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State Dept. review completed

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

21 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Richard Lehman ^{RL}
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : US Support for Non-Communist Kampuchean Resistance

1. The captioned subject is on the agenda for your breakfast meeting Tuesday with Secretary Haig.

2. State has informed ASEAN that subject to a Presidential Finding and Congressional Committee approval, the US will give financial support to the Resistance. State acted in response to requests from Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. The amount of financial support is very small, about \$3M. Pertinent State cables are at Tab A, with important portions scored in yellow. Tab B is a paper on the same subject prepared for Secretary Haig by his staff.

3. Although State told ASEAN that a Presidential Finding is required, ASEAN may not have been listening. Therefore, CIA should decide as soon as possible whether to request Presidential approval. In reaching a decision, we should recognize that the initial request for \$3M in financial support is only a beginning: ASEAN will be back within two or three months for more, and ultimately Singapore and Malaysia will press us to provide military aid as well. Thus our decision to seek Presidential approval should be coupled with a decision on how far we are willing to go.

4. I recently discussed this subject in Bangkok, where I stopped briefly during a trip to East Asia. John Dean sends his regards to you. He believes that modest financial support is the only alternative to two

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unacceptable options: support the Communist Democratic Kampuchean Resistance; or accept a permanent Vietnamese presence on the Thai border. [redacted]

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[redacted] agrees, but is not optimistic that the Resistance will use our support effectively. I agree with both of them -- although the prospects for success are limited, we have little choice. Back in Washington, I talked to former Ambassador Mort Abramowitz. Although he believes the Resistance movement ultimately will force the Vietnamese into a political accommodation, Mort doubts the US will be able to limit intervention to occasional small-scale financial contributions. Mort's concern is that what starts small often ends up big.

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5. [redacted] has read this memorandum and agrees with the contents. Tab C is a contribution to this memorandum prepared by his staff.

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Dave
David D. Gries

Attachments
As Stated

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TELEGRAMPAGE 01 JAKART 18787 01 OF 02 160918Z
ACTION INRD-02

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JAKART 18787 01 OF 02 160916Z

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CCO-00 /009 W
-----001674 160919Z /38O 160902Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY MANILA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 18787

ROGER CHANNEL

EO 12865: RDS-1 12/16/81 (O'DONOHUE, DANIEL A.)
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, VH
SUBJECT: KHMER RESISTANCE

REF: (A) STATE 328178, (B) STATE 329734

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS INSTRUCTED, DAS O'DONOHUE BRIEFED ON HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS KEY GOI OFFICIALS ON OUR RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE. (MOCHTAR WAS OUT OF TOWN.) IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GENERAL MUNAWIR AND ASIA DIRECTOR (AND INTELLIGENCE GENERAL) SATARI, O'DONOHUE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD RESPONDED LAST WEEKEND TO THE THAI, MALAYSIAN AND SINGAPOREAN REQUESTS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER. OUTLINING SALIENT POINTS REF F, O'DONOHUE SAID THAT WE HAD INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A LIMITED PACKAGE OF NON-MILITARY, HUMANITARIAN AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO SUPPLEMENT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES OWN EFFORTS WITH THE KHMER RESISTANCE. THIS PACKAGE WOULD BE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 3-4 MILLION DOLLARS AND WOULD BE USED FOR FOOD, MEDICINES, OTHER NON-LETHAL MATERIAL AND ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES. WE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE THREE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES MUST REMAIN IN THE FOREFRONT AND THAT ANY USG PROGRAM WOULD BE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OWN EFFORTS. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ANY U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE INTERNATIONALLY AND CAUSE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS IN TERMS OF SUPPORT FOR USG POLICY IN THE AREA.

