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**UN Special Session
on Disarmament:
A Preview**

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UN Special Session on Disarmament: A Preview

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*Information available as of 5 May 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

The authors of this paper are

Office of Global Issues.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Weapons Proliferation Branch,
International Security Issues Division, OGI, on

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**UN Special Session
On Disarmament:
A Preview** [redacted]

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Key Judgments

The UN Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II) will open on 7 June in New York. The most likely outcome of the five-week session will be a cosmetic declaration reaffirming the principles and goals established by the First Special Session (1978) and calling for additional work on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament. The Final Document of the conference is likely to:

- Call for the conclusion of a Nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB).
- Urge a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.
- Endorse expansion of the Committee on Disarmament.
- Recommend convening of a Third Special Session on Disarmament.

[redacted]

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This outcome should satisfy many nonaligned leaders who fear that a conference ending in confrontation or stalemate would call into question the utility of such multilateral forums and jeopardize the gains they have made in acquiring a greater voice in disarmament negotiations. The nonaligned have not organized behind specific substantive objectives or negotiating tactics. Moderate nonaligned nations share the Western belief that lessened international tensions and some renewal of trust is necessary before progress can be made on arms control. This may provide some opportunity for the United States to garner support for its positions, but these nations are also likely to support the demands of more radical nonaligned nations that the superpowers commit themselves to progress on nuclear disarmament. [redacted]

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The Soviet Union does not as yet appear to have any new initiatives to bring forward, although it could offer sweeping disarmament proposals. Moscow will undoubtedly use this meeting as a propaganda event to vie with Washington for Third World favor, yet try to avoid poisoning the atmosphere for upcoming superpower bilateral negotiations. The industrial democracies are generally in line with the United States but are more willing to meet the rhetorical demands of the neutral and nonaligned states. Many Western leaders, under domestic political pressure, will take advantage of extensive media coverage to propose largely symbolic disarmament initiatives. [redacted]

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Nonaligned nations will focus conference proceedings on nuclear weapons, because they assert that the arsenals of the great powers present the greatest danger to world peace. The nuclear focus also offers the best opportunity for maintaining the negotiating unity of the nonaligned and

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allows them to sidestep blame that their own military behavior and refusal to accept limits on acquisition of arms stymie serious progress toward multilateral arms control. [redacted]

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The nonaligned view the Special Session on Disarmament as a dialogue between the developed and developing nations. If the conference is dominated by East-West exchanges and fails to address the concerns of the nonaligned, they will judge it to be a failure. Because Soviet disarmament proposals generally are closer to those of the nonaligned in language and approach, the United States would be held responsible for a conference that ends in confrontation. Many already suspect that the United States views the SSOD II primarily as a damage limitation exercise. [redacted]

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An unsuccessful session would cause West European and Japanese leaders to take stands on issues like the Comprehensive Test Ban and outer space arms control that are highly divergent from those of the United States to preserve their image with the nonaligned. This would enable radical and pro-Soviet nonaligned states to become more influential in multilateral disarmament forums. The Soviet Union would undoubtedly take advantage of these developments by increasing its efforts to isolate the United States at future meetings of the UN Committee on Disarmament and by pressuring Washington to make concessions in bilateral arms control negotiations. [redacted]

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**UN Special Session
on Disarmament:
A Preview** [redacted]

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Introduction

The Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II)¹ opens in New York on 7 June. The meeting will be the largest international conference on disarmament in history and could produce five weeks of acrimonious discussion on virtually every aspect of arms control. Nearly all of the 157 UN-member states will attend, and many will be represented at the opening by heads of state, prime ministers, or other high-ranking officials. [redacted]

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Like the First Special Session (SSOD I) in 1978, SSOD II is a deliberative meeting and will not negotiate treaties or other binding agreements on arms control. Its success will largely depend on the ability of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the nonaligned states to find some common ground on the major disarmament issues. The provisional agenda of the SSOD II, constructed over four sessions of the Preparatory Committee, includes the following items:

- A general debate on disarmament, including speeches by several heads of government, which addresses the present risks of war and the effects of the arms race on international security and economic development.
- A review of the recommendations of the First Special Session, focusing on the current status of negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons reduction, nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), and compliance with existing limitations on chemical and biological weapons.
- Work on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament (CPD), including its phased implementation, legal nature, and verification procedures.
- New initiatives, including a ban on attacks on peaceful nuclear reactors.

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¹ See appendix A for a glossary of terms. [redacted]

- A review of multilateral disarmament institutions, including the Committee on Disarmament.
- Consideration of a Third Special Session and the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.
- Adoption of a final document. [redacted]

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A declaration, or Final Document, embodying conference decisions adopted by consensus, is the desired formal outcome of the Special Session. Any agreements reached will become significant milestones in the multilateral disarmament process. The expected presence in New York of thousands of individuals from peace movements throughout the non-Communist world and dozens of nongovernmental organizations concerned with disarmament will focus the attention of world media on the conference. [redacted]

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The Difficult Conference Setting

The Second Special Session comes at a particularly delicate time. A number of developments since SSOD I appear to cast doubt on the possibility that new arms control or disarmament agreements can be reached any time soon. The United States, in particular, is perceived by many neutral and nonaligned states and, to a lesser degree, by some allies to have become less interested in arms control progress since 1978. Suspicions of Soviet intentions have also risen as a result of the use of lethal chemical and biological weapons by the Soviet Union and its allies and the invasion of Afghanistan. [redacted]

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Lack of Progress in Arms Control

Perhaps the most significant factor clouding the atmosphere for SSOD II is the frustration felt by the Group of 77 (G-77), the caucus of neutral and nonaligned states at the UN.² In the four years since

² Austria, Finland, and Sweden (the traditional European neutrals) caucus with Third World nonaligned states at the UN. [redacted]

