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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

31 August 1982

NOTE FOR: NIO/GPF

FROM : A/NIO/W

The book reviewed in the attachment
may have relevance to you and the drafters of
NIE 11/12-82, Military Reliability of the
Warsaw Pact Allies.



Attachment:

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25X

Flowerree, Charles C. and Victor L. Issraelyan, "Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective," Occasional Paper 29, Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, February 1982, 32 pp. Summarized by Sandra Daugherty, SAFAAR. (82-32)

(Note: Issraelyan is a member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USSR Representative to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Flowerree serves as a senior advisor in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)

The 1979 Soviet-US draft treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons defines such weapons as: any device or radioactive material, including any weapons or equipment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of disseminating the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

Flowerree's paper chronicles radiological weapons control efforts by the UN since 1948. According to Flowerree, early interest in the issue was "sporadic." The problem did not assume any great significance until the early 1970s, when great quantities of radioactive waste began to accumulate as a by-product of nuclear energy programs. Negotiations since that time have dealt primarily with two aspects of the issue: "(1) the definition of radiological weapons, and (2) the question of whether attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power stations, constituted radiological warfare."

Issraelyan, a physician, focuses on the biological aspects of radiological warfare. He discusses the physical properties of radioactive waste, stressing the fact that "the development of radiological weapons would result from military or political (or both) considerations and in no way depends on specific characteristics of a radioactive material."

Both authors address the skeptics who contend that radiological warfare is improbable. According to Flowerree, while no operational capability for radiological weapons existed at that time, their use against North Korea was proposed by Douglas MacArthur in 1951. Such use was also briefly considered by the US against North Vietnam in the early 1960s. Issraelyan suggests that arguments against the practicality of production and transport of radiological weapons are "short-sighted."

Opposing ideologies aside, Issraelyan and Flowerree agree that the problem of radiological weapons control warrants far more attention than has been evident to date. In their view, the time to set controls in motion is now, before development and proliferation of such weapons takes place. Firm commitments in this area could mark the beginning of a new and successful era of arms control negotiations.

Johnson, A. Ross, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1982, 182 pp., \$19.50. Summarized by Laura Hutchinson, SAFAAR. (82-32)

(Note: This book is the product of research conducted under the National Security Strategies program of Project AIR FORCE at the Rand Corporation.)

The authors present an historical overview of the military establishments of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland and trace the postwar development of military relations between the USSR and the Northern Tier. By analyzing the different institutional histories of these East European military establishments, they highlight Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities that warrant closer Western attention. The authors are distressed that the study of the East

European contribution to Soviet military power has been neglected: "Apart from a few West German books on the East German military...there is not a single Western book devoted to an East European military establishment." Therefore, they attempt to put into perspective the unique role of each Northern Tier country within the Warsaw Pact by addressing such key issues as the extent of Communist Party control over the military, the tensions that exist between the national military elites and the USSR, and the loyalties and professional skills of the officer corps. Also included are several appendices presenting an outline of the structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and selected data on the Northern Tier military capabilities and expenditures.

The authors note that the formal Warsaw Treaty Organization, formed in 1955, was primarily a political alliance. Even though the military functions of the Warsaw Pact were strengthened during the 1960s, the alliance still lacked the functional military organs and integrated command and control systems such as NATO had created. They point out that the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a watershed event, marking the development of multilateral military relationships in the Soviet bloc and demonstrating the Soviets' ability to mobilize loyalist allies. However, the invasion was not cost-free for the USSR, as the morale of the Czech officer corps was destroyed and "soul-searching" within the Polish and East German military establishments began.

The Polish armed forces, the authors contend, have evolved into the most modern of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military establishments. They call attention to the depth of national tradition, anti-Sovietism, and pro-Western orientation that have existed within the Polish military since its inception. Despite this strong nationalist sentiment, the authors make clear that the Polish military is viewed by Moscow as capable of providing a significant increment to Soviet military power in Europe.

In contrast to the Polish military, the East German military lacks a national tradition to embrace. It is a young organization and has not experienced the internal conflicts prevalent within the Polish and Czechoslovak armed forces. Because the GDR's armed forces were developed as a military instrument by the USSR, the relationship of the East German elites to the Soviets has been one of direct subordination. According to the authors, the Soviets probably have more confidence in the reliability of the East German military than in any other Northern Tier armed forces.

The Czechoslovak military lost its autonomy during the 1950s when the Soviets began to control policy and planning. Consequently, national sentiments started to emerge and were vocalized by the officer corps. When the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, the officer corps began to disintegrate and all reform movements within the military ceased. The authors contend that Czechoslovakia has not yet recovered from this trauma. Its military has not regained its pre-invasion size and suffers from a shortage of trained professionals. Therefore, the Soviets must skeptically view the dependability of the Czechoslovak military in a European contingency, they argue.

