



9 May 1978

I. Introduction

## A. Converging requirements

1. I&W Seminar -
2.  exercise - Carlucci letter
3. WISP
4. HPSCI and OMB

## B. Definitions and DCI responsibilities (conceptual framework)

1. Current intelligence
2. Little-W
3. Big-W
4. Crisis management (including relations to I&W)

II. BackgroundA. History of Warning in Community 

1. Watch Committee/NIC
2. Internal CIA staff arrangements
3. Change to Special Assistant/SWS
4. WISP

B. Evolution of community watch centers 

1. Development in CIA
2. Elsewhere in Community (including WH)
3. Role in warning

C. Arrangements for crisis management (over time) 

1. Task force & situation report
2. Role of NIO

3. National Task Force experiment
  4. Present confusion - need to reflect NITC
- D. Major (and perennial) issues
1. Relationship of warning to current intelligence
  2. Big-W vs. Little-W
  3. DCI's responsibilities vs. those of Secretary of Defense  
(in warning and intelligence crisis management only)
  4. DCI's responsibilities to field commands

### III. Discussion

#### A. Criteria for a National System

1. Clear lines of responsibility under the DCI
2. Smooth transition from normal operations to crisis
3. Line responsibility for warning, balanced by effective second-look mechanisms
4. DCI control over mechanisms directly supporting him, balanced by a recognition of Community equities (especially in strategic warning)
5. Protection of national intelligence assets supporting NSC from premature subordination to NCA and war-fighting

#### B. Necessary elements of such a system:

1. Management
  - a. Line of command under DCI
  - b. Community oversight and coordination
  - c. Internal staffing under DCI
2. Arrangements for warning
  - a. First-look
  - b. Second-look



25X1

- c. Dissemination
- d. Collection tasking
- 3. Additional arrangements for strategic warning
  - a. Second-look
  - b. Dissemination
  - c. Collection tasking
- 4. Arrangements for crisis management
  - a. Policy support
  - b. Analysis
  - c. Dissemination
  - d. Collection tasking



25X1



25X1

IV. Recommendations (or Options?)



I. B







II. B

I BACKGROUND

## B - Evolution of community watch centers

1. The historical evolution of the CIA Operations Center had its roots in a number of diverse factors which in their own way brought about its development from a simple, one Directorate support adjunct to the CIA/DDI current intelligence effort to its present status as an all Agency, all near real time source, community oriented, alert mechanism. The first was the so-called "information explosion" brought about by the improvement of technical collection systems and the concomitant high speed dissemination of this data to a wider audience of both analytical senior policy players. A second phenomena, more psychological in nature, was the reluctant realization, based mainly on past errors and consequent policy pressure, on the part of intelligence collectors and producers; intelligence and operational players; and the highest levels of the government that we in the field of foreign affairs were living in an increasingly interdependent world; ~~and~~ a world which <sup>SPIALS</sup> ~~operates~~ and causes things to happen 24 hours a day, every day. Thus there began, starting in the mid-1960s, a growing realization in CIA that much needed to be done to contend with these phenomena.

By the early 1970s this need had become so manifest that the DCI, in the spring of 1973, commissioned an in-depth study of the need for and scope of a full blown CIA Operations Center which hopefully would evolve into a Community-wide National Intelligence Operations Center. The results of this Working Group led by Mr. Richard Lehman, the then D/OCI/DDI, were approved and the CIA Operations Center was born in June 1973.

2. The experience of the other members of the intelligence community was not dissimilar. NSA, given the singular real time nature of its environment <sup>AND</sup> the experience <sup>S</sup> learned in the shoot down of the EC-121 off the coast of Korea in the spring of 1969, organized its NSOC in February 1973. However, the NSOC is not only an alert mechanism for SIGINT but one which also <sup>HAS</sup> ~~gives~~ significant requirements and analytical responsibilities around the clock. Today the NSOC, though devoted solely to SIGINT, is by a significant margin the largest and most comprehensive, in scope and authority, of all the 24 hour Centers in the Community.

The experiences of State and its motives for establishing a 24-hour Operations Center are not clear. But they too probably felt the same kinds of pressure. However, unlike most of the intelligence community Centers their development seems to have had an internal organizational focus, i.e., the need to <sup>COMBINE</sup> ~~combine~~ the immediate Office of the Secretary with the Department's information system and the I&R intelligence function. Since its development in late 1972 State's 24-hour center has been subordinate to the Department's Executive Secretary and has comprised two discrete 24-hour parts, the Operations Center and an INR portion <sup>PHYSICALLY</sup> ~~removed~~ <sup>but</sup> ~~by~~ substantively integrated.

The Pentagon experience was unique in that its J-2/J-3 separate orientation continued to drive the way their 24-hour centers evolved. Both developed separate Centers, one the NMCC under the J-3/JCS and the Other the NMIC under DIA. Until 1976 they were not colocated, but with the experiences of recent crises as the unifying element there is today a significant improvement in cooperation in crisis times.

Further the arrival of the NRT imagery era provided the impetus for further improvement which was manifest, also in 1976, with the establishment of the CCF to manage collection systems overall in behalf of all DOD interests.

