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**Terrorism:
The West German Response**

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A Research Paper

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Terrorism: The West German Response

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A Research Paper

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This paper was prepared by [redacted]

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[redacted] the Office of Global Issues and
[redacted] the Office of European Analysis.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Terrorist Issues Branch,
OGI [redacted]

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This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. [redacted]

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**Terrorism:
The West German Response** [Redacted]

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Overview

*Information available
as of 27 September 1982
was used in this report.*

Since the late 1960s, West Germany has fought a running battle with terrorism—first from the left, then from the right and from abroad. The terrorists of the left have been by far the most lethal and destructive and have caused dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in property damage. They have weakened their cause, however, by goading successive FRG Governments into establishing and refining a counterterrorism mechanism as sophisticated and capable as that of any democratic country in the world. [Redacted]

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The primary responsibility for combating terrorism lies in the Federal Interior Ministry. Its Federal Criminal Office (BKA) supervises and coordinates the national counterterrorism effort. Its Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) also plays an important role, as does its Federal Border Guard, in particular Border Guard Group 9 (GSG-9), the country's world-renowned counterterrorism strike force. In West Germany's strongly federal system, state counterparts of the BKA and BfV conduct most of the investigations and operations through which terrorists are captured. [Redacted]

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In addition, the FRG has been active internationally:

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[Redacted]

- The FRG is represented in several regional organizations that facilitate multilateral cooperation against terrorism: INTERPOL, the Club of Berne, the Trevi Group, and the Club of Five.
- West Germany has led efforts to forge international legal conventions that would outlaw certain acts of terrorism and mandate the punishment of terrorists no matter where they flee. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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The biggest danger, especially to US interests, remains leftist terrorism. The Red Army Faction (RAF) has been inactive

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[redacted]

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since last fall but should not be taken lightly [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] The Revolutionary Cells (RZ) have not been as deadly or destructive as the RAF

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[redacted]

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Rightist terrorists—chiefly unstable individuals acting on their own initiative—will remain a lesser threat; such terrorists only occasionally attack US interests. As for foreign terrorists, Yugoslavs, Syrians, and Iranians have been the most active recently, although they have generally targeted their own countrymen rather than German or US interests. [redacted]

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
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**Terrorism:
The West German Response** [Redacted]

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25X1 Since the late 1960s, West Germany has faced a continuing onslaught of terrorism—first from the left, then from the right and from abroad. The terrorists, especially those of the left, have caused dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in property damage. [Redacted]

In addition to domestic terrorism, West Germany finds itself an arena for violent factional struggles among foreigners. This brand of terrorism involves foreign policy as well as public safety concerns. At present the major threats involve groups from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Palestine. [Redacted]

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Successive FRG Governments have reacted strongly. Armored vehicles prowl the streets of Bonn and other major cities. Every post office and railway station prominently displays posters calling for the capture of the most wanted terrorists. [Redacted]

The Red Army Faction

The Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the most prominent of the West German terrorist groups, has been repeatedly crippled by government counterterrorist successes, only to rebuild and strike again. Over the years many of its most important members have died in confrontations with police or from suicide or accidents, and many others have been imprisoned. The group has not committed any attacks since the autumn of 1981, when it set off a car bomb at Ramstein Air Base and tried to assassinate US Army General Kroesen in Heidelberg.¹ This lull has given rise to two schools of thought among West German counterterrorism officials:

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[Redacted]. In one way at least, West Germany's terrorists have succeeded in textbook fashion: their acts of violence, destruction, and intimidation have had effects well beyond the objective amount of damage. [Redacted]

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The Terrorist Scene

Domestic terrorists from both the extreme left and the extreme right have been active in West Germany, but the leftists—generally members of the fringes of the so-called undogmatic new left—have been by far more numerous, more destructive, and more lethal. The leftists have concentrated their attacks on the West German establishment and on US military personnel and facilities. The rightists have focused on the large numbers of foreign workers in West Germany, although they have also found time to indulge their traditional anti-Semitism. The most destructive terrorist acts from the left have been conducted by organized groups, particularly by the Red Army Faction and its predecessor organizations and by the Revolutionary Cells. While organized for political and social goals, the rightists, by contrast, have tended to operate as individuals when engaged in terrorist activity. [Redacted]

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- That the capability of the RAF to mount successful major terrorist attacks is much lower now than in previous years and that the RAF must carry out a successful attack against a major target soon—say, before the end of this year—in order to maintain its credibility.
- That the RAF is as dangerous and capable as ever and that no one should be misled by its recent inactivity, since the RAF has in the past taken as long as 18 months to plan and set up major operations. [Redacted]

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Officials who hold the first view [Redacted]
[Redacted] point to the estimate

¹ State Police officials in Baden Wuerttemberg, where several bombings have recently taken place at US military installations, believe that the bombs were set by RAF sympathizers, not members of the hardcore. [Redacted]

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of the Federal Prosecutor that only 16 to 20 of the members prepared to commit assassinations remain at large, including only four of the hardcore leaders; they believe that if any two of these leaders were captured the RAF would be through. They also point to the fact that logistic support has been weakening as authorities have taken a harder line toward RAF supporters and sympathizers, members of the self-styled "legal RAF." Most tellingly, in their opinion, the RAF does not seem to have been able to recruit enough new blood to replace those of its members imprisoned or killed. [redacted]