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Table 1

Events Leading to SSOD II

1957	First UN resolution adopted urging consideration of a Special Session on Disarmament or a General Disarmament Conference.
1961	First Summit of Nonaligned States adopted resolution proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia urging the convening of a Special Session on Disarmament or a World Disarmament Conference. Proposal remains a standard theme at subsequent Nonaligned meetings.
1965	UN resolution passed urging the convening of World Disarmament Conference.
1971	Soviet Union proposed a World Disarmament conference and UN adopted resolution to explore this goal.
1976	UN adopted resolution concerning a Special Session.
1978	First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament met from 23 May to 1 July. 144 of 149 Member States attended with 16 prime ministers or presidents, four vice presidents or deputy prime ministers, and 49 foreign ministers representing their nations. A Final Document adopted by consensus and called for the convening of a Second Special Session on Disarmament at some later date.
	UN General Assembly adopted resolution calling for a Second Special Session in 1982.
1980-81	Three meetings of the Preparatory Committee on a Second Special Session held; agenda for the meeting outlined.
1982	Final meeting of the Preparatory Committee held between 26 April and 14 May to prepare draft language for a Final Document.

[Redacted]

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SSOD I, only two arms control agreements have been produced:

- A 1979 draft convention between the United States and the USSR prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons.
- A 1980 multilateral treaty prohibiting or restricting the use of certain conventional weapons deemed inhumane. [Redacted]

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Other more important arms control negotiations have not been concluded:

- US-USSR treaties on a Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE), signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively, remain unratified.
- The Second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) between the United States and the USSR, signed in 1979, remains unratified.
- The US-UK-USSR negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban have been adjourned since 1980.
- The US-USSR negotiations on a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons (CW) have been adjourned since 1980, and only slow progress has been made in the

CW Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament.

- In Europe, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) have gone nowhere despite almost 10 years of effort, the Second Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) produced no agreement on a follow-on Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), and talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have just begun.

[Redacted]

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Multilateral arms control initiatives encouraged by SSOD I but not yet arranged address an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), guarantees by nuclear weapons states against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons (NSA, or Negative Security Assurances), and restraints on the international transfer of arms. In these areas, difficulties have occurred as much because of rivalries among developing nations and their general insistence on national sovereignty as because of any great power disagreements. Developing countries generally seek to avoid any blame for the increasing threats to peace posed by their own arms races and regional conflicts. As a consequence, the nonaligned draft review of the implementation of

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Table 2

SSOD II: World Leaders Expected To Attend

Australia	Anthony A. Street, Foreign Minister
Austria	Bruno Kreisky, Chancellor
Belgium	Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Canada	Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister (Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs)
China	Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Cuba	Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Rodriguez, Vice President
Denmark	Anker Jorgensen, Prime Minister
Federal Republic of Germany	Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor
Finland	Kalevi Sorsa, Prime Minister
France	Claude Cheysson, Minister of External Relations
Israel	Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
Italy	Giovanni Spadolini, Prime Minister (Emilio Colombo, Minister of Foreign Affairs)
Japan	Zenko Suzuki, Prime Minister
Netherlands	Max van der Stoep, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Norway	Svenn Stray, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sweden	Thornbjorn Falldin, Prime Minister (Ola Ullsten, Deputy Prime Minister)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
United Kingdom	Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
United States	Ronald Reagan, President

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the Final Document of SSOD I contains criticism only of the United States, the USSR, and their allies.³

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Heightened International Tensions

Increasing superpower tensions, the outbreak of several regional armed conflicts, and the nearly universal sense of growing insecurity since 1978 add to the uncertainties facing the conference because of the bleak arms control record. Western and nonaligned delegates to the last preparatory conference urged that a review of arms control progress since 1978 include an assessment of the international situation. Heightened tensions in every region, and particularly between East and West, are likely to become a focus for debate in and of themselves.

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While the First Special Session was not entirely free of East-West debate, the United States and the USSR did cooperate to defend the superpower record

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³ See appendix B for excerpts from the SSOD I Final Document.

on arms control and prevent excessive interference by other nations in determining the pace and organizational venue of bilateral negotiations. They also shared an interest in strengthening support in the developing world for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These common interests are still largely valid from Moscow's point of view, with the probable exception of the nonratification of SALT II. Soviet press commentary indicates, however, that Moscow is ready to use SSOD II purely as a propaganda event, and to vie with Washington for favorable treatment at the hands of the Third World.

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International conflicts between other nations also may become issues and further dim the possibility for agreement. Recent sessions of the UN General Assembly have witnessed an increase in the number of proposals to condemn the actions of states by name. In SSOD I, Israel and South Africa were targets of the now standard G-77 attack for being "racist" states and seeking a nuclear weapons capability. These states along with Iraq, Iran, and the United Kingdom

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will likely be the targets of criticism and resolutions by some nonaligned states. Western criticism of nations like Libya, Cuba, Argentina, or Nicaragua probably will encourage others to attempt to politicize the Special Session. [] 25X1

Growing Public Pressures for Disarmament

The recent lack of arms control progress and heightened international tension have created a third development that may make the work of the Special Session even more difficult from the US perspective. Throughout the industrialized world, peace and disarmament groups have grown in strength, and some now receive support from members of parliaments in their calls for unilateral steps toward disarmament. Many of these groups, particularly from Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada, plan to demonstrate in New York at the time of SSOD II. Some of their leaders will achieve high visibility because, as at SSOD I, they will be allowed to address the Special Session during the first two weeks of the meeting. [] 25X1

The resurgence of the peace movement encourages the Soviet-aligned and the neutral and nonaligned nations to press harder for concessions from Western states. At the very least, Moscow may "play to the galleries" and eschew meaningful negotiations to lend credence to the perception of some groups that the West must show its good faith by accepting Soviet offers or taking unilateral actions. Although events in Poland and Afghanistan have made many Western activists suspicious of Moscow's motives, some Western leaders may feel compelled to take stands or make gestures that lean toward Soviet positions to appeal to domestic political audiences. [] 25X1

