

15 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: I&W Working Group

SUBJECT : Next Meeting

1. We will meet Tuesday, 16 May, at 1430 in 5G00 Headquarters.

2. Attached are a series of contributions as follows:

-- A new outline reflecting our last meeting

-- History of Warning in Community - IIA in
the new outline ([redacted])

-- Evolution of Community Watch Centers - IIB
(Heyman)

-- Past Arrangements for Crisis Management - IIC
[redacted]

-- Current Intelligence and Warning - IID1
[redacted]

-- Arrangements for Warning - IIB2 [redacted]
et. al.)

-- Additional Arrangements for Strategic Warning -
IIIB3 [redacted] et. al.)

-- Support to the DCI in Crisis Management - IIIB4
[redacted] et. al)

3. The [redacted] papers (IIIB2 & 3) overlap sub-
stantially and get to the guts of one of our major problems. I
would like to devote tomorrow's meeting to them. If there is time,
we will also take up the [redacted] paper (IIIB4).

[redacted]
Richard Lehman
AD/NFAC/SS

9 May 1978

I. Introduction

A. Converging requirements

1. I&W Seminar -
2. exercise - Carlucci letter
3. WISP
4. HPSCI and OMB

B. Definitions and DCI responsibilities (conceptual framework)

1. Current intelligence
2. Little-W
3. Big-W
4. Crisis management (including relations to I&W)

II. Background

A. History of Warning in Community

1. Watch Committee/NIC
2. Internal CIA staff arrangements
3. Change to Special Assistant/SMS
4. WISP

B. Evolution of community watch centers

1. Development in CIA
2. Elsewhere in Community (including WH)
3. Role in warning

C. Arrangements for crisis management (over time)

1. Task force & situation report
2. Role of NIO

3. National Task Force experiment
 4. Present confusion - need to reflect NITC
- D. Major (and perennial) issues
1. Relationship of warning to current intelligence
 2. Big-W vs. Little-W
 3. DCI's responsibilities vs. those of Secretary of Defense
(in warning and intelligence crisis management only)
 4. DCI's responsibilities to field commands

III. Discussion

- A. Criteria for a National System
1. Clear lines of responsibility under the DCI
 2. Smooth transition from normal operations to crisis
 3. Line responsibility for warning, balanced by effective second-look mechanisms
 4. DCI control over mechanisms directly supporting him, balanced by a recognition of Community equities (especially in strategic warning)
 5. Protection of national intelligence assets supporting NSC from premature subordination to NCA and war-fighting
- B. Necessary elements of such a system:
1. Management
 - a. Line of command under DCI
 - b. Community oversight and coordination
 - c. Internal staffing under DCI
 2. Arrangements for warning
 - a. First-look
 - b. Second-look

- c. Dissemination
- d. Collection tasking
- 3. Additional arrangements for strategic warning
 - a. Second-look
 - b. Dissemination
 - c. Collection tasking
- 4. Arrangements for crisis management
 - a. Policy support
 - b. Analysis
 - c. Dissemination
 - d. Collection tasking

IV. Recommendations (or Options?)

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I. BACKGROUND

A. History of Warning in Community

1. The Watch Committee of the US Intelligence Board was formed in January 1951 following the Chinese intervention in the Korean war. Its mission was to provide USIB with the earliest possible warning of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, or Chinese intentions to initiate military action or to provide military support to any other nation to an extent that US security interests were affected. The highest priority was assigned to warning of Soviet nuclear attack on the US, US forces or bases overseas, or US allies. The chairman of the Watch Committee throughout most of its existence was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The committee was composed of two members each from CIA, DIA, NSA and State, and one each from the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. The Watch Committee was supported by an interagency staff called the National Indications Center. The NIC, established in 1954 and located in the Pentagon, had a staff of approximately 30, including 12 analysts and ten people who manned a 24-hour Watch Center. The principal functions of the NIC analysis staff were to review all-source indications intelligence and to draft weekly Watch Reports. These reports were reviewed by the Watch Committee and submitted to USIB for approval. Watch Reports were disseminated throughout the Washington policy and intelligence communities and cabled to some field stations by CIA and to various major commands by DIA. Sanitized versions of the Watch Reports were passed to Commonwealth liaison officers.

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Internal CIA staff arrangements

3. From 1951 to 1974, the Office of Current Intelligence was the focal point for CIA's role in the Watch Committee. An OCI officer served as director of the NIC, and the CIA contingent in the NIC included three OCI analysts. Within OCI, and Indications Control staff (INDICO) composed of three officers managed the agency's participation in the Watch Committee mechanism. INDICO coordinated draft Watch Reports with CIA production offices, briefed the chairman of the Watch Committee on all current items of I&W significance, and maintained liaison with the NIC and with warning analysts in other USIB agencies.

Change to Special Assistant/SWS

4. In 1973-74, USIB authorized a study of the community's warning mechanism and performance. This study concluded that the Watch Committee process was outmoded and should be restructured to meet the needs of policymakers in the 1970's, particularly in the light of improved collection systems. By the late 1960's, the weekly Watch Reports had gradually expanded to cover such areas as the Middle East, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In treating this wide range of subjects, the Watch Committee became increasingly preoccupied with tactical details and its ability to perform its original mission was impaired. Procedures had grown increasingly ponderous and the coordination process was delayed by lengthy debates over minor textual points and semantics. The value of the Watch Reports to senior policymakers was diluted by the need to negotiate bland compromise language which often blurred the clarity of

judgments. Divergent agency evaluations were not adequately reflected, and the provision for recording clearly defined dissenting views was seldom used.

5. USIB decided in early 1975 to replace the Watch Committee and the NIC with a Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning Staff. The DCI appointed the Special Assistant in consultation with the Director, DIA. The first Special Assistant was Air Force MajGen Lincoln D. Faurer, DIA's Vice Director for Production. The SWS was directed by a CIA officer appointed by the DCI. The SWS director is responsible to the Special Assistant and serves as his deputy for strategic warning.

6. In contrast to the expanding scope of subjects and areas covered by the Watch Committee, the mission of the Special Assistant and the SWS was narrowed to providing the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, China, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontations with the US. In contrast to the deliberations and time-consuming negotiations on compromise language which impaired the effectiveness of the Watch Committee, the SWS was to concentrate on in-depth analysis and the preparation of clearly-articulated warning judgments. The SWS was intended to provide a devil's advocate and second-look function, and to prod NFIB production offices into addressing specific developments of potential warning significance. It was not to duplicate the work of operations centers and current intelligence offices.

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7. DCID 1/5 authorized the Special Assistant and the SWS to take the lead in initiating, and when appropriate drafting, strategic warning notices to the DCI who, at his discretion, would notify the President and the NSC. The Special Assistant and the SWS were also directed to submit to the DCI and NFIB principals studies and recommendations for improving the community's strategic warning capabilities.

WISP

8. WISP -- an acronym for Warning Improvement Study and Plan -- is a DOD-sponsored project managed by DIA, with participation of CIA and other NFIB agencies. Its purpose is to identify the major actions the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact nations might take in preparation for hostilities in Europe. The WISP concept is based on a constant sampling of selected I&W targets with a view to identifying abnormalities related to changes in readiness posture that may suggest preparations for attack. The selection of military targets has been nearly completed, although more work remains in defining the political and economic data base. From the thousands of targets associated with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, a relatively small set of targets will be selected as Necessary Key Events. The WISP collection strategy is designed to enable analysts to identify those key events that would have to occur in advance of an attack were the Soviets to decide to mobilize for an attack against NATO forces.



Director, Strategic Warning Staff

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I BACKGROUND

B - Evolution of community watch centers

1. The historical evolution of the CIA Operations Center had its roots in a number of diverse factors which in their own way brought about its development from a simple, one Directorate support adjunct to the CIA/DDI current intelligence effort to its present status as an all Agency, all near real time source, community oriented, alert mechanism. The first was the so-called "information explosion" brought about by the improvement of technical collection systems and the concomitant high speed dissemination of this data to a wider audience of both analytical senior policy players. A second phenomena, more psychological in nature, was the reluctant realization, based mainly on past errors and consequent policy pressure, on the part of intelligence collectors and producers, intelligence and operational players, and the highest levels of the government that we in the field of foreign affairs were living in an increasingly interdependent world; ~~and~~ a world which ^{SPINS} ~~spins~~ and causes things to happen 24 hours a day, every day. Thus there began, starting in the mid-1960s, a growing realization in CIA that much needed to be done to contend with these phenomena.

By the early 1970s this need had become so manifest that the DCI, in the spring of 1973, commissioned an in-depth study of the need for and scope of a full blown CIA Operations Center which hopefully would evolve into a Community-wide National Intelligence Operations Center. The results of this Working Group led by Mr. Richard Lehman, the then D/OCI/DDI, were approved and the CIA Operations Center was born in June 1973.