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Officials who hold the second view (prominent in police circles, according to official statements made by national and regional police spokesmen) anticipate another major RAF attack sooner or later, probably against a high-ranking US military or German political figure. They point out that the hardcore membership of the RAF has never been very large and has always limited its recruitment to the numbers it needs to achieve specific goals or mount specific operations. Furthermore, they argue, the large antiwar, antinuclear, antiestablishment community of activists provides a pool of potential converts. [redacted]

We tend to agree with the latter view: it is much too early to count the RAF out, at least in the short term. The leaders who remain at large are tough, experienced, clever, daring, and committed. Moreover, judging by the sophistication of their operation against General Kroesen, as revealed by the subsequent investigation, they have adequate resources of money, weapons, and helpful foreign connections. [redacted]

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We believe, however, that the RAF's chances for survival over the long term are dubious. Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that terrorist groups that do not grow tend to wither away or be supplanted by more dynamic organizations. Owing in part to police successes, RAF membership has been shrinking; moreover, the brutality of RAF actions has deprived the group of meaningful public sympathy. [redacted]

[redacted] few West Germans identify with the fuzzy, millennialist goals of the

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RAF or with its perfervid support of radical Third World grievances and aspirations. [redacted]

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The latest RAF manifestos. [redacted]

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indicate that the RAF realizes that its activities have repelled a large portion of the general leftist congregation whose support it not only wants but needs. Yet, judging by its 1981 operations, its members have been unwilling—or perhaps psychologically unable—to change their approach. [redacted]

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Many of the RAF terrorists now in German prisons were captured in and extradited by other European countries—Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, and even Bulgaria. [redacted]

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The Revolutionary Cells

The Revolutionaere Zelle (RZ) are more broadly based and diffused throughout West Germany than the RAF. Also unlike the RAF, the RZ are careful to tie their terrorist activities to widespread political grievances, such as opposition to the construction of a new runway at Frankfurt's Rhein-Main Airport, to absentee landlords who charge poor tenants high rents, or to nuclear energy—whether used in weapons or to generate electricity. Finally, in contrast to the RAF, the RZ generally try to limit the violence of

² French traditions regarding the sanctity of political asylum have been embodied in French law, making it difficult to extradite foreign terrorists who claim political motivation. French Government policy, moreover, appears to offer foreign terrorists a trade-off: effective asylum in return for forbearance from terrorist activity on French soil. The tolerance for the activities of Spanish Basques in southern France exemplifies this policy. [redacted]

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their activities to a level their supporters and sympathizers can tolerate. For these reasons [redacted]

[redacted] the RZ may be more dangerous than the RAF in the long run, even though the RZ have not been responsible for nearly as many deaths as the RAF. [redacted]

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In the past [redacted] there was some movement between the ranks of the RZ and the RAF, but West German police and security analysts believe there are few connections now. RZ authors have publicly criticized the RAF as "boastful and arrogant" and have denigrated its obsession with Third World causes. [redacted]

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[redacted] in addition to their terrorist activities, the RZ participate in leftist demonstrations and other mass actions, where they foment militancy and incite violence without disclosing their identities as RZ members. [redacted] has blamed instigation by the RZ for the emergence of the Guerrilla Diffusa, self-recruited terrorists who lack any ideological underpinnings or strategic aims but engage in political violence because it is emotionally satisfying—as indicated by slogans such as "rebellion instead of revolution" and "self-actualization through aggression." [redacted]

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[redacted] according to their own published statements, the RZ lack central organization and direction, although information and ideas are exchanged at meetings of leftist groups such as the "Antifa" (antifascists), in leftist publications (particularly one called *Revolutionary Wrath*), and at hangouts such as bookstores, restaurants, and university student facilities. Each autonomous cell consists of only a few—perhaps five—members and maintains little or no contact with other cells. Aside from the few who have been identified by the police, RZ members do not have to live underground or abroad, in constant fear of identification and arrest. Much of the time they live normal lives, attending classes, holding down jobs, and participating in overt, legal political activity; consequently, some have dubbed them "weekend terrorists." When an RZ member is caught in the act or otherwise identified, he can reveal little beyond the membership of his own cell. [redacted]

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[redacted] They estimate that at present there are about 10 cells nationwide, with those in the area of Frankfurt and Wiesbaden the most active and dangerous. (C NF) [redacted]

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The attention paid by the RZ to security has operational drawbacks, since the small, autonomous cells are limited in the type of terrorist activities in which they can engage. This is not a problem for them at present because their policy is to attack local targets of opportunity, such as a branch bank, the office of a firm engaged in nuclear research, or a nearby US military shopping center. Although the RZ claimed responsibility for the murder of the Hessen Minister of Economics (indicating, however, that they meant only to wound him), in general their attacks have not caused casualties. Their favorite tactic has been a time bomb, set to explode during the middle of the night when no one is likely to be around. [redacted]

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The RZ game plan, as revealed in *Revolutionary Wrath*, calls for the number of cells to proliferate inexorably until there are so many and the support is so great that they will be able to establish a central coordinating structure strong enough to withstand government countermeasures. To this end, most RZ communiques close with the slogan, "Create Many Revolutionary Cells!" [redacted]

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Rightwing Terrorists

[redacted] between 50 and 150 of the 2,000 to 3,000 members of neo-Nazi and other rightwing extremist groups are capable of violent terrorist acts. Like their leftist counterparts, these extremists appear to have relatively easy access to weapons and explosives both in West Germany and in neighboring countries. The openness of their organizations compared with leftwing terrorist

