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*DCI - I am I now; moving to E
if SWS doesn't show more usefulness
Pls discuss w/ Bob (& me if you prefer) - we
need to give him his chance to speaking*

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence *WIB*
FROM: Richard Lehman
Associate Director for Substantive Support
SUBJECT: DCI's Role in Warning and Crisis

1. The attached memorandum signed by [] and Sayre Stevens for Bob Bowie responds to your comments on the working group's study of your role in crisis and warning. It contains, as you requested, a broad range of options on which we ask that you indicate your tentative preferences, but makes no recommendations.

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2. I have also attached a matrix and a decision tree which are designed -- we hope -- to help you find your way through these complex matters.

3. [] believes that any of the three options for lodging the leadership function can be made to work satisfactorily and that regardless of where it is lodged the function should take the form of a responsible individual whether his title be Strategic Warning Officer, NIO for Strategic Warning, NITO for Crisis Management, or whatever. However, he recommends that a decision with respect to the disposition of the Strategic Warning Staff should not be made in isolation from other issues concerning movement of collection tasking organizations to the Pentagon.

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4. We have not been able to consult Bob Bowie. Sayre and I think he would vote for a variant of Model B (B¹ on the charts) which placed overall responsibility in NFAC, but replaced the "center" with a single staff officer, perhaps an NIO for Warning. In general, he believes elaborate systems are unnecessary.

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5. Two significant dates are approaching. The HPSCI Subcommittee on Evaluations has tentatively scheduled hearings for 19-20 September on its report on warning. (There may be some give to these dates). More important, Frank Carlucci is scheduled to be the keynote speaker at the DIA I&W Seminar on 27 September.

6. Mr. Bowie and have noted to me that they look forward to discussing these issues with you.

Richard Lehman

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8 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director for National Foreign
Assessment

[Redacted]
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking

SUBJECT : The DCI's Role in Warning and Crisis

REFERENCES : a. Report on the DCI's Role in Warning
and Crisis, dtd 22 June 1978
b. Memorandum from DCI to DDCI, same
subject, dtd 18 July 1978

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Introduction

1. Your memorandum of 18 July notes that, although all the relevant sources and experiences are cited in the Working Group's report, the report does not lay out "a series of alternatives between which we can exercise a decisionmaker's judgment." You asked for a statement of the essential elements of warning, some alternative ways to achieve an adequate warning program, and an evaluation of previous organizational arrangements for warning.

2. Knowing that you have read the report, we have not attempted to rewrite it or to review again for you the argumentation and background. Rather, this memorandum is confined to the questions you raised.

3. Our approach to providing you the clear alternatives you ask for is necessarily somewhat complex, reflecting the intractability and intertwining of the issues. Section I of this discussion lays out the minimum requirements for a national warning system as a yardstick against which to judge alternative approaches. Section II develops

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a number of models of national warning systems, past, present, and possible, and measures them against the yardstick of Section I. It will be apparent that in deciding among these models, or considering others not discussed, you will have to make certain fundamental choices. These are presented in Section III.

4. The Working Group noted that warning and crisis management probably should be managed together, as related functions involving many of the same people and organizations, but that substantive operations should be kept separate, in order that a crisis in progress not obscure the potential emergence of another. For that reason, we address crisis management in Section II by noting when particular arrangements for Community coordination of warning policy and procedures are not suitable for a parallel coordination of crisis management matters. For the substantive side of crisis management, the Working Group did not recommend any change from the approaches you had already evolved ad hoc. We do not, therefore, review these here, but a few issues need to be settled. These are included in Section III.

5. When you are ready to express your tentative preferences on the issues here presented, we recommend you meet with us for a review before finally committing yourself. At that time we should also discuss how best to engage the rest of the Community.

I. Requirements for a National Warning System

6. The discussions in the Intelligence Community over the past few years indicate a consensus as to the essential ingredients of a warning program. The wording varies from one forum to another and from one warning and crisis study to another, but one can perceive these essential principles:

- Warning must be an explicit mission of all intelligence organizations.
- There must be a way to converge intelligence information in order to analyze it for I&W content.

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-- The output must be recognizable as warning.

-- The output must flow up, laterally, and down.