3. The role of these various Centers in warning varies from almost total involvement vis-a-vis SIGINT resources in the case of NSOC to practically no role in the case of the State Operations Center. This of course follows the nature of the source each represents- [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] political reporting can be a first indication but not nearly to a similar extent as to justify an active State role in warning. Both the NMCC and the NMIC are deeply involved in warning both within their 24-hour center and in conjunction, through vast communication system, with DOD elements abroad throughout the world. To a significant degree this is all source though they rely heavily on NSOC for the SIGINT contribution and through NMIC/CCF for its NRT imagery element.

The role of the CIA Operations Center in warning is at the same time extant but unordained. It performs a first look warning function by the very nature of its access, orientation, organization and personnel. How this role relates to either the second look warning function, either to current analysts or to SWS or later WISP is unclear largely because the issue has never seriously been examined in CIA.

The establishment of the White House Situation Room as a 24-hour consumer center occurred in the early 1960s as a need was manifested by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to be kept

immediately and consistently aware of world developments of all kinds. The Situation Room was originally formed in close consultation with CIA, in fact its first head was a DDI/CIA officer. Since then the leadership has gone through several changes, CIA, NSA, and State, but always with a civilian Director. Another constant is the fact that the Watch Officers at the WHSR are members of the CIA Operations Center detailed there for two years or more, a factor stemming in large measure from their all-source experience and current intelligence support focus.

II. C

II C .

15 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman  
Associate Director-Substantive Support

FROM :   
Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : Past Arrangements for Crisis Management

25X1

1. These are some thoughts in response to para I C of your 4 May outline. This is nothing more than one man's view of the lessons of the past five years.

2. The CIA analytical task force has usually provided the DCI with quality analysis, that was relevant to the issues under consideration by the NSC, and in a timely fashion. Occasional lapses in relevance have occurred when the DCI failed to feed back to his analytical support the results of policy deliberations. This occurred because the DCI did not have the time or he was accompanied to those meetings by someone who had other management responsibilities that precluded briefing the analytical support chief.

3. The establishment of the NIO as the senior substantive assistant to the DCI largely eliminated the lapses in relevance of analytical support to the DCI. The NIO also provided a means of drawing upon the capability of INR or DIA to produce a piece of analysis for which they were uniquely qualified. This was seldom arranged as an additional output by INR or DIA because they usually functioned at full capacity during a crisis. Their contribution became possible, however, when they realized that the DCI would use their analysis in a policy forum and thus they would adjust their schedule to accomodate the NIO request.

4. The effectiveness of CIA task forces has improved markedly in recent years, both demonstrated and potential, as a result of the improvements in the Operations Center. Dedicated space, especially

S E C R E T

X1

arranged for task forces, have brought order, better morale, and improved timeliness. Improved communications and dedicated administrative support have improved timeliness and allowed us to have analysts analyze rather than support other analysts.

5. The National Situation Report idea resulted from the frustrations of the NSC Staff when they were beset with a continuous stream of situation reports from CIA, DIA, State, NSA and spot reports from the DDO. The closing time of the intelligence was usually different in each report, they were issued at different times, and not infrequently the predictions and judgments were different. Brent Scowcroft and Bill Hyland were the leaders of a movement to establish a single national situation report and the responsibility fell to the DCI.

6. No one in the intelligence community failed to understand the White House predicament but the obvious solutions all had drawbacks. The DCI could not seriously contemplate issuing instructions to Defense and State ordering them to deny the President the benefit of their information and analysis. The NSC Staffers could have ordered some staff procedures at the White House Situation Room to alleviate the confusion. The decision, as a consensus of the Intelligence Community, was for the DCI to issue a single National Situation Report into which all intelligence organizations would put their information and analysis.

7. An ad hoc DCI committee and some elements of the IC Staff worked on the problem about a year and a consensus evolved that the production of a National Situation Report required a National Task Force. Consideration was given to having each organization provide selected information and analysis to the CIA task force and making them responsible for incorporating it into a National Situation Report. That was ruled out on the basis that the Community's communications capabilities were inadequate. The decision was to assemble analysts from INR, DIA, and CIA into a single task force at the call of the DCI. Before we ever tried this, DIA and CIA decided that neither could afford the proper number of analysts in a NTF and still retain their home-based capability. The only test of the NTF concept was on the occasion of the Korean tree cutting incident. Most of us believed that the concept failed the test.


8. A major improvement in communications has occurred since we initially discussed issuing a National Situation Report from CIA into which we would incorporate other contributions. We have an improved grey phone trunk system which provides better and wider services. We have grey phone conferencing service. All operations centers now can transmit page size copy at five seconds per sheet versus 45-60 seconds per sheet. We have the "Laserfax" facsimile



transmission system for photographs and map segments. We have a first generation conferencing and text editing system in DIA, CIA, and State. The inescapable conclusion is that it is time to review the concept of CIA/NFAC issuing a National Situation Report without having to move analysts all over town.

9. The communications improvements noted in para eight probably would resolve all but one deficiency we found with the concept of a National Task Force. However we approached the task force problem, either having the CIA task force issue the National Situation Report or by having a National Task Force, we perceived the need for a crisis collection coordinator. This deficiency has been remedied by the concept of the NITO in the Collection Tasking Staff. It would appear that the D/DCI/CT could put a NITO in direct support of the DCI's principal substantive assistant for the crisis (D/DCI/NI or NIO) and that NITO could then provide the D/DCI/CT the information he would need to coordinate the collection tasking.

