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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

21 July 1982

NOTE FOR: See Distribution

FROM : [redacted]
Acting NIO/USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: USSR-EE

1. Attached is the assessment prepared following the monthly Community warning meeting held on 20 July 1982. Comments would be most welcome. [redacted]

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Tuesday, 17 August, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. I solicit suggestions regarding any topics or contingencies you feel we may be overlooking, and request that such recommendations be forwarded to me by COB Friday, 6 August. [redacted]

Attachment:
DDI #6010-82

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #6010-82
22 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : 25X1
Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EESUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE 25X1
(Meeting held on 20 July 1982)

1. Poland. The analysts' expectation of little, if any, movement on the part of the government has been borne out by Jaruzelski's speech. Calm will probably prevail in the next few days although isolated incidents are possible. However, once the limited nature of Jaruzelski's moves become clear, the possibility of renewed Solidarity activity and limited anti-government demonstrations will increase. The second half of August with its anniversaries of the black Madonna and the Gdansk agreements is a particularly sensitive period. The scarcity of information on Solidarity should not lead us to underestimate its recuperative capacity. As for the Soviets, their public opposition to the papal visit, their renewed attacks against Solidarity, and more recently the dispatch of another ideological delegation all suggest Moscow's realization that the situation in Poland, while no longer immediately threatening, remains tense.

2. Soviet Nuclear Politics. Ustinov's 12 July Pravda article is a propagandist Politburo document whose main intent is both to impress the West with the significance of the Soviet no-first-use pledge and to increase the pressure on the US to modify its policies (particularly in the INF negotiations). Analysts disagree about whether Ustinov's reference to questions being raised in the USSR about the wisdom about the no-first-use pledge is factual or designed to impress the West with the alleged difficulty of making the decision (I share the latter view). The most interesting parts of the speech, however, are the statement that the no-first-use pledge means that the Soviet military will now have to give "more attention . . . to the task of preventing

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a military conflict from growing into a nuclear one" and the assertion that any aggressor still cannot hope to gain victory through the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. By these two statements, Ustinov seems to be saying that recent changes in the Soviet command structure do not mean any diminution in central control and that central control does not affect the Soviet capability to react quickly.

3. The Soviet Position in the Middle East. There was general agreement that the apparent Soviet helplessness in the Lebanese nexus and ambivalence in the Iran-Iraq war had diminished Soviet stature in the short term. However, the Soviet response to date also reflects continuity in Soviet policy and probably the realization that more active Soviet involvement now, particularly with Syria, would increase the risk of directly embroiling the Soviet Union in situations where its power to shape events was very limited. More importantly, the Soviets probably calculate that Israeli intransigence and the perceived US association with it will eventually turn short term losses into gains at the expense of the US. The Soviets are probably formulating their overall, and particularly their Syrian, policy with this end in mind. Barring any unexpected developments, analysts do not foresee any dramatic change in Soviet policy over the next few months. The possibility of Soviet out-of-area actions aimed at the US or its allies was discussed but judged to be not immediately necessary and also very much dependent on conditions in those potential out-of-area locations. For instance, the Soviets probably encouraged the latest Ethiopian offensive but that development can be explained without any reference to the Middle Eastern events. The possibility of out-of-area response needs to be kept well in mind however.

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