7. The complexity of the warning mission has increased rapidly in recent years. The indications of impending crises come to us from a wide variety of geographical and functional specialties within and without the Intelligence Community. We must assign warning as a mission for all intelligence organizations because of the many sources of indications and in the interests of economy. We cannot afford to duplicate the Intelligence Community with an apparatus devoted solely to I&W.

8. There is a requirement that intelligence information converge in order to analyze it for warning. This implies both a technical capability for handling information and a means of focusing organizational activity.

9. The intelligence message must be clearly recognizable as a warning. The last thirty years are littered with crises where the indications were perceived, evaluated, and passed on to military operators and national decision-makers but the warning message was not effectively communicated. There were several reasons for such failures. In some cases the intelligence analyst simply failed to recognize the indications of a crisis. In many more cases, however, the message lacked a warning label because the sender did not have an explicit warning responsibility and a concomitant authority to send a "warning." In other cases, the military operator or national decisionmaker failed to heed the warning because the sender was not "the official warning office."

10. There must be an established and readily recognizable means whereby the output of a national warning system flows up to the President, laterally to other departments, and down to the military operators. Placing all on the same footing is an obvious requirement. It is less obvious that the national warning system is dependent upon inputs from the same sources to which it owes warning.

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11. Just as there is general consensus on the essentials of a warning system, there appears to be consensus on the functions that such a system must incorporate. These are:

- Coordination, across the Community and across disciplines, of warning management, policy, procedures, and methodologies.
- Analysis, the identification, convergence, and assessment of warning information and the formulation of the warning message.
- Discipline, the means by which Community line organizations, which have primary responsibilities other than warning, are kept sensitive to their warning responsibilities.
- Challenge, the insurance taken out against analytic failure.

II. Systems for Warning

12. There are any number of ways in which these functions can be wired together in a national system. The range is bounded at one extreme by an integrated collection and analysis system fully dedicated to warning and at the other by no system at all. The first is unacceptable as enormously expensive and duplicative (warning is an integral part of all analysis), the second is equally unacceptable both politically (the DCI's "Pearl Harbor" responsibility) and practically (central coordination is needed).

13. In this section we analyze both systems used in the past, as you requested, and some other approaches, against the set of requirements postulated in Section I.

14. The "Watch Committee" system used from 1951 to 1974 consisted of a senior interagency committee, usually chaired by the DDCI, that prepared weekly and occasional special Watch Reports, and a 24-hour jointly manned National Indications Center under a CIA Director. The

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Committee submitted its reports to USIB (now NFIB) and the DCI issued them after USIB discussion as is still done with Estimates. The NIC was linked to the working levels in each intelligence agency through a network of staff officers who acted as warning referents.

15. This arrangement provided all the functions needed for a system. The Watch Committee, assisted by the NIC and staff arrangements throughout the Community, handled both the coordination of policy and operations and the analytic function; the DCI had a central focus for strategic warning. (Strategic warning was vaguely defined, but the overwhelming emphasis was on Soviet military attack.) The Community-wide review that was required to prepare for the weekly Committee meetings provided the discipline necessary. The Committee and the NIC, in theory at least, performed the challenge function from a position partially independent of the current intelligence apparatus.

16. This system eventually failed, not because it was ill-conceived, but because the world in which it functioned changed and it did not.

- The intense national concern with surprise Soviet attack which had caused its creation gradually decreased. This led Community managers to give a lower priority to the assignment of good people to the warning apparatus. In time, the NIC became a turkey farm.
- As a consequence, the NIC was no longer capable of performing a challenge function and could not command the respect of line organizations in this role.
- The Watch Committee/NIC missions became confused with the current intelligence mission. The result was both to diffuse the warning effort and to place it in competition with current intelligence.

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- The intelligence business matured mightily in the two decades after 1951. Whereas the NIC was the only thing of its kind at the beginning of the period, it had been badly overtaken by the agency operations centers at the end of it in terms of facilities, communications, and access. If it was to play a role in the 1970s, it would need an extremely expensive modernization that would unnecessarily duplicate existing facilities. It was, in effect, a fossil of the 1950s.
- Handling substance through weekly committee meetings both at the Watch Committee and the USIB (NFIB) level, was barely workable in the 1950s, but was never the most effective way of developing a clear warning message. By the 1970s, it had degenerated into haggling over the wording of current intelligence and was clearly ineffective.