Because of the distinct institutional histories of each Northern Tier military establishment, the authors reach several conclusions about the Soviets' ability to utilize these armed forces in a European war. They contend that all three countries are prepared to participate in a rapid, massive, offensive strike into NATO territory and can be relied upon by the Soviets (although the Czech contribution is questionable). The authors reiterate that the Warsaw Pact is an instrument of Soviet hegemony and the Soviets expect all Northern Tier armed forces during wartime to combine with Soviet forces under the direction of the Soviet High Command. However, tension between East European military elites and the Soviets is likely to rise if the Soviets continue dominating all Warsaw Pact institutions, planning, and doctrine. The authors believe that the Soviets are aware that nationalist sentiments can quickly reemerge within the East European officer corps; this will influence Soviet perceptions of the reliability of the East European military elites under wartime conditions.

The authors do not fail to note the significance of the assumption of supreme political power by the Polish military in 1981. The Polish crisis dramatized the inherent vulnerabilities in the kinds and level of Soviet reliance on East European military forces. Because the Polish officer corps was preoccupied with enforcing martial law at this time, they point out that it was inconceivable that the Soviets could have counted on the Polish army in the event of a European conflict. The Soviets still must solve the dilemma that was reemphasized by this crisis: "Should the USSR rely on uncertain East European military capabilities or devote more of its own military resources to the region?"

Foot, Peter, "Problems of Equity in Alliance Arrangements," Aberdeen, Scotland: Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, No. 23, Summer 1982, 43 pp. Summarized by Kathleen Anderson, SAFAAR. (82-32)

(Note: Foot is a Research Fellow with the Centre for Defence Studies.)

For more than three decades, the members of the Atlantic Alliance have grappled with the issue of equity in burden-sharing. At the June summit meeting in Bonn, the leaders pledged to "continue to give due attention to fair burden-sharing and to possibilities for developing areas of practical cooperation." Foot finds this declaration of intent inconsistent; he reasons that the concept of "fair burden-sharing" may be at odds with or even preclude the Allies from "developing areas of practical cooperation" so long as "equity" implies the financial aspects of membership without reference to achieving Alliance objectives.

Foot points out that using "equality of sacrifice" as the historical measure of burden-sharing entraps the Allies in a "numbers" game. Statistical analysis leads to a preoccupation with budgetary inputs. This focus, he asserts, distracts the NATO community from its real objective--the output of defense capability. He also discounts the "benefits" received and "ability to pay" approaches to equality of sacrifice as threatening the members' freedom of action.

In the late 1970s, NATO decreed the "3 percent solution"--a general commitment to increase military spending by three percent per year in real terms. Foot describes this agreement on "equiproportionate" increases as "another turn on the burden-sharing carousel" which has not been successful in reducing tensions because perceived inequalities were not removed and no provision was made for non-quantifiable considerations.

The DoD studied the efficacy of "equiproportionate" increases near the end of the Carter administration, though Secretary Weinberger presented the Report on Allied Commitments to Defense Spending to Congress in March 1981. Foot characterizes the Weinberger report as "the culmination...of three decades of intra-Alliance wrangling" and as "the product of the ability-to-pay school of equity." He cautions that, while the report seems to demonstrate that the European Allies measure up to the requirement of equity, the DoD made no attempt to resolve the issue of non-financial contributions to the common defense. He also stresses that a nation could increase defense spending by three percent without improving its own security or its contribution to NATO's military effort.

In a positive vein, Foot notes that the Weinberger report reassured Americans that their Allies are carrying their share of the load and, more importantly, it directed attention to the fact that financial criteria should not be the sole determinant of equity.

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Foot proposes a fresh approach--that burden sharing be measured by equality of effort, a concept emphasizing "not what Allies are paying but what they are doing." He states that equity in Alliance arrangements will have meaning only when expressed in terms of the organization's objective--security--and suggests a reassessment of the Alliance itself would be healthy. Four areas which should be studied as part of such a reassessment include: the provision of territory; the amount of host nation support; manpower considerations; and extension of military and economic aid to non-NATO countries.

In sum, Foot argues that "equality of effort" is a more constructive way to measure the use of resources because it centers around collective endeavors. Dividing the labor, roles and responsibilities among NATO members, he suggests, would afford the Alliance an opportunity to eliminate duplication of effort and to exploit the special expertise of its members.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Pearce, Frank, Last Call for HMS Edinburgh: A Story of the Russian Convoys, NY: Atheneum, 1982, 200 pp., \$14.95.

(Note: Pearce is the author of six books, including The Ship That Torpedoed Herself.)

During World War II, along a two-thousand-mile convoy route through the Arctic Ocean from Iceland to Murmansk, men of the British Royal Navy fought and died in a monumental struggle to transport supplies to their beleaguered Russian allies. Pearce, himself a veteran of the "Gateway to Hell," describes the horrors of a sea war pitting merchant ships and escort vessels against two formidable aggressors--the Germans and the icy Arctic.

One such escort vessel was the British battle cruiser HMS Edinburgh. Pearce recounts the last days of that gallant ship, from the first German torpedo attack on 30 April 1942 to the final blow on 2 May which took her to the bottom--with a cargo of ten tons of gold bullion. Pearce's gripping chronicle includes the recollections of both survivors of and witnesses to the Edinburgh's death, men who endured that Arctic nightmare in defense of their freedom.

(The story of the Russian convoys did not end with World War II. In September 1981, after more than 39 years at the bottom of the sea, the treasure of the Edinburgh was recovered by the salvage vessel Stephaniturm.)