowhere. The immediate future appears to involve continued instability combined with indecisive military actions. Should the Peacekeeping Force depart within the next three months, the GUNT will probably collapse. The likelihood of active Libyan military involvement in the situation is extremely limited, at least until Qadhafi assumes the chairmanship of the OAU in August. 25X1

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