X1 cc: Vincent Heyman



II. D-1

CONFIDENTIAL

Relationship of Current Intelligence and Warning

The business of intelligence is a seamless web. Cuts in it must always be to some extent arbitrary and must do some damage to the whole. So it is in the business of current intelligence (the setting apart of current intelligence is itself one such cut) which broadly stated is, "Ensure that all evidence that is collected is brought together and the results disseminated to those who need to know."

The goal of this sweeping charge is to prepare policymakers to act promptly and wisely. Closer examination of the intelligence web to identify those parts of it which contribute most directly to producing prompt action identifies what can be called indications and warning functions. Some of these are formal processes directed toward warning of specific upcoming events. The formal processes range from highly structured systems depending on automatic data processing and computer facilities such as the WISP committees are developing under DoD auspices to warn of war in Europe, down through the regular meetings of groups of knowledgeable analysts such as the interagency South African nuclear watch team which periodically assesses the likelihood of a South African nuclear explosive test. At their lower extremities these formal processes blend into a host of informal thought processes in thousands of analysts who see their day to day responsibilities as including watch and ward for the Nation's interests.

The issues of current intelligence versus warning that arise perennially in the intelligence community nearly all reflect frustrations and failures arising from the fundamental conflict between two facts. On the one hand it is clear that there is no division, only a blending, of what is called current intelligence and what is called indications and warning. On the other hand it is also clear that the capacities and stamina of no single mind is up to the task of covering the whole range of these responsibilities continuously for any area of the world worth worrying about. Cuts must be made in the web in order for men to manage it.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The history of intelligence community efforts to cope with this fundamental conflict shows an oscillation between (relatively heavy) reliance on organs specifically assigned I&W responsibility and (relatively heavy) reliance on generalists. After a period of reliance on specialists arguments begin to mount to the effect that this reliance has placed unrealistic and imprudent reliance on the prescience and ingenuity of narrowly focused bodies and has blurred and diluted the warning responsibilities of the wider community of knowledgeable analysts. After relying for a time on generalists to warn of impending events in some region arguments will begin to mount to the effect that <sup>the</sup> nature, pressures and conflicting demands of current intelligence are so great that it is asking too much of one analytic corps to expect it to also meet the rigorous and time-consuming requirements of systematic and effective warning; only a group trained and experienced in the specialized tools and techniques of I&W can do that. And so the pendulum has swung back and forth.

Out of this history has emerged a fairly coherent set of issues which must be faced again today.

- How do we invest in the warning function so as to concentrate in those areas where likelihood and relevance combine?
- How do we capitalize on the capacity of mechanical processors to handle vast quantities of data and the capacity of knowledgeable area specialists to capture ineffable signs of change?
- How do we prevent the indication and warning function from becoming a rout exercise?
- How do we maintain the sensitivity of the whole body of intelligence analysts to the warning function?

#### Warning and Strategic Warning

Another finer cut in the web has been made. Strategic Warning (Big-W) has been set off by itself within the broader concept of warning (little-w). There are no inherent differences between W and w in terms of the techniques and methods required. Distinctions rest primarily on judgments of priorities (the most serious potential and likely military threats to US security and interests) and the capacities and limitations of various national-level mechanisms. The significance of the distinction is that, as a consequence of various policy and program decisions, the formal national-level warning mechanisms of the Community are almost exclusively devoted to W while current Community definitions in effect limit W to warning of a military attack on the United States or its allies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

A central issue now is the nature and range of potential threats and crises that most likely will require national-level warning judgments over the next five to ten years. Is the community consensus of 1974-75 still valid that the principal problem and focus should be W (as now defined), or should priorities and primary missions be revised to conform to a new and different perception of the most probable range of threats and crises in the foreseeable future? In an era of detente relationships between the US, on the one hand, and the USSR and China, on the other, a plausible case could be made that although strategic warning (as now defined) must remain the ultimate requirement, the principal warning problems on the US agenda in the foreseeable future probably will not focus on potential military confrontations between the great powers, but rather on lesser conflicts, tensions, and crises elsewhere. Some of these "lesser" warning situations, of course, will involve dangers of escalation to strategic warning situations.

CONFIDENTIAL



MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the I&W Working Group

Attached is [redacted] contribution as requested at our last meeting.

25X1

It is unclear whether I will have to be in court Tuesday afternoon. If so, I will reschedule the meeting for 1400 on Thursday, 11 May, and notify you soonest.

[redacted]  
Richard Lehman  
AD/NFAC/SS

25X1

Attachment

Date 8 May 1978

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

## Strategic Warning Staff

Washington, D.C. 20301

IUO-0023/SWS

5 May 1978

### Big "W" and Small "W"

1. There are no inherent differences between strategic warning and warning in terms of the techniques and methods required for performing these missions. Distinctions between these two categories of warning that were made in the past (for example, in DCID 1/5 in 1975) rested primarily on judgments of (a) priorities (the most serious potential and likely military threats to US security and interests), and (b) the capacities and limitations of specific national-level warning mechanisms.