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organizations, however, has enabled the West German authorities to conduct relatively successful investigations of their activities and to stifle any emergent terrorist factions before they really get going. Thus, the West Germans contend, and we agree, the primary danger from the right lies more in the unpredictability of individual members—or sympathizers—who act on their own initiative.³ [redacted]

In recent years, rightist offenses of all sorts—ranging from murders to slogans (“Out with foreigners!”) painted on walls—against foreigners, particularly Turks, have been growing in number much faster than offenses against the other traditional targets of rightists—Jews and leftists. The 11-percent increase in rightist offenses in 1981 over 1980 was attributable entirely to the increase in offenses against foreigners, which more than doubled. (According to the government’s 1981 estimate, of the country’s total population of 61.7 million, about 4.6 million—7.5 percent—are foreigners; 1.5 million are Turks.) Although only a small fraction of these offenses were terrorist acts, the trend has disturbed government officials including Interior Minister Baum, who noted that, “Hostility to foreigners begins with tasteless and slanderous jokes at the foreigner’s expense and ends with attacks on people’s lives.” [redacted]

The political organizations of the far right do not directly promote violence against foreigners. Their publications, however, indicate they believe that in the current climate of rising unemployment and slowing economic growth they have found an issue with strong appeal for many of the German people and that their drumbeating in favor of measures to hold down the number of foreigners will bring them increased political support, just as the leftists have gained support through their espousal of popular grievances. [redacted]

Foreign Terrorists

Yugoslavs. About 600,000 Yugoslavs live in the Federal Republic of Germany. Most of them are guest workers, whose remittances to their homeland are an

³ The most recent notable incident of rightwing violence occurred in Nuernberg in June, when an unaffiliated and evidently demented sympathizer of rightist causes shot up a bar frequented by black US soldiers. He killed two Americans and an Egyptian and wounded three other people before shooting himself to avoid capture by police. [redacted]

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Two Months in 1977

The following material is taken from appendix A, a chronicle of German terrorism during the year 1977. During September and October of that year, terrorism in West Germany crested at an unprecedented (and so far unrepeated) level of violence.

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2 September; Flensburg

*Bombing attack on the courthouse.
Perpetrator: a rightist extremist.*

2 September; Bergamo, Italy

*Bombing attacks on office of Allianz insurance firm and Mercedes-Benz showroom.
Claiming responsibility: RAF Kommando Petra Schelm.*

5 September; Cologne

Abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer, President of West German Employers Association; murder of his driver and three accompanying policemen.

Demand: Schleyer to be exchanged for 11 imprisoned RAF members, each to be given 100,000 deutsche marks (about \$45,000) and flown to country of his or her choice.

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Perpetrators: RAF Kommando Siegfried Hausner.

19 September; The Hague, Netherlands

Discharge of firearms at police officers during arrest of two RAF members; one policeman seriously wounded.

22 September; Utrecht, Netherlands

Discharge of firearms at police officers during

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- arrest of RAF member; one policeman killed, another seriously wounded; weapon used had been taken by the RAF in a holdup of a weapons dealer on 1 July 1977 in Frankfurt/Main.*
- 26 September; Bremen
A bank held up; more than \$220,000 stolen. Currency from this holdup was found 19 January 1978 at a terrorist hideout in Hannover.*
- 2 October; Zurich, Switzerland
Bombing attack on office of Mercedes-Benz.*
- 6 October; Rotterdam, Netherlands
Shots fired at German Consulate.*
- 13 October; Palma de Mallorca, Spain
Hijacking of Lufthansa aircraft with 82 passengers and five crew members in flight from Palma to Frankfurt/Main. Circulation of a "Communique of the Operation Koffre Kaddum" together with an "Ultimatum to the Chancellor of the FRG" signed by the "Struggle Against World Imperialism Organization" and a statement of an RAF Kommando concerning previous ultimatums. Demands: repeat of demands made by Schleyer abductors, plus release of two PFLP members imprisoned in Istanbul, plus payment of \$15 million, all by 16 October 1977. Perpetrators: PFLP Kommando Martyr Halimeh.*
- 17 October; Aden, South Yemen
During interim landing, pilot of hijacked aircraft shot to death by leader of PFLP Kommando.*
- 18 October; Mogadishu, Somalia
Unit of GSG-9, German counterterrorist strike force, stormed hijacked aircraft and freed hostages, killing three terrorists and wounding another.*
- 18 October; Stuttgart/Stammheim
Upon hearing of hostage rescue, imprisoned RAF members Andreas Baader and Jan Karl Raspe committed suicide using pistols previously smuggled into their cells, and Gudrun Ensslin hanged herself with the cord from her record player.*
- 19 October; Muehlhausen, France (Alsace)
Body of the murdered Dr. Schleyer found in trunk of a parked car, following telephoned instructions from the killers.
Claiming responsibility: an RAF Kommando.*
- 21 October; Hannover
Bombing attack on district courthouse.*
- 31 October; Zweibruecken
Bombing attack on State Supreme Court. Attackers, who did not identify themselves, justified act as retribution for alleged murder of RAF prisoners by state security authorities. Suspects: Group Antifascist Struggle (Antifa) Kaiserslautern.*
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important source of hard currency. But there are also sizable contingents of dissident emigres, especially Croats, some of whom are—as in other countries—actively trying to subvert the current Yugoslav state. Since the mid-1960s, more than 40 ethnic Yugoslavs have died in an escalating war of assassination and reprisal between enemies and supporters of the Yugoslav regime. Although most of the emigre victims have been Croats, in the latest major incident, which took place in January 1982, three ethnic Albanian emigres from Yugoslavia belonging to a dissident group advocating enhanced political status for the Autonomous Province of Kosovo were assassinated near Heilbronn.