2. The experience of the other members of the intelligence community was not dissimilar. NSA, given the singular real time nature of its environment ^{AND} the experience ^S learned in the shoot down of the EC-121 off the coast of Korea in the spring of 1969, organized its NSOC in February 1973. However, the NSOC is not only an alert mechanism for SIGINT but one which also ^{HAS} gives significant requirements and analytical responsibilities around the clock. Today the NSOC, though devoted solely to SIGINT, is by a significant margin the largest and most comprehensive, in scope and authority, of all the 24 hour Centers in the Community.

The experiences of State and its motives for establishing a 24-hour Operations Center are not clear. But they too probably felt the same kinds of pressure. However, unlike most of the intelligence community Centers their development seems to have had an internal organizational focus, i.e., the need to ^{COMBINE} ~~combine~~ the immediate Office of the Secretary with the Department's information system and the I&R intelligence function. Since its development in late 1972 State's 24-hour center has been subordinate to the Department's Executive Secretary and has comprised two discrete 24-hour parts, the Operations Center and an INR portion ^{PHYSICALLY} ~~removed~~ ^{but} substantively integrated.

The Pentagon experience was unique in that its J-2/J-3 separate orientation continued to drive the way their 24-hour centers evolved. Both developed separate Centers, one the NMCC under the J-3/JCS and the Other the NMIC under DIA. Until 1976 they were not colocated, but with the experiences of recent crises as the unifying element there is today a significant improvement in cooperation in crisis times.

Further the arrival of the NRT imagery era provided the impetus for further improvement which was manifest, also in 1976, with the establishment of the CCF to manage collection systems overall in behalf of all DOD interests.

3. The role of these various Centers in warning varies from almost total involvement vis-a-vis SIGINT resources in the case of NSOC to practically no role in the case of the State Operations Center. This of course follows the nature of the source each represents--SIGINT is usually real time or close to real time; political reporting can be a first indication but not nearly to a similar extent as to justify an active State role in warning. Both the NMCC and the NMIC are deeply involved in warning both within their 24-hour center and in conjunction, through vast communication system, with DOD elements abroad throughout the world. To a significant degree this is all source though they rely heavily on NSOC for the SIGINT contribution and through NMIC/CCF for its NRT imagery element.

The role of the CIA Operations Center in warning is at the same time extant but unordained. It performs a first look warning function by the very nature of its access, orientation, organization and personnel. How this role relates to either the second look warning function, either to current analysts or to SWS or later WISP is unclear largely because the issue has never seriously been examined in CIA.

The establishment of the White House Situation Room as a 24-hour consumer center occurred in the early 1960s as a need was manifested by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to be kept

immediately and consistently aware of world developments of all kinds. The Situation Room was originally formed in close consultation with CIA, in fact its first head was a DDI/CIA officer. Since then the leadership has gone through several changes, CIA, NSA, and State, but always with a civilian Director. Another constant is the fact that the Watch Officers at the WHSR are members of the CIA Operations Center detailed there for two years or more, a factor stemming in large measure from their all-source experience and current intelligence support focus.

S E C R E T

15 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support

FROM :
Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : Past Arrangements for Crisis Management

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1. These are some thoughts in response to para I C of your 4 May outline. This is nothing more than one man's view of the lessons of the past five years.

2. The CIA analytical task force has usually provided the DCI with quality analysis, that was relevant to the issues under consideration by the NSC, and in a timely fashion. Occasional lapses in relevance have occurred when the DCI failed to feed back to his analytical support the results of policy deliberations. This occurred because the DCI did not have the time or he was accompanied to those meetings by someone who had other management responsibilities that precluded briefing the analytical support chief.

3. The establishment of the NIO as the senior substantive assistant to the DCI largely eliminated the lapses in relevance of analytical support to the DCI. The NIO also provided a means of drawing upon the capability of INR or DIA to produce a piece of analysis for which they were uniquely qualified. This was seldom arranged as an additional output by INR or DIA because they usually functioned at full capacity during a crisis. Their contribution became possible, however, when they realized that the DCI would use their analysis in a policy forum and thus they would adjust their schedule to accommodate the NIO request.

