

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

DDI #565-82

22 January 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

25X1

FROM : [Redacted]  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Intelligence Support to Crisis Management

1. The attached paper is the latest in a series of drafts prepared by a member of the Intelligence Community Staff. While sharing his concern that we may not be as fully prepared as we should be to support the DCI in crisis situations, I do not agree with this paper.

2. This paper addresses the issue of a Community SITREP for "senior national consumers" without any discussion of what other situation reports may be contemplated or in existence. This concept paper assigns a situation report drafting responsibility to the NIOs that is at variance with the crisis role of the NIOs over the past eight years. The resources and the production responsibilities of the Directorate of Intelligence are not directly mentioned. There also is a reference to the NIO "shifting his flag" to DIA, NSA or State/INR that implies taking control or otherwise interfering with the responsibilities and prerogatives of those agencies. Finally, the author plans to circulate the concept paper at the NSC staff; an inappropriate move at this stage by the wrong DCI organization.

3. My judgment is that these issues need to be addressed, now, and by the two of you before the Community and the White House become involved. I recommend that you ask the DCI to restrain the IC Staff until we get a plan worked out here.

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Attachment

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*File*

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

19 January 1982

LDX TO:

Doug MacEachin  
OCO/CIA Hqs, Langley

*A*

[Redacted]

DIA/JSW  
Pentagon

*B*

[Redacted]

V-3/NSA

*F*

[Redacted]

Bob Martin  
PMT/State INR

*B*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*A*

NIO/W  
CIA Hqs, Langley

[Redacted]

INFORMATION

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

19 January 1982

Gentlemen,

The attached is a revised version of the concept paper I sent you last month, outlining how we might prepare a community crisis SITREP. With your concurrence, I plan to forward it to the NSC Staff as a "working level" community position. If it generates any interest there, we can pursue the matter in more detail.

I would appreciate your comments.

[Redacted]

IC Staff

[Redacted]

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INFORMATION

## A Concept for a Community Crisis Reporting System

**Purpose:** During a crisis, national decisionmakers must be provided information more rapidly and at more frequent intervals than conventional current intelligence publications allow. Specially created situation reports, or SITREPS, are issued to cover these crises. Their purpose is to apprise consumers of developments, interpret the meaning and impact of those developments, and convey whatever uncertainties exist about the situation. This concept paper describes how such a SITREP will be prepared for senior national consumers, i.e., that President or Vice President, their staffs, members of the National Security Council or members of the NSC staff.

**Initiation:** The Intelligence Community Situation Report will be initiated by the DCI either on his own cognizance or at the request of the White House, a member of the National Security Council, or the NSC Staff. It will be issued at a frequency specified by the DCI, depending on the nature of the crisis at hand and will generally follow issuance of an Alert Memorandum. On conclusion of the crisis, the situation report will be terminated by the DCI with the coordination of the official originally requesting it.

**Content.** Crisis reports will contain the following sections:

- o **Principal Developments:** A recital of the facts which have been reported to the Intelligence Community since the previous SITREP and the background necessary to put them in context.
- o **Analysis:** An interpretation of the meaning of those facts.
- o **Outlook:** Expectations for near term developments
- o **Collection Considerations:** A look at US/Allied collection posture, capability and problems. (This section will only report what collection is underway. It will not serve as a tasking mechanism.)
- o **Community Perspectives:** Differing CIA, DIA, NSA or State/INR views on any of the foregoing.

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Drafting - The cognizant NIO should be the principal drafter of the first three sections. The "Collection Considerations" section should be prepared by a representative of the IC Staff, and "Community Perspectives" will be prepared separately by the DIA, CIA, NSA, or State/INR, with DIA representing Service Intelligence elements. This section will be included exactly as submitted by the member agency.

Location - Personnel involved in the preparation of this report will not be centrally located but will remain with their parent agency. At the outset of the crisis, however, each agency will designate to the DCI which of its officials are authorized to represent it for crisis reporting. In this fashion the task group will be "decentralized" and connected only by electronic means.

Coordination - Crisis reports must be prepared in the most time-sensitive situations. Coordination inevitably slows the preparation process, so no Community-wide coordination will be required. All exceptions, reservations, footnotes, etc., will be expressed in the "Community Perspectives" section.

Preparation Sequence - The NIO will prepare the first three sections of the report and send them to Community members to insure their receipt at least one hour in advance of the expected release time. Agencies will review those sections and submit comments for inclusion under "Community Perspectives" within the prescribed time. Final release of the finished SITREP will be by the NIO or another official designated by the DCI.

Communications - Community members are authorized use of all communication links except the NOIWON. This net must be maintained open for alert center requirements on other areas of the world.

Staff Support - The NIO preparing the report will act as a Community figure and, as such, is authorized to consult with or request assistance of any Community element, within the limits of the above provisions. In practice, the NIO's location at Langley will make him largely dependent on CIA resources for support. If, however, the NIO should decide that advantage is to be had by shifting his "flag" to DIA, NSA or State/INR, it shall be the responsibility of that agency to provide the necessary office space, secretarial assistance and communication support.

Post Mortem - A post mortem would be required for every crisis SITREP situation declared.

Distribution - This SITREP is not intended for wide dissemination. It will be restricted to US national policymakers and principal military commanders. This is intended as a measure to allow increased candor in the report and to accommodate more restrictive security compartments and caveats. This SITREP will therefore not replace any existing SITREPS.

General - This SITREP is intended to be a report prepared by senior officials for senior officials. Agency heads or their immediate representatives should be involved. The report should be brief, on an appropriate level of generality, and tailored to the needs of the national policymaker.

Implementation - This concept would be implemented by DCID.

**SUBJECT: A Concept for a Community Crisis Reporting System**

**Distribution:**

5 - see LDX list      1 - ICS Registry

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(19 Jan 82)

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