Disarray Among Neutral and Nonaligned Nations

A final problem that complicates prospects for the Special Session is the confusion and lack of unity among neutral and nonaligned nations. Despite the significance of SSOD II as an opportunity for Third World nations to influence the atmosphere and course of international disarmament, neither the Nonaligned Movement (NAM—the international caucus of developing states on East-West and colonial issues) nor the G-77 has yet organized their members behind specific substantive objectives or negotiating tactics. This means that no deliberately confrontational approach

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Table 3

SSOD II: Selected NonGovernmental Organizations Expected To Attend

Canada	United Nations Association (Canada)
Denmark	No to Nuclear Weapons
Federal Republic of Germany	Action Reconciliation
Italy	League of Rights of People
Japan	Japanese Socialist Party Japanese Democratic Socialist Party Clean Government Party New Liberal Club United Socialist Democratic Party General Council of Trade Unions (SOHYO) Confederation of Labor (DOMEI) Japanese Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (GENSUIKIN)
Netherlands	Dutch Interchurch Council
Sweden	People's Parliament on Disarmament
United Kingdom	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament British Labor Study Group Pax Christi World Disarmament Campaign
United States	American Friends Service Committee Clergy and Laity Concerned AFL-CIO United Nations Association (USA) World Council of Churches
Europe/Greece	Torch from Olympia to New York
Europe wide	European Nuclear Disarmament
Global	Ad Hoc Liaison Group of the NGO Committee on Disarmament (official UN observer status, umbrella organization) World Federation of UN Associations
Communist Front	World Peace Council ^a

^a Note: Except for the World Peace Council, the above organizations are not Communist front organizations although Communists may participate in some as a minority. []

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by the NAM has been devised as was the case prior to the 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.⁴ []

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⁴ The NAM could yet do so at a Havana meeting just prior to SSOD II. Before the 1980 meeting, the NAM and the G-77 established a coordinated position and negotiating strategy which put the nuclear weapons states on the defensive. []

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This may provide some opportunity for the United States to garner support for its positions from the more moderate nations. The potential benefits of nonaligned fragmentation are likely to be outweighed by the difficulties in dealing with contending neutral and nonaligned spokesmen when consensus is desired. Most developing nations are not actively involved in multilateral disarmament activities and usually follow the lead of the activist nation or nations that appear to have organized the greatest following in the developing world. [redacted]

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The current "moderates" on disarmament issues—Brazil, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and other European neutrals—usually draw the greatest following in the G-77. These nations accept in varying degrees the Western belief that lessened international tensions and some renewal of trust are necessary before real progress in arms control can be made. While placing priority on nuclear disarmament, most of the moderates acknowledge the need to consider simultaneously arms control measures that limit the arsenals of the nonnuclear nations. Their efforts in the latest Preparatory Committee Session indicate that they hope to avoid major confrontations at SSOD II that would:

- Create conflicts between nonaligned states.
- Further impede arms control progress.
- Question the right or ability of nonaligned states to participate directly in future disarmament negotiations.
- Diminish chances of holding a third special session.

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More radical activist nations are likely to succeed in gaining support among the nonaligned by persuading the moderates to accept their views. States like Pakistan, India, Mexico, and possibly Nigeria are adamant in their intent to focus on, as a fundamental principle, the responsibility of the superpowers to engage in the first concrete steps toward disarmament before developing nations assume new obligations. Specifically, they will seek promises of progress in nuclear disarmament and may argue that growing international tensions require a display of political good will on the part of major powers. The United States almost certainly will receive more public criticism from these states than the USSR. Should both

superpowers prove unwilling to endorse most of their disarmament proposals, the radical activists appear willing to hold out for their principles rather than make major concessions. [redacted]

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Finally, Marxist and pro-Soviet nations like Cuba will attempt to focus the ire of the moderates and the rest of the G-77 on the United States and away from the USSR. These states will not be as successful as the radicals in obtaining the support of the moderates because of Moscow's weakened international image. Cuba undoubtedly will try to stiffen Mexico and others against compromise with the West and will suggest, with less likelihood of success, that the Soviet Union and nonaligned countries have common concerns. [redacted]

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Moscow's own diplomacy at SSOD II will have an important effect on the extent to which less involved developing nations fall into line behind an anti-Western confrontational posture. Support among the nonaligned for Soviet proposals in the past has been substantial because these proposals are similar in language and approach to sweeping nonaligned initiatives. Neither require the nonaligned to make sacrifices in the disarmament field and both avoid issues that would expose differences in security interests among developing states. Moscow's support for national liberation movements and US ties to former colonial powers have been used in the past by the Soviet Union and its Third World allies to drum up support for Soviet proposals. We believe that US support for the United Kingdom in the Falkland Islands crisis will be used to this end at the conference. [redacted]

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The Major Issues

Comprehensive Program of Disarmament

Proposals for a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament will receive considerable attention at SSOD II. The nonaligned have long viewed the CPD as the centerpiece of their disarmament efforts. Frustrated with the agonizingly slow pace of arms control talks between the nuclear weapon states, these nations view

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Table 4

Saga of the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament

1960	New Committee on Disarmament examined proposals for general disarmament as well as specific arms limitation.
1961-62	Joint US-USSR Statement of Principles for General and Complete Disarmament; separate US and USSR draft treaties.
1964-65	Nonaligned states called for a World Disarmament Conference endorsed by UN General Assembly.
1969	The UN General Assembly recommended that the Committee on Disarmament address "a comprehensive program dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control." The Committee adopted the suggestion but gave scant attention to this recommendation for more than a decade.
1978	SSOD I endorsed the nonaligned concept of a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament.
1979	The UN Disarmament Commission agreed to a skeletal text which was referred to the Committee on Disarmament for negotiation.
1980	The CD established a CPD working group and quickly adopted an outline for a CPD.
1981	CD received separate CPD draft from Nonaligned States and Western States, but discussions bogged down.
1982	The CD submitted to the SSOD II a heavily bracketed, nearly 50-page CPD draft that reflected disagreement on basic concepts.