Turks and Armenians. The Turkish Government is concerned about the potential for anti-Turkish terrorism in West Germany, and not only from rightwing German extremists. In the aftermath of the military takeover in the the fall of 1980,

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The Turkish Government is even more concerned, however, about potential Armenian terrorism directed against Turkish diplomats in West Germany. Although the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) periodically murder Turkish diplomats in other countries around the world, to date they have not attacked any in the FRG.

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The Yugoslav Government officially denies that it employs killer squads or hired assassins to keep its emigres cowed, and the West German Government rarely obtains conclusive proof of Yugoslav Government complicity in any particular attack on an emigre. Nevertheless, the pattern of events and the thrust of available evidence

ASALA poses a further threat: if West German authorities captured its operatives during a terrorist incident, we believe that ASALA would probably begin targeting West German interests, as it has targeted French and Swiss interests in the past.

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have convinced the Germans that the Yugoslav security service has been behind many of the killings.

Syrians. In March 1982, three Syrian agents were arrested in the FRG with handguns, bombs, and other explosives in their possession. West German authorities believe their intended targets were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has established a common antigovernment front in Syria with moderate Sunni Muslims, one of whose leaders, Islam al-Attar, lives in Aachen, West Germany. Al-Attar's wife was killed there last year by Syrian agents who were trying to assassinate him, evidently in retaliation for Brotherhood attacks against the Syrian Government and Soviet interests in Syria.

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in the spring of 1981, FRG Interior Minister Baum met with his Yugoslav counterpart to complain about the activities of the Yugoslav service in West Germany. The latter indicated that Belgrade was unwilling to cease these activities unless Bonn would take further action to restrict the political activities of Yugoslav emigre groups. Baum could only reply that German security officials were already taking all measures available to them under the law.

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Stane Dolanc, Yugoslavia's new Interior Minister, will probably be more responsive to Bonn's concerns. He has long had close ties to West German Social Democrats and generally seeks improved relations with the West. To be effective, however, Dolanc must succeed in imposing his will over the security service, which has had a reputation for independent initiative.

The Syrian Government had great difficulty putting down the rebellion in Hama earlier this year, owing to the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. In numerous past instances, when the Syrian Government has felt

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
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threatened by an adversary, it has relied on terrorism and assassination to keep its opposition off balance and deprive it of leadership. [redacted]

No More Herr Nice Guy

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In 1970 Andreas Baader was serving a three-year term in a West Berlin jail for firebombing a department store—his first terrorist act, although certainly not his first criminal act. Upon receipt of a letter from a bogus publisher, naive prison authorities agreed to let Baader perform research in various libraries on sociological topics for a paper he claimed to be writing. Taken under guard to such a library, Baader was rescued by Ulrike Meinhof and some associates, in the deed that turned her from an activist into a criminal.

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Palestinians. Terrorists espousing the Palestinian cause have not been active in West Germany recently, and they have generally not counted West German interests among the targets of their frustration and rage. Nevertheless, if Palestinian terrorists decided to attack US or German interests in the FRG, the capability and infrastructure would already be in place. [redacted]

In 1972 Baader, Meinhof, and most of the other founders of what had meanwhile become the RAF were back in prison, this time held in solitary confinement under conditions described by their supporters—and many medical experts as well—as mental torture through sensory deprivation. As months turned into years, both sides argued their causes and justified their actions in a veritable media circus, while the authorities leisurely compiled overwhelming (albeit largely circumstantial) cases against the prisoners; constructed for their trials at a cost of \$6 million a maximum security courthouse at the prison in Stammheim, near Stuttgart; arrested many of their lawyers as fellow terrorists and conspirators; and dealt with hunger strikes in some cases by denying the prisoners water or force-feeding them with oversized tubes.

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
Tens of thousands of Palestinians live in West Germany, particularly in West Berlin. Not all of them are documented. Many of the major Palestinian political and terrorist groups—including Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—are openly represented in West Berlin, although they have been banned in the rest of the FRG since the Munich massacre in 1972; consequently, terrorist cells could be formed in or infiltrated into West Germany without much difficulty. Furthermore, Palestinian terrorists could draw on the support of several Arab embassies and consulates if they needed it. [redacted]



Most of the terrorists began as student activists hardly distinguishable from the majority of their compatriots who never graduated to terrorism; furthermore, the earliest terrorist incidents involved rather minor cases of arson, bombing, and robbery, none of which caused casualties. The coalition government of the period tried various reforms, especially of

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The Government Response to Terrorism



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the university system, to address the grievances of the "extraparliamentary opposition"—partly because some of the grievances were justified, and partly in the hope that the violent fringe of the opposition would wither away once deprived of reasons for complaint. [] 25X1