2. In the present review of warning and crisis management arrangements, the central issue would seem to be a determination of the nature and range of potential threats and crises that most likely will require national-level warning judgments over the next five to ten years. Is the community consensus of 1974-75 that the principal problem and focus should be Strategic Warning still valid, or should this definition of priorities and primary mission be revised to conform to a new and different perception of the most probable range of threats and crises in the foreseeable future? In an era of detente relationships between the US, on the one

INTERNAL USE ONLY



hand, and the USSR and China, on the other, a plausible case could be made that although strategic warning must remain the ultimate requirement, the principal warning problems on the US agenda in the foreseeable future probably will not focus on potential military confrontations between the great powers but rather on lesser conflicts, tensions, and crises elsewhere. Some of these "lesser" warning situations, of course, will involve dangers of escalation to strategic warning situations.

3. If a determination is made that the present national-level mission should no longer be confined exclusively to strategic warning, and that the mission defined by DCID 1/5 does not adequately address the most likely developments of potential warning significance, the central problems will be (a) how to define and delimit a broader mission that covers both small "W" and a wide range of non-military threats, and (b) what mechanisms and procedures should be established to perform this expanded mission.

4. It seems to me that in considering answers to these problems, greater and more careful attention should be given to functions and procedures than to "mechanisms." The correct answer to the question posed in III A. of Mr. Lehman's Working Paper -- is the provision of warning of all kinds a line responsibility? -- should, in my view, be a loud and clear "yes."

The preoccupation with warning mechanisms in the past has confused and blurred the fundamental problems and dilemmas of effective warning. The notion that the principal, if not exclusive, responsibility for strategic warning should be (or has been) vested in a single entity (the Watch Committee or the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff) has tended not only to place unrealistic and imprudent reliance on the prescience and capacities of these bodies but also to blur and dilute the warning responsibilities of the production offices and senior managers of NFIB agencies.

5. Much of the discussion about warning at the national level and the concern expressed about the adequacy of the arrangements for strategic warning created by DCID 1/5 reflect misunderstanding and confusion with respect to the intent and expectations of this directive. It did not envisage that the Special Assistant and the SWS would be the sole or exclusive authority for strategic warning. On the contrary, the directive contemplated that strategic warning would be a shared community responsibility. The SWS was conceived as serving essentially a staff, research, and supporting function and as an adjunct and supplement to the DCI, NFIB production offices and the NIO system in meeting their strategic warning responsibilities.

6. This concept that warning is a broadly shared community responsibility will assume even greater importance if Small "W" is to be accorded higher priority and national-level attention in the future. In view of the formidable range of subjects, areas, and events that will have to be covered, procedures and functions of warning analysis will have to be given more thoughtful attention than organizational mechanisms. No single entity or mechanism would be even remotely capable of performing this world-wide mission in a systematic and effective manner. The sheer volume of material and range of subjects would seem to rule out the option of a separate organization for warning. Line responsibility would be the only feasible course.

7. Line responsibility, however, would raise almost as many thorny problems and potential hazards as a separate organization. In view of the prevailing structure of, and the division of labor in, the intelligence community, responsibility for the provision of warning of all kinds would necessarily fall primarily on current intelligence analysts. Long experience has underscored the difficulties and hazards in combining current and warning functions in the same corps of analysts. Training, exhortation, and constant attention by senior management would have some positive effect in increasing warning

INTERNAL USE ONLY

sensitivity among current intelligence analysts. But the nature, pressures, and conflicting demands of the current mission are such that it would be asking too much of the analyst corps to expect them to meet the rigorous and time-consuming requirements of systematic and effective warning. Some additional safeguards, insurance, assistance, and support would be necessary.

8. The safeguard/insurance function should be performed by a relatively small interagency staff of trained and experienced specialists in warning intelligence. Warning, to some extent, is a separate and distinct intelligence discipline. It is not so much that warning skills, techniques, and methods are unique; it is more a matter of a systematic and disciplined evaluation and meticulous reconstruction of trends, information and events, drawing upon the lessons of past warning failures and applying these lessons in a self-conscious way to contemporary problems.

9. This staff of warning specialists would function primarily as "second-look" analysts, as consultants and advisers to line analysts, and as researchers into specific warning problems. These specialists would focus on those areas where experience has shown deficiencies in threat perception and the warning process. Their functions would include:

INTERNAL USE ONLY

- a. Study of foreign perceptions and misperceptions of the distribution of power, opportunities for political or military gains, and calculations of risk.
- b. Examination of contingencies and options as perceived by foreign actors.
- c. Examination of assumptions and preconceptions underlying threat perceptions contained in finished intelligence publications.
- d. Identification of perceptions and assessments that seem to require revision in the light of recent events or changes in variable conditions. Are threats being over-estimated or underestimated?
- e. Examination of possible areas of unexpected behavior, actions or accidents.
- f. Study of discrepant information or events which may not have received sufficient attention or analysis -- as a safeguard against the "trap or preconception," hardening of assumptions, and "cognitive closure."
- g. Preparation of "worst-case" warning assessments when the community seems to be face with particularly ambiguous situations and when incoming

reports on foreign intentions are conflicting and the possibility of risks or surprise appears to be increasing.

10. The safeguard staff should have closer and more regular contacts with NFIB production offices than has been possible under the SWS arrangement. The logic of the present institutional structures under the DCI, and of the functions proposed in paragraph 9, suggest that the safeguard staff should be subordinate to NFAC and, if possible, be located in CIA Headquarters. NFAC would provide general and specific guidance to the staff, and proposals or initiatives by the staff would be reviewed and authorized by NFAC. Members of the staff would provide a warning perspective and leavening by participating in interagency groups drafting national estimates, Alert Memoranda, and various intelligence studies.