4. The effectiveness of CIA task forces has improved markedly in recent years, both demonstrated and potential, as a result of the improvements in the Operations Center. Dedicated space, especially

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arranged for task forces, have brought order, better morale, and improved timeliness. Improved communications and dedicated administrative support have improved timeliness and allowed us to have analysts analyze rather than support other analysts.

5. The National Situation Report idea resulted from the frustrations of the NSC Staff when they were beset with a continuous stream of situation reports from CIA, DIA, State, NSA and spot reports from the DDO. The closing time of the intelligence was usually different in each report, they were issued at different times, and not infrequently the predictions and judgments were different. Brent Scowcroft and Bill Hyland were the leaders of a movement to establish a single national situation report and the responsibility fell to the DCI.

6. No one in the intelligence community failed to understand the White House predicament but the obvious solutions all had drawbacks. The DCI could not seriously contemplate issuing instructions to Defense and State ordering them to deny the President the benefit of their information and analysis. The NSC Staffers could have ordered some staff procedures at the White House Situation Room to alleviate the confusion. The decision, as a consensus of the Intelligence Community, was for the DCI to issue a single National Situation Report into which all intelligence organizations would put their information and analysis.

7. An ad hoc DCI committee and some elements of the IC Staff worked on the problem about a year and a consensus evolved that the production of a National Situation Report required a National Task Force. Consideration was given to having each organization provide selected information and analysis to the CIA task force and making them responsible for incorporating it into a National Situation Report. That was ruled out on the basis that the Community's communications capabilities were inadequate. The decision was to assemble analysts from INR, DIA, and CIA into a single task force at the call of the DCI. Before we ever tried this, DIA and CIA decided that neither could afford the proper number of analysts in a NTF and still retain their home-based capability. The only test of the NTF concept was on the occasion of the Korean tree cutting incident. Most of us believed that the concept failed the test.

8. A major improvement in communications has occurred since we initially discussed issuing a National Situation Report from CIA into which we would incorporate other contributions. We have an improved grey phone trunk system which provides better and wider services. We have grey phone conferencing service. All operations centers now can transmit page size copy at five seconds per sheet versus 45-60 seconds per sheet. We have the "Laserfax" facsimile

transmission system for photographs and map segments. We have a first generation conferencing and text editing system in DIA, CIA, and State. The inescapable conclusion is that it is time to review the concept of CIA/NFAC issuing a National Situation Report without having to move analysts all over town.

9. The communications improvements noted in para eight probably would resolve all but one deficiency we found with the concept of a National Task Force. However we approached the task force problem, either having the CIA task force issue the National Situation Report or by having a National Task Force, we perceived the need for a crisis collection coordinator. This deficiency has been remedied by the concept of the NITO in the Collection Tasking Staff. It would appear that the D/DCI/CT could put a NITO in direct support of the DCI's principal substantive assistant for the crisis (D/DCI/NI or NIO) and that NITO could then provide the D/DCI/CT the information he would need to coordinate the collection tasking.

cc: Vincent Heyman



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Relationship of Current Intelligence and Warning

The business of intelligence is a seamless web. Cuts in it must always be to some extent arbitrary and must do some damage to the whole. So it is in the business of current intelligence (the setting apart of current intelligence is itself one such cut) which broadly stated is, "Ensure that all evidence that is collected is brought together and the results disseminated to those who need to know."

The goal of this sweeping charge is to prepare policymakers to act promptly and wisely. Closer examination of the intelligence web to identify those parts of it which contribute most directly to producing prompt action identifies what can be called indications and warning functions. Some of these are formal processes directed toward warning of specific upcoming events. The formal processes range from highly structured systems depending on automatic data processing and computer facilities such as the WISP committees are developing under DoD auspices to warn of war in Europe, down through the regular meetings of groups of knowledgeable analysts such as the interagency South African nuclear watch team which periodically assesses the likelihood of a South African nuclear explosive test. At their lower extremities these formal processes blend into a host of informal thought processes in thousands of analysts who see their day to day responsibilities as including watch and ward for the Nation's interests.

The issues of current intelligence versus warning that arise perennially in the intelligence community nearly all reflect frustrations and failures arising from the fundamental conflict between two facts. On the one hand it is clear that there is no division, only a blending, of what is called current intelligence and what is called indications and warning. On the other hand it is also clear that the capacities and stamina of no single mind is up to the task of covering the whole range of these responsibilities continuously for any area of the world worth worrying about. Cuts must be made in the web in order for men to manage it.