At the same time, however, legislation was passed that permitted the federal government to declare a "state of defense" (state of emergency). During such an emergency, special legislation could be enacted that would supersede state and federal laws for the duration of the crisis; the Federal Border Guards could be deployed throughout the states or anywhere in them; and certain federal officials would be placed in authority over otherwise independent state officials. Actions against the federal constitution or encouragement of such acts, the "glorification of violence," and public "approval of criminal acts" became criminal offenses. [] 25X1

In the early 1970s, the terrorists moved from small bombings and robberies to kidnappings, skyjackings, and killings, partly (as indicated by their demands) in efforts to spring their compatriots from prison and partly (as indicated by their writings) to goad the government into taking repressive steps that, they mistakenly believed, would reduce its public support. (This theory had been popularized by Latin American terrorists, whose example the RAF was trying to emulate.) Moreover, terrorist leaders in prison, using their lawyers as communications channels, continued to direct the activities of their comrades who were still free. They also staged hunger strikes and prison escapes and tried to turn their trials into propaganda forums. [] 25X1

To cope with these tactics, the penal code was amended. Under specific circumstances it became permissible to exclude certain defense lawyers from particular trials, to ban contacts between jailed terrorists and their lawyers, to hold a trial or hearing in the absence of the defendant, and to remove a disruptive defendant from a courtroom without stopping his trial. Although aimed at terrorists, the new laws necessarily applied to everyone in West Germany and therefore constituted a significant diminution of civil and legal rights, for which they were criticized in some legal and liberal circles. [] 25X1

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Several times during the early 1970s, the federal government traded imprisoned terrorists for kidnaped or skyjacked hostages. Later, however, the authorities announced that this approach had merely encouraged the commission of even more outrageous acts. When terrorists occupied the German Embassy in Stockholm in 1975, the government refused to deal, even though the terrorists had proved—by killing some—that they intended otherwise to kill all of their hostages. Instead, said Chancellor Schmidt, "We'll have to give it to them this time." When industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer was kidnaped in 1977, the government refused to negotiate, even though it correctly realized he would then be murdered. When, also in 1977, a Lufthansa airliner was hijacked to Mogadishu, Somalia, the government negotiated only long enough to permit a counterterrorism strike unit to get there and take the plane and hostages back by force. [] 25X1

Reacting to criticism of the government's toughening response to terrorism, Chancellor Schmidt explained that "A constitutional state can meet its obligations only if its citizens can entrust it to enforce the law. . . . Whoever wants reliable protection from (terrorism) must be inwardly prepared to go the limit of what a free constitutional state allows and requires." Despite its willingness to adopt necessary legal measures to deal with the terrorist threat, however, the Schmidt government has repeatedly rejected calls by the opposition to extend police powers over political demonstrators, even those who resort to violence. [] 25X1

Government Organizations Involved in Counterterrorism

The West German internal security system that evolved after World War II reflects the policy of the Western occupation powers to decentralize the system. In 1949 the Allies directed the prospective federal government to limit its police activities primarily to border control and the establishment of certain investigative and coordination agencies without substantive enforcement powers. As a result, although the Federal Ministry of the Interior has the

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Mobilizing the Counterterrorism Forces

BKA tasking and coordination authority in the field of counterterrorism was demonstrated in 1981 during a hunger strike by 26 imprisoned terrorists and the eventual death of one of them, RAF terrorist Sigurd Debus. [redacted]

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[redacted] *the BKA anticipated both planned and spontaneous disorders in the event any of the terrorists should die, and as Debus weakened, the BKA took the following preventive measures:*

- *It arranged to notify authorities in foreign countries of the increased threat, using the Foreign Office to inform German institutions (embassies and the like) and the INTERPOL network to inform police and security agencies. It also passed the warning on to the BND, the BfV, the ASBW, the BGS, the Customs Police, the Main Railroad Administration, and the Railroad Police (requesting precautionary searches of the main routes), as well as to foreign security agencies represented in West Germany.*
- *It tasked the LKAs with providing information via spot reports on the movements and activities of terrorists and sympathizers under surveillance, as well as information concerning sightings of wanted terrorists. It indicated that this information would be used to update BKA files on persons and installations in danger from terrorism—chiefly persons in the judiciary and executive spheres, medical personnel involved in treating the hunger strikers, and “symbolic” public figures and facilities.*

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- *It also directed the LKAs and the BGS (as appropriate) to prepare to establish traffic control points, to increase patrols around endangered civilian and military installations, to intensify search measures in border regions, and to prepare to cut off public access to post boxes and baggage lockers in railway stations and air terminals (to deter bombings).*
- *It called for the LKAs and the BGS to report by telex precisely what measures they had taken in response to the threat and the BKA instructions.*
- *For its part, the BKA promised to furnish daily situation reports on the status of the hunger strikers in general, and special reports on individual cases as circumstances warranted.*

Much of this could be viewed as mere muscle-flexing by the BKA, since the agencies upon which it was showering orders would presumably be taking most of these rather obvious steps even in the absence of specific instructions. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that in a crisis management situation involving a terrorist incident, the BKA is well prepared to direct and monitor the considerable counterterrorism resources of the FRG.