Director

25X

II. D-3

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

5 MAY

DoD Equities in Warning and Crisis Management

- DoD perceives warning (i.e., strategic warning) as a distinct collection and analysis sub-discipline and as a full-time occupation for those assigned to it.
- Warning-related activities are largely confined to the Big W countries--USSR-Warsaw Pact, North Korea and secondarily China.
- Crisis management is considered an ad hoc function to be handled on a case-by-case basis; although the same people become involved, it is not considered a functional extension of the I&W mission.
- The SWS role, as viewed by DIA, is long-range I&W; it does not become involved in day-to-day I&W activities (Alert Center function) or is it expected to participate in crisis management. Although DIA formally recognizes that SWS is a DCI element, it is very sensitive to suggestions that the DCI might want to change its status, mission, location, etc.
- DIA provides expanded support to the OSD/JCS hierarchy on all situations in which the White House/SCC is interested; however, extraordinary procedures (task forces, etc) are generally not implemented unless a Big W country is involved or it is perceived that the U.S. military establishment may be asked to take an active part.
- Absent the foregoing conditions, DoD perceives no relative change of equities vis-a-vis the DCI and is content to have the latter lead. Given those conditions, DoD will see increased relative importance of its interests which will be manifested first and foremost in demands on National collection assets.
- Similarly, under the latter circumstances, DoD/JCS will play a more active role vis-a-vis the DCI in SCC intelligence-related deliberations concerning the situation at hand. Where a question-of strategic warning exists, DoD/JCS will claim equal, if not greater, voice in advising the President.
- Consequently, DoD (DIA) is not likely to agree to participate in a DCI warning and crisis management structure in which its predominance in the strategic warning area is not operationally recognized, nor is it likely to assign resources to the functions of that structure (Little W) it considers to be subsidiary interests.
- However, DoD will likely participate in a Community warning and crisis management structure to which the DCI has coopted DIA as a principal player and in which improved access to DCI patronage and resources (particularly collection) is viewed as a benefit.

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY





3 May 1978

DCI SUPPORT TO U.S. MILITARY  
FIELD COMMANDERS

OVERVIEW:

The DCI's responsibility for providing national intelligence to the President and the NSC is well established, agreed upon and reflected in DCI procedures and deployment of resources. This intelligence support is also selectively available to other senior U.S. officials in Washington. The degree to which this kind of support is made available either directly or through their parent organizations to senior U.S. official representatives abroad, especially U.S. military field commanders is not well established but clearly should be, especially in areas like Europe/Middle East (USCINCEUR) and Korea where serious crisis and warning issues are ever present. The U.S. military field commanders there constitute another primary customer for national intelligence and any DCI statement of I&W or crisis management responsibilities or the establishment of DCI mechanism should reflect the reality of this responsibility.

The broadening of the DCI's authority in the recent Executive Order, specifically the creation of the NITC, plus the DCI's responsibility to insure proper distribution of information collected and produced makes the manifestation of his responsibilities vis-a-vis the "CINCs" even more necessary than previously. Also the recent studies on the subject of national/tactical interface indicate the urgent need for these elements of the Community to work toward the development of more interactive and mutually supportive arrangements.

PROCEDURAL/ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:

The nature of any enhanced DCI national intelligence support to the CINCs has a number of facets requiring attention. One of the major issues is reporting both the what and the how:

--currently the provision of finished national intelligence to them is sporadic; some (Gen. Haig) get practically all that is available concerning these areas: others CINCSAC-CINCPAC and the U.S. component of Gen. Haig's command receive considerably less. The presence of a CIA substantive officer assigned to a command is a major factor in this connection. Some serious effort to rationalize this situation must be undertaken to protect the DCI from criticism;

--currently the provisions of collected, unfinished national intelligence also lack uniformity. Imagery reporting out of NPIC is wide spread and responsive and goes directly to the commands: Sigint support likewise is broad in coverage and goes directly to the Commands. CIA/DDO Humint field reporting goes both ways: a very small amount goes to the CINCs on an "EXCLUSIVE FOR" named recipients basis, but most goes via the DDO/DIA arranged MILDIS system which is not viewed as satisfactory by the CINCs, mainly because the distribution is limited to military subjects, as determined by the individual DDO divisions in Washington.

The other major aspect of the DCI's support to the CINCs is organization, i.e., the establishment of DCI representatives at the major field commands and a responsive community wide supportive or coordinating counterpart.

25X1

I&W AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ISSUES:

If we can assume an enhanced recognition of the need to manifest the DCI's support to the major U.S. military commanders, and given the improvements in the DCI's procedural and organizational arrangements discussed earlier, his ability to deal with I&W and crisis management issues at the CINC level should then exist. It would lack only the conceptual basis of what kinds of "warning" related data is involved and via which DCI Washington based mechanisms, i.e., the SWS, an enhanced SWS, a WISP like arrangement or something entirely new. Clearly, and mainly on political grounds, the DCI must have at least "a dummy in the window" (hopefully a lively one) if he is to be perceived as the President's senior intelligence official in all respects, including warning and crisis management.

25X

Vincent J. Heyman

SECRET

May 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman  
SUBJECT : I&W Resources

1. A vast number of resources must be tapped to fulfill the I&W obligation; I recommend that relatively few be dedicated full-time. CIA needs a system to use resources already in place.