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the CPD as a vehicle for increasing their leverage in disarmament negotiations and as a set of proposals for reducing the levels of armaments throughout the world. The nonaligned have linked the CPD to their call for a new international economic order by asserting that global disarmament would free funds to aid their economic development. [redacted] 25X1

On 21 April 1982, the Committee on Disarmament (CD), after two years of nearly complete frustration, submitted a CPD draft to the SSOD II.⁵ Only parts of the declaratory sections of the draft—the Preamble, Objectives, Principles, and Priorities—are clearly worded and probably reflect international consensus. The more important and complex sections on Measures, Stages of Implementation, Machinery, and Procedures remain heavily bracketed compilations of national and regional views. [redacted] 25X1

The Measures section, for example, is so inclusive that it constitutes a menu of all disarmament proposals made since 1945, from decades-old proposals for the

⁵ See appendix C for a Comparison of Western and Nonaligned Proposals. [redacted] 25X1

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) to the French proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. The proposals have been organized into three categories: measures required to address the present situation, intermediate measures, and measures required for general and complete disarmament. States have made numerous reservations on both the appropriateness of specific measures and their placement in particular time frames. After some cosmetic blending of these disparate suggestions, the CD accepted the Measures section solely for the purpose of continuing negotiations at SSOD II. [redacted] 25X1

More significant disagreements continue over the legal nature of the program, the timing of its phases, and the emphasis on nuclear weapons. The nonaligned have argued in the CD that the CPD should be a legally binding document with three or four well-defined stages, each to be completed within a specific time period. In particular, they maintain that the threat posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, covered in the first phase, make a deadline imperative—possibly 1990, the end of the Second Disarmament Decade. [redacted] 25X1

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Given its casual treatment of the CPD issue, Moscow probably does not expect any real progress to be made and probably hopes that the exercise will create additional divisions between the West and the nonaligned. It hopes to place itself in an advantageous position by giving tacit support to the nonaligned position. Moscow will actively enter the debate only if a document is about to be concluded that would significantly circumscribe its ability to maneuver on arms control negotiations with the West. [redacted]

continued stalemate, which could undermine support for future multilateral negotiations and give credence to those nonaligned states who favor closer ties with the Soviet Union. [redacted] 25X1

Nuclear Disarmament

The lack of progress on nuclear weapons issues ensures that they will be at least as important and controversial as the CPD issue. Strategic arms control between the superpowers and the CTB issue will be the focus of this discussion. The nonaligned in previous multilateral disarmament discussions have pointed to the nuclear arsenals of the great powers as the most significant threat to world peace. Nuclear issues are also of immediate interest to most nonaligned countries because they offer the greatest opportunity for maintaining nonaligned negotiating unity in SSOD II. Further, the focus on nuclear weapons allows the nonaligned to sidestep any efforts to place limits on their own conventional arsenals. [redacted] 25X1

Most Western states are reluctant to agree to a program that commits them to meet arbitrary deadlines even with adequate verification mechanisms, security guarantees, and workable alternative methods for resolving international conflicts. The West also desires a link between nuclear and conventional disarmament. Many states feel that negotiations limiting conventional arms should parallel discussions of nuclear disarmament to prevent destabilizing the East-West military balance and giving the nonaligned a free ride in the early stages of a CPD. [redacted]

Strategic Arms Control Negotiations. The majority of neutral and nonaligned nations are unknowledgeable about, and unsympathetic to, detailed arguments concerning the strategic nuclear balance. Some nations, like Mexico, specifically reject nuclear deterrence as a stabilizing factor in the world. Peru and Yugoslavia link continued adherence to the NPT by nonnuclear weapons states to real progress toward nuclear disarmament. These states may try to insert such thoughts in a Final Document and almost certainly will want SSOD II to declare strongly its disappointment over the failure of the superpowers to fulfill their promises for a second strategic arms agreement. [redacted] 25X1

A West German proposal, for example, calls for an undetermined number of open-ended disarmament phases. In each phase, nations would undertake negotiations on a specific set of interrelated measures while determining an agenda for the next phase. Periodic UN reviews of the CPD process would replace the time limits set forth under the nonaligned proposal. [redacted]

Both the nonaligned and the West continue to develop new positions, and it is possible that progress on the CPD issue could be made at SSOD II. Within the last several months, some nonaligned nations have indicated that they might accept a statement of agreed principles as an alternative to adoption of a complete CPD as part of the final documents of SSOD II. Pakistan has stated that it would support a nonbinding CPD, signed later by heads of state of the great powers and approved by a UN Security Council vote. Sri Lanka and others believe that such a genuine political commitment to a CPD by the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies is an acceptable substitute to adopting a CPD at SSOD II. They have indicated in the CD that they are willing to compromise on this issue because the alternative they face is

Most of the nonaligned will blame the United States for the absence of a strategic arms control agreement since October 1977. Washington deferred ratification of the SALT II treaty in January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the current administration has opposed resurrecting it. Most US allies and some neutral and nonaligned states recognize that Moscow's global behavior accounts for present US attitudes, but all wish that Washington

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had ratified the agreement to set the stage for additional negotiations. More specifically, many nations are impatient over the 18-month review of policy by the new US administration prior to any resumption of negotiations. [] 25X1

President Reagan's call for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the announcement of United States readiness to initiate Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) beginning this summer should prevent foreign critics from focusing exclusively on the United States. US allies welcome these initiatives and will work to make any discussion of strategic arms control evenhanded in its treatment of the two superpowers. []