[redacted]

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overall responsibility for the maintenance of public order, police units of the 10 state Ministries of the Interior normally execute this mission. Federal involvement with state law enforcement efforts is permitted under the constitution, however, when a crime is committed on a national level—such as terrorism or drug trafficking—or when an individual state requests the assistance of the federal government. [redacted]

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At the federal level, a number of police, security, and intelligence services share the responsibility for combating terrorism. The Federal Criminal Office (BKA) supervises and coordinates the national counterterrorism effort. Important but clearly secondary roles are played by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Border Guard (BGS), in particular Border Guard Group 9 (GSG-9), the counterterrorism strike force. Outside the Interior Ministry, other federal agencies including the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Office for the Security of the Armed Forces (ASBW), and the customs, postal, air, river, and railway police support the counterterrorism effort. [redacted]

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Counterterrorism Cooperation With Other Countries




At the state level, State Criminal Offices (LKAs) and State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (LfVs) perform most of the day-to-day operations through which terrorists are captured and brought to justice.⁴ [redacted]

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International Legal Agreements

West Germany has been at the forefront of efforts to close the international legal loopholes through which some terrorists can escape retribution. Transnational terrorists have often been able to avoid apprehension and punishment by exploiting disparities among national legal systems, political policies, and social customs. By operating from or fleeing to countries that welcome, tolerate, or are too timid to confront them, some international terrorists have been able to strike repeatedly, almost with impunity. [redacted]

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Owing to fundamental and irreconcilable disagreements over the difference between common crime (which is crime everywhere) and political crime (which may not be considered crime outside the country where it is committed), the world's nations have been unable to arrive at a consensual definition of terrorism that could be used to draw up a comprehensive international law against it. Efforts to get around this obstacle have taken two forms: identifying specific acts, such as skyjacking, that most or all countries can agree are intolerable and must be punished, and seeking legal counterterrorism agreements in regional forums, where disparities in political and social values are smaller and may be overcome. [redacted]

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West Germany has helped to draft many of the conventions and agreements that have resulted from these efforts and has ratified all of them that it was eligible to ratify. Moreover, it has tried to persuade other governments to do the same and has backed the use of sanctions against governments that harbor particular types of terrorists, such as skyjackers. [redacted]

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Prospects

Judging by the current tenor of public debate, the West German Government and people have, in large measure, overcome the ambivalence that characterized their earlier attitudes toward the treatment of terrorists. [redacted]

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Counterterrorism Conventions and Agreements

The Tokyo Convention (*Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft*) entered into force in December 1969. It calls for states to make every effort to restore control of a hijacked aircraft to its lawful commander and to arrange for the prompt onward passage of the aircraft, passengers, cargo, and crew. West Germany signed this convention in September 1963 and formally ratified it in December 1969.

The Hague Convention (*Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft*) entered into force in October 1971. It requires adhering states either to extradite skyjackers or to submit them to local prosecution; in other words, a state could no longer evade responsibility by claiming that the crime took place outside its own territory. West Germany signed this convention in December 1970 and formally ratified it in October 1974.

The Montreal Convention (*Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation*) entered into force in January 1973. It extends *The Hague Convention's* extradite-or-prosecute provisions to acts committed on the ground against civil aircraft in service and against associated ground facilities. The FRG signed this convention in October 1971 and formally ratified it in February 1978.

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents entered into force in February 1977. Modeled after a similar convention worked out by the Organization of American States, this convention applies the extradite-or-prosecute formula to acts committed against protected persons (chiefly diplomats and people who have been granted political asylum) and their premises and vehicles. The FRG signed this convention in August 1974 and formally ratified it in January 1977.

The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Safety of Civil Aviation of 13 October 1977 was a consensual resolution urging all countries to adhere to the three aviation conventions described above. West Germany was one of the five countries in the "contact group" that sent delegations around the world to try to persuade countries that had not yet ratified these conventions to do so.

The Bonn Economic Summit Antihijacking Declaration of July 1978 asserted that the participating countries (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany—which together account for more than two-thirds of the non-Communist world's air passenger traffic) would halt all air traffic with any country harboring a hijacker or refusing to return the aircraft and passengers. This was the first effort to put teeth into the antiskyjacking conventions; previously there had been no way to punish countries that violated the provisions of these conventions.

The Strasbourg Convention (*European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism*) is an agreement drafted in Strasbourg (at the initiative of France and West Germany) in November 1976 by the Council of Europe and signed in January 1977 by all members of the Council except Ireland and Malta. It entered into force in August 1978. The convention declares that—regardless of the motivation—certain violent crimes, including kidnaping, hijacking, bombing, and attacks against internationally protected persons, are not subject to the "political offense exception" that might otherwise prevent extradition of the perpetrators; if extradition is denied for some other legal reason, the denying country must prosecute under its own laws. The FRG is one of the few countries that have formally ratified this convention, having done so in May 1978.

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indigenous German terrorists, particularly of the left, seem likely to continue their depredations, and foreign terrorists as well will probably continue to fight some of their battles on West German soil.

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In March 1982, [Redacted]

[Redacted] nine rightist terrorists and 45 leftist terrorists (mostly members of the RAF and associated groups) were serving prison terms in West Germany. Four of the rightists and at least 19 of the leftists were scheduled to be released during 1982 (11 of the leftists are serving life sentences).

