


22 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group Members

SUBJECT : Draft TOR for the SWS

Comments on the draft SWS Terms of Reference received prior to today have been minor. DIA's suggestions, at enclosure, are significant, and are provided to you now so that you may review them prior to Friday's meeting.



/ Acting
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning

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This memo can be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment.

DIA review(s) completed.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



16 AUG 1979

S-0592/VP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING, CIA

SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Terms of Reference for the SWS (U)

1. (U) In accordance with NIO/W memorandum of 6 August 1979, subject: "Meeting on Friday, 17 August 1979," DIA provides the following comments on the draft Terms of Reference for the Strategic Warning Staff, enclosed with referenced memorandum.
2. (S) As a general comment, DIA believes that the draft Terms of Reference, if adopted, would involve the realignment to the SWS of functions which are being satisfactorily performed elsewhere in the community and give the SWS a charter which marks a radical departure from that of the past. DIA would be disinclined to concur with a change of the magnitude proposed without strong evidence that a need exists, and that the proposed change would satisfy that need. Specific comments follow.
3. (S) Reference paragraph 2, change as follows:
 - "2. The Staff should have three main functions:
 - a. To serve as a catalyst to community activities with regard to Strategic Warning.
 - b. To synthesize military, political, economic and scientific intelligence related to strategic warning, and to provide that synthesis to the remainder of the community as a catalyst and stimulus, but not as an alternative which would absorb any function now being performed elsewhere.
 - c. To conduct research on methodology for use by I&W analysts, and to provide the results of that research to the community."
4. (S) Reference paragraph 3, delete the word "conscience" in the first sentence and substitute "catalyst." Under 3, change the first underlined sentence to read "Alert NIO/W and the community to:" and the second tick mark under paragraph 3 to read:

"-- Reasonable hypotheses, not covered in other community publications, providing alternate explanations and short-term forecasts for situations of the

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threatening nature. These should be disseminated only to the intelligence community, not to consumers."

To the third tick mark under paragraph 3, add a sentence: "This is also a function of the NIO for Warning and the remainder of the community and not a unique SWS function." In the underlined portion following the third tick mark of paragraph 3, change sentence to read: "Produce, for NIO and the community, hypotheses on the course of major developments, strictly for dissemination within the community and not to intelligence consumers." In the last separate paragraph of paragraph 3, DIA does not understand the reference to "a useful model," and suggests that this particular sentence lacks meaning without such an understanding. The first sentence should be changed to read: "The objective is to give NIO/W an independent capability to stimulate...."

5. (S) With respect to paragraph 4, DIA does not understand the apparent assumption that the links with State/INR and CIA political analysis do not already exist. If the suggestion is for a private SWS-State/INR-CIA communications channel, DIA would obviously object. If the suggestion is that useful intelligence is being withheld from the remainder of the community with respect to warning situations, then the entire community should be made the recipient of such intelligence and not just the SWS staff. Finally, the paragraph makes no reference to DIA, although it does suggest that the SWS should be linked with the economic and military elements of INR and CIA. DIA presumes that this apparent oversight is based upon the assumption that the SWS, due to its collocation with the NMIC, already has a satisfactory link with DIA. However, DIA believes that the structure of the paragraph could lead the reader to judge that the link is unimportant. If the point of the paragraph should be that there must be, in a crisis situation or in any situation which appears threatening, full sharing of information by all Washington agencies concerned with warning and that a function of the SWS should be to assure that this exchange is planned for and will take place, DIA would agree that this might be an appropriate task to assign to the SWS but it is not an appropriate part of the SWS charter.

6. (S) With reference to paragraph 5, DIA desires a detailed explanation of what is intended. The major U&S Commands are by law incorporated into the national and military command system, and provision already exists for a continuous dialogue between Washington military staffs and U&S Commands. A function of DIA is to be sensitive to the needs of the field for information, and a detailed reporting system exists to assure a flow to and from the U&S Commands on intelligence. Accordingly, DIA could not agree with this paragraph as written without further and satisfactory explanation of the purpose and mode of the suggested dialogue.

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7. (S) DIA has similar difficulties with paragraph 6, which appears to suggest that SWS will take over functions presently performed by the NMIC, by the NIO for Warning, and by other agencies. DIA cannot concur with any portion of paragraph 6 as written.

8. (S) With respect to paragraph 7, DIA takes into account that most of DIA's effort, more than half of NFAC's effort, and a very high percentage of efforts of other intelligence agencies are already devoted to the military field. The suggestion that SWS should look upon itself as the only military research organization dedicated to the warning problem is, in DIA's judgment, misleading, because warning is specifically a function of the NMIC and there is a very extensive Department of Defense mechanism devoted to the warning problem. Further, because of the limited staff of the SWS, because of the talent and depth in other organizations, and because of the need for unfettered research, DIA questions whether the SWS could or should be developed to the level that could lead the community effort. DIA considers that this is too ambitious an undertaking for the SWS. DIA therefore disagrees with the recommendation that SWS should coordinate the national program and draft NIE's or other products. Because of the complexity of the warning problem and the obvious conflict of interest, DIA most strongly disagrees with the suggestion that SWS should draft any NIE with respect to U.S. warning capability.

9. (U) For similar reasons, DIA would disagree with the SWS functions outlined in paragraph 8.

10. (S) For the reasons which appear at various places above, DIA would disagree with paragraph 9, which does not take into account the other community arrangements for dealing with crises and warning situations. The nature of existing arrangements indicates that SWS would have great difficulty integrating its efforts with that of the remainder of the community under the concept proposed.

11. (S) With respect to paragraph 10, DIA recommends that the SWS be directly subordinated to the NIO/W. As written, the paragraph leaves much room for uncertainty as to the SWS subordination. DIA further recommends that the proposed Terms of Reference be discarded, and that the SWS continue under the Terms of Reference approved by the NFIB on 23 May 1979, as incorporated in DCID 1/5.

[Redacted Signature]

Acting Vice Director for
Foreign Intelligence

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