
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The Opposition Left in Mexico

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A Research Paper



State Dept. review completed

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ALA 82-10090 June 1982





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The Oppos	ition	Left
in Mexico		

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A Research Paper

Information available as of 23 June 1982 has been used in the preparation of this report.

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This paper was prepared by	20/(1
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.	
Comments and queries are welcome and may be	
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	The Opposition Left in Mexico	25X1
Overview	Organizational activity among Mexico's opposition left significantly over the past few years. Although some prunity has been made with the formation of the Communified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), Mexico's of generally remains weak and divided. Four opposition to participating in July's general elections, but voter apat major concern of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary PSUM will probably not be able to replace the center-Action Party as the PRI's major opponent.	ogress toward leftist unist-dominated opposition left eftist parties are hy remains the y Party (PRI). The
	Although Mexico is experiencing serious economic diffination may have fewer resources for co-opting subsidies and political rewards, a good deal would have the legitimate opposition—much less a violent revolution emerge as a potent force. The ruling party's flexibility balance and effectively contests the attempts of small of lay exclusive claim to almost any constituency. In additional party's tactics for containing, co-opting, or eliminating continue to be effective.	opponents with e to change before onary left—could enhances intraparty opposition groups to tion, the ruling
	Parties of the opposition left recognize that at present the by following the government's rules. During the 1970s radical-terrorist groups such as the 23rd of September C While leftist groups currently support Central America ideologically and politically, they have declined to take their own government.	they refused to aid Communist League. In insurgencies
		. 1 1
	appear committed to nonviolent change.	st leaders in general 25X1
	The formation of the PSUM reflects a commitment to and is part of a Communist effort to build a broad-base undercut the ruling party's claim of representing the M refusal of the Mexican Workers Party to join the fusion will limit the PSUM's ability to attract significant supp its usual sources among youths, intellectuals, teachers, groups. The party still has not succeeded in its efforts t	ed coalition to lexican left. The n effort, however, ort from other than and some peasant

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in the middle class and has made few inroads into the unions controlled by

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the PRI. The Communists' desire to appeal to a broader spectrum of the domestic left has contributed to their move toward a Eurocommunist image and efforts to win friends within the media, the Church, and	25 X 1
educational institutions.	
Cutcational institutions.	_
	25)
Remaining opposition leftist parties are a complex mixture of co-opted and	25
independent entities.	
Mexico City employs a variety of	
traditional tactics to aggravate the Marxist left's chronic disunity. Among	
independent leftist groups, Herberto Castillo's Mexican Workers Party	2
probably has the greatest potential to rally the opposition left, but this	
depends largely on Castillo's personal appeal. Realizing that fact, the government has refused to recognize the party officially.	_

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The Opposition Left		25X1

Role and Influence of the Opposition Left

Organizational activity among the opposition left in Mexico has picked up substantially over the past two years, and may enable leftist parties to improve significantly their 1979 vote totals in the general elections on 4 July. A good deal would have to change in Mexico, however, before the legitimate opposition—much less a violent revolutionary left—could become a significant force. Despite Mexico's glaring socioeconomic inequities and growing disenchantment with politics-as-usual, the opposition confronts one of the most effective contemporary political machines in the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

PRI Tactics Toward the Opposition Left

Governing Mexico since 1929, the PRI has provided political stability in which Mexicans generally take considerable pride. The party and the government employ a variety of control techniques to mobilize support from three main sectors—organized labor, the peasantry, and an amorphous group dominated by middle echelon, white-collar workers. The PRI's amoeba-like flexibility both maintains intraparty balance and effectively denies the existing small opposition groups the opportunity to challenge the party's preeminence.

Throughout the PRI's history, its pragmatism has usually overridden revolutionary principle. The government has followed a generally conservative course, particularly in the domestic arena. The ruling party and the government nevertheless jealously guard their revolutionary, nationalistic image. They see serious opposition from the left as threatening their claim to the revolutionary mantle, whereas opposition from the right merely reinforces their credentials. In this peculiar political atmosphere, the PRI-government complex is well served by numerous small and divided opposition parties. For example, through its financial assistance for the Socialist Workers Party and the Popular Socialist Party, we believe the PRI has

prevented them from joining in Communist-sponsored
unity efforts and has otherwise assured their general
responsiveness to ruling party manipulation.