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The history of intelligence community efforts to cope with this fundamental conflict shows an oscillation between (relatively heavy) reliance on organs specifically assigned I&W responsibility and (relatively heavy) reliance on generalists. After a period of reliance on specialists arguments begin to mount to the effect that this reliance has placed unrealistic and imprudent reliance on the prescience and ingenuity of narrowly focused bodies and has blurred and diluted the warning responsibilities of the wider community of knowledgeable analysts. After relying for a time on generalists to warn of impending events in some region arguments will begin to mount to the effect that the nature, pressures and conflicting demands of current intelligence are so great that it is asking too much of one analytic corps to expect it to also meet the rigorous and time-consuming requirements of systematic and effective warning; only a group trained and experienced in the specialized tools and techniques of I&W can do that. And so the pendulum has swung back and forth.

Out of this history has emerged a fairly coherent set of issues which must be faced again today.

- How do we invest in the warning function so as to concentrate in those areas where likelihood and relevance combine?
- How do we capitalize on the capacity of mechanical processors to handle vast quantities of data and the capacity of knowledgeable area specialists to capture ineffable signs of change?
- How do we prevent the indication and warning function from becoming a rout exercise?
- How do we maintain the sensitivity of the whole body of intelligence analysts to the warning function?

Warning and Strategic Warning

Another finer cut in the web has been made. Strategic Warning (Big-W) has been set off by itself within the broader concept of warning (little-w). There are no inherent differences between W and w in terms of the techniques and methods required. Distinctions rest primarily on judgments of priorities (the most serious potential and likely military threats to US security and interests) and the capacities and limitations of various national-level mechanisms. The significance of the distinction is that, as a consequence of various policy and program decisions, the formal national-level warning mechanisms of the Community are almost exclusively devoted to W while current Community definitions in effect limit W to warning of a military attack on the United States or its allies.

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A central issue now is the nature and range of potential threats and crises that most likely will require national-level warning judgments over the next five to ten years. Is the community consensus of 1974-75 still valid that the principal problem and focus should be W (as now defined), or should priorities and primary missions be revised to conform to a new and different perception of the most probable range of threats and crises in the foreseeable future? In an era of detente relationships between the US, on the one hand, and the USSR and China, on the other, a plausible case could be made that although strategic warning (as now defined) must remain the ultimate requirement, the principal warning problems on the US agenda in the foreseeable future probably will not focus on potential military confrontations between the great powers, but rather on lesser conflicts, tensions, and crises elsewhere. Some of these "lesser" warning situations, of course, will involve dangers of escalation to strategic warning situations.

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
Arrangements for Warning

1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrangements for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible, is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary leadership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would report to the DCI through the DDCI.

2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible NIO.

3. The Special Assistant for Warning would have two deputies; one would deal with military matters. He would have a staff of approximately 10 people (Staff A) located in the current Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) space in the Pentagon, adjacent to the NMIC. This staff would have responsibility for warning of the deployment of military forces anywhere in the world that could ultimately adversely affect the security of the US. (This would be an extension of the charter of the SWS to include coverage of military movements by non-Communist countries as well as Communist.)

4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately 10 people (Staff B) located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of any non-military developments throughout the world that have the



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potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The personnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community. (The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.

5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first look now taken by the various operations centers around town as well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insurance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient conferencing techniques at hand.

6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and when feasible to the Warning Control Group.

7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation. This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an alert memorandum to the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.

8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization required. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report, collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures the NITC would have in being by that time.

9. There, obviously, are several other options which could be pursued. One would be to include the whole warning mission (big W and small w) within the framework of a greatly expanded SWS located at the Pentagon; another would be to create a national intelligence officer for warning; a third would be the establishment of a 24-hour national warning center either at CIA, DIA, State or NSA; a fourth would be the continuation of our present procedures with the SWS responsible for large W and each NIO responsible for his particular share of the small w.

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10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level within the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the cooperation of analytical elements of the community.



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II-C-3 Additional arrangements for strategic warning

1. Arrangements for strategic warning, as well as for other categories of warning, should be based on a clear understanding that this is a line responsibility shared by all NFIB production offices. A small interagency strategic warning staff should function as a backup and supplement to line responsibility, not as the sole authority for strategic warning. Its mission should be focused on long-range research and analysis directed toward providing a greater margin of insurance and safeguard against strategic surprise.

2. This mechanism should have the right and responsibility to take the lead in drawing community attention to developments of potential strategic warning significance. Beyond this alerting function, the strategic warning mechanism should be authorized, in cooperation with the appropriate NIO, to prepare warning assessments that would serve as catalysts for broader community examination and judgment. This mechanism should not be involved in day-to-day I&W activities, which should remain the responsibility of such line elements as DIA's Alert Center, WISP, CIA's Operations Center, and current intelligence offices. The strategic warning function should not duplicate the daily, routine process of examining, evaluating, and reporting force postures, military exercises, normal deployments, etc. Warning personnel, moreover, should not be directly involved in crisis management, although they would contribute warning assessments to crisis task forces.

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3. The present definition of strategic warning under DCID 1/5 should be broadened to include (a) political confrontations between the major Communist powers (the USSR, Warsaw Pact, China, and North Korea), and the US and its allies; and (b) small "W" situations involving a potential for escalation into strategic warning situations. The strategic warning group would work closely with whatever mechanism is established to cover other categories of small "W" -- a parallel warning staff, responsible NIOs, etc.

4. This distinction between major warning developments that involve a potential for political or military confrontation between the major Communist powers and the US, on the one hand, and other developments which do not carry immediate dangers of such confrontation, on the other, would meet the DoD's primary interest in warning activities related to Big "W." The strategic warning group would function in close association with DIA's Vice Director for Production.

5. The strategic warning group would report either to a Special Assistant to the DCI, the Director of NFAC, or the DDCI. Community responsibility could be symbolized by and centered in a high-level interagency warning committee which would oversee the group's operations and advise the senior warning authority. This committee would not have regular weekly meetings but would convene at the direction of the senior warning authority to examine specific developments and oversee the community's response -- in the form of an Alert Memorandum or a Strategic Warning Notice.

6. Other options for handling the strategic warning function might include:

A. Dropping the distinction between Big W and Small W and vesting the entire warning mission in an expanded SWS, which could either operate

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as a single warning mechanism or be subdivided into two units -- one for Big W and the second for all other categories.

B. Appointing a national intelligence officer for warning who would supervise the separate warning mechanism, provide guidance and oversight for the I&W functions and responsibilities of line production offices, and advise the DCI, DDCI, the Director of NFAC, and the NIOs on all matters pertaining to warning.

C. Continuing the present arrangement under DCID 1/5, but with a broader Big W mission for the Special Assistant and SWS as described in paragraph 3, and with the NIOs responsible for other small "W" coverage.

Dissemination

7. Alert Memoranda or Strategic Warning Notices would be issued to the DCI and passed, at his discretion, to the President and the NSC. Other reports and studies prepared by the warning staff would continue to be disseminated to the Washington policy and intelligence communities and to the major U & S Commands.

Collection Tasking

8. The strategic warning function should not have a separate tasking system but should form an integral part of the total warning tasking system. The warning group would maintain constant contact with the NITO for warning; any collection requirements not satisfied through line production offices and Alert Centers would be presented to the NITO for warning.

15 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support

FROM :
Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : Support to the DCI in Crisis Management

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1. The following thoughts are offered in response to para II C 4 of your 4 May outline.

2. The arrangements for crisis management should be derived from the DCI responsibilities in crisis management. The President and the NSC expect the DCI to provide warning of radical changes in the flow of events inherent in the crisis of the moment, analysis of intentions and implications of the actions of the foreign actors in the crisis, and sometimes he is asked for analysis of the likely implications of alternative causes of action considered by the USG. The DCI traditionally has provided these services and we usually label it "policy support" as a shorthand expression to describe the complicated interaction of the DCI and the NSC principals in deciding and executing policy in a crisis.

3. To provide this policy support, the DCI must be concerned that a variety of intelligence collection activities be continued, initiated, or discontinued. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is happening or is likely to happen. The DCI must be concerned about the priorities to be accorded intelligence information processing and dissemination activities. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is happening or is likely to happen. The NSC policy maker has little or no interest in the details of the collection or processing activity but has an insatiable appetite for the relevant facts collected and the analysis of those facts. The output, or the cutting edge, of policy support is facts and analysis.

4. Our arrangements for crisis management should be designed to:

- increase the responsiveness of analysis to meet the needs of the policy makers,

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- increase the responsiveness of collection resources to meet the requirements of the intelligence analysts, the policy maker, and the military commanders,
- reduce the number of people the DCI must see,
- increase the availability of people and data the DCI may want to consult,
- increase the time available to the DCI for contemplation and consultation on crisis matters.

