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**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #6246-82

30 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: July

- 1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
- 2. Comments on warning situations.

a. Lebanon:

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(1) Although the Begin government remains skeptical about the prospect of an acceptable agreement on the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from West Beirut, it apparently continues to defer a decision to launch a major ground assault because of concern over the domestic and international consequences.

(2) Intensified Israeli military pressure on West Beirut and renewed attacks on Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley may be intended in part to induce "provocations" that would provide a pretext for a drive to expel the PLO from the city and the Syrians from Lebanon.

(3) The Israelis' expression of concern about an increase in the readiness of Syria's Scud missiles raises the possibility that major Israeli offensive actions will include preemptive strikes against these missiles.

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b. Iran-Iraq:

(1) If the third phase of Iran's offensive fails to break through Iraqi defenses northeast of Al Basrah, the

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SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: July

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Khomeini regime may create a diversion by sharply increasing pressure on Kuwait and other Gulf states to end their assistance to Iraq.


c. South Africa-Angola:

(1) The South African military buildup in northern Namibia and southern Angola probably signals another major incursion into Angola similar to the offensive last August-September. Although the South Africans may be trying to enhance their leverage in negotiations on Namibia prior to their deadline for an agreement by mid-August, major cross-border operations could trigger a military escalation if the Cubans are prepared to risk greater involvement in supporting Angolan resistance to South African forces.

d. Nicaragua-Honduras:

(1) The Nicaraguans are laying the political groundwork for retaliatory strikes against anti-Sandinista rebel bases in Honduras. The Hondurans have warned that they will launch preemptive airstrikes if they believe a Nicaraguan attack is imminent.

(2) There is a serious chance that direct clashes between Nicaraguan and Honduran forces will fuel a rapid military escalation. This contingency would create new opportunities for a sharp increase in the Cuban presence in Nicaragua and possibly for an upsurge in Soviet military assistance.

  
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

Attachments:

- [redacted] NIO/NESA
- [redacted] NIO/AF
- [redacted] NIO/USSR-EE
- [redacted] NIO/WE
- [redacted] NIO/EA
- [redacted] NIO/LA

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**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

26 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Charles E. Waterman  
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - July 1982

1. Iran-Iraq. All agencies agreed Iran had not utilized, during the current offensive, techniques such as flanking movements which had enabled its previous victories. While Iranian losses are apparently higher thus far in the southern offensive, resupply currently underway presages further fighting. The following consensus observations were made:

- Were the Iranians to succeed in the south, the sheer logistics of an offensive towards Kerbala and Najaf are formidable. It probably would not occur soon.
- Should the Iranians spread south to the Kuwait border, pressures for accommodation would probably prevail in the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. Such pressures would exist but be less dominant in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.
- Due to the commitment of Khomeini personally to the offensive, its failure would not result in internal upheavals. [redacted] 25X1

2. Lebanon. The basis of the discussion was not to give warning on the timing, likelihood, or impact of an Israeli attack on West Beirut. Sufficient attention was focused on this situation by decisionmakers, and sufficient warning of possible resurgent terrorism had been given. The group did note, however:

- Israeli policies in south Lebanon were clearly designed to create a compliant Lebanese force structure, regardless of events in Beirut or with the central government. Their intention appears to be to be prepared to ensure Israeli security in any eventuality.

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-- These policies do not, at present, have the effect of strengthening the central government.

-- The future of the northern Biqa and north Lebanon are unclear. Whether or not the Israelis intend to insist on clearing them of their Syrian/Palestinian presence is not certain. [redacted]

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[redacted]

4. Morocco/Polisario. The following essential trends were noted:

-- INR suggests that a basic enhanced readiness exists in Morocco and Algeria to settle the problem, but that no mechanism to do so is in place.

-- As a result, continuing skirmishing at a medium level of intensity should be anticipated.

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*fw* Charles E. Waterman

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