Reflecting the government's flexibility, its apprehension over future political instability, and its determination to maintain the appearance of a multiparty system, five small parties—including the Communist Party—have been granted official status. This followed enactment in 1977 of a reform program that liberalized guidelines for party registration and guaranteed minority parties one-fourth of the seats in the nation's lower house.

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Although electoral reforms have enabled the opposition to gain greater public exposure, US Embassy reporting indicates the government aimed at co-opting the opposition by bringing it into the system rather than providing an avenue for meaningful competition. Recent modifications of federal electoral laws illustrate the government's continued resistance to opening up the political system. The changes, which include creating one more district in which deputies are elected by their proportional strength, will guarantee the survival of small opposition parties but limit the influence of larger opposition groups. Strongholds of the largest opposition party, the center-right National Action Party, as well as the recently formed Communist-dominated Unified Socialist Party of 25X1 Mexico (PSUM) will be split. Minority parties can earn two deputy slots by winning 1.5 percent of the votes in a proportional representation district. With eight minority parties now eligible to field candidates, no single party, regardless of overall strength, is likely to win more than a dozen seats in a district.

The Opposition Left's Struggle for Influence

Playing by the Rules. Opposition party leaders, as indicated by conversations with US Embassy political officers, recognize the facade of liberalization for what it is, but they understand that at present they

Major Marxist Parties

Party/Year Formed	Leaders	Membership a (Estimates)	Orientation/Ideology/Comment
Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), 1981	Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, Pablo Gomez Alvarez	80,000- 125,000	Marxist-Leninist. Not automatically subject to Soviet dictates. Formed by merger of Communist Party and four smaller doctrinaire Marxist parties.
Mexican Workers Party (PMT), 1974	Heberto Castillo	19,000	Marxist-oriented but nationalistic. Critical of government oil and development policies. Refused to merge with the PSUM.
Popular Socialist Party (PPS), 1948	Jorge Cruickshank Garcia	25,000	Marxist, but submits to government guidelines on domestic policy. Not automatically subject to Soviet dictates.
Socialist Workers Party (PST), 1975	Rafael Aguilar Talamantes	25,000	Marxist. Co-opted by the ruling party but strives to be more independent than PPS. Pro-Cuban but not automatically subject to Soviet dictates.
Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), 1976	Jose Manuel Aguilar-Mora	8,000	Trotskyite. Divisive force on the left.

^a Total Population: 70,000,000 Registered Voters: 31,000,000

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can survive only by playing by the government's rules. The ruling party has an imposing track record not only for containing legitimate opposition elements but also for eliminating those that have tried to operate outside the system. Moreover, radicalism has no history of acceptance within the mainstream of Mexican political thought. Indeed, the PSUM's vague campaign demands for social justice and implementation of revolutionary precepts are formulated intentionally to avoid the appearance of extremism.

Such enforced closeness to PRI policies suggests that the opposition left will continue to play only a minor role in Mexican politics. Yet, these groups are able to exert some indirect impact on government policies by encouraging the government when it is on a leftist tack. The PRI is anxious both to avoid damaging its carefully cultivated image as Mexico's only true revolutionary party and to cater to the broad range of forces within the party—including leftists—to avoid deterioration of its political base. Mexican foreign policy, especially support for Central American radical leftists, is in some respects a product of these exigencies. At the same time, foreign policy and

progressive domestic policies reflect an implicit consensus among leftists inside and outside of government and the ruling party on some of these questions.

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The climate in which the Mexican left must operate, however, is fluid. Mexico is experiencing serious economic difficulties, and the next administration may find it more difficult to sustain subsidies and political rewards commensurate with those of the past four years when economic growth exceeded 8 percent annually. We believe the next few years could witness mounting tensions between the government and organized labor as well as student demonstrations and consumer protests. The PSUM as well as other opposition leftist parties will undoubtedly seek to take advantage of temporary economic weaknesses.