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[Redacted]

If upon their release these prisoners return to active terrorism (as some jailed German terrorists have done in the past), they could substantially boost the prospects and capabilities of the RAF. West German police units will watch them closely, however, and if they do try to resume their former careers they will find that the operating climate has become much more difficult. [Redacted]

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Appendix A**A Year of German Terrorism**

Following is a chronicle of all significant terrorist events in 1977 in which West Germans were involved, directly or indirectly, as either perpetrators or victims. The chronicle is based on statistics compiled by the Ministry of the Interior and published in 1980 by *Der Spiegel*. According to the Ministry, "Included are criminal acts for which concrete evidence exists of their having been committed by terrorists or their accomplices. In instances where a (listed) criminal act could not be attributed to a specific person or group, the target chosen as well as circumstantial evidence justified the suspicion of its origin with terrorist individuals or groups." Not included are any politically motivated acts of violence that may have been committed by foreigners against foreigners, with no German involvement. There were an unusual number of major terrorist incidents in 1977, but that year otherwise well represents the type and extent of terrorism with which the West Germans learned to cope during the 1970s.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1, 8, 16 January;
Frankfurt/Main | Bombing attacks on urban transit ticket vending machines (part of a protest against fare hikes).
Suspects: Revolutionary Cells (RZ). |
| 3 January; Aachen
and Duesseldorf | Arson attempts on two cinemas in protest against the showing of a film depicting the Israeli rescue of the hijack victims at Entebbe.
Claiming responsibility: RZ Fighters for a Free Palestine. |
| 4 January; Hannover | Arson attack on a cinema showing the Entebbe film.
Claiming responsibility: RZ. |
| 4 January; Giessen | Bombing attack on a US Army fuel storage tank.
Claiming responsibility: RZ. |
| 5 January;
Basel, Switzerland | Exchange of gunfire at border control point; one Swiss customs officer injured.
Suspects: two members of the Red Army Faction (RAF). |
| 24 January; Munich | Bombing attempt on the editorial offices of <i>National Zeitung</i> (a newspaper of the extreme right). |
| 14 February;
West Berlin | A branch of the municipal savings bank held up; about \$25,000 stolen.
Suspects: members of the 2 June Movement. |
| 15 February; Essen | A branch of the National Bank held up; more than \$100,000 stolen.
Perpetrators: three women, suspected of being RAF members. |
| 16 February;
Duesseldorf | Arson attack on car owned by public defender involved in terrorist trials.
Claiming responsibility: an RZ Kommando. |

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- 24 February;**
Saloniki, Greece Bombing attack on a German school; slogans painted on walls: "Ulrike Meinhof lives!" and "Down with German neofascism!"
- 26 February; Munich** Bombing attack on editorial offices of *National Zeitung*; about \$4,500 in damage.
- 24 March;**
Frankfurt/Main Bombing attack on the residence of the Vice President of the Federal Association of Attorneys; he and his wife injured slightly by glass fragments.
Perpetrators: RZ.
- 30 March; Munich** Bombing attempt on offices of South African Airways "in remembrance of the dead at Soweto."
Claiming responsibility: Group Patrice Lumumba.
- 30 March; Kassel** A branch of the municipal savings bank held up; about \$25,000 stolen.
Suspects: RAF sympathizers.
- 7 April; Karlsruhe** Murder of Federal Attorney General Siegfried Buback, together with his driver and a court security officer.
Claiming responsibility: an RAF Kommando. In 11 identical letters the perpetrators accused Buback of being responsible for the deaths in prison of Ulrike Meinhof, Holger Meins, and Siegfried Hausner.
- 12 April; Cologne** A branch of the Dresdner Bank held up; about \$30,000 stolen.
Suspects: RAF.
- 15 April;**
Duesseldorf A branch of the Deutsche Bank held up; about \$50,000 stolen. Part of the money was recovered 20 April 1978 at a terrorist hideout in Vienna, Austria.
Perpetrators: one man and two women, suspected of belonging to the 2 June Movement.
- 16 April;**
Dinkelsbuehl Vandalism to billboards advertising a showing of the Entebbe film.
- 19 April;**
Lille, France Arson attack on the German Consulate General.
- 21 April; Kassel** A branch of the municipal savings bank held up; about \$10,000 stolen.
Suspects: two RAF sympathizers.
- 21 April;**
Barcelona, Spain Bombing attack on Lufthansa offices.
Claiming responsibility: GRAPO (a Spanish leftist terrorist group).
- 29 April; Cologne** Bombing attack on a building which housed offices of the Federal Association of Physicians (evidently in protest of attitude of medical establishment toward treatment of hunger-striking RAF prisoners).
Claiming responsibility: (RAF) Kommando Petra Schelm.
- 30 April;**
Milan, Italy Bombing attack on Opel automobile showroom.
Claiming responsibility: Revolutionary Action.

