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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officers
FROM : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : Food for Thought

Attached are some questions for possible use in your
monthly warning meetings next week.



Richard Lehman

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Attachment

This memo can be downgraded to
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attachment.

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FOOD FOR THOUGHT

I. USSR: Fallout from the Intervention in Afghanistan

Soviet Perceptions of US Reactions: Brezhnev's Pravda interview suggests that the Soviets anticipate a sharper and more long-lasting decline in bilateral relations than occurred during the first six months of the Carter administration. If the Soviets have in effect written off prospects for serious dealings with the present administration, will they feel more disposed to respond to US retaliatory measures with countermeasures of their own? Alternatively, if Brezhnev's harsh rhetoric is a short-lived tactical response to the President's statements and actions, will the Soviets seek to contain the damage to bilateral relations?

Brezhnev's Authority: In view of Brezhnev's personal responsibility for foreign policy since early 1973, will events set in motion by the intervention impair Brezhnev's prestige and authority in the CPSU and encourage renewed challenges? Will Afghanistan become a political football in maneuvering in the coming succession contest?

TNF: What effect might post-intervention developments in East-West relations have on Soviet policy on NATO's TNF modernization? Was Moscow's rejection of the NATO offer to negotiate limitations on medium-range missiles in Europe prompted by the post-intervention climate, or was it part of Moscow's original scenario for opposing TNF? Is Soviet rejection aimed primarily at dividing the European allies from the US and exploiting Dutch, Belgian and West German SPD reservations and conditions?

Inter-German Relations: Might the Soviets and East Germans now be inclined to adopt stronger reactions to the TNF decision than they had intended prior to 25-27 December? Soviet and GDR spokesmen have warned that TNF could not only damage GDR-FRG relations but affect the situation in Berlin as well. Might Gen. Yepishev's visit to GSFG on 24-27 December have been related to imminent Soviet countermeasures in Berlin? Embassy Moscow has raised the possibility that the Western reaction to Afghanistan may cause the Soviets to "lash out with a counter reaction of their own" and suggested renewed attempts to terminate Allied patrols in East Berlin "might well be one such step."

Eastern European Nations: Might Soviet actions in Afghanistan cause increased apprehension among the East European leaders? Might their fears of Soviet intervention provide the spark for outbreaks of anti-regime demonstrations, in Poland, for example? How is the equation altered if Tito dies in the near future?

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II. Afghanistan

Pakistan Border: Do the Soviets believe that the Muslim insurgency cannot be contained or destroyed as long as the Afghan-Pakistani border remains open? How far are the Soviets prepared to go in pressing the Pakistanis to curtail Afghan insurgents' activities in Pakistan?

Military Aid to Pakistan: How will Moscow respond if Pakistan accepts a substantial increase in military assistance from the US and/or China? Will the Soviets play the "Baluchi card" by increasing support for Pathan and Baluchi independence or endorsing Babrak's advocacy of integrating Pakistani Baluchistan into Afghanistan?

III. Iran

Prospects for Khomeini: Are events moving closer to a catalytic turning point which could abruptly transform the hostage situation and the Khomeini regime's prospects? Do any of the following seem more likely than before?

- a. A showdown between Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council, on the one hand, and the embassy captors, on the other.
- b. A sharp escalation of the minorities' confrontation with Tehran; a declaration of independence by the Kurds or Azarbayjanis.
- c. Strong Iranian reaction to moves by the US and its allies to impose economic sanctions: Moinfar's renewed threat to cut off oil exports to any country which imposes sanctions; moves by the captors to place the hostages on trial as spies.
- d. Bolder Iraqi military probes or provocations, diplomatic initiatives to abrogate the 1975 Algiers accord, or break diplomatic relations.

IV. Iran-Iraq

Iraq is sharpening pressures on Tehran, and recent events have increased chances of an escalation of mutual hostility. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz has called for the return of "Arab territories" acquired by the Shah in the Algiers accord. If Iran, as expected, rejects Baghdad's demands for revision of the 1975 agreement, will the Iraqis apply even stronger pressures which might trigger a serious clash?

V. Syria

Initial assessments have concluded that the Baath congress and Assad's changes in the leadership will not be effective in arresting

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his declining political base and checking Sunni extremist attempts to overturn Alawite dominance.

What are the implications of these judgments for Assad's policies in the next three months? Will he sharpen his campaign against Arab "reactionary regimes"?

VI. Lebanon

Have the chances of strong Lebanese Christian reaction to the appearance of Iranians in southern Lebanon increased?

What are the Begin government's calculations regarding the pros and cons of "unleashing" Haddad's forces again?

What would be the likely impact on Syrian and Israeli policies of an escalation of fighting throughout southern Lebanon?

VII. The Yemens

The Alert Memorandum of 12 January covered the major warning issues. Additional questions might include:

- Who is now calling the shots in Aden? What is the present status of the traditional cleavage between Ismail's northerners and the southerners?
- What is Iraq's perception of recent events? Might the Iraqis attempt to forestall a PDRY takeover under the guise of a unity agreement by ordering the Baathists in the YAR to oust Salih? Would a Baathist coup attempt provoke PDRY military intervention in the YAR?
- Have chances increased that Salih will order an attack on Saudi forces occupying disputed territory along the undemarcated border?

Soviet Perceptions: How does Moscow assess the present situation? Which faction in Aden are the Soviets backing?

Ismail has long been regarded as a Soviet protege. Is this still valid?

How do the Soviets view their recent arms agreement with Salih in the context of unity negotiations?

Does the Soviet scenario call for jettisoning Salih in favor of backing a unified Yemen under PDRY control?

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Are events building toward an early showdown which could destroy the London agreement?

Nkomo's conciliatory statements on his return to Salisbury suggest an overture to Muzorewa for an election alliance or a coalition government after the elections against ZANU. How will ZANU react if its leaders adopt a "worst case" interpretation of these events?

IX. Vietnam-Kampuchea-China

The major judgments in the Alert Memo of 7 December seem to remain valid. The principal question for judgment is why the Vietnamese offensive in western Kampuchea has been delayed.

-- Did the Soviets persuade Hanoi to postpone the offensive because they feared that if it occurred concurrent with their intervention in Afghanistan, it might "overload the international circuits" in a potentially dangerous way by creating an impression of a concerted Soviet and Vietnamese military initiative? The Soviets would be concerned that such an impression might provoke an overreaction in the US, Western Europe, China and Japan.

-- Did the Chinese deliver a stiff ultimatum which caused a last-minute change in Hanoi's schedule--a blunt and persuasive threat of Chinese military reaction about which we have no knowledge at this point?

X. South Korea

Have the actions of the group of officers led by Maj. Gen. Chon Tu-hwan since the 12 December coup increased the chances of a confrontation with the NDP and student militants in the next three months?

Are opposition leaders preparing to challenge Chon and/or provoke a confrontation over the timing of constitutional revisions and elections?

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