3. O'DONOHUE SAID THAT WE HAD EXPLAINED THAT NO FINAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT WE WOULD NEED A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION AND CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. WE ALSO TOLD THE THREE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS THAT BEFORE PROCEEDING TO OUR OWN DECISION WE WOULD NEED A CLEAR PICTURE OF THEIR OWN PROGRAMS AND AN ASEAN CONSENSUS INCLUDING AT LEAST TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES. THE INITIAL MALAYSIAN, THAI AND SINGAPOREAN REACTION WAS FAVORABLE AND WE ARE NOW AWAITING A MORE SPECIFIC RESPONSE FROM THEM.

4. IN MEETING WITH SATARI, HE SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT WE HAD NOT INCLUDED MILITARY AID AND HE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH OUR OFFERING NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS LONG AS IT WAS "NOT ON AN ASEAN BASIS." HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR OUR KEEPING HIM INFORMED AND SAID, IN ADDITION TO MOCHTAR, HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER ONLY WITH GENERAL BENNY MURDANI IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD. SATARI MADE CLEAR THAT HE VIEWED ANY U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A MISTAKE AND WAS CLEARLY RELIEVED THAT WE HAD NOT INCLUDED A MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMPONENT.

5. FOR HIS PART MUNAWIR WARMLY WELCOMED OUR RESPONSE TO

THAILAND, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE, STATING THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS "JUST RIGHT." HE SAID THAT GOI HAD BEEN QUITE UPSET WITH RAJARATNAM'S REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ASEAN'S PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY "SINCE THE GOS WAS WELL AWARE OF INDONESIA'S AND THE PHILIPPINES' NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT. MUNAWIR ADDED THAT MOCHTAR HAD AGREED THAT, SHOULD THE USG ASK INDONESIA'S OPINION ON OUR GIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE GOI WOULD REPLY THAT IT HAD "NO OBJECTION." HOWEVER INDONESIANS DO NOT BELIEVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE A GOOD IDEA AND ANY SUCH USG INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN GOI VIEW. MUNAWIR REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY GRATIFYING TO HIM THAT THE USG AND GOI SHARE SIMILAR VIEWS ON NOT INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. FURTHER, HE NOTED THE GOI IS CONSIDERING WHETHER IT SHOULD GIVE TOKEN NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SON SANH. IN CONCLUSION MUNAWIR ASSURED US THAT HIS POSITIVE REACTION TO OUR LIMITED, NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE PACKAGE REFLECTED AN OFFICIAL GOI VIEW.

6. COMMENT: IN BOTH DISCUSSIONS O'DONOHUE STRESSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR RESPONSE AND NEED TO AVOID PUBLICITY. BOTH MEN AGREED COMPLETELY, INDICATING THAT THEY HAD MADE THE SAME POINTS IN PATTAYA TO OTHER ASEAN PARTNERS, PARTICULARLY SINGAPORE.

7. SATARI (THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY) AND MUNAWIR (FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY) WERE ALIKE IN EXPRESSING GREAT APPRECIATION AND RELIEF THAT WE ARE NOT CONTEMPLATING GIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER RESISTANCE. THERE WAS A DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE,

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SINGAP 12592 01 OF 02 170912Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-08 CCO-08 /B09 W
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 12592

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/17/81 (SMITH, MORTON S.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, VM
SUBJ: (S) AID TO KHMER: DISCUSSION WITH MFA

REF: STATE 328178

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DAS O'DONOHUE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE U.S. NON-MILITARY AID TO THE KHMER WITH PERMSEC OF MFA DECEMBER 17. O'DONOHUE REPORTED POSITIVE REACTION OF INDONESIANS TO PROSPECT OF NON-MILITARY U.S. AID. HE DESCRIBED THE U.S. EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD FOLLOW A DEFINITIVE ASEAN RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. THAT ASEAN RESPONSE AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE MODALITIES OF ASEAN PLANNING REMAIN TO BE DEVELOPED. NATHAN ACCEPTED UNDESIRABILITY OF U.S. MILITARY AID AT PRESENT BUT BELIEVES KPNLF WILL NEED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM SOME SOURCE TO DEFEND ITSELF FROM DK AND VIETNAMESE. END SUMMARY

3. DAS O'DONOHUE ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE CALLED ON MFA PERMSEC S.R. NATHAN DECEMBER 17. ALSO ATTENDING FROM MFA WERE LEE CHIONG GIAM (DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS), KISHORE MAHBUBANI (DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR FOR COMMUNIST AFFAIRS), BILIHARI KAUSIKAN (AMERICAN DESK OFFICER).