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The Prospects for Violence. The flexibility of the ruling structure combined with a traditional commitment to nonviolent reform has so far dissuaded opposition leftists from resorting to violence in their effort to transform Mexican society. During the mid-1970s

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when radical-terrorist activity was near its peak, organized Marxist parties publicly disavowed the activities of such groups as the 23rd of September Communist League and refused to support them. In addition, although leftist leaders recognize the limits of the political reform measures, PSUM spokesmen recently told US Embassy officers that the reforms could provide an opening to greater democracy and that the registration of the Communist Party was itself an important example of the opening of the political system.	current economic difficulties to garner additional sympathy, there are no indications that significant numbers of the populace are any more prepared to support an insurgent movement now than they have been during the past several decades.
pontical system.	25X1
	The Parties of the Left 25X1
	Unified Socialist Party of Mexico Structure. The formation in November 1981 of the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) for the first time raised attempts at leftist unity above the level of temporary alliances. This amalgamation of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) with the small- er Mexican Peoples Party (PPM), the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), the Movement for United Socialist Action (MAUS), and the Popular Action Movement (MAP) represents the largest and best organized leftist grouping in Mexico, but still a minor force in the Mexican political context. Its durability is doubtful, given the fact that the PCM's legality and size provide the chief centripetal force for the smaller members of the coalition. 25X1 Communist Party members dominate the leadership of the PSUM. Pablo Gomez Alvarez, a longtime Communist Party official, is Secretary General and Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo—Communist Party Sec- retary General during the 1960s and 1970s and leader of the party's dominant Eurocommunist faction—is the PSUM's presidential nominee. Press reports sug- gest that the PSUM's influential Central Committee and Political Commission are also heavily populated by former Communist Party members. Reflecting the domination of ex-Communist Party
For whatever motives a turn to violence against the	members, Embassy officials report the PSUM is

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opposition left's long-term prospects by adhering to

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government by opposition leftists would probably be

suicidal. Moreover, although the PSUM and other leftist parties may be able to take advantage of

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nonviolence, advocating nationalism, and incorporating as many leftist groups as possible in order to form a mass party with effective popular support. Although US Embassy officials report that party leader Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo was a student in the Soviet Union and although the pro-Moscow stance of several of the parties merging with the Communists may temper party criticism of Soviet activities, we believe the PSUM will probably continue to remain independent from outside direction.	We judge that the four small parties that merged with the Communists are motivated more by pragmatic considerations than by ideological affinity. All are Marxist and probably more pro-Moscow and doctrinaire than the Communist Party mainstream, but they lacked its legal status. Moreover, none has been able to build wide support. Their membership is overwhelmingly drawn from urban, educated elements of society.	25X1 25X1
Although exact figures are unavailable, PSUM membership probably numbers between 80,000 and 125,000.	The Mexican Peoples Party, largest of the four, is strongest in the remote western state of Nayarit. Currently headed by Alejandro Gascon Mercado, the party split from the Popular Socialist Party in the mid-1970s, claiming that the parent organization had cast aside opposition to imperialism in favor of political opportunism.	25X1 25X1
Recent US Embassy estimates support this figure, but predate a decision by one faction of the Communist Party led by Joel Ortega and Rodolfo Echeverria not to join the fusion effort. Further clouding the question of membership, a leftist newspaper reported that in January and February 30,000 new members joined the PSUM. We believe the Communist Party's immediate motive for unifying the opposition left is to broaden its own	The Revolutionary Socialist Party, formed in 1975, may be the new alliance's most unreliable member. During the first PSUM congress in March, press reports suggested that party leader Roberto Jaramillo Flores—apparently upset by his party's limited representation on the PSUM Political Commission and concerned over the shallowness of the new group's commitment to fostering change in Mexico—was considering breaking with his fellow leftists. Such an eventuality would have weakened the PSUM's image as a leftist unity party.	25X1 25X1
constituency. This is in line with its wider effort to appeal to domestic sentiment by projecting a Euro-communist image and attempting to win friends within the media, the Church, and educational institutions. In existence since 1919, the party was pla-	The strongly anti-US Movement for United Socialist Action was formed in the early 1970s by its present leader, Carlos Sanchez Cardenas, and has been an active advocate of leftist unity.	25X1
gued by sectarianism and forced into a low profile after the 1968 student disruptions. Only a handful of Communists currently fill elected posts at the grassroots level. The Communