



# INDOCHINA ISSUES 21

## Diplomacy of the Kampuchea Conflict: Key Documents

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The documents assembled in this special issue of *Indochina Issues* have been chosen to show the evolution of the diplomatic impasse over Kampuchea during the past eighteen months. From the key documents of the major actors, we have extracted those parts which convey official positions regarding negotiations on Kampuchea and the wider regional problem of Vietnam-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) relations. What the documents show is that none of the parties is ready to offer a real compromise on Kampuchea. Instead Vietnam and ASEAN each wait for the other side to signal its readiness to make serious concessions.

Vietnam's diplomatic strategy, as shown in these documents, is to blunt pressures for a political compromise on Kampuchea by offering to satisfy many of the past concerns voiced by the ASEAN states about Vietnamese intentions toward the region. Meanwhile, Vietnam has begun defining the conditions under which its troops would withdraw from Kampuchea. In effect, Vietnam is offering ASEAN friendship and cooperation in return for acceptance of the political status quo in Kampuchea.

ASEAN, however, is holding out an olive branch to Vietnam on the condition that Vietnam give up its dominant position in Kampuchea. ASEAN's 1980 demand that Vietnam withdraw its forces from Kampuchea in advance of a U.N.-sponsored political settlement was neither altered nor clarified by the July international conference on Kampuchea. ASEAN has tried unsuccessfully to sweeten the pill for the Vietnamese by recognizing Vietnamese security concerns in Kampuchea and by suggesting that economic assistance from the international community could be forthcoming if Vietnam yields on Kampuchea.

China, on the other hand, has avoided giving any assurances to Vietnam that Pol Pot will not replace the

Vietnamese-sponsored regime in Phnom Penh. Beijing offers only the resumption of negotiations toward normalizing relations with Vietnam in return for a Vietnamese military withdrawal from Kampuchea—not a pledge to forego the use of military force and other pressures against the Indochinese states.

The United States has made no proposal of its own on Kampuchea, but instead has supported positions worked out by ASEAN and China. Washington has expressed strong support for pressures on Vietnam to agree to the demands of the international community, including China's threat to Vietnam's northern border and Chinese arming of anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, but avoids any commitment to help provide positive incentives to Vietnam to agree to a compromise settlement.

### Statement by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, April 22, 1980

Shortly before Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach embarked on visits to several ASEAN nations in May, 1980, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement ruling out any Vietnamese participation in an international conference on Kampuchea which did not have the approval and participation of the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin regime. The statement was evidently aimed at reassuring Phnom Penh that no political settlement would be negotiated over its head.

The Vietnamese Government fully agrees with and resolutely supports the correct stand of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council. All matters concerning Kampuchea must be solved by the Kampuchean people, whose sole, legal, authentic representative is the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council. All international conferences to discuss the matters concerning Kampuchea must be held with the agreement and

participation of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council which is handling Kampuchea's internal and foreign affairs.

Stemming from its desire to join other Southeast Asian countries in building and developing long-term friendly and cooperative relations in the interest of each country and for the sake of peace and stability in the region and in contributing to the defense of world peace, Vietnam is ready to hold bilateral discussions with other countries in the region.

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Asia and Pacific Daily Report, April 22, 1980, p. K1.*

**Address by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1980 (extract)**

*In July, 1980, following Vietnam's brief incursion into Thai territory, the three Indochinese foreign ministers proposed a demilitarized zone on the Thai-Kampuchean border, with some form of international controls, to be negotiated directly or indirectly between Thailand and Kampuchea. In September, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach offered, in a meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila in New York, to withdraw part of the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea in response to a restoration of security on the Thai-Kampuchea border. Thach then made the proposal public in a U.N. speech. He also made it clear that a complete Vietnamese withdrawal would depend on China ending its "threats" against both Kampuchea and Vietnam.*

[ . . . ] we have notified the UN secretary general of the following agreements between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea:

—The presence of Vietnamese armed forces in Kampuchea is aimed at opposing the Chinese threats to Kampuchea and Vietnam and is at the request of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea [KPRC]. When these threats no longer exist and at the request of the KPRC, the Vietnamese armed forces will leave Kampuchea.

—The strained situation along the Kampuchean-Thai border is threatening peace in this region. The establishment of a demilitarized zone along both sides of the Kampuchean-Thai border is the best measure for ensuring peace, security and stability in the border areas of Kampuchea and Thailand. With the help of the UN secretary-general, Kampuchea and Thailand will hold negotiations to settle the tense situation along the Kampuchean-Thai border on the basis of respect for each other's interests.