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We believe Moscow will maneuver cautiously to deflect neutral and nonaligned criticism away from itself and toward the United States while trying to avoid souring the atmosphere for the resumption of bilateral strategic arms control negotiations. The USSR will probably call attention to public discussions in the United States of "nuclear war fighting strategy" and Washington's rejection of the Soviet proposal to freeze intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe at current levels. It will also try to associate itself with the idea of a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons by pointing to Brezhnev's proposed multilateral no first use declaration in 1978 and to a 1981 Indian UN resolution calling for a prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. []

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The lack of US-UK-USSR agreement after five years of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear testing will be another major point of contention at SSOD II. The three negotiating parties noted significant progress toward a treaty and expressed their desire to achieve early agreement in a report to the Committee on Disarmament in July 1980. Negotiations have been in abeyance since November 1980. As in the past, neutral and nonaligned states will argue that only a lack of political will blocks a final CTB agreement and probably will insist that the Special Session call for a speedy resumption of the trilateral negotiations. []

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Nearly all US allies favor a nuclear test ban, and while some may stand with the United States against nonaligned attempts to insert sharply critical comments on the CTB delay in any conference statement, most will likely endorse a call for completion of a treaty. Japan, the Netherlands, and Australia appear most willing to diverge from the US desire to avoid explicit declarations calling for a test ban treaty any time soon. []

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The Soviet Union has more room for maneuvering on the CTB issue than on strategic arms talks. It is less concerned than the United States and the United Kingdom about the need for strong verification measures to monitor an absolute ban. Moreover, on the political level, the Soviets undoubtedly realize that French and Chinese refusal to accept such a treaty would provide a convenient excuse for setting a fixed date for the expiration of any treaty. They will argue, as they have for two years in the CD, that the United States and the United Kingdom have delayed the talks and will stress, as the nonaligned have, the view that only a lack of political will on the part of the West blocks a treaty. Moscow could extend its criticism to France and China as parties unwilling to engage in nuclear arms control, but these states will argue that significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers must occur prior to a universal test ban that otherwise would freeze in place the current nuclear preponderance of the United States and the Soviet Union []

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The Soviet position has been weakened to some degree by US success on the issue of a CTB working group at this year's CD meeting. The United States achieved a tactical victory in March when it proposed establishment of a working group with a mandate limited to verification and compliance issues. Despite hasty Soviet efforts to get nonaligned nations to hold out for more, agreement was reached between Western and nonaligned nations. On the last day of the CD meeting, Moscow reluctantly endorsed the idea rather than become the only nation opposing procedural progress. []

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Moscow could encourage nonaligned nations to seek an endorsement by SSOD II of an expansion in the mandate of the new working group in an attempt to isolate Washington once again. We doubt that moderate activists—Brazil, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Sri Lanka—among the nonaligned will press this proposal at the conference, however, because they probably realize the new working group must be given some chance to hold discussions before any attempt is made to broaden its focus. [redacted]

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Institutional Reform

The First Special Session made a number of significant changes in disarmament institutions:

- The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was changed to Committee on Disarmament and was expanded from 30 to 40 members.
- The moribund UN Disarmament Commission was revived as a deliberative body to give additional states representation on arms control matters.
- The importance of the UN Center on Disarmament was increased by enlarging its staff and expanding its research and public information programs.

Most states are generally satisfied with these institutions and believe that the lack of arms control progress reflects a failure of political trust and will, and not a failure of institutions. Only a few states will present initiatives for institutional change. If agreement cannot be reached on the major substantive issues, tinkering with the disarmament institutions and procedures may become the last resort for those states wishing the meeting to show some concrete results. [redacted]

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It is highly likely that the conference will recommend convening a Third Special Session. This would provide the international community with a regularly scheduled forum for assessing progress on disarmament. Although some states probably view such sessions as a waste of time and money, few are likely to object publicly to holding additional disarmament sessions. Most of the nonaligned will view a third session as an institutionalization of the gains they have made in acquiring a greater voice in the disarmament field. [redacted]

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Proposals for enlarging the CD have an even chance for success. Sweden intends to propose a small expansion of the committee and several other nations—Norway, Turkey, Finland, and Austria—are seeking a seat on it. Membership on the CD is now carefully balanced between 21 neutral and nonaligned, 10 Western, eight Eastern states, and China. To preserve this balance, additions to any one bloc would necessitate additions to the others, resulting in the addition of 10 to 20 members. This would make substantive negotiations in committee sessions all but impossible unless agreement was reached on rotating seats among selected group members or on establishing special forms of limited membership. [redacted]

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The previous expansion of the CD reduced the willingness of the major powers to conduct negotiations in this forum and generally made proceedings slower and more unwieldy. Most Western states have joined the United States in opposing further enlargement of the committee. Portugal, Denmark, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany, however, may be willing to acquiesce if significant support for expansion comes from the nonaligned. The Soviet Union may also be willing to reverse its position if it believes that an enlarged committee would include more nonaligned states sympathetic to its concerns. [redacted]

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Organizational changes designed to improve UN ability to verify existing arms control agreements are less likely to be adopted. France has proposed the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and a handful of others have supported the creation of an International Disarmament Organization devoted to ensuring compliance with arms control agreements. Some national leaders believe such institutions could play a major role in monitoring adherence to a variety of confidence-building measures (CBM), which many states will propose as the next prudent step in the disarmament process. Nevertheless, significant disagreement exists over the legal and practical aspects of extending UN verification authority at the expense of national sovereignty. [redacted]

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Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Ustinov (USSR), UN Under Secretary General for Political and Security Council Affairs (July 1981 - [redacted])