4. O'DONOHUE, HAVING JUST ARRIVED FROM JAKARTA, SUMMARIZED THE REACTION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE U.S. DECISION TO CONSIDER PROVIDING LIMITED NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NON-COMMUNIST KHMER. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF DEPLU, MUNAWIR, PROVIDED THE GOI VIEW, WHICH O'DONOHUE TERMED POSITIVE AND "RELIEVED" THAT THE USG PROPOSAL DID NOT INCLUDE A MILITARY COMPONENT. WHEN NATHAN ASKED HOW COL. SATARI REACTED, O'DONOHUE SAID HE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC BUT HE ACQUIESCED. THE GOI, HE SAID, HAS A LONG RANGE VIEW OF WHERE IT BELIEVES IT AND ASEAN SHOULD GO VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM AND SINCE THE GOI BELIEVES VIETNAM IS NO SERIOUS THREAT TO INDONESIA IN THE NEAR TERM THE GOI HAS DECIDED TO STAY ON THE CURRENT COURSE WITH ASEAN. NATHAN SAID THAT THOSE SCURRYING ABOUT TRYING TO COME UP WITH NEW CAMBODIAN SOLUTIONS ONLY GIVE THE SRV THE IMPRESSION THAT "ASEAN IS SUING FOR PEACE."

5. HE WELCOMED THE REPORT OF INDONESIAN ACQUIESCENCE AND SAID HE WOULD PASS IT QUICKLY TO FONMIN DHANABALAN WHO WOULD BE MEETING WITH GHAZALI IN THE COURSE OF THE TWO DAY VISIT OF MALAYSIAN PM MAHATHIR WHICH STARTED TODAY.

6. O'DONOHUE NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE BRIEFING PRESIDENT MARCOS AND FONMIN ROMULO ON THE MATTER ALSO THEREBY ENSURING, AS DHANABALAN HAD SUGGESTED, THAT ALL FIVE

ASEANS WERE AWARE OF U.S. INTENTIONS. OUR ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRIEF ONLY THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE STEMMED FROM OUR DESIRE NOT TO INJECT OURSELVES INTO ASEAN'S INTERNAL DEBATE OVER ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER.

7. NATHAN ASKED ABOUT THE TIME FRAME FOR THE U.S. AID PACKAGE. O'DONOHUE SAID AFTER RECEIVING THE ASEAN RESPONSE WE COULD MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY. HE OUTLINED THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH PROCEDURES INVOLVED. NATHAN WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT WHETHER THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL REQUIRED WOULD BE PUBLIC. O'DONOHUE STATED THAT THE PROCESS INVOLVED WELL-ESTABLISHED, CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES WITH INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS. NATHAN WAS VISIBLY RELIEVED AND IMPLIED THAT OTHER ASEANS WERE SIMILARLY FUZZY IN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE.

8. O'DONOHUE ASKED WHAT THE ASEAN PROGRAM FOR CAMBODIAN ASSISTANCE LOOKED LIKE. NATHAN SAID IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ASEAN WOULD SET UP A SMALL WORKING-LEVEL GROUP TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES. THEY GENERAL IN THE BORDER REGION WOULD HAVE THE BEST IDEA OF HOW TO PROCEED, NATHAN SAID. O'DONOHUE TWICE MORE DURING THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION ASKED THAT ASEAN TELL US HOW THEY PLAN TO PROCEED.

