

SECRET

NFAC #

3362-78

7 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support
National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Responses to DCI Comments on I&W Working Group Report

REFERENCE : Memorandum from [redacted] same subject, dated
4 August 1978

25X1

Dick:

1. I have read [redacted] suggested approach to the DCI's request for "alternatives" and am submitting herewith both my comments and those of [redacted] who, as you know, is an unofficial member of the Working Group largely because of his vast experience in this field.

X1
X1

2. Our comments are submitted in the form of separate attachments. [redacted] are included as Attachment "A" and mine as Attachment "B". In connection with [redacted] submission I give it my complete support, particularly as it concerns the discussion of recommendations from Paragraph 8 forward. I think the dispersal of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) and the use of these positions as a network of warning officers throughout the community is a worthy one and would serve to convince the HPSCI that the DCI is indeed serious about approaching this problem on a total community basis. My comments in Attachment "B" are not nearly as detailed and very largely are keyed to [redacted] proposed answer to the DCI.

X1
X1
X1

[redacted signature box]

Director
CIA Operations Center

25X1

[redacted box]

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060009-1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060009-1

Background

1. Each warning and crisis situation is different with respect to location, time stress, kinds of substantive analytic talent (across the community) required, types of collection needed, and the element of risk involved.

2. An outline of the steps in the warning process, together with the functional responsibilities (), can be put in the following sequence:

- a. detection of the problem (community)
- b. determination of the unknowns (analytic)
- c. defining the requirement (analytic)
- d. selection of collectors (collection)
- e. assessment of risks (both to collector and policy)
(analytic, collection, policy)
- f. activation, processing and dissemination (collection)
- g. reassessing the problem and unknowns (analytic)

3. Obviously the above steps require a close coordination of many elements in the intelligence community. In the transition from normal times to times of potential warning this coordination must often take place rapidly. Fortunately, there now exists within a number of operations centers a new remote conferencing communication system called the National Operations and Intelligence Analysts Net (NOIAN) which allows secure voice (speaker phone) conferencing as well as a means to create and edit documents when necessary (CONTEXT Conferenced Text Editing) at the same time. An ability to add display conferencing (DISCON) for map problems is also being developed. These NOIAN/CONTEXT rooms are established at CIA, DIA, NSA, State and

4. The most difficult step in the warning process is the ability of the community to detect the problem (Paragraph 2 a. above). This step first occurs in the transition from the normal to the potential warning phase. Detection usually begins when someone in the community notices a significant change. Others in other parts of the community also notice related changes. These "pockets of concern" often do not get connected unless they are reported to some point of convergence or focal point within the intelligence community. In order to facilitate this convergence the following steps are recommended.

SECRETRecommendation:

5. Abolish the SWS and disperse the positions back to their representative agencies with the understanding that each agency and service would use these positions to establish a Warning Officer (WO).

6. Create directly under the DCI (or DDCI) a Special Assistant for Warning (SAW) who would be the focal point of all agency and service warning officers. Under the SAW's direction they would meet periodically (perhaps daily) by remote conferencing means (NOIAN) to bring attention to any incidents which might grow into a warning situation.

7. If a warning situation appears probable, the SAW would notify the appropriate NIO as well as the appropriate DIOs and NITOs or other substantive elements within the intelligence community, seeking their advice and recommendations for issuing alerting memoranda and/or the formation of an appropriate working group or task force either by individual agency or by the intelligence community, or to withhold any action.

8. If agency working groups or task forces were to be formed the SAW would provide means of assembling the results of their efforts. If a community working group or task force were formed the SAW would see that they were supported by remote conferencing techniques and procedures as appropriate, particularly when situation reports are required.

Discussion of Recommendations:

9. The role of the SAW (as well as agency or service warning officers) would remain catalytic rather than analytic in nature. The SAW's main function would be to detect and connect "pockets of concern" within the intelligence community. He would also have expertise in the procedures to allow information to be exchanged on a community basis using NOIAN conferencing and other means. In this function he could depend on the network of 24-hour watch centers across the community.

