


INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

TO: Warning Working Group

FINAL VERSION OF RESOURCE PAPER ATTACHED.

THANKS FOR ALL YOUR SUPPORT.

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INFORMATION

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO I&W

GENERAL FINDINGS

The mid-80s will be a period of increasing challenge from the standpoint of indications and warning intelligence. We must continue close surveillance of the military threat while improving our ability to deal with more subtle political and economic warning situations, especially in the Third World. To achieve that, we will have to make the warning process more systematic and better able to integrate political, economic and military intelligence into a comprehensive, national warning product.

Additional resources will be needed in particular:

-- Manpower - More trained personnel will be needed, especially experienced warning analysts. Programs must be undertaken now to provide the training and incentives needed to assure that such personnel are on hand in sufficient numbers.

-- Surge Capacity - We must have the ability to handle more than one crisis at a time. This requires the deliberate creation of capacity in excess of standing requirements for all phases of intelligence: collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.

-- More and Better HUMINT - The increasing emphasis on Third World warning problems, [redacted]

[redacted] will make HUMINT more necessary and valuable to warning problems.

-- Preparations for New Collection Systems - We must assure that our personnel are adequately trained and facilities adequately prepared to maximize the utility of expected new collection systems to the warning process.

-- Better Communications - More extensive, dedicated communication support is required if the widely dispersed elements of the Warning Community are to exchange information with the speed necessary for the mid-80s warning problem.

This paper does not treat the above subjects in sufficient detail to be characterized as programmatic. The Warning Working Group's involvement in resource matters has been rather small and our collective knowledge of such matters is sketchy. We would like that to change. To that end, we endorse here a recommendation made previously by this group that the current Strategic Warning Staff be reconfigured to provide staff support for management of the national warning system.

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO I&W

I. Introduction

This report provides the views of the Intelligence Community's Warning Working Group, membership of which is shown in the attachment, on the subject of resource requirements for Indications and Warning during the National Foreign Intelligence Program period, FY 1983-1987. It recaps the challenges we anticipate during those years, assesses our general capability to handle those challenges, and offers certain points which bear on development of the 1983-1987 NFIP. It is not a programmatic review. It does, however, treat general matters which underlie consideration of warning-related programs.

Some introductory remarks on the mission and nature of indications and warning are appropriate. I&W is that aspect of intelligence which seeks to identify impending threats to US interests and warn policymakers of such developments in sufficient time for meaningful counteraction. Its purview is not confined to simple warning of hostilities. Indeed, consumers generally expect we will provide warning of any sudden development--political, economic or whatever--that may significantly affect US interests. (See DCID 1/5, 23 May 1979, paragraph 1.A.) This has become known as the so-called "No Surprise Doctrine" and significantly expands the scope of the I&W mission.*

Several other characteristics of I&W should be noted:

- it deals with situations of the gravest potential consequence. It is difficult to imagine a more important intelligence judgment being rendered than warning of an impending strategic attack on the continental US.

*INR does not agree with a "no surprise" definition of warning, and therefore disassociates itself from Sections I and II of this paper which are based on such an approach to warning. This extremely broad definition tends to divert attention from the key warning mission--a possible attack on the US--by suggesting that other issues are of comparable importance. It also leads to wide-ranging, and in some cases ambiguous, program suggestions in Section III which we cannot fully endorse on the basis of I&W. For example, the recommendations related to surge and manpower could divert resources away from analysts who provide the assessments necessary for a warning system in favor of multiple, and perhaps competing, alert centers. Moreover, INR doubts that a National Warning System based on such a broad definition would be practical. Such a warning system would overlap current intelligence functions so much that it would appear likely to create far more management problems than it could solve.

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- It is the most highly visible form of intelligence, where so-called "intelligence failures" occur.

- It is the most time-sensitive form of intelligence, requiring high technology support and dedicated communications to meet the necessary time lines.

- It depends on the broadest possible data base, including access to not only all-source intelligence, but also privileged information on US or allied military operations, policy initiatives, etc. Without such total access, the warning analyst risks misinterpreting events, issuing an incorrect warning or failing to issue any warning.

- It covers a broad spectrum of threats, ranging from local riots which might endanger Military Airlift Command aircraft to the possibility of strategic attack itself.

- It is very difficult to manage centrally. Its mission overlaps other aspects of intelligence and is shared by all elements of the Community. It is managed differently by the different elements and its assets are spread through the CCP, CIAP, GDIP, et al.

Having attempted to clarify what I&W is, we should also note what it is not. I&W is not current intelligence. I&W concentrates on predicting significant developments affecting US interests whereas current intelligence is much more journalistic, reporting broad intelligence matters as they occur. I&W is also not tactical warning. The latter provides notice that an attack has already commenced, e.g., radar detection of a penetrating aircraft, whereas I&W seeks to warn of attack before it begins. Finally, I&W should be distinguished from crisis management, which transcends the intelligence field to policy formulation and command and control of friendly forces. The point is that, while I&W is distinct from all three of the above fields--current intelligence, tactical warning and crisis management--it is closely related in operation. It is a part of the same functional continuum, employs many of the same personnel and draws on many of the same resources. That adds to the problem referenced earlier regarding the difficulty of managing the I&W process centrally.

