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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*25X1 TO :

DATE: 23 June 1966

FROM : Chief/Security Research Staff

SUBJECT: ADP Projection

1. At your request, this Staff has projected some of the possible uses of ADP beyond present facilities, and possibly, feasibilities. Each of the items included in this memorandum is submitted in the context of projection of ADP potential.

2. Perhaps the most feasible utilization, and most valuable to the present and future needs of this Staff, is the security-counterintelligence exploitation of Agency personnel-security-training records by ADP. With proper input, the specific counterintelligence needs of this Staff could be met in a highly successful manner. For example, with appropriate input an ADP search could ascertain those employees, past and present, applicants, and persons of security interest who have worked for a particular firm, studied at a particular educational institution, visited or resided in a certain area, etc. This could be secured, with proper input, for desired time periods, geographical locations, and other specific requirements. Similarly, membership in certain organizations, by such persons, again equated with time and location, could be assembled and afforded preliminary analysis by ADP. An extension of this to include personnel assignments and training by Agency personnel, for example, could provide identification of personnel attending various training courses or having the same specific geographic assignment as an individual under security-counterintelligence study. With proper input of operational data, agents, etc., it might conceivably be possible to determine agents, operations, drops, caches, etc., to which an employee under security-counterintelligence study was exposed, if not indeed knowledgeable. The value of such an integrated system in the research work of this Staff is self-evident.

2. Another utilization which might be explored for ADP exploitation is photograph storage. One such utilization would be the

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storage on magnetic tape of video signals of the photographs of Agency employees, agents, etc. Video-interrogators could thus reproduce, on command, the photo of any such person desired by a using officer. The most basic utilization would be in visitor control. A guard, for example, could have a video interrogator at his control point, the video screen facing him, the inquiry keys facing the visitor. The visitor could punch out his "secret" number without it being noted by the guard. The storage tapes would be interrogated, much as airline reservation records are interrogated for space availability in commercial practice, and the photographic image of the person holding that number shown on the screen for a visual comparison by the guard with the visitor before him. Similarly, in overseas areas, a walk-in at a station who claimed to be an employee of another station or Headquarters could be compared through a system interrogation. Of course, the true name or pseudonym could also be used to interrogate the system, but a numerical sequence would provide greater accuracy and provide for secure integration of agent photographs, making it unnecessary for the guard or inquiring station to learn the true identity or cryptonym. In time of national emergency, with Agency staff, contract and agent personnel "walking-in" at an Agency facility closest to them at the time of the emergency, a visual comparison of the individual with an image obtained from photographic storage would be a most valuable method of determining identity. (The stored image could also provide a short text, if desired, relating further identification data, clearances, etc.)

3. The system related in paragraph two could also be utilized for storage of photographs of hostile personalities, targets, etc., so that interrogation by name--or even description if properly imputed, would provide out-stations with a method of immediate interrogation of photographic holdings. In the event of description-only interrogation, the video read-out could provide a series of photographs one after the other, for the review of the person making the interrogation of the system. Thus, for example, if the system is interrogated with the physical -description-only of a suspected hostile agent, depending on the details available for such system interrogation, the person making the interrogation of the Headquarters holdings could review a series of photographs of hostile agents to determine the specific identity of the individual with whom he is concerned.

4. The foregoing suggestions, as indicated earlier, are a

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projection of possible ADP utilitions. No time deadline for the feasibility of such applications has been considered in making these projections.

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