2. Rather than adding people, the I&W responsibility can be better met by:

- a. Designating a small I&W control group,
- b. Defining the I&W responsibility of NFAC analysts,
- c. Improving analyst attitudes, emphasizing that I&W is a basic responsibility of all analysts,
- d. Establishing clear lines of responsibility and authority, clearly delineating an I&W SYSTEM,
- e. Demanding better communication between elements in the I&W system.

3. Well defined formal relationships should exist among elements of an Agency I&W system and between an Agency system and other Intelligence Community I&W components:

- a. A small, specially designated I&W control group should exist,  
?(Indico, Ops Ctr)?

SR M 78-10102

SECRET

WARNING REUSE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

[Redacted Box]

5X

~~SECRET~~

- b. An interface with NITC should be established,  
?(NIO, NITO, CIA members of WISP Review and Advisory Panel (RAP))?
- c. Direct and constant communications with DOD elements should take place,  
?(SWS, RAP, Ops Ctr)?
- d. Channels should be established for regular analytical inputs and reviews,  
(NFAC analysts)
- e. An alert reservoir of crisis managers should exist.  
(NFAC task force leaders)

#### DISCUSSION

4. The increased attention focused on I&W, and in particular an I&W system, calls for a clearly delineated unit vested with responsibility for monitoring I&W and drawing on analytic and mechanical assets to assist the DCI in fulfilling his charter responsibilities. Warning, uncontestably, is the prime object of intelligence. Therefore, all reasonable resources should be tapped to assure that information is continually measured against this object.

5. Theoretically, the analytic capability of the Intelligence Community has always been brought to bear on this responsibility. Analysts need to understand more clearly their place in the I&W system.

6. Recently, there has been an effort to make better use of mechanical processors to prevent omission of relevant material. The Agency should take advantage of WISP.

7. Both human judgments and mechanical results should feed into a small, but specifically charged CIA unit which has a full-time I&W responsibility.

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

THE I&W UNIT

8. However dissatisfied the Intelligence Community has been with the administration of the I&W function, it has always felt the need for personnel exclusively devoted to that function, be it a 15-man NIC, a 10-man SWS, or a 3-man Indico. This need remains unchanged and, in the interest of a designated I&W system, should continue. The unit should be small, responsible for securing analytic inputs and merging these with mechanical products, issuing assessments, and interfacing with other Intelligence Community I&W elements.

I&W RESOURCES

9. Under the auspices of the DOD, WISP committees are developing (initially for NATO/WP) indicator lists with individual target weights to provide periodically computer processed evaluations. This provides a new tool in the effort to exploit rigorously the increased amount of raw I&W data.

10. An I&W system should exploit the broad perspectives of the current intelligence analyst. The analyst must be drawn into an I&W system to provide leavening and insights necessary to interpret indicators and the computer product. The analyst with specialized detailed knowledge in an area of responsibility (functional or geographical) should have a specified role in I&W.

11. The current NFAC stress on interdisciplinary analysis could be used to focus further attention on warning. Increased analyst interaction should provide opportunity for indicator review and assessment.

12. In essence, the personnel necessary for I&W are in place, and no additional resources are recommended in this area. A system to exploit existing resources fully is badly needed.



Chief  
Regional Analysis Division  
OSR

25X

**SECRET**

III, Discussion





III, A-2

III, A-3

III, A-4





SECRET

III 81

15 May 1978

II. DISCUSSION

.....

C. Necessary elements of such a (National) system:

1. Management. The DCI's management role must be considered carefully in light of his authority and limitations under E.O. 12036.

a. Line of command under (the) DCI

According to E.O. 12036, the DCI acts as the primary adviser to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence and provides the President and other officials with national foreign intelligence. Further, he acts with appropriate consultation as the Community's principal spokesperson. He thus has implicit authority to exercise Community oversight during a crisis situation.

b. Community coordination and oversight

It is critical that the DCI's responsibilities for Community coordination and oversight be effective during warning and crisis situations. The effort must be across the entire Intelligence Community to bring together the analysts and the collectors.

c. Internal staffing under the DCI

E.O. 12036 (1-601b) is clear concerning the duties of the DCI as "the head of the CIA and of such staff elements as may

SECRET

SECRET

be required for discharge of the Director's Intelligence Community responsibilities." Thus the DCI is free to establish his own staff elements to carry out his responsibilities both in the CIA and in the Intelligence Community as a whole. In warning and/or crisis situations the DCI can use the NFIB, or a DCI committee, or any other element of his own staff, or a CIA element, to carry out his responsibilities for coordination and oversight. If a warning and crisis situation arises from an international terrorist activity, special Intelligence Community procedures can be initiated, by either the DCI or any Intelligence Community agency. To be effective and responsive, any DCI staffing to cover crisis situations should provide that support which the President and the other policy players want most from the DCI -- that is, intelligence on and analysis of the events and collection activity during the crisis.

The DCI must be capable of exercising Community leadership during a period of crisis. To do so, he must be able to operate through one individual, several individuals, or a committee. The individuals or committee should function in a Community mode and support the DCI as a Community entity.