5. The responsiveness of analysis can be improved in a crisis by concentrating the CIA analytical resources into a task force operated by the NFAC. This task force could be augmented by analysts from INR and DIA in the unlikely event that State and Defense needs for direct intelligence support do not overwhelm INR and DIA. In any event, the analytical output of the CIA/NFAC task force can benefit by drawing upon some of the paper produced by INR and DIA as we have done many times in past crises.

6. The relevance of the CIA/NFAC analysis to policy interests will be, to some measure, dependent upon our knowledge of what is under discussion in the USG policy arena. There must be a bridge between the policy arena and the intelligence support the DCI is expected to provide. This communication bridge can be provided by providing a special substantive assistant to the DCI for the duration of the crisis. This person must possess detailed knowledge of the area and events so that he can back up the DCI in SCC or NSC meetings. This person must be attuned to policy nuances and understand the analytical effort behind the DCI in order to provide guidance to the CIA analytical task force and to INR and DIA as appropriate. This role could be filled by the D/DCI/NI, by the appropriate NIO, or by a combination of their efforts.

7. The responsiveness of collection resources will in large measure improve by the reflexive actions of the collection program managers in response to the crisis situation. Frequently, however, the crisis will result in a conflict of priorities for the use of a single collection system between analysts and policy makers involved in the crisis and those whose responsibilities are untouched by the crisis. In the case of such conflict, and also to maintain the level of responsiveness, it would be helpful for the D/DCI/CT to place a NITO in direct support of the DCI's special substantive assistant. This would ensure that there will be someone who has direct knowledge of the analytic support needed by the DCI who can keep the D/DCI/CT informed of the priorities from that support.

8. The DDCI could assume a more direct management role and reduce the demands upon the DCI in the crisis. In particular, the NFAC

less the analytical task force could report to the DDCI and the Directorate of Operations less the headquarters resources devoted to support of the DCI and the task force could report to the DDCI.

9. The main point one ends up with is that the thrust of the DCI's responsibilities are analytical in nature and that all procedures must be designed to support him in that role. The major portion of the DCI's time in a crisis will be spent absorbing the details of events, interacting with his analytical support, presenting his analysis in policy arenas, and participating in policy debates. The next heaviest demand will stem from covert action or paramilitary planning and activities should they be involved. Other than having periodic briefings or reports on the overall status of collection systems, one would not expect the DCI to spend much time on collection matters.

cc: Vincent Heyman

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15 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support

FROM : Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : Support to the DCI in Crisis Management

25X

1. The following thoughts are offered in response to para II C 4 of your 4 May outline.

2. The arrangements for crisis management should be derived from the DCI responsibilities in crisis management. The President and the NSC expect the DCI to provide warning of radical changes in the flow of events inherent in the crisis of the moment, analysis of intentions and implications of the actions of the foreign actors in the crisis, and sometimes he is asked for analysis of the likely implications of alternative causes of action considered by the USG. The DCI traditionally has provided these services and we usually label it "policy support" as a shorthand expression to describe the complicated interaction of the DCI and the NSC principals in deciding and executing policy in a crisis.

3. To provide this policy support, the DCI must be concerned that a variety of intelligence collection activities be continued, initiated, or discontinued. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is happening or is likely to happen. The DCI must be concerned about the priorities to be accorded intelligence information processing and dissemination activities. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is happening or is likely to happen. The NSC policy maker has little or no interest in the details of the collection or processing activity but has an insatiable appetite for the relevant facts collected and the analysis of those facts. The output, or the cutting edge, of policy support is facts and analysis.

4. Our arrangements for crisis management should be designed to:
- increase the responsiveness of analysis to meet the needs of the policy makers,

S E C R E T

- increase the responsiveness of collection resources to meet the requirements of the intelligence analysts, the policy maker, and the military commanders,
- reduce the number of people the DCI must see,
- increase the availability of people and data the DCI may want to consult,
- increase the time available to the DCI for contemplation and consultation on crisis matters.

5. The responsiveness of analysis can be improved in a crisis by concentrating the CIA analytical resources into a task force operated by the NFAC. This task force could be augmented by analysts from INR and DIA in the unlikely event that State and Defense needs for direct intelligence support do not overwhelm INR and DIA. In any event, the analytical output of the CIA/NFAC task force can benefit by drawing upon some of the paper produced by INR and DIA as we have done many times in past crises.

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cc: Vincent Heyman

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