—Proceeding from the situation of peace, security and stability along the Kampuchean-Thai border, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will hold discussions with the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea and decide on the withdrawal of part of Vietnamese armed forces from Kampuchea.

*FBIS, Asia and Pacific Daily Report, September 29, 1980, pp. K7-8.*

**Statement of Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, January 28, 1981 (extract)**

*In January, 1981, the three Indochinese foreign ministers defined the phrase "ending the Chinese threat" for the first time by proposing agreements between China and each of the three countries on "peaceful coexistence." The statement also proposed for the first time a regional conference between the Indochinese and ASEAN countries, with the agenda to be agreed upon between the two groups of states. The proposal envisioned an international conference to ratify the regional agreement. ASEAN rejected the proposal as failing to address the issue of the Kampuchean conflict.*

[ . . . ] 3. The basic factor for restoring peace and stability in Southeast Asia at present is that China must terminate its hostile policy toward the three Indochinese countries and its policy of interfering in other countries in this area. The three Indochinese countries and China are neighbors with age-old relations. The Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean people have always cherished their traditional friendship with the Chinese people. Proceeding from their policy of peace and friendship and their attitude of good will, the SRV [Socialist Republic of Vietnam], the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] and the PRK [People's Republic of Kampuchea] declare their readiness to sign bilateral treaties of peaceful coexistence with the PRC [People's Republic of China] on the basis of the principles of absolute respect for each country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, nonintervention in each other's internal affairs; equality; mutual benefit; good neighborly relations and the settlement of all bilateral disputes through peaceful means.

The SRV once again calls on the PRC to resume at an early date the Vietnam-China talks in order to resolve the problems in their mutual relations. The Vietnamese side once again reaffirms that in the framework of these talks, it is ready to discuss the problems raised by the Chinese side, and demands that the Chinese side adopt the same attitude toward the problems of interest to Vietnam.

In the interests of the two peoples of Laos and China, the LPDR demands that the PRC respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Laos; stop supporting, assisting and fostering the reactionary Lao exiles in Chinese territory and other countries; terminate its armed threats along the Lao-Chinese border areas; stop sending spies and commandos into Laos and stop spreading slanderous propaganda against the LPDR. The LPDR deems that a response to these points will serve as a basis for restoring normal relations of friendship between the two countries.

The PRK demands that the PRC stop using the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique

and other groups of Khmer reactionaries to oppose the PRK; and that the PRC respect the independence and sovereignty of the PRK—with the KPRC [People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea] being the sole genuine and legal representative of the Kampuchean people—and stop interfering in its internal affairs. The PRK deems that these points serve as a basis for peace and stability in Southeast Asia as well as a basis for normal relations between the PRK and the PRC. [ . . . ]

4. The Indochinese and the ASEAN countries, despite their different social systems and their disagreement on a number of questions, share the same basic benefit of regional peace, stability, friendship and cooperation, which is an essential condition for protecting independence and security as well as for each country building a prosperous and happy nation in its own way. In the interest of their own peoples and in the common interest of building a peaceful, stable and prosperous Southeast Asia, the Indochinese and the ASEAN countries must eliminate all the schemes of interference and division by foreign countries and must not let relations of friendship and cooperation between the two groups of countries be affected by their differences and disagreements. [ . . . ]

The persistent policy of the three Indochinese countries in pursuing a dialogue to settle all disputes through negotiations has been realistically proven as a correct way to guarantee peace, stability and cooperation in the region. According to the above spirit, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea propose that:

A. A regional conference between the Indochinese and ASEAN countries be held to discuss the problems concerning them for the benefit of peace, stability, friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia based on the principle of equality in achieving mutual agreement, of respect for each country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, of non-imposition of the will of one group of countries on the other, and of no outside interference. For the sake of the common interests of the region, the Indochinese and ASEAN countries must quickly eliminate the obstacles to and discuss those problems concerning the holding of this conference. The agenda, the timing and the venue will be agreed upon by the two groups of countries. [ . . . ]

B. After the countries of these two groups have signed an agreement on Southeast Asian peace and stability, an enlarged international conference will be held to endorse and secure this agreement. In order to prepare for a regional conference between the two groups of countries, the representatives of the three-country Indochinese group and those of the five-country ASEAN group will meet in a preparatory conference. The three Indochinese countries nominate the LPDR as their representative in this preparatory conference.