17. The reorganization of 1974 abolished the Watch Committee and the NIC. The Deputy Director for Production, DIA, was designated by the DCI as his Special Assistant for Strategic Warning. Under him, a jointly-staffed Strategic Warning Staff was established with a CIA Director. "Strategic Warning" was more precisely defined to deal only with military attack by Communist powers on the US and its allies. (This is the definition referred to below as the "narrow" warning mission.) The SWS was to be a challenge mechanism and to conduct research in the indications and warning field.

The Special Assistant, with the advice of the Director, SWS, was to be responsible for recommending to the DCI the issuance of Strategic Warning Notices. (None has ever been issued.) The strong points of this arrangement were that it gave full recognition to the DoD role in strategic warning and that it provided a direct and uncluttered channel for the warning message. But if the Watch Committee system had been ponderously bureaucratic and stultified, its replacement went too far to the other

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extreme. In eliminating outmoded organizations and mediocre personnel, we also eliminated the critical underpinnings of a national warning system. The terms of the essential functions noted above:

- The Special Assistant--a senior DIA officer--was supposed to combine, under the DCI, the coordination of policy and operations and the analytic mission. In fact, in his anomalous position--with secondary duties assigned by an authority whose interests often are different from those of the authority for whom he performs his primary ones--he could not play a central coordinating role. The arrangement was widely seen as a retreat by a besieged DCI (Colby) from his warning responsibilities. The Special Assistant has exercised his authority only within the DoD chain of command.
- The SWS has no formal links to the rest of the Community and there is no Community-wide warning organization or routine. Warning outside DoD is entirely a current reporting responsibility. Thus the SWS is unable to serve as an energizing force for warning matters; the warning discipline that might sensitize the Community is lacking.
- Without structured links to the Community the SWS is ineffective in its challenge role. Many analysts are unaware of its existence. Moreover, although it did not inherit the personnel or practices of the NIC, it suffers from the same manning problems.
- The narrowed scope of the strategic warning mission omits a wide range of the warning spectrum. (Referred to below as the "broad" warning mission.)

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19. New Models. Current pressures for structure and order, e.g., from HPSCI, are a recognition of these weaknesses. Some relatively feasible and inexpensive ways of repairing them are as follows:

A. Fix the present system. This would require stronger links between the Special Assistant and the DCI on the one hand and the SWS and Community analysts on the other. It could be done by:

- Creating a DCI Committee on Warning chaired by the Special Assistant, and charged with the coordination of warning policy and operations for the Community (but not the analytic mission).
- Reaffirming and publicizing the Special Assistant's responsibility to the DCI for warning analysis.
- Broadening the strategic warning mission to include warning of any situation that might lead to US-Soviet confrontation. (A compromise between the narrow and broad missions.)
- Reaffirming the challenge mission of the SWS and requiring the Community to upgrade its personnel.
- Providing discipline by charging the SWS with conducting a weekly review to sensitize the Community to warning matters; designating referents in each agency through which the full analytic resources of the Community participate in these reviews.

Strengths

- Simple and inexpensive.
- Least disruption of present arrangements.
- Recognized DoD role in strategic warning.

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Weaknesses

- DCI is carrying out his most important single responsibility through an officer not subordinate to him.
- Focus of coordinating committee in DoD incompatible with DCI's crisis management responsibilities to President and NSC.
- The more mission is broadened to include warning of the politico-military and economic events that are realistically most likely to matter to the US in the next few years, the less appropriate lodging this mission in a DIA office becomes and the less capable of dealing with them is a small SWS.
- Conversely, the more narrowly the mission is defined, the larger that slice of the spectrum not covered by any structural warning system.
- A SWS charged with warning of events that are intrinsically unlikely will issue warning very rarely. Either, like the NIC, it will atrophy and fail to warn when it should, or it will go looking for another mission and confuse Community functions and chains of command.
- Manning the SWS will be no easier than before.
- There is no clear role for NFAC, the DCI's own analytic organization, in the warning chain.
- The responsibilities of the Special Assistant may overlap or conflict with those of DD/CT and DD/NFA.

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B. An NFAC Warning Center. This model would emphasize the importance of the analytic process in warning.