9. NATHAN RETURNED TO THE AID ISSUE LATER IN THE MEETING AND SAID FOR THE MOMENT THERE COULD BE NO MATERIAL (MILITARY) AID FROM THE U.S. BUT WITHOUT MILITARY AID (A) HOW WILL THE KPNLF STAND UP TO THE DK, AND (B) CAN THE KPNLF FIGHT OFF A VIETNAMESE ATTACK? THE DK, HE SAID, WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE A THIRD FORCE ERADICATED BY

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CCO-00 /BBS W
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION #1 OF #2 SINGAPORE 12382

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 12865: RDS-1 12/12/81 (THAYER, HARRY E.T.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, VM, SN
SUBJ: (S) KHMER RESISTANCE

REF: A. STATE 328178; B. SINGAPORE 12381

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: I CONVEYED INSTRUCTED POINTS ON AID TO THE KHMER TO FOMIN DHANABALAN DECEMBER 12. DHANA OFFERED PRELIMINARY RESPONSE AND WILL AMPLIFY NEXT WEEK. HE SAID USG SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING SAME APPROACH TO THE FIVE ASEANS SINCE THEY ALL HAVE NOW AGREED, AT PATJYA, ON THE NEED FOR NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE. I SAID THAT SINCE THREE ASEANS SEPARATELY ASKED US TO AID THE KHMER WE WERE RESPONDING SEPARATELY TO EACH. DHANA WILL MAKE PROPOSAL NEXT WEEK ON HOW TO HANDLE INDONESIA. END SUMMARY.

3. I MET WITH FOMIN DHANABALAN DEC. 12 AFTER RECEIVING PERMSEC NATHAN'S BRIEFING ON THE PATTAYA MEETING OF THE ASEAN FOMINS REPORTED IN REFTEL B. I EXPLAINED THAT WHILE I HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED THE MEETING BECAUSE OF MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS RESPONDING TO THE GOS REQUEST FOR AID TO THE KHMER. I THEN PRESENTED THE SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL A IN DETAIL. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE THE DCM, THE MFA ASSISTANT POLITICAL DIRECTOR FOR COMMUNIST AFFAIRS RAYMOND WONG AND AMERICAN DESK OFFICER BILINARI KAUSIKAN.

4. AFTER PRESENTING OUR POSITION, I NOTED THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS PRESUMABLY WERE PREPARED PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE PATTAYA CONFERENCE AND THAT NATHAN'S JUST CONCLUDED BRIEFING HAD HELPED ANSWER SOME OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN MY INSTRUCTIONS. I NOTED ALSO THAT I OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT SPECULATE BEYOND THE LANGUAGE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS BUT WOULD WELCOME ANY IMMEDIATE COMMENT THE MINISTER MIGHT HAVE.

5. DHANA SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO STUDY OUR VIEWS MORE CLOSELY BEFORE COMMENTING DEFINITELY. HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION, HOWEVER, CENTERED ABOUT AN INFERENCE HE FELT ONE CAN DRAW FROM THE INSTRUCTIONS. IT APPEARED, HE SAID, THAT THE USG ASSUMES ASEAN WOULD NOT BE UNITED IN BEING AGREEABLE TO THE USG EXTENDING NON-MILITARY AS WELL AS MILITARY AID TO THE KHMER. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE WAY OUR INSTRUCTIONS DISCUSS HANDLING THIS ISSUE WITHIN ASEAN IMPLY THIS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE GOS WOULD NOT DISCUSS OUR DEMARCHE WITH INDONESIA OR ANYONE ELSE RIGHT NOW. DHANA

FELT, HOWEVER, THAT SINCE THE USG WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER NON-MILITARY AID AND SINCE ALL ASEANS AGREED ON THE NEED FOR THIS TYPE OF AID FOR THE KHMER, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE USG TO MAKE THE SAME DEMARCHE TO ALL FIVE ASEANS. HE NOTED THAT WE HAD ALREADY TOLD ALL OF THE ASEANS OF OUR PREVIOUS HUMANITARIAN AND FMS ASSISTANCE AND WONDERED WHY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME TYPES OF AID SHOULD NOT AGAIN BE DISCUSSED WITH ALL OF THE ASEANS. THE INDONESIANS MAY WONDER WHY THEY WERE LEFT OUT AT THIS EARLY STAGE.