*FBIS, Asia and Pacific Daily Report, January 28, 1981, pp. A1-3.*

### **Statement of the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, June 14, 1981 (extract)**

*In a revision of their regional conference proposal, the Indochinese foreign ministers suggested that ASEAN and the Indochinese states could alternate in establishing the agenda for discussions, thus allowing ASEAN to raise the issue of a political settlement in Kampuchea and Vietnamese troop withdrawal. They moved slightly closer to the idea of an international conference by proposing that some outside states and the U.N. Secretary General could participate as observers, and that the international conference to ratify the regional agreement could be U.N.-sponsored—provided that Pol Pot was first derecognized.*

[ . . . ] With the desire to bring the process of dialogue quickly to positive results beneficial to peace, stability, friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia, the three Indochinese countries propose the following:

A) A regional conference to be held between the two groups of Indochinese and ASEAN countries to discuss regional issues of bilateral interest with the participation as observers of the UN Secretary General himself and a number of other countries to be agreed upon by the two sides. The agenda would be presented in turn by the two groups of Indochinese and ASEAN countries for discussion on the basis of rotation and equality. The Indochinese countries propose that this conference be convened in mid-July 1981 at Rangoon or a capital of another Asian country that may be mutually agreed upon by the two sides.

B) In case the ASEAN countries are not yet ready to attend the proposed regional conference, the three Indochinese countries propose that bilateral or multi-lateral regional consultations be continued among countries in the region, as proposed by some ASEAN countries, in order to discuss and reach mutual agreement on various regional issues of mutual interest.

C) An international conference with a broad composition of participants to be mutually agreed upon by the two sides to be convened to acknowledge and guarantee various treaties mutually agreed upon by the two sides at the regional conference or regional consultations. If the United Nations ceases to recognize Pol Pot and his colleagues, the Indochinese countries will consider the possibility of the United Nations convening such an international conference.

*FBIS, Asia and Pacific Daily Report, June 15, 1981, pp. A3-5.*

### **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 35/6, October 22, 1980 (extract)**

*The ASEAN states agreed in September, 1980 to call for an international conference under U.N. auspices and to demand total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep law and order in Kampuchea and U.N.-supervised elections.*

*The ASEAN draft of a United Nations General Assembly resolution to this effect was altered in one important respect before becoming resolution 35/6: the call for a U.N. peacekeeping force was deleted, presumably at the insistence of China.*

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling its resolution 34/22 of 14 November 1979, [...]*

2. *Decides, taking into account paragraph 12 of resolution 34/22, to convene early in 1981 an international conference on Kampuchea which should involve the participation of all conflicting parties in Kampuchea and others concerned, with the aim of finding a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem;*

3. *Decides further that the conference should negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on, inter alia:*

(a) *Total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea within a specific time-frame to be verified by the United Nations;*

(b) *Measures by the United Nations to ensure law and order and the observance of the fundamental principles of human rights in Kampuchea;*

(c) *Measures by the United Nations to ensure non-interference by outside Powers in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;*

(d) *United Nations-supervised free elections in Kampuchea;*

(e) *Guarantees against the introduction of any foreign forces in Kampuchea;*

(f) *Guarantees to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kampuchea;*

(g) *Guarantees that an independent and sovereign Kampuchea will not be a threat to its neighbours;*

4. *Requests the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps for the convening of such a conference;*

5. *Calls for, pending the settlement of the conflict:*

(a) *The stationing of a United Nations observer team on the Thai side of the border in order to observe the situation along the border and to verify that only civilian Kampuchean obtain international relief aid;*


(b) *The establishment of safe areas under United Nations supervision in western Kampuchea for the uprooted civilian Kampuchean encamped near the Thai-Kampuchean border and those in Thailand who wish to return to their homeland;*

6. *Urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict is achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia; [...]*

*United Nations Department of Public Information, Press Release GA/6375 (1981)*

#### **Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, July 17, 1981**

*ASEAN's draft declaration for the international conference represented a step forward in defining a*



*realistic alternative to the continuing presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea by calling for the disarming of all Khmer factions and the setting up of an interim administration, presumably to be negotiated as part of the overall settlement. But these provisions, which would have ruled out the return of Democratic Kampuchea to power, were strongly opposed by the Chinese delegation. The substitute provision for "appropriate arrangements" to maintain law and order and to prevent disruption of free elections, left the issue in doubt (see *Indochina Issues* #18, July, 1981). The declaration, as adopted by the conference, also straddled the issue of whether the U.N. presence would be a "peacekeeping force" or an "observer group." ASEAN efforts to provide "carrots" in the document for the Vietnamese to make concessions on Kampuchea were severely cut back before the conference began.*

1. Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and to General Assembly resolution 35/6, the United Nations convened the International Conference on Kampuchea at its Headquarters in New York, from 13 to 17 July 1981, with the aim of finding a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

2. The Conference reaffirms the rights of all States to the inviolability of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and stresses their obligation to respect those rights of their neighbours. The Conference also reaffirms the right of all peoples to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference, subversion and coercion.