In sum, I&W is costly, complex, highly visible and probably the most important single task facing the Intelligence Community. We therefore believe this effort to address its resource requirements through the mid-80s is particularly well-advised.

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II. Warning Capabilities and Gaps in the 80s

The following highlights those geographic areas we expect to be of particular warning concern in the 1983-1987 time frame. We have included in the discussion of each area an evaluation of our capability to provide warning of impending threats in three functional areas: military, political, and economic. Although such judgments are necessarily impressionistic and subjective, they may prove useful as a starting point for projecting future needs. We have employed for this purpose a simple three point adjectival scale: "poor," "fair," and "good." Our ratings are made from the perspective of final product quality, and are not an assessment of any individual component or collection system.

The Soviet Union: The USSR will continue to be of primary I&W interest through the mid-80s. This entails a broad spectrum of threats ranging from limited adventures such as Afghanistan, through conventional attack on NATO, to allout strategic nuclear attack on the continental US. During this period, the Soviets will become a more difficult warning target. Their military readiness will continue to improve. Cover, concealment and deception (CC&D) will become more widespread, and the US-USSR strategic imbalance will likely peak during the mid-80s, possibly tempting Moscow toward more risky courses. As Brezhnev and his colleagues advance in age, the political succession issue and its implications for US policy will also become more important. Russian economic problems, including energy production and a proportionally smaller work force, will be more acute. The possibility of a major technological breakthrough--a "super weapon"--will continue to be with us. And the impact of technology transfers to the Soviet Union will become increasingly important.

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
Eastern and Western Europe: In Eastern Europe, the after effects of the Polish situation will continue to be felt into the mid- 80s. No matter how Warsaw (or Moscow) finally comes to grips with the liberalization process in Poland, there will be repercussions within the Pact. Western Europe will become increasingly independent of the US and our ability to perceive their role in any warning problem will decrease commensurately. The Western European inclination to view the Soviet-US relationship as separate from and not directly related to Soviet-European affairs will increase, as will the economic interdependence between Western Europe and the Pact. European dependence on raw materials from the Third World and the resultant economic vulnerabilities will persist.

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


25X1 The Middle East (North Africa to Syria/Jordan): The supply of oil to the West and Japan/Korea will continue to be the dominant issue in the Middle East, complicated by numerous other factors such as the ultimate fate of the Palestinians, the US commitment to ensure Israel's security, the potential intrusion of Soviet influence, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the split between the more moderate and radical Arab nations, the possibility of nuclear proliferation and the general political instability. These will all combine to make the Middle East a highly volatile warning problem through the mid 80s.



Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean (including the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf States): Potential warning problems in this area are also numerous. Fragility of many of the governments in the area, the criticality of Persian Gulf oil, intra-regional entanglements, Islamic fundamentalism, nuclear proliferation, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and a myriad of other factors combine to make this a most volatile area from a warning point of view.

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25X1 Africa South of the Sahara: Political turmoil will continue in this region. The Soviets will seek to expand and consolidate their influence. The stability of new regimes will be debilitated by racial and tribal strife as well as national confrontations. Growing competition for mineral resources by the developed nations will further complicate Africa's problems in this area.



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Korea: We must be prepared to handle the North Korean military threat into the mid-80s [redacted]

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China: The Sino-Soviet struggle will continue as a major warning concern. Problems with Southeast Asia including insular Southeast Asia may increase. Taiwan is also a matter which bears watching.

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Southeast and Northern Asia: The Soviets and Chinese will continue to compete for influence. [redacted]

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[redacted] are danger points--"intelligence failures waiting to happen."

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Prospects for Singapore and Malaysia are somewhat better. [redacted]

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The Western Hemisphere: Social and economic unrest south of the Rio Grande, in particular Central America, will continue to breed opportunity for Soviet and Cuban penetration. Although there appears no immediate threat, the long term stability of [redacted] will be matters of warning concern in the mid-80s.

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In summary, our tour d'horizon of mid-80s warning problems makes it abundantly evident that I&W will become generally more difficult during 1983-1987. We see no area, with the possible exception of China, where a relaxation of effort appears acceptable. We must continue to monitor the set-piece military threats--the Soviet/Warsaw Pact, Korea, USSR-China, the Middle East, etc. -- while improving our ability to deal with more subtle political and economic situations, especially in the Third World.

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III. Programmatic Implications

Having reviewed the various challenges we anticipate through the mid-80s, we offer the following observations bearing on resource allocations. These are not listed in priority order. We have indicated those of particular concern with a statement to that effect.