- Scrap the present system.
- Designate a senior NFAC officer as the DCI's warning and crisis management officer.
- Make him chairman of a DCI Committee charged with coordination of policy and operations.
- Create under him a "Warning Center" in NFAC staffed with perhaps 25 professionals drawn largely from NFAC but with at least some Community participants. It would incorporate, but not control, the NITO for Warning and other NITOs as appropriate. The Center would be responsible for all analytic aspects of warning under a broad definition.
- Provide a Community-wide discipline by requiring the rest of NFAC and other Community agencies to conduct regular warning reviews and provide the results to the Center.
- Encourage challenge and debate among the Center, NIOs, and line organizations.

Strengths

- Recognizes importance of analytic process in warning.
- Provides lively challenge function.
- Center large enough and stimulating enough to avoid stultification, will be much easier to man.
- Center fully able to absorb and analyze warning information.

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- Provides a clear focus for the warning information flow Community-wide.

Weaknesses

- Expensive.
- Minimizes attention to management and collection aspects, especially in crisis management.
- May overlap with responsibilities of DD/CT.
- Community equities given short shrift.
- Overlap of analytic missions will lead to unnecessary bureaucratic frictions, even paralysis.
- Danger of consumer receiving contradictory interpretations because two analytic channels exist.
- Community participation likely to be pro forma.

C. A Community Coordination Facility

- Scrap the present system.
- Place responsibility for coordination of warning and crisis management policy and operations on the DD/CT with staff responsibility assigned to the NITO for Warning and Crisis Management based in the Pentagon.
- Place responsibility for analytic and production aspects on the DD/NFA (NFAC), and establish an NIO for Warning on his Staff.
- Define warning broadly.

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- Assign the challenge function jointly to the NIO and NITO for Warning, each approaching the problem from the perspective of his particular discipline.
- Provide a network of warning referents in each agency through which the NIO and NITO for Warning can sensitize the Community in their respective areas of cognizance.

Strengths

- Consistent with DCI's reorganization of functions among his deputies.
- Gives major attention to collection and interagency coordination aspects.
- Basing coordination element (DD/CI) at Pentagon accommodates DoD equities; facilitates DCI "shift of flag" to maintain leadership in military-related crises.
- Meets HPSC(I) strictures to integrate and use existing DoD capabilities.
- Least expensive.

Weaknesses

- Warning system focus is split organizationally (HPSC(I) called for a single point of focus) between CT and NFA and in location between the Pentagon and Langley; split could cause disconnects, e.g., between collection and production.
- Community equities not fully recognized on the analytic side.
- NIO for Warning may not have bureaucratic position to perform effectively, particularly if warning is broadly defined.

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D. A Hybrid System. This is the solution recommended in the Working Group study. It attempts to reconcile the diffuse and unpredictable requirements of warning as broadly defined with the critical and often highly specialized requirements of strategic warning as narrowly defined. It would:

- Scrap the present system (but see below).
- Create a unified system with the DCI or DDCI at the apex, acting through a Senior Warning (staff) Officer who would also be responsible for crisis management. (The SWO might be a DoD officer on detail to the Office of the DCI.)
- Retain the SWS under the SWO, but improve quality of manning. ✓ 2
0
- Coordinate Community policy and operations through a senior interagency steering group chaired by DDCI or a DCI Committee chaired by the SWO.
- Handle analytic aspects of warning (broadly defined) through the NIOs acting for the Community, with the SWO having an additional challenge responsibility ("ombudsman for warning"). Provide a Community discipline by requiring each NIO to convene analysts periodically for discussion of future contingencies; each NIO to report results to SWO.
- Handle analytic aspects as narrowly defined through the SWS in consultation with certain NIOs. Provide a Community discipline through reestablishment of referent network, with periodic strategic warning reviews provided to SWS. SWS retains its present challenge function.

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Strengths

- Demonstrates importance DCI gives to critical mission.
- Places unified responsibility at DDCI level where collection and production threads come together, keeping management lines clear.
- Recognizes most Community equities.
- Places primary challenge function on officers best equipped to perform it (NIOs).
- Encourages through NIOs broadest Community sensitization to warning matters.
- Accommodates both broad and narrow warning functions.

Weaknesses

- More complicated than other models.
- Would require a few more people than present system.
- Uncertain whether SWS can be made effective.
- May not go far enough toward Community.