6. I TOLD HIM THAT SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND HAD REQUESTED AID TO THE KHMER FROM US AND THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO COMPLICATE THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES BY, IN EFFECT, ANSWERING THOSE BILATERAL REQUESTS IN A MULTILATERAL MANNER. REFERRING TO THE "COORDINATION" LANGUAGE IN MY INSTRUCTIONS, I SAID WE WOULD WELCOME HIS VIEWS OF HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE MATTER WITH THE INDONESIANS. DHANA SAID HE WOULD GET BACK TO US ON THIS AND AGREED THAT AT THIS POINT WE SHOULD KEEP THIS A BILATERAL ISSUE.

7. COMMENTING FURTHER ON MY PRESENTATION, DHANA SAID THAT IT WAS "UNREALISTIC" TO EXPECT THE ADMINISTRATION TO START PROVIDING MILITARY AID TO THE KHMER "RIGHT AWAY" AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT,

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ACTION INRD-06

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 CCO-00 /009 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9797
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 58500

ROGER CHANNEL

EO 12865: RDS-1/3 12/15/01 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, VM
SUBJECT: KHMER RESISTANCE

REF: STATE 328178

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 15 I MET WITH THAI FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI TO DISCUSS WITH HIM HOW WE PLAN TO RESPOND TO THE APPEALS OF SOME ASEAN STATES FOR U.S. SUPPORT TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMERS (REFTEL). AFTER LISTENING TO MY PRESENTATION, FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

-- (A) AT THE PHATTHAYA CONFERENCE, THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO PROVIDE NON-MILITARY AID TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMERS BUT LEFT THE MATTER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. THIS FORMULA IS SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO MAINTAIN ASEAN UNITY WHILE ALSO MEETING THE SPECIFIC VIEWS OF INDIVIDUAL ASEAN MEMBERS.

-- (B) IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT LIMIT THE DISCUSSIONS OF U.S. INTENTIONS TO SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND, BUT WOULD ALSO KEEP THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA INFORMED. SUCH ACTION BY THE U.S. WOULD FACILITATE COOPERATION AMONG THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND HELP TO MAINTAIN UNITY AMONG ITS MEMBERS ON A POTENTIALLY DIVISIVE ISSUE.

-- (C) THE INDONESIANS DO NOT WISH TO TAKE A PUBLIC POSTURE WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN "ASEAN PROVOCATION". HENCE THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS AT PHATTHAYA ON NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WHILE PUBLICLY AVOIDING ANY REFERENCE TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA BY ASEAN COUNTRIES, SITTHI CLAIMED THE INDONESIANS ARE SECRETLY PROVIDING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. THIS SHOWED, IN HIS VIEW, THAT THE INDONESIANS COULD BE VERY REALISTIC AND UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE U.S. NOT TO KEEP INDONESIA IN THE DARK CONCERNING OUR INTENTIONS ON HELPING THE KHMER RESISTANCE.

-- (D) THE NON-MILITARY SUPPORT PROVIDED BY ASEAN TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMERS WILL BE CHANNLED THROUGH THAILAND. SITTHI THOUGHT EVERYBODY HAD AGREED ON THIS PRINCIPLE AT PHATTHAYA, BUT NO DETAILS WERE DISCUSSED.

-- (E) THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DID NOT DISCUSS AT PHATTHAYA HOW MILITARY AID BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES MIGHT BE CHANNLED TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER RESISTANCE.

-- (F) IN A SIDE CONVERSATION AT PHATTHAYA, SITTHI HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY AID WITH HIS MALAYSIAN AND SINGAPORAN COLLEAGUES. SITTHI FEELS THAT SINGAPORE AND THAILAND MIGHT END UP WITH A JOINT MECHANISM FOR HANDLING MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY

INDIVIDUAL ASEAN COUNTRIES, BUT THIS IDEA WILL NEED FURTHER DISCUSSION.