SECRET



SECRET

The following duties should be performed by the individual or group:

- Keep the DCI fully informed of the events themselves, the analysis of them, and the collection activities during the crisis.
- Ensure that Community efforts are focused on key intelligence needs and on intelligence support to US actions during the crisis.
- Organize substantive intelligence efforts and collection tasking in order to ensure that the entire Community is working together effectively in providing intelligence support during the crisis.
- Assign tasks and objectives to collection organizations and systems.

It is less clear as to whether these individuals should function in noncrisis periods. It is obvious, however, that they could carry out duties during a crisis only if, by virtue of normal responsibilities, they possessed the substantive knowledge and, during noncrisis periods had carefully studied intelligence capabilities, organizations, and procedures and had established the necessary relationships and understandings with Community components.

SECRET

SECRET

Organizationally, there are a number of entities through which the DCI could exercise leadership during a crisis. Internal leadership and staffing could be provided by NFAC in the form of an NIO, the Director of the CIA Operations Center, or some other person. The fact that most of the substantive analysis during the crisis would be an NFAC product, argues for this arrangement. Further, the major portion of the DCI's time in a crisis will involve the details of events, interaction with substantive analytical support, and the presentation of analytical views.

Alternatively, leadership could be provided by the Collection Tasking Staff. CTS is responsible for collection guidance tasking, an important aspect of crisis management and, as a result, should play a prominent role in crisis operations.

A third possibility would be the chairman of a committee or intelligence warning and crisis management team under the DDCI. The DDCI has command authority explicit in his office. That authority could be strengthened by a specific delegation of authority by the DCI. An alternative would be to form a national level committee, composed of the D/DCI/NI, the D/DCI/CT, the D/INR, and D/DIA under the chairmanship of the DDCI. Another alternative would be to form the committee as an advisory or consultative body to the DDCI who would exercise command authority over the crisis management organization.

SECRET

SECRET

A fourth option would involve some combination of the other alternatives. The latter option could call for dual leadership and staffing from NFAC and the CTS. In this arrangement, an NIO, either for crisis management or for an area, would provide leadership for substantive analysis and would be responsible for analytical support of the DCI. The NFAC officer or team would be responsible for analytical intelligence reporting and for coordination of that reporting. The CTS officer or team would be the focal point for collection tasking and would provide Community coordination of collection, processing, and dissemination activities. In performing these functions, the CTS officer or team would serve as NFAC's agent for tasking and coordinating Community activities in support of NFAC's substantive role.

This dual management concept would provide the DCI:

- A single point of contact for analytical and collection support during a crisis.
- Support immediately available and directly responsible to him.
- A Community entity upon which to rely.

SECRET

III. B-2

12 May 1978

II-C-2

Arrangements for Warning

1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrangements for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible, is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary leadership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would report to the DCI through the DDCI.


2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible NIO.



25X1

4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately  located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of any non-military developments throughout the world that have the

X1



25X

potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The personnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community. (The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.

5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first look now taken by the various operations centers around town as well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insurance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient conferencing techniques at hand.

6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and when feasible to the Warning Control Group.

7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation. This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an alert memorandum to the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.

8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization required. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report, collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures the NITC would have in being by that time.

25X1

10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level within the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the cooperation of analytical elements of the community.

X1



III, B-3



CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1978

II-C-3 Additional arrangements for strategic warning

1. Arrangements for strategic warning, as well as for other categories of warning, should be based on a clear understanding that this is a line responsibility shared by all NFIB production offices. A small interagency strategic warning staff should function as a backup and supplement to line responsibility, not as the sole authority for strategic warning. Its mission should be focused on long-range research and analysis directed toward providing a greater margin of insurance and safeguard against strategic surprise.

2. This mechanism should have the right and responsibility to take the lead in drawing community attention to developments of potential strategic warning significance. Beyond this alerting function, the strategic warning mechanism should be authorized, in cooperation with the appropriate NIO, to prepare warning assessments that would serve as catalysts for broader community examination and judgment. This mechanism should not be involved in day-to-day I&W activities, which should remain the responsibility of such line elements as DIA's Alert Center, WISP, CIA's Operations Center, and current intelligence offices. The strategic warning function should not duplicate the daily, routine process of examining, evaluating, and reporting force postures, military exercises, normal deployments, etc. Warning personnel, moreover, should not be directly involved in crisis management, although they would contribute warning assessments to crisis task forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. The present definition of strategic warning under DCID 1/5 should be broadened to include (a) political confrontations between the major Communist powers (the USSR, Warsaw Pact, China, and North Korea), and the US and its allies; and (b) small "W" situations involving a potential for escalation into strategic warning situations. The strategic warning group would work closely with whatever mechanism is established to cover other categories of small "W" -- a parallel warning staff, responsible NIOs, etc.

4. This distinction between major warning developments that involve a potential for political or military confrontation between the major Communist powers and the US, on the one hand, and other developments which do not carry immediate dangers of such confrontation, on the other, would meet the DoD's primary interest in warning activities related to Big "W." The strategic warning group would function in close association with DIA's Vice Director for Production.

5. The strategic warning group would report either to a Special Assistant to the DCI, the Director of NFAC, or the DDCI. Community responsibility could be symbolized by and centered in a high-level interagency warning committee which would oversee the group's operations and advise the senior warning authority. This committee would not have regular weekly meetings but would convene at the direction of the senior warning authority to examine specific developments and oversee the community's response -- in the form of an Alert Memorandum or a Strategic Warning Notice.