E. A Variant to D. You have expressed some skepticism as to the usefulness of SWS. It would be possible to eliminate it from Model D, but it would remove a key element from the system. The SWS is the instrument by which Community discipline with regard to the narrow warning mission would be enforced, and an important node at which strategic warning information would be converged. It could be replaced by:

- Placing an additional burden on the NIO/SP, NIO/CF, and NIO/USSR-EE;

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- Creating an NIO for Strategic Warning; or
- Providing the SWO with a staff.

There are difficulties in all these, but the NIO/SW is the most attractive.

As compared with Model D, Model E with the NIO/SW would:

- Be less expensive, as SWS positions could be used to provide the staff positions called for in the agencies and under the DCI.
- Provide somewhat less attention to the narrow strategic warning mission.
- Have slightly less "Community" flavor.
- Be somewhat simpler in structure and function.

III. ISSUES

20. In the preceding section five broad organizational structures were discussed; each represents a different compromise among the policy issues that await early decision. In the following sections each of these policy issues is discussed in its own right. They are, however, interrelated and cannot be decided in isolation.

A. Warning Issues

21. The HPSCI recommends, "That the DCI provides a focus for warning leadership in the community, which may require appointment of a special assistant for warning." Most observers agree there is such a need, but not all agree about where to lodge the focus function and about its forms. How these are decided will largely determine the balance struck between two sets of competing demands. The first set is how to balance the demands that arise from military requirements against those that arise from

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the broader needs of the President and his foreign policy advisers. The second set is how to balance the attention given to analysis against that given to collection. Current analytic weaknesses are of more immediate concern from a warning viewpoint. But, collection involves far more resources; errors there can waste a lot of money. Also, tasking collectors in a crisis will present some contentious decisions.

22. Leadership can be placed in:

-- O/DCI (Models D and E)

Pro -- Symbolic of importance of warning.

-- Ready access to DCI.

-- Clearly a Community position.

Con -- DCI spread too thin to give it attention.

-- Could be perceived as subverting chain of command.

-- O/DDCI (Models D and E)

Pro -- Symbolic importance still there.

-- Moderate access to DCI.

-- Lowest point at which collection and analysis chains of command come together.

Con -- Could be perceived as subverting chain of command.

-- O/DD/NFA (Model B)

Pro -- Warning is largely an analytic problem and here's where the assets are.

Con -- Tendency for Defense to see this as a "CIA" position.

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- Relatively reduced access to collectors, especially for planning crisis management preparations.
- In-house coordination a problem.
- O/DD/CT
 - Pro -- Seen by Defense as more "Community" than DD/NFA.
 - Here is where control of collection assets used in crisis management will be exercised.
 - Con -- Reduced access to analysts who are primary warning source.
 - In-house coordination a problem.
- O/DD/RM
 - Pro -- Short of DCI the Deputy most seen by observers from outside CIA as "Community."
 - Has expertise to examine programs and evaluate efforts.
 - Con -- Has direct control of no analytic or collection tasking assets.
 - Assignment of this function would require broadening charter somewhat.
- Defense Department (Model A)
 - Pro -- Access to elaborate DoD I&W mechanisms.
 - Con -- Split responsibility to DCI and SecDef.
 - Lack of access to DCI and political analysis.
 - Will not be seen as Community.

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-- Or it can be split. (Model C) One possibility is to split responsibility between DD/NFA and DD/CT. The factors arguing for or against any such split are:

Pro -- Warning and crisis management cross existing organizational responsibilities. So putting focal point under any one Deputy (except DDCI) will do violence to the existing chain of command.

Con -- Splitting the function will be seen by most observers as reducing the importance attached to fulfilling the warning function.

23. A secondary question is what form the leadership should take. Should it be lodged in an individual (and perhaps an assistant), an interagency committee, or an operating organization of up to 25 people? This turns out not to be a choice, however. Any individual with staff responsibility under the DCI for warning is going to need some sort of interagency committee or working group through which to coordinate Community activities. And a committee is going to need a chairman. (It is generally agreed that such a committee should be managerial and should not be involved in the substantive process of warning.) Further, any operating organization will have to be headed by an individual who serves as the DCI's "leader" or answers to the leader. The question then is really whether the individual needs to be backed up by such an organization, as by a rejuvenated SWS in Models A and D, or by an NFAC center in Model B.

Pro -- Such a staff can do independent warning analysis.

-- Can perform an effective devil's advocacy role in the Community.

-- Provides locus of responsibility for producing the warning message.

