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3 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive and Planning Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director of Security
for Personnel Security


SUBJECT : Office of Security Significant
Accomplishments - FY 1969

1. In accordance with your request of 7 August 1969, the following items are suggested for inclusion in Subject report to the DDS as the significant accomplishments of the Personnel Security Division:

A. Post-Polygraph Interview Program: In January 1967 this Division initiated a new program with regard to the entrance on duty processing of young female applicants under twenty-five years of age. Immediately after the polygraph interview of a young girl, she is interviewed by a PSD lady representative in order to (a) spot and neutralize serious post-polygraph anxiety; (b) supply an attractive and mature woman to whom the interviewee might confide if the technical interview ended on an unsatisfactory note from her standpoint; and (c) provide a useful feedback mechanism for polygraph examiners to learn interviewee's reaction to polygraph testing. Although the main thrust of this program is directed towards forestalling any adverse feeling that the applicant may have regarding what could be construed as an invasion of privacy, there have been numerous worthwhile side benefits from a personnel security standpoint. To date 2,271 girls between 17 and 25 years of age have been interviewed under this program.

B. Personnel Security Program for Consultants and Private Contractors: Steps are being taken to develop a

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program for tighter security controls to ensure that only currently approved consultants and private contractors are allowed access to Agency buildings. To accomplish this, a security review of all consultant files has been made, and recommendations are now being studied for expanding field investigative coverage on cases involving Government char force and maintenance personnel, as well as certain private contractors who require entrance to Agency installations. In line with this tighter personnel screening, the Agency Reinvestigation Program was expanded to include General Services Administration employees, Government Services Incorporated employees, Contract Type "A" employees, and Industrial Contractor's employees performing at the Top Secret level.

C. Security Coordination with Medical and Personnel Staffs: Within the last year there has been a significant increase in the amount of information developed by the Office of Security in the area of overall suitability, both in relation to applicants as well as old line employees. This particularly applies to increased evidence of dope usage by applicants. As a result of this problem there is an important and beneficial trend towards a greater degree of interchange of information between Security, Medical, and Personnel representatives. This continuing informal exchange dovetails with and otherwise supplements the formal presentation of cases to the Applicant Review Panel (ARP) and the Personnel Evaluation Board (PEB).

D. Personnel Security Guidance and Counselling: A conscious and concerted effort is being made to provide increased assistance and counselling to Agency employees at all levels, with particular attention being directed to young female employees who have recently arrived in the Metropolitan D. C. area and have encountered personal problems with inherent security ramifications. Consideration is being given to providing these new employees with a special personnel security briefing which would highlight recent patterns and trends. The thrust of this program would be to prevent the development of significant difficulties by candidly discussing recent factual personnel security cases.

E. Polygraph Program for Office of Training Language Instructors: During the last fiscal year arrangements were

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
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made with the Office of Training so that all new language instructors would be informed at the time of initial employment interview that standard personnel security processing would include a polygraph examination. In cases involving language instructors who have been affiliated with the Agency for a number of years, a program has been initiated to (a) acquire complete updated personal history data, (b) schedule supplemental field investigations, and (c) consider the advisability of polygraph interview on an individual case basis.

F. Staff and Contract Employees Assigned Overseas: Within the last year significant policy agreements were established with the Clandestine Services guaranteeing that staff-like access for contract personnel will only go to those employees who meet staff standards. Likewise, when Security records reveal that an Agency employee has been identified in the press media, this data is passed to the Counter-Intelligence Staff before the individual departs for overseas. Increased emphasis has also been placed on risk-of-capture briefings.

G. Personnel Security Program for Assignees to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC): A study of the security program at NPIC was initiated in recent months in order to more clearly identify Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) XX-4 assignees and ensure that all of these individuals have met the CIA security criteria. The security files of all DIA XX-4 personnel have been reviewed, and the record has been appropriately documented as to the nature, extent and basis for all clearances.



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
J. Prepared detailed charts to show Agency investigative requirements for all categories of support-type cases in all major programs, i.e. Facility Access Program, Industrial Security Program, and the [redacted] Program. These charts are designed to afford a ready reference for professional personnel scheduling investigations and appraising cases, thereby insuring that investigative requirements are complied with in all cases.

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K. Conducted appropriate studies and made recommendations for expanding field investigative coverage and requiring fingerprints on all non-government char and maintenance personnel working in Agency Buildings. A recommendation for obtaining field coverage on Industrial Security Secret type cases is also under consideration. Approval and implementation of these recommendations should result in better security safeguards in the areas affected.

L. In conjunction with the Office of Personnel, revised the procedure for processing Form 1152, Request for Personnel Action, through issuance of OPM 20-60-4, which clarifies types of actions requiring Office of Security prior approvals and decreases the duplication of files pulled by approximately 5,000 security folders per annum.

M. Instituted a program, in cooperation with Compartmented Information Branch/SR&CD, for converting date of last background investigation into Julian calendar date and placing such date on Form 2018a regarding special clearance approvals.



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O. Redrafted [redacted] "Limitations on Outside Activities", to include recent Agency policy and procedures related to public appearances and writing for publication.

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P. Revised [redacted] "Risk of Hijacking in Commercial Air Travel", to provide employees with the benefit of hijacking experiences and guidance related to this threat.

Q. Expanded liaison with other U. S. Government "crank" mail offices to facilitate the handling of this Agency's intake of that type of material.

R. Compartmented the responsibility for handling cancellation notices received from the Office of Personnel within the Preliminary Review Section to provide for expeditious notification to investigative field offices.

S. Placed into operation the Department of Defense Central Index telecommunications link with SR&CD which initiates those checks by SR&CD through PRS rather than ID/3 thereby providing faster replies [redacted]

T. Initial processing has been completed concerning the Applicant Review Panel Project. Statistical data has been compiled from Office of Security records for the past five years to permit further study and evaluation. This Project probably will extend into FY 1971 due to low priority nature.

2. The Personnel Security Division in FY 1969 received and processed:

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[redacted]

- Staff Applicant Cases
- Other Field Investigation Type Cases
- Industrial Security Cases
- Contact Cases
- Facility Access Authorization Cases
- Clearance Certifications
- Transfer & Reassignment Actions
- Special Clearance Actions

3. Fuller details on any of the above items can be obtained from the undersigned.

[redacted]

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