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Ustinov, a 30-year veteran of the Soviet foreign service, has had extensive experience in Third World affairs. He has consistently interfered with the UN investigation of the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union and its allies. Ustinov is very cautious in discussing Soviet policy and does not go beyond the official line. [redacted]

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A group of Western and nonaligned states may attempt to improve UN verification capabilities by removing the UN Disarmament Center from the control of UN Undersecretary General Ustinov of the Soviet Union and giving its Swedish Director Martensen more autonomy. They resent Ustinov's consistent interference with UN investigations into Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Soviet-sponsored use of chemical weapons and toxins in Southeast Asia. Ustinov's performance has led most Western states to oppose the creation or enlargement of any functional UN disarmament agency which might be controlled by a Soviet or pro-Soviet international civil servant. [redacted]

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Among the proposals least likely to be adopted is the Canadian proposal to abolish all present UN disarmament institutions and replace them with a Disarmament Conference. Such a conference would hold general debate for only three weeks each year to limit the now perennial polemical debates on disarmament in UN institutions. Serious negotiations would be limited to small groups with permanent or rotating membership, which would meet throughout the year. The Canadians believe that this arrangement would end demands for expanding the CD and institutionalizing the Special Sessions on Disarmament. The conference could also monitor implementation of a CPD and other disarmament treaties. [redacted]

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The Soviet Union has long called for a World Disarmament Conference that would serve as a propaganda platform for attacking Western governments and lending support to Western peace and disarmament groups. SSOD I called for the convening of such a conference, at some appropriate time, but the issue has received little attention. It is unlikely that SSOD II will do more than endorse the idea of a World Disarmament Conference because Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly are viewed by most participants as more workable forums. [redacted]

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Any institutional changes agreed to at SSOD II will have little immediate impact on progress in the disarmament field. Organizational reforms could, however, play an important role in demonstrating national commitment to the process of disarmament. Moreover, once institutions are created and negotiations begun, eligible states feel obliged to participate and may even be compelled by international or domestic public pressure to demonstrate success. By their very existence, new forums could affect national positions on arms control. [redacted]

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Other Issues

The conference will consider a number of other issues contained in the Final Document of SSOD I or raised by national initiatives. Marginal growth in the level of economic aid provided by the developed countries to LDCs in the past few years and the debilitating effects of the current global economic slowdown will probably generate considerable interest in the relationship between disarmament and economic development. We believe less developed countries may seek conference endorsement of a disarmament-development fund as a concrete step that could be taken at SSOD II. Neither of the superpower blocs are likely to endorse this idea. An SSOD I-mandated study, completed in 1981 under the chairmanship of Swedish Undersecretary of State for Disarmament Inga Thorsson, will undoubtedly be the basis for discussion. The study concluded that:

- The arms race and underdevelopment are not two problems but one and, accordingly, must be solved together.

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Table 5

SSOD II: Anticipated National Proposals

Country	Proposal
Belgium	Verification mechanism for 1925 Geneva Protocol
Canada	Standing UN Conference on Disarmament
Denmark	Nuclear Proliferation; Disarmament and Development
France	International Satellite Verification Agency
Federal Republic of Germany	Principles for a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament; Ban on Chemical Weapons
India	Nonuse of Force Convention
Italy	International Verification Agency; Limitations on Conventional Weapons Transfers
Japan	Ban on Attacks on Safeguarded Nuclear Reactors
Norway	International Arms Control Impact Statements International Exchange of Data on Seismic Events
Sweden	International Conference on Verification and Compliance With the Biological Weapons Convention Call for the Resumption of US-USSR Bilateral Negotiations on Outer Space Arms Control International Discussion of Antibalistic Missile Developments and Their Implications for Outer Space UN Disarmament Agency Protocol to the Radiological Weapons Treaty Prohibiting Attacks on Peaceful Nuclear Facilities Expansion of the UN Committee on Disarmament
US-USSR	Radiological Weapons Treaty (draft)
USSR	Outer Space Treaty Nonfirst Use of Nuclear Weapons Agreement Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Deployment World Disarmament Conference

[Redacted]

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- Growing East-West tension threatens to spill into the entire field of international economic relations.
- Military outlays work to the detriment of less developed economies.
- All governments should prepare assessments of the economic and social costs attributable to military spending.
- The UN should consider establishing an international development fund financed by savings that result from implementation of disarmament measures. [Redacted]

Many Western states—Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Norway, and West Germany—motivated by domestic pressures and fears of increased superpower confrontation, will advocate a number of discrete steps which could be implemented to consolidate previous arms control agreements and to restore momentum to the disarmament process. Following the lead of the United States, they will highlight verification issues. Swedish diplomats have indicated to US officials that Sweden will call for an international conference to establish a verification mechanism for

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the 1974 Treaty on Biological Weapons, and Belgium may make a similar initiative on verification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical warfare. China has expressed tacit support for these initiatives by noting that it will not agree to any new limitations on these weapons unless compliance with existing agreements can be adequately verified. [redacted]

Other Western countries will draw attention to measures which could easily be agreed to or implemented through voluntary compliance. Norway, for example, has informed the West it will propose that national arms control impact statements be submitted to the UN on new major weapons systems and military programs. Many Western states hope that such information exchanges and other Confidence-Building Measures will help to restore credibility to the arms control process and ease international tensions. They acknowledge that the present international climate does not favor complex and dramatic initiatives but believe that symbolic and incremental steps might prepare the way for more meaningful agreements in the future. [redacted]

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In contrast to these limited measures, the Soviet Union and its allies will restate their ambitious disarmament proposals in a variety of areas: outer space, new weapons of mass destruction, and nonuse of force agreements. It is also possible that the Soviets will table new sweeping proposals at SSOD II. They could characterize Western insistence on detailed verification and information exchanges as obstructionism and may note that Soviet proposals in 1981 for establishing CBMs in the Far East were rejected by Japan and China. Further, Moscow will lobby for the creation of additional international public education programs, which could be used as propaganda platforms to attack the West for the lack of progress on disarmament. [redacted]