- Timely Introduction of New Systems: We are relying heavily on programmed improvements in collection and processing systems achieving IOC on schedule to monitor the increased Soviet threat. Delays in their introduction or possible initial unreliability could seriously affect our warning effort. We therefore recommend retaining present or redundant systems until the new or improved systems perform consistently, adequately, and reliably.

- Surge Capacity: We must bolster our I&W surge capacity. The need to handle two or more developing crises is a current and growing problem. We must, therefore, have reserve manpower, reserve collection capability and reserve system support, and it must be truly reserve capacity. [redacted]

[redacted]

- Preparation for New Systems: The introduction of new collection and processing systems during the mid-1980s will provide I&W major new capabilities. We must be prepared to accept and integrate the data from those systems into the warning process and make full use of them from the very outset. Adequate training must be provided. In particular, we are not satisfied that enough is being done to prepare the Community for the [redacted] New ADP capabilities such as machine readable message formats, automated report handling and easily accessible common data bases are needed as well. Without careful preparations at this stage, the new data flow could exceed our ability to analyze it. We consider this a very significant requirement.

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- More and Better HUMINT: [redacted]

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- that HUMINT can contribute to the warning problem more effectively by emphasizing quality over quantity reporting;

- that the usefulness of HUMINT to the warning problem needs to be improved through greater timeliness; and

- Communications: The very life-blood of I&W analysis is the ability to communicate rapidly and effectively, even under crisis conditions. This means the creation of separate, dedicated communication nets for I&W.

[redacted] Improved communications facilities are fundamental to improved cooperation among Community analysts and an improved analytical product.

- Broadened Clearance Levels: Closely related to the matter of communications is the need for more balanced security restrictions. We recognize the difficulties of providing a common set of clearances. Nevertheless, we believe that I&W must be given certain privileged access if it is to perform its mission.

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- Manpower: As in most aspects of intelligence, I&W has developed a manpower shortfall. We believe it is more pronounced in the warning field because a single position in a 24-hour warning center must be filled by no less than five personnel. Moreover, most personnel elect to spend only the minimum necessary tour on shiftwork, necessitating considerable training for replacements and causing frequent manning gaps. A particularly difficult subset of this general problem is the shortage of properly trained warning analysts. Years are required to develop a senior analyst. Attention must be paid now to training, career patterns, and the necessary incentives to have analysts remain within the warning field. We

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- Analytical Skills: Closely related to the need for more analysts is the need to maintain a minimum base of essential analytical skills.

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AS US interests in these areas expand, these shortages in analytic specialists will intensify. At the same time we must develop more generalists on the Soviet Union. In the latter area, our analytic community has tended to become overspecialized for warning purposes. This should not be interpreted as an argument for fewer Soviet analysts, but rather a better balance of analysts capable of addressing broad warning problems. In all cases, we must sensitize our analytic community to the warning aspects of the information they analyze and expose them to topics such as cognitive learning to guard against being blinded by their mind set.

- Methodology: The mid 80s will require faster, more accurate, and more comprehensive treatment of data by warning analysts. This need not involve ADP. More rigorous procedures for considering alternative hypotheses can be devised without the assistance of a computer. Where ADP can be applied, we should take every opportunity to do so. Basic work has already been done with such techniques as hierarchical modeling and decision analysis. This should be continued. Two points are germane here: First, ADP is much more amenable to the problems of the military warning analyst than his political counterpart. The latter deals with much more subtle matters and our expectations for the utility of ADP in this area must be more modest. The second point has to do with the need for manual backup. We believe a written, conventional data base constitutes a valuable insurance policy. A scaled down program analogous

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to the long defunct National Intelligence Survey could produce the needed effort. It would offer the advantages of being fully reliable, mobile enough to be taken anywhere, and its preparation and upkeep could be designed to offer a training experience.

- National I&W Management: Improvements have been made in the management of our national I&W capability over the past several years.

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The problem is exacerbated by the disparity of agencies, organizations, collection systems, etc., which participate in one way or another in the warning process. While the NIO/Warning theoretically is at the center of this activity, his office has not been staffed adequately in nonsubstantive, management-related areas. We therefore endorse our previous recommendation that the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) be reconfigured to provide the needed management support to NIO/W. This will enable him to discharge more actively his responsibilities vis-a-vis budgetary matters and to move toward a "national warning system", building on that which exists within the Department of Defense. It should also give him the wherewithal to improve the integration of political and economic with military intelligence, develop a systematic approach to focusing the I&W contributions of the Intelligence Community, and generally create a more effective national warning apparatus.

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ATTACHMENT

The Intelligence Community Warning Working Group was established by DCID 1/5. Its membership is as follows:

Richard Lehman, Chairman, NIO/W

25X1 [redacted] DIA

25X1 [redacted] NSA

Robert A. Martin, State/INR


Peter C. Oleson, OSD

Richard J. Kerr, CIA

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