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3 May; Singen	Discharge of firearms at police officers during identity check; one policeman wounded seriously, another slightly; Buback murder weapon recovered. Perpetrators: two RAF members.
11 May; West Berlin	Arson attacks on private cars of a judge and a state prosecutor. Claiming responsibility: RZ.
13 May; Cologne	A branch of the Cologne Bank of 1876 held up; about \$120,000 stolen. Suspects: members of a terrorist splinter group.
27, 28 June; West Berlin	Arson attacks on buildings of the Berlin Public Transport Authority. Claiming responsibility: RZ.
29 June; West Berlin	Arson attacks on urban transit ticket vending machines. Suspects: RZ.
30 June; Hannover	Arson attack on state court building. Perpetrators: RAF sympathizers.
1 July; Frankfurt/Main	A firearms dealer held up and beaten with blunt instrument; 18 handguns stolen. Perpetrators: two RAF members.
4 July; Duesseldorf	A branch of the Dresdner Bank held up; about \$100,000 stolen.
12 July; West Berlin	Acid attacks on three urban transit ticket vending machines. Suspects: RZ.
21 July; Nuernberg	Arson attack on a ticket office of the urban transit authority. Suspects: RZ.
21 July; Hamburg	Vandalism to eight subway ticket vending machines. Suspects: RZ.
30 July; Essen	Shots fired at the door of a police station.
30 July; Oberursel	Banker Juergen Ponto murdered when he resisted efforts to kidnap him for ransom. Perpetrators: an RAF Kommando including Ponto family friend Susanne Albrecht.
3 August; Essen	A branch of the National Bank held up; one bank customer shot and seriously wounded; about \$210,000 stolen. Claiming responsibility: the National Front. Suspects: RAF.
15 August; Stuttgart	Bombing attack on the law offices of Klaus Croissant, RAF lawyer accused of complicity in RAF terrorist acts. Claiming responsibility: Combat Group Siegfried Buback of the National Antiterrorist Organization.

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- 22 August; Nuernberg** Bombing attack on offices of the MAN engineering firm. Claiming responsibility: RZ.
- 25 August; Karlsruhe** Attempted rocket attack using homemade launcher on office of the Federal Attorney General; attack site was private apartment seized by force.
- 26 August; Milan, Italy** Bombing attack on office of German-Italian Chamber of Commerce.
- 26 August; West Berlin** A branch of the Berliner Bank held up; about \$18,000 stolen. Perpetrators: two men and two women, suspected of being terrorists (female bank robbers relatively common in terrorist groups, otherwise rare).
- 28 August; Hamburg** Arson attack on office of IBM.
- 30 August; Frankenthal** Bombing attack on commercial building. Claiming responsibility: RZ.
- 2 September; Flensburg** Bombing attack on the courthouse. Perpetrator: a rightist extremist.
- 2 September; Bergamo, Italy** Bombing attacks on office of Allianz insurance firm and Mercedes-Benz showroom. Claiming responsibility: (RAF) Kommando Petra Schelm.
- 5 September; Cologne** Abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer, President of West German Employers Association; murder of his driver and three accompanying policemen. Demand: Schleyer to be exchanged for 11 imprisoned RAF members, each to be given 100,000 deutsche marks (about \$45,000) and flown to country of his or her choice. Perpetrators: RAF Kommando Siegfried Hausner.
- 19 September; The Hague, Netherlands** Discharge of firearms at police officers during arrest of two RAF members; one policeman seriously wounded.
- 22 September; Utrecht, Netherlands** Discharge of firearms at police officers during arrest of RAF member; one policeman killed, another seriously wounded; weapon used had been taken in the robbery of 1 July 1977 in Frankfurt/Main.
- 26 September; Bremen** A bank held up; more than \$220,000 stolen. Currency from this holdup was found 19 January 1978 at a terrorist hideout in Hannover.
- 2 October; Zurich, Switzerland** Bombing attack on office of Mercedes-Benz.
- 6 October; Rotterdam, Netherlands** Shots fired at German Consulate.

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13 October; Palma de Mallorca, Spain	Hijacking of Lufthansa aircraft with 82 passengers and five crew members in flight from Palma to Frankfurt/Main. Circulation of a "Communique of the Operation Koffre Kaddum" together with an "Ultimatum to the Chancellor of the FRG" signed by the "Struggle Against World Imperialism Organization" and a statement of an RAF Kommando concerning previous ultimatums. Demands: repeat of demands made by Schleyer abductors, plus release of two PFLP members imprisoned in Istanbul, plus payment of \$15 million, all by 16 October 1977. Perpetrators: PFLP Kommando Martyr Halimeh.
17 October; Aden, South Yemen	During interim landing, pilot of hijacked aircraft shot to death by leader of PFLP Kommando.
18 October; Mogadishu, Somalia	Unit of GSG-9, German counterterrorist strike force, stormed hijacked aircraft and freed hostages, killing three terrorists and wounding another.
18 October; Stuttgart/Stammheim	Upon hearing of hostage rescue, imprisoned RAF members Andreas Baader and Jan Karl Raspe committed suicide using pistols previously smuggled into their cells, and Gudrun Ensslin hanged herself with the cord from her record player.
19 October; Muehlhausen, France (Alsace)	Body of the murdered Dr. Schleyer found in trunk of a parked car, following telephoned instructions from the killers. Claiming responsibility: an RAF Kommando.
21 October; Hannover	Bombing attack on district courthouse.
31 October; Zweibruecken	Bombing attack on State Supreme Court. Attackers, who did not identify themselves, justified act as retribution for alleged murder of RAF prisoners by state security authorities. Suspects: Group Antifascist Struggle (Antifa) Kaiserslautern.
10 November; Amsterdam, Netherlands	Discharge of firearms by two RAF members being arrested; one policeman and both terrorists wounded.
13 November; Vienna, Austria	Abduction of Austrian industrialist, later released in exchange for payment of more than \$2 million. Perpetrators: three Austrian nationals, with suspected help of members of 2 June Movement.
13 November; Hamburg	Arson attack on district court building.
19 November; Madrid, Spain	Bombing attack on German cultural institute.
20 December; border area near Delmont, Switzerland	Discharge of firearms at Swiss customs officers; one officer wounded critically, another slightly; perpetrators captured. Perpetrators: members of 2 June Movement.

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