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Con -- Costly.

-- Problem keeping such a group relevant.
They tend to become isolated and moribund.

-- Competition with line organizations.

24. A cross-cutting question is the breadth of the Community warning effort. Should it deal with all major developments of concern to national policymakers (Models B and C), only with military attacks on the US or its allies (present system), or something in between (Model A)? One can also visualize a hybrid system in which broad warning issues are treated one way and narrow issues another (Models D and E). Such a hybrid is inevitable as a practical matter if there is to be a class of warning problems on which special techniques and talent are to be brought to bear, because there will always be some warning problems that lie beyond the pale defined by resource limitations. Therefore, the question reduces to, "What warning problems should be subjected to special formal warning procedures and who should operate them?"

25. One can subject one or more of the following warning problems to special procedures.

-- Military attacks on the US or its allies by the...

...Warsaw Pact ...PRC

...North Korea ...Others?

-- Situations that might lead to a US confrontations with...

...USSR ...Others?

...North Korea

Which of these or other problems to subject to special procedures involves balancing the extra assurance of producing a warning which is implicit in using more formal procedures on and devoting more resources to these problems against the

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overall cost and effectiveness of the Community warning system and against the fact that most of the "likely" (not necessarily most dangerous) events of which national policy-makers would want warning are too diffuse and numerous for application of a highly structured approach.

26. Having defined the limits above one then asks, "How to do it?" There are several options.

- Make Defense the DCI's executive agent for narrowly defined warning tasks.
 - Pro -- Most of the structured formal warning procedures are already under DoD auspices and the main impetus for such work comes from military commanders.
 - Con -- This is unlikely to work except for warning of war and in any case will not be seen as a Community function. The man in charge will inevitably be torn between two loyalties.
- Assign the narrowly defined warning tasks to an organization of 1-2 dozen people, depending on the definitions used. In effect this is to keep or reinvent the (SWS). In general, this gives a greater Community flavor to the exercise without interrupting the good work that Defense is doing, but it is more costly and runs the risk of becoming moribund. If one goes this route the specific arguments for and against keeping the SWS as an entity are:
 - For -- The SWS is the most significant Community structure linking various agencies, notably CIA and Defense, in the warning field. It has value as a symbol of the DCI's continuing commitment to helping Defense solve what it sees as its warning problem.
 - Against -- The SWS is widely perceived by analysts as moribund and irrelevant. It will carry this image into any new

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warning program, in effect, requiring it to live down its reputation, something a new entity would not have to do. Furthermore, dispersing the SWS would ease the problem of providing the positions for a community network of Agency warning referents.

-- Assign all warning tasks to Community line organizations, i.e., use the same procedures for all warning problems:

Pro -- Properly challenged and disciplined line organizations can do the whole job, and at much less expense than other approaches. Left to its own Defense will provide structured approaches to the most serious warning problems.

Con -- This approach is most likely to fail because of ingrained habits of thought.

27. Two of the essential functions of a warning system are the discipline by which the Community is kept sensitive to the warning mission and the challenge to complacent analysis that comes from "thinking ominously." Note that these are needed for broad warning issues as well as narrow. The question is what organizational instruments to use for these functions in what combination. (Models A-E present a variety) The choices are:

-- Line managers. This is the least expensive and is integral to the chain of command. Whatever additional arrangements are made, managers will always be responsible. But relying on them alone provides no independent check. Moreover, managers have many other concerns and can be as much prisoners of conventional thinking as their analysts.

-- NIOs. This is also inexpensive and not disruptive of normal operations. NIOs are in a better position than managers to see

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the forest rather than the trees. They can provide a low-key way of keeping the system on its toes. But they are also very busy and can become wedded to lines of analysis. Moreover, the informality of the NIO approach risks uneven application.

- An "ombudsman for warning." The responsible staff officer under the DCI can serve this function. He will not cost much, but he can, again in an informal way, bring his weight to bear at key points in the system. He will be spread very thin if substantive responsibilities are added to his managerial ones, however, and he will have to be an individual of extremely broad ability and experience. A court of appeal standing outside the chain of command is likely to create frictions.
- An operating staff. This would extend the ombudsman concept by providing the resources for independent analyses. It would provide a stronger discipline and challenge, but it would be quite expensive and would cause great friction by appearing to compete with line current intelligence. Many of the arguments relating to the SWS are applicable here.