6. Other options for handling the strategic warning function might include:

A. Dropping the distinction between Big W and Small W and vesting the entire warning mission in an expanded SWS, which could either operate

CONFIDENTIAL

as a single warning mechanism or be subdivided into two units -- one for Big W and the second for all other categories.

B. Appointing a national intelligence officer for warning who would supervise the separate warning mechanism, provide guidance and oversight for the I&W functions and responsibilities of line production offices, and advise the DCI, DDCI, the Director of NFAC, and the NIOs on all matters pertaining to warning.

C. Continuing the present arrangement under DCID 1/5, but with a broader Big W mission for the Special Assistant and SWS as described in paragraph 3, and with the NIOs responsible for other small "W" coverage.

Dissemination

7. Alert Memoranda or Strategic Warning Notices would be issued to the DCI and passed, at his discretion, to the President and the NSC. Other reports and studies prepared by the warning staff would continue to be disseminated to the Washington policy and intelligence communities and to the major U & S Commands.

Collection Tasking

8. The strategic warning function should not have a separate tasking system but should form an integral part of the total warning tasking system. The warning group would maintain constant contact with the NITO for warning; any collection requirements not satisfied through line production offices and Alert Centers would be presented to the NITO for warning.

III. B-4

~~SECRET~~  
III B 4

15 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman  
Associate Director-Substantive Support

FROM :   
Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : Support to the DCI in Crisis Management

25X1

1. The following thoughts are offered in response to para II C 4 of your 4 May outline.

2. The arrangements for crisis management should be derived from the DCI responsibilities in crisis management. The President and the NSC expect the DCI to provide warning of radical changes in the flow of events inherent in the crisis of the moment, analysis of intentions and implications of the actions of the foreign actors in the crisis, and sometimes he is asked for analysis of the likely implications of alternative causes of action considered by the USG. The DCI traditionally has provided these services and we usually label it "policy support" as a shorthand expression to describe the complicated interaction of the DCI and the NSC principals in deciding and executing policy in a crisis.

3. To provide this policy support, the DCI must be concerned that a variety of intelligence collection activities be continued, initiated, or discontinued. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is happening or is likely to happen. The DCI must be concerned about the priorities to be accorded intelligence information processing and dissemination activities. These decisions are based upon an analysis of what is happening or is likely to happen. The NSC policy maker has little or no interest in the details of the collection or processing activity but has an insatiable appetite for the relevant facts collected and the analysis of those facts. The output, or the cutting edge, of policy support is facts and analysis.

4. Our arrangements for crisis management should be designed to:

- o increase the responsiveness of analysis to meet the needs of the policy makers,

X1

S E C R E T

- increase the responsiveness of collection resources to meet the requirements of the intelligence analysts, the policy maker, and the military commanders,
- reduce the number of people the DCI must see,
- increase the availability of people and data the DCI may want to consult,
- increase the time available to the DCI for contemplation and consultation on crisis matters.

5. The responsiveness of analysis can be improved in a crisis by concentrating the CIA analytical resources into a task force operated by the NFAC. This task force could be augmented by analysts from INR and DIA in the unlikely event that State and Defense needs for direct intelligence support do not overwhelm INR and DIA. In any event, the analytical output of the CIA/NFAC task force can benefit by drawing upon some of the paper produced by INR and DIA as we have done many times in past crises.

6. The relevance of the CIA/NFAC analysis to policy interests will be, to some measure, dependent upon our knowledge of what is under discussion in the USG policy arena. There must be a bridge between the policy arena and the intelligence support the DCI is expected to provide. This communication bridge can be provided by providing a special substantive assistant to the DCI for the duration of the crisis. This person must possess detailed knowledge of the area and events so that he can back up the DCI in SCC or NSC meetings. This person must be attuned to policy nuances and understand the analytical effort behind the DCI in order to provide guidance to the CIA analytical task force and to INR and DIA as appropriate. This role could be filled by the D/DCI/NI, by the appropriate NIO, or by a combination of their efforts.

7. The responsiveness of collection resources will in large measure improve by the reflexive actions of the collection program managers in response to the crisis situation. Frequently, however, the crisis will result in a conflict of priorities for the use of a single collection system between analysts and policy makers involved in the crisis and those whose responsibilities are untouched by the crisis. In the case of such conflict, and also to maintain the level of responsiveness, it would be helpful for the D/DCI/CT to place a NITO in direct support of the DCI's special substantive assistant. This would ensure that there will be someone who has direct knowledge of the analytic support needed by the DCI who can keep the D/DCI/CT informed of the priorities from that support.

8. The DDCI could assume a more direct management role and reduce the demands upon the DCI in the crisis. In particular, the NFAC

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200090001-6

less the analytical task force could report to the DDCI and the Directorate of Operations less the headquarters resources devoted to support of the DCI and the task force could report to the DDCI.

9. The main point one ends up with is that the thrust of the DCI's responsibilities are analytical in nature and that all procedures must be designed to support him in that role. The major portion of the DCI's time in a crisis will be spent absorbing the details of events, interacting with his analytical support, presenting his analysis in policy arenas, and participating in policy debates. The next heaviest demand will stem from covert action or paramilitary planning and activities should they be involved. Other than having periodic briefings or reports on the overall status of collection systems, one would not expect the DCI to spend much time on collection matters.

X1 cc: Vincent Heyman