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Individually and collectively, these issues could play an important role at SSOD II. Given a widespread desire to make the conference at least a nominal success, one or more national initiatives could be seized upon as a vehicle for tangible progress. This possibility will become more likely if progress cannot

be made on the CPD, nuclear disarmament, or institutional reform. On many issues, particularly questions of verification and information exchange, Western interests parallel those of influential LDCs, placing Soviet-aligned nations in the minority. While voting on specific measures remains unlikely, Moscow and its allies may be pressured into making minor tactical concessions or breaking the valued goal of consensus. [redacted]

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Prospects

The number and complexity of issues and the diversity of national positions almost guarantee difficulty in achieving meaningful agreements at the SSOD II. The addition of East-West tensions to fundamental disagreements between the major powers and the neutral and nonaligned nations creates an atmosphere conducive to sharp exchanges and acrimonious discussion. [redacted]

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On balance, the most likely outcome is a short cosmetic declaration reaffirming the principles and goals established by SSOD I and calling for additional work on a CPD in continuing multilateral forums. This would be widely perceived as disappointing, but not as a complete failure. Several less likely outcomes are possible, however:

- A declaration that sidesteps disagreement on a CPD by endorsing specific principles or proposals on nuclear issues, expansion of the CD, and possibly on new initiatives made at SSOD II.
- A longer, compromise Final Document that endorses a nonbinding CPD and calls for further intensive negotiations.
- A stalemated conference that adjourns in confrontation with consensus only on the need for general progress toward disarmament and on the desirability of holding a subsequent SSOD III.
- A conference that breaks consensus and votes on individual issues, forcing some nations, including the United States, to vote in opposition. [redacted]

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Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico), Chairman of the CD Working Group on a CPD (1981-82) [redacted]

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Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria), Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for SSOD II (1980-82) [redacted]

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Garcia Robles often serves as a spokesman for the nonaligned on disarmament issues. His nearly obsessive commitment to a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament—and his relative autonomy from Foreign Ministry control—may prevent him from compromising on a CPD formula. He is likely to hold out for a legally binding program unless he loses the support of prominent nonaligned states. [redacted]

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Adeniji, noted for his negotiating ability and forcefulness, has nearly two decades of experience in UN-related affairs. Generally pro-West in political outlook, he is, nonetheless, a staunch advocate of nonalignment. He has sought compromise with the West at the CD, where in 1980 he served as the first chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament. [redacted] 25X1

The actual outcome of the meeting is likely to depend on the flexibility and diplomatic skill of the leaders of SSOD II working groups, as well as those individuals who negotiate informally on behalf of the various groups of states. Mexican Ambassador Garcia Robles is attempting to play a major role at the conference by becoming chairman of the Session's CPD Working Group. He has become almost fanatically attached to his own concept of a CPD and is not very sensitive to Western concerns. He was ineffective in working out agreement on this issue as chairman of the CPD Working Group in the Committee on Disarmament and, according to diplomatic sources, probably plans to marshal support in the G-77 for his own CPD draft to be tabled at the Special Session. Garcia Robles was instrumental in creating a confrontation between the United States and nonaligned nations over the CTB issue at the 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and, we suspect, may prefer a similar outcome this year if the alternative is a weak CPD. [redacted]

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they are not as concerned about achieving a CPD at this time and privately share the Western view that the comprehensive approach is a confusing and unrealistic morass. They may attempt to sidestep the problem by seeking specific declarations on nuclear disarmament, measures to prevent nuclear war and build international confidence, and on other secondary issues that reaffirm and embody the objectives of the Final Document of SSOD I. Finally, nonaligned leaders in the General Assembly not normally involved in disarmament negotiations will play an important role at the Special Session, as they do in all General Assembly sessions. Former Iraqi Ambassador Kittani, President of the General Assembly, will wield considerable authority on procedural issues at the conference. Algerian Ambassador Bedjaoui, Chairman of the G-77, will be able to exert influence when the G-77 caucus to consider important substantive questions. [redacted] 25X1

Others, such as the Nigerian Ambassador Adeniji, the Swedish representative Lidvard, and the Brazilian Ambassador Sousa y Silva, are committed to the goal of forcing concessions from major powers, but are more willing to innovate and compromise. These leaders have indicated in preparatory meetings that

We believe the responsiveness of Western delegations to the concern of these neutral and nonaligned leaders will be critical in determining how the outcome of SSOD II is perceived. West European and Japanese leaders will try to display flexibility and are prepared to sign nonbinding declarations on most issues to

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mollify both the nonaligned and Western disarmament groups. In contrast, the USSR and its allies showed surprising clumsiness in handling the array of multilateral issues on the agenda at the CD. Moscow may find itself at a disadvantage at SSOD II because of its inability to do more than restate longstanding views in the face of a confusing, fast-moving, and poorly prepared meeting. It also may be on the defensive now that Washington has announced its START proposals. President Reagan's "zero option" speech before the opening of the INF talks last year had such an effect. [redacted]

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Implications for the United States

The announcement that President Reagan will address the session already has produced a positive foreign response which should continue through the conference itself. Many participants will view the Presidential speech to the General Assembly and the announcement of US willingness to begin strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union as signs of Washington's commitment to arms control. [redacted]

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Many nations will also be attentive to US positions and behavior during the general debate and work of the conference's various subgroups. Delegates from many nonaligned nations indicated that they were extremely disappointed in what they saw as the polemical attitude of the United States at the last session of the General Assembly. The US delegation was perceived as being needlessly provocative in its attacks on the Soviet Union. The nonaligned view the Special Session as a dialogue between the developed and developing nations—a dialogue in which they expect the superpowers to take all the first steps in reducing arms and controlling means of destruction despite the role their own pursuit of weapons and armed conflicts play in preventing multilateral arms control. If the conference takes on the character of an East-West debate and does not address the nonaligned concern for arms reduction between the superpowers, they will view SSOD II as a failure. Because sweeping and unverifiable Soviet disarmament proposals generally are closer to those of the nonaligned, the United States would be held responsible for a conference that ends in confrontation. [redacted]

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The outcome of the session could also have some impact on US foreign and arms control policies. The most likely scenario for SSOD II, an acrimonious session ending in cosmetic agreement, probably would not further undermine Western unity in multilateral disarmament negotiations. It probably would preserve, though not advance, ties which Washington has cultivated with moderate nonaligned states. Important nongovernmental organizations will be disappointed with such a conference result, but Moscow would not be able to exploit this dissatisfaction to effect a decrease in allied support for US negotiating positions in the START and INF talks. [redacted]

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A less satisfactory outcome, one which ends in stalemate, might cause West European and Japanese leaders to take stands divergent from those of the United States to preserve their image with the nonaligned and at home. This would enable radical and pro-Soviet nonaligned states to become increasingly influential in multilateral disarmament forums, and nonaligned activists in arms control would become more difficult to deal with. The Soviet Union would undoubtedly take advantage of these developments in an attempt to isolate the United States at future meetings of the CD and the UN General Assembly. Moreover, Moscow might try to benefit from such a climate by pressuring Washington for concessions in bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. [redacted]

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Regardless of its individual successes and failures, SSOD II will be seen by the leading neutral and nonaligned states as an indicator of not only the status of the disarmament process but also the condition of East-West and North-South relations. In particular, the Second Special Session on Disarmament will color perceptions of US, West European, and Japanese willingness to address nonaligned concerns in other issue areas, notably negotiations for a new international economic order. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Glossary of Terms

ABM	Antiballistic missile
BW	Biological weapons
CBM	Confidence-building measures
CD	Committee on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CPD	Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB	Comprehensive test ban
CW	Chemical weapons
G-77	Group of 77 Nonaligned States
INF	Intermediate-range nuclear forces
IOZP	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
LDC	Less developed country
MBFR	Mutual and balanced force reductions
NAM	Nonaligned movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	Negative Security Assurances
PNE	Peaceful nuclear explosions
RW	Radiological weapons
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament (UN General Assembly)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TTBT	Threshold Test Ban
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission

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Appendix B

Excerpts From the SSOD I Final Document

Declaration

11. *Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced.*

12. *The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . It also adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. . . .*

13. *Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority.*

16. *In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. . . . The economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation.*

17. *No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments. Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether. . . . These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. . . .*

Programme of Action

43. *The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency.*

45. *Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.*

51. *The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind.*

52. *The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations . . . leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms.*

59. *In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.*

60. *The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.*

64. *The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, . . . can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.*

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65. *It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. . . .*

66. *Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.*

67. *Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation . . . by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.*

68. *Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. . . .*

72. *All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.*

73. *All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.*

75. *The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.*

76. *A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.*

77. *In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements.*

80. *In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.*

81. *Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.*

82. *In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential. . . would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. . . .*

85. *Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all*

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States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right.

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are nondiscriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.

103. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament.

Machinery

113. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfill its role in the field of disarmament. In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament—deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

115. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. . . .

117. The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

118. The General Assembly establishes . . . a Disarmament Commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament.

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119. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

120. The Assembly welcomes the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear-weapon States, and thirty-two to thirty-five other States to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-second session of the Assembly; that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals.

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world-disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

123. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfill its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended. The Centre should also increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament.



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Appendix C

A Comparison of Proposals for the First Stage of a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament ^a

Item	21 Neutral and Nonaligned States	Five Western States
General	A legally binding treaty. First stage should be completed in 3 to 10 years. Three or four stages should lead to general and complete disarmament within 10 to 30 years.	An indicative declaration. First phase is of indeterminate time with a review at the end of Second Disarmament Decade (1990), leading to further phases when appropriate with an ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.
Nuclear weapons		
Strategic	Ratification of SALT II; reduction of US and USSR warheads and vehicles by 20.	Continue negotiations; conclude agreements where possible.
Intermediate	Reduce.	Continue negotiations; conclude agreements where possible.
Comprehensive Test Ban	Agreement.	Continue negotiations; conclude agreements where possible.
Ban on production and improvements	Agreement.	Phase 2.
Nonuse	Unconditional guarantees for nonnuclear weapons states; agreements for nonuse.	Begin efforts to negotiate.
Nonproliferation	Strengthen treaty in particular guarantee of access for all states to modern technology.	Strengthen all aspects of treaty and assure universal adherence.
Regional	Emphasize nuclear-free-zones measures.	Nuclear-free zones part of collateral measures; more emphasis in Phase 2.
Other weapons of mass destruction		
Chemical	Conclude agreement.	Continue negotiations.
Biological	Universal adherence.	Strengthen compliance and verification.
Conventional Weapons		
US-USSR	25 percent overall reduction.	Continue negotiations of mutual and balanced force reductions; more in Phase 2.
Other European states	Reduction of forces.	
Other militarily significant states	Reduction.	Phase 2.
Arms race	Reductions by major producers.	Study relation of producers and recipients; more in Phase 2.
Expenditures	Immediate freeze by US and USSR. Budget reductions by militarily significant states.	Study uniform reporting system; reductions in Phase 2.
Verification	(Vague; to be specified.)	An important precondition for each arms limitation or disarmament element.
Peaceful settlement of disputes	Strengthen institutions.	Strengthen institutions.
Development	Reallocation of resources to developing countries.	No provision.

^a Source: Based on proposals made at the Committee on Disarmament during summer 1981.

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Approved For Release 2008/08/01 : CIA-RDP83B00231R000200170001-4

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