B. Crisis Management Issues

28. As noted above, the warning issues are the primary ones at this time. But shaping the management structure for warning and for crisis will be difficult without decisions on two issues: whether we should attempt to resurrect the "national task force" and where you locate your task force in crisis. Both should be settled before any major crisis hits us.

29. We assume on the basis of experience that you will need a task force of analysts to prepare briefings, periodic situation reports, and assessments for you and your primary customers. (Under the new organization such a task force will, of course, contain collection tasking elements as well.) You can do this in four ways:

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- A truly "national" task force, jointly manned by the Community agencies and producing a single periodic situation report for the entire national security establishment.
- Pro -- Provides the single comprehensive situation report that NSC has in the past requested.
 - Maximum concentration of expertise.
 - Fully integrated Community effort.
- Con -- Departmental imperatives mean each agency will produce its own sitrep anyway.
 - Location a problem: some analysts will be deprived of files and support.
 - No agency likely to give up analysts when it needs them the most.
 - Command and coordination difficult, threatens loss of timeliness.
- An NFAC task force with INR & DIA representation with some interagency participation.
- Pro -- Provides NSC with national sitrep in substance if not in title.
 - NFAC has balanced political, military, economic capabilities across the board.
 - Fully under DCI control, but able to tap other agencies.
 - No disruption of existing organizations and support arrangements.
 - Timeliness not a problem.
 - Independent of policy considerations.

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- Con -- Departmental sitreps will still be issued.
- Coordination may be difficult.
- Liaison arrangements heavily dependent on personalities and communications.
- A variant on the above, centered on INR or DIA rather than NFAC. The arguments are the same except for:
 - Pro -- More "Community" in nature.
 - More closely in tune with diplomatic or military operations (but not both).
 - If in DIA, stronger military input.
 - Con -- Did not work well when tested in DIA.
 - Two masters problem--not fully responsive to DCI.
 - DIA cannot supply political or economic input, State cannot supply military and weak on economic. Both thin on low priority regions.
- An NFAC task force issuing an independent NFAC situation report. Arguments same as for second option except:
 - Pro -- Least messy administratively.
 - Most timely and responsive.
 - Tested and effective.
 - NFAC is sole organization dedicated to support of NSC.
 - Con -- Preeminence of CIA's departmental sitrep will depend entirely on its being superior to others.

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- No pretense to national status.
- No access to other agency contributions.
- Lack of coordination may lead to errors.

30. The task force report went at some length into the location question and summarized its analysis in the attached table.

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~~for~~ Robert. R. Bowie



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*Use of EOB assumes presence of N/FAC liaison officers in the EOB office.

EOB*	Pentagon	CIA Langley	
←	↓	→	Anal. Talent Available
→	↓	←	DCI Access to Policymakers
↓	←	→	TG Members/DCI Mutual Rapport
←	→	→	Communications w/ Other Organizations
←	→	↓	Access to Collectors
→	←	→	Focusibility to DCI Problems
←	→	→	Space
Proximity to President & NSC	Elaborate display & Comms facilities	Analytic Talent DCI/TG rapport	Major +
Space No in-place talent	Conflicting demands in military-related crisis	Location	Major -

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Summary Comparison of Warning Systems

	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>B¹</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>
	<u>Fix the Present System</u>	<u>NFAC Warning Center</u>	<u>NFAC SWO</u>	<u>Community Coordination</u>	<u>Hybrid</u>	<u>Hybrid, No SWS</u>
General Perception of Priority DCI is Attaching to Warning	Lowest	Moderate	High	Moderate	Highest	High
Community Aura	Moderate	Low	Lowest	Highest	High	Moderate
Likely Defense Perception of Treatment of Its Equities	Moderate	Low	Lowest	High	Moderate	Low
Fit with the Overall Community Structure	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Responsiveness to DCI	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	High	High
Ability to Challenge and Discipline Community	Lowest	High	Moderate	Low	High	Moderate
Cost Relative to Current Arrangements	Low	High	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Low
Emphasis	Emphasizes avoiding further organizational changes	Emphasizes analytic aspects of warning	Modification of emphasis on analysis to eliminate staff	Emphasizes dissemination of collected information to appropriate parties	Emphasizes assuring coordination between collection and analysis	Modification of Hybrid to eliminate SWS