-- (G) ON DECEMBER 28 MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHAZALI WILL MEET JOINTLY IN BANGKOK WITH GENERAL SAIYUD (THAI SUPREME COMMANDER) AND FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI TO DISCUSS DETAILS ON HOW TO SUPPORT THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER. IN THIS CONNECTION SITTHI EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT ANY ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER MUST TRANSIT THAILAND, WHICH GIVES THE THAIS A SPECIAL ROLE IN CHANNELING THIS AID TO ITS DESTINATION.

-- (H) SITTHI FELT HE NEEDED TO CONSULT SOME OF HIS ASEAN COLLEAGUES BEFORE ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF HOW U.S. PROVIDED ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE HANDLED. HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE NON-MILITARY NATURE OF OUR RESPONSE TO THE APPEALS OF SINGAPORE, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE.

-- (I) SITTHI ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE MATTER OF WHETHER U.S. NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE LINKED TO THE FORMATION OF A COALITION AMONG THE THREE KHMER FACTIONS. SITTHI THOUGHT A "BEST EFFORT" SHOULD BE MADE TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A COALITION, BUT EVEN IF THIS DID NOT OCCUR, "THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER MUST HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THEIR FRIENDS."

-- (J) SITTHI PLANS TO INFORM PRIME MINISTER PREM ON DECEMBER 15 OR 16 OF AMERICAN THINKING ON SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER RESISTANCE. HE WILL ALSO DISCUSS WITH PREM GHAZALI'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BANGKOK. IN ANY CASE, THE OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE THAT WILL GOVERN THAI POLICY ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE TO WORK IN HARMONY WITH ITS ASEAN

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ACTION INRD-06

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-02 CCD-02 /BB9 V
-----266555 120923Z /38

O 120805Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1767
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T KUALA LUMPUR 8232

ROGER CHANNEL

E.O. 12065: RDS-1/3 12/12/01 (PALMER, RONALD D.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, ASEAN, CB, US, VN, MY
SUBJECT: (S) KHMER RESISTANCE

REF: STATE 328178

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL, I WENT IN TO SEE FOREIGN MINISTER GHAZALI THIS MORNING (DECEMBER 12). HE AND MFA SECRETARY GENERAL ZACHARIA AND GHAZALI'S PRIVATE SECRETARY HASHIM RECEIVED ME. I INFORMED GHAZALI MY GOVERNMENT HAD RESPONDED TO THE PLEAS HE AND OTHER ASEAN LEADERS HAD MADE FOR US ASSISTANCE TO NON-COMMUNIST KHMER RESISTANCE, BUT I NOTED I COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE POINTS I WOULD OUTLINE. I ALSO SAID I AND OTHER US CHIEFS OF MISSION IN THE ASEAN REGION WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL POLICY CONTACTS ON THE PROJECT, WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE LIAISON PEOPLE DEALING WITH ITS OPERATIONAL ASPECTS, AFTER RESPONSES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS WERE OBTAINED, AND REQUISITE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WERE OBTAINED.

3. AFTER OUTLING THE INTRODUCTORY PORTIONS OF PARA 2 REFTEL, I READ ALOUD THE RELEVANT TALKING POINTS IN PARA 2, WHILE THE FOREIGN MINISTER MADE NOTES. WHEN I FINISHED MY PRESENTATION, HE SAID, IN ESSENCE, THE US HAS AGREED TO MAKE A NON-LETHAL PACKAGE CONTRIBUTION, SUBJECT TO RECEIVING ANSWERS TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS, AND FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH AND APPROVAL BY THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS. I AGREED ON THE THREE KEY POINTS, GHAZALI SAID 1) RE ASEAN CONSENSUS ON A US ROLE IN ASSISTING THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER RESISTANCE, SUCH CONSENSUS AMONG MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND THAILAND HAD BEEN OBTAINED AT THE DECEMBER 10 PATTAYA ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND THE "ACQUIESCENCE" OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA IN SUCH A US ROLE HAD ALSO BEEN OBTAINED; 2) RE WHAT ASEAN INTENDS TO DO, GHAZALI SAID HE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR TO SINGAPORE IN THE COMING WEEK AND WOULD TALK WITH HIS SINGAPOREAN COLLEAGUES. ADDITIONALLY, HE WILL BE IN BANGKOK ON DECEMBER 20 AND INTENDS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER WITH BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY GROUP AND GENERAL SAIYUD AND THE SUPREME COMMAND GROUP IN ORDER TO "BUNDLE UP" THIS QUESTION AND GET A COORDINATED RESPONSE BACK TO THE US; 3) RE AN AGREED MECHANISM FOR HANDLING ASSISTANCE, GHAZALI SAID THIS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION. THE MOST EFFICACIOUS WAY TO GET THE MATERIALS TO THE KPRLF MUST BE FOUND TO MAKE CERTAIN THE MONEY IS NOT WASTED OR TURNED TO IMPROPER USES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT INSOFAR AS THE MONITORING AND CHECKING OF US

ASSISTANCE WAS CONCERNED, MALAYSIA ITSELF CAN GUARANTEE TO SEE THAT WHATEVER THE US PROVIDES WILL ACTUALLY GET TO THE KPRLF. HE SAID HE DID NOT RECOMMEND THAILAND AS THE CONDUIT AND LAUGHED THAT CERTAIN THAI LEADERS HAD RECOMMENDED AGAINST US ASSISTANCE BEING CHANNELED THROUGH THAILAND "BECAUSE SOME OF IT MIGHT NOT REACH THE TARGETS." GHAZALI SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE WORKING WITH THE OTHER ASEAN GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE THE US THE RESPONSES IT DESIRED.

4. IN REACTING TO THE PROPOSED US ASSISTANCE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED FAVORABLY THAT THE US PROPOSED TO CONTINUE EXISTING HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE KHMER AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND. ON THE SPECIFIC PACKAGE ITSELF, HE SAID, "ANYTHING IS BETTER THAN NOTHING BUT NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESS; SO WE HAVE TO MAKE THIS THING A SUCCESS." GHAZALI SAID, ADDITIONALLY, HE "VERY MUCH APPRECIATES THE US OFFER AND UNDERSTANDS WHY THE US HAS PUT THE MATTER THE WAY IT HAS. I WILL WORK WITH THE OTHERS PARTICULARLY ON THE MODALITIES."

5. I WILL BE REPORTING BY SEPTEL GHAZALI'S COMMENTS ON RECENT MALAYSIAN CONTACTS WITH HANOI.

6. COMMENT: FOREIGN MINISTER GHAZALI WAS CLEARLY PLEASED BY USG RESPONSE. HOWEVER, HE DID SEEK TO PROBE ME ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO AFTER THE NON-COMMUNISTS MADE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS; I DID NOT RESPOND, CITING MY INSTRUCTIONS TO NOT GO BEYOND THE POINTS I HAD ALREADY MADE.

7. GHAZALI WAS COMPLETELY APPRECIATIVE OF NEED TO KEEP THIS MATTER CLOSE HOLD BUT WARNED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WITH SON SANN BECAUSE "THE PROBLEM OF PUBLICITY WOULD COME FROM THE KPRLF."
PALMER

FILE

SPECIAL HANDLING

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POSSIBLE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER RESISTANCE

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers reached again a consensus on Kampuchean strategy during their December 10 meeting in Pattaya, Thailand. The Ministers assuaged Indonesian irritation over Singapore's earlier handling of the coalition talks and Rajaratnam's public mention of military assistance from ASEAN to the Khmer, and Indonesia is again comfortably on board with other ASEAN's.

The Ministers supported the "loose coalition" approach and agreed to urge China and others to get the Khmer Rouge to join the loose coalition. They also agreed that ASEAN as an organization would not provide military assistance to the Khmer, but as individual states, each was free to do so or seek third country assistance.

The guidance, which you authorized, on possible U.S. support to the Khmer resistance reached the capitals immediately after the Pattaya meeting. It was extremely helpful in responding to renewed requests after the meeting for the USG position by Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia and was very timely.

Our positive approach produced a positive reaction in all three capitals, and in Jakarta, where we provided a more limited briefing. Malaysia and Singapore (with Ghazali Shafie particularly pleased) accepted our approach, but made clear that they hope eventually for U.S. military assistance by the U.S. as well. The Indonesians were somewhat surprised, but pleased that we do not intend to provide military assistance, which they would regard as counterproductive. We do not yet have the Filipino reaction, but Deputy Assistant Secretary O'Donohue briefed President Marcos late last week. The Filipinos should welcome our approach. Ambassador Hummel also briefed December 18 Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wen Jin, who responded that Chinese had consistently supported efforts to help any Khmer faction opposed to the Vietnamese occupation.

Our approach thus was constructive and avoided exacerbating the divergencies within ASEAN. The quick response following the Pattaya meeting appears to have been just the right response at just the right time.

We made clear that our proposal was tentative and did not represent a USG decision. Following receipt of a more integrated response (from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore), which spells out what ASEAN plans to do, how our efforts might integrate with theirs

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and through what mechanism we might proceed, we will seek a presidential finding and congressional oversight concurrence in our proposal. We anticipate a considered response from the three ASEAN's soon.

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TALKING POINTS

-- OUR INITIAL CONVERSATION WITH THE THAIS, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA WAS TIMELY AND PRODUCED A POSITIVE REACTION IN ALL THREE CAPITALS. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE (FOREIGN MINISTER GHAZALI SHAFIE ENTHUSIASTICALLY) ACCEPTED OUR APPROACH, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT THEY HOPED EVENTUALLY FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

-- INDONESIANS AND PROBABLY THE FILIPINOS WERE COMFORTABLE WITH OUR APPROACH AND PLEASED THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

-- THE CHINESE WELCOMED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUPPORT.

-- OUR QUICK RESPONSE FOLLOWING THE PATTAYA MEETING TO RE-NEWED APPEALS BY THAILAND, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN THE RIGHT RESPONSE AT JUST THE RIGHT TIME.

-- WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR PROPOSAL WAS TENTATIVE AND DID NOT REPRESENT A USG DECISION. WE ANTICIPATE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE SOON FROM THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE TO SPELL OUT THEIR OWN PLANS, HOW OUR EFFORTS MIGHT INTEGRATE WITH THEIRS AND WHAT CHANNEL THEY PROPOSE THAT WE USE.

-- AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THEIR RESPONSES, WE SHOULD STUDY IT FOR ACCEPTABILITY THEN PROCEED TO SEEK A PRESIDENTIAL FINDING AND, ON YOUR PART, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT CONCURRENCE.

21 December 1981

SUBJECT: Assistance to the Non-Communist Khmer Resistance

1. Secretary Haig will raise the issue of US assistance to the non-Communist Khmer resistance. Since this matter was last discussed in November, East Asia Division officers have been in close touch with Assistant Secretary Holdridge and the Department's East Asia Bureau. Final steps are now underway to obtain information from ASEAN, notably Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, necessary for the drafting of a Presidential Finding submission. It is expected this can be put together in early January 1982.

2. Division officers met with Secretary Holdridge and his associates on 24 November. It was agreed that a limited, non-military aid package

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3. Preliminary replies appear to be positive. Malaysia and Singapore welcome the approach but made clear that they hope eventually to have the US provide military assistance. Indonesia has expressed relief that military assistance will not be included, which Jakarta believes would be counter-productive. The Philippines have not yet responded. Briefed about the US intention on 18 December, the PRC Vice Foreign Minister stated that the Chinese consistently support efforts to help any Khmer faction opposed to the Vietnamese occupation.

4. The Department is now awaiting a more detailed response from Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore which will identify precisely what ASEAN plans to do and how the US effort can be integrated. After this is received we will again meet with Assistant Secretary Holdridge to react concurrence the content and scope of the Presidential Finding submission.

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