10. The dispersal of the SWS and the creation of Warning Officers in each agency would overcome the problem of unwillingness of personnel to be assigned away from their parent agency which has always been considered a detriment to one's career.

11. By including the services as well as the agencies a broader base of convergence could be achieved.

12. The endless argument over "strategic" vs. "tactical" as well as "big W" vs. "small w" would be non-existent.

13. This proposal would have a better chance to relieve the support of the intelligence community than other proposals presented so far because it serves the needs of military as well as non-military intelligence. The military needs warning primarily for purposes of readiness, but

SECRET

SECRET

they have less interest in crisis avoidance (within the constraints of national policy) which is the primary concern of the civil side of intelligence. The SAW and the WOs across the intelligence community could bridge those interests.

14. The proposal, while eliminating the SWS, does not interfere with the functions or command relationships of other elements of the intelligence community, but, rather, enhances their functions in the I&W area.

15. A sub-option would be to have a committee on warning and crisis (COWAC), as suggested in previous proposals, to represent the interests of the NFIB. It should be understood, however, that the COWAC would not be a permanent standing committee but one which would be convened only as necessary. The SAW would serve as its permanent executive secretary. COWAC meetings could also use the NOIAN to conduct conferences without having to leave their own agency.



25X1

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060009-1

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200060009-1

~~SECRET~~

7 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support
National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : DCI's Comments on our I&W Report

REFERENCE : [] memorandum of 4 August seeking our
comments on his paper in this regard

X1 1. Most of what [] included in his proposed answer to the DCI's
18 July memo flows logically from our earlier deliberations and has my
support. There are several things that could concern me, however, and
the main thrust of this response is to seek clarification on these points.

a. Page 2, Paragraph 4: The last sentence of this paragraph
seems unnecessarily restrictive. While we certainly do not intend
to "duplicate" the Community's I&W apparatus we do indeed intend to
add something to it that it currently lacks, cohesion, a focal
point status and executive attention and support. [] sentence
seems to be designed to assure that the regular analytical echelons
do not feel threatened. All well and good. But we should not
lead people to believe--as this does--that nothing new will be
added. 25X

X1 b. Page 3, Paragraph 5: In the middle of this paragraph
[] "The technical problems of converging I&W information
are manageable." Agreed, but this lacks a "for instance" in
order for the DCI to know whether (and how) this concerns I&W information
among Washington players only or in a broader context. I urge a few
sentences of explanation or dropping the sentence altogether. []
X1 [] NOIAN/CONTEXT pitch could fit in here if we are just talking
about the Washington community. 25X

c. Page 10, Paragraph 13 f.: Here again we could mislead
the DCI. If we are advocating a Senior Assistant for Warning
plus a committee you will need a few staffers to support the
structure. I advocate that the first sentence of this sub-paragraph
be changed. To my recollection I remember no consensus against
staffs, per se, just against large and redundant staffs.

X1 d. Pages 13 & 14, Paragraphs 15 and 16: In two places
[] advocates an individual from DOD being named to the
Senior Assistant job. While this was touched on I recall no serious
discussion of it, no less a consensus in its favor. Personally,
I have doubts you will get anything but second raters from DOD.

SECRET

SECRET

Further, the person must be comfortable with the overall DCI environment and that of Langley where he should be located. I doubt if a DOD officer could fill this bill even if he were first class. On this point I do not see DOD joining the effort fully as long as the subordination is to the DCI. Thus, they will always have their warning group. We should give the DCI a man who is totally the DCI's man (With frankly a little CIA bias).

2. Finally I wish to go on record most strongly against splitting this responsibility between NITC and NFAC. Aside from not working it probably would not be acceptable to the HPSCI and its view of the warning problem.



Director
CIA Operations Center

25X1

SECRET