3. The Conference expresses its concern that the situation in Kampuchea has resulted from the violation of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in international relations.

4. The Conference takes note of the serious international consequences that have arisen out of the situation in Kampuchea. In particular, the Conference

notes with grave concern the escalation of tension in South-East Asia and major Power involvement as a result of this situation.

5. The Conference also takes note of the serious problem of refugees which has resulted from the situation in Kampuchea and is convinced that a political solution to the conflict will be necessary for the long-term solution of the refugee problem.

6. The Conference stresses its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem.

7. The Conference regrets that the foreign armed intervention continues and that the foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus making it impossible for the Kampuchean people to express their will in free elections.

8. The Conference is further convinced that a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict is vital to the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia.

9. The Conference emphasizes that Kampuchea, like all other countries, has the right to be independent and sovereign, free from any external threat or armed aggression, free to pursue its own development and a better life for its people in an environment of peace, stability and full respect for human rights.

10. With a view to reaching a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea, the Conference calls for negotiations on, *inter alia*, the following elements:

(a) An agreement on cease-fire by all parties to the conflict in Kampuchea and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea in the shortest time possible under the supervision and verification of a United Nations peace-keeping force/observer group;

(b) Appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections, or intimidate or coerce the population in the electoral process; such arrangements should also ensure that they will respect the result of the free elections;

(c) Appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order in Kampuchea and the holding of free elections, following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country and before the establishment of a new government resulting from those elections;

(d) The holding of free elections under United Nations supervision, which will allow the Kampuchean people to exercise their right to self-determination and elect a government of their own choice; all Kampuchean will have the right to participate in the elections.

11. The Conference appreciates the legitimate security concerns of all States of the region and, therefore, deems it essential for Kampuchea to remain non-aligned and neutral and for the future elected government of Kam-

puchea to declare that Kampuchea will not pose a threat to or be used against the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States, especially those sharing a common border with Kampuchea.

12. The Conference also deems it essential for the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, all States of South-East Asia as well as other States concerned to declare, in conjunction with paragraph 11 above, that:

(a) They will respect and observe in every way, the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned and neutral status of Kampuchea and recognize its borders as inviolable;

(b) They will refrain from all forms of interference, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;

(c) They will not bring Kampuchea into any military alliance or other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with its legislation under paragraph 11 nor invite or encourage it to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(d) They will refrain from introducing into Kampuchea foreign troops or military personnel and not establish any military bases in Kampuchea;

(e) They will not use the territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;

(f) They will not pose a threat to the security of Kampuchea or endanger its survival as a sovereign nation.

13. The Conference expresses the hope that, following the peaceful resolution of the Kampuchean conflict, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all States of the region.

14. The Conference notes the absence of Viet Nam and other States and urges them to attend the future sessions of the Conference. In this context, the Conference takes note of the current bilateral consultations among the countries of the region and expresses the hope that these consultations will help to persuade all countries of the region and others to participate in the future sessions of the Conference.

15. The Conference expresses the hope that Viet Nam will participate in the negotiating process which can lead to a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem and to the restoration of peace and stability to the region of South-East Asia. This will enable all the countries of the region to devote themselves to the task of economic and social development, to engage in confidence-building and to promote regional co-operation in all fields of endeavour, thus heralding a new era of peace, concord and amity in South-East Asia.

*United Nations General Assembly document A/CONF. 109/L.1/Add. 1, July 17, 1981.*

**Speech by Chinese Acting Foreign Minister  
Han Nianlong at the International Conference on  
Kampuchea, July 13, 1981 (extract)**

*China insisted at the conference that no international body interfere with the internal affairs of Kampuchea, rejecting any infringement on the legal claim of the Pol Pot regime to be the legitimate government of Kampuchea. And despite pressures from ASEAN countries that China offer to withdraw the threat of force against Vietnam in return for a Vietnamese military withdrawal, the Chinese delegate, Acting Foreign Minister Han Nianlong, offered only to resume bilateral negotiations with Vietnam, broken off unilaterally by Beijing in March, 1980. China would thus retain its military pressure on Vietnam after a Kampuchean settlement to extract concessions from Hanoi on other issues.*

[ . . . ] In our opinion, a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question must include the following elements:

First, the Vietnamese troops must withdraw completely from Kampuchea within a time limit. As is known to all, the continued presence of 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea is the main obstacle to a fair settlement of the Kampuchea question. The Chinese delegation believes that the primary task of this conference is to discuss and work out ways for the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. This is not only the key to and basis for the settlement of the Kampuchean question, but also an essential prerequisite to easing the tension in Southeast Asia. We propose that the conference call on Vietnam to pull out all its troops from Kampuchea within six months.

Second, the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination must be fully respected. General Assembly Resolution 35/6 affirms the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future free from outside interference. In our view, after the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, it is up to the Kampuchean people themselves to decide through genuine free elections under UN supervision such internal affairs as to what kind of government and political system are to be established in Kampuchea and who are to be chosen to form the government. We hope that the patriotic forces in Kampuchea will consult among themselves genuine free elections without any threat of force so as to give full expression to the will of the Kampuchean people.

Third, necessary international guarantee of the independent, neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea should be provided.

The Chinese delegation wishes to propose that, after the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, the permanent member states of the Security Council, together with Vietnam, the ASEAN and other countries concerned undertake the following:

1. To refrain from any interference in Kampuchea's internal affairs;
2. To respect the independent, neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea;

3. Not to use Kampuchea as a base for aggression against other countries or for interference in their internal affairs; and

4. To respect the results of the genuine free elections to be held by the Kampuchean people under UN supervision.

On the basis of the UN Charter, the norms of international relations and the resolutions adopted at the last two sessions of the General Assembly, the Chinese government has put forward the above three-point proposal with a view to reaching a just and reasonable settlement of the Kampuchean question. We are prepared to discuss and consult with all of you on our proposal.

In our opinion, any political settlement of the Kampuchean question should be in conformity with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the norms of international relations. It should not depart from the General Assembly resolution, and certainly not infringe upon the fundamental interests of the Kampuchean people. Historical experience shows that when a small and weak nation is subjected to aggression, compromises or concessions will only court greater harm. Today, on the Kampuchean question, to condone the Vietnamese authorities' hegemonist behaviour of bullying the weak or to seek a compromise at the expense of the interests of a small and weak nation such as Kampuchea will only serve to further embolden the aggressors and, far from achieving a lasting settlement of the Kampuchean question, will bring serious consequences to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole.

[ . . . ] We hope that Vietnam will become a factor conducive to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. We are only opposed to the policies of aggression and expansion pursued by the Vietnamese authorities. Should they withdraw all their troops from Kampuchea and abandon their policies of aggression and expansion, the Chinese Government would be prepared to start negotiations with Vietnam on the restoration of normal relations between the two countries and the conclusion of a treaty of mutual non-aggression and peaceful coexistence.

*FBIS, PRC Daily Report, July 14, 1981, pp. K8-10.*

**Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State  
John H. Holdridge, July 15, 1981 (extract)**

*Under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. policy of joining hands with China in order to put pressure on Vietnam has become more explicit than it had been under the Carter Administration. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge endorsed China's military pressure on Vietnam while disclaiming any "permanent hostility" toward Hanoi. To the demand for Vietnamese willingness to withdraw from Kampuchea, Holdridge added the undefined*

requirement that Hanoi cease "being a source of trouble to the entire region." And he avoided any commitment to normalization of relations if Vietnam "changes its present policies."

[ . . . ] But the central issue in U.S. policy toward Vietnam is the occupation of Kampuchea, and that is why we will continue to keep pressure on Hanoi. In this we and ASEAN are in full agreement: The course of action most likely to result in the removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea is to make the occupation as costly as possible for Hanoi. We will continue a process of diplomatic isolation and economic deprivation until Hanoi is prepared to follow the will of the world community as expressed in two consecutive U.N. General Assembly resolutions and agree to troop withdrawal, free elections, and an end to outside interference in Kampuchea. This policy of isolation and pressure is, of course, supplemented by the presence on Vietnam's northern border of hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops and the continuing guerrilla activity of several resistance groups inside Kampuchea.

When Hanoi is prepared to withdraw from Kampuchea and when it is no longer a source of trouble to the entire region, the economic and political pressures

which now weigh heavily upon that country can be lifted. It is Vietnam which has chosen its current isolation and its heavy dependence on the Soviet Union. Only Vietnam can end that isolation. It is in no one's interest to have a permanently hostile Vietnam on the borders of ASEAN and neither ASEAN nor the United States seeks permanent hostility. But I want to make it clear that the United States will not consider normalizing relations with Vietnam until Vietnam changes its present policies.

[ . . . ] Our concern with Vietnam is a function of the threat which Vietnam poses to ASEAN through its aggression in Kampuchea and through its relationship with the Soviet Union. The latter has established its military presence in Vietnam and is clearly bent upon expanding its political influence in Laos and Kampuchea. ASEAN understands fully the nature of this bargain between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which is costing the Russians millions of dollars per day, and the threat it poses to the region's non-Communist states.

"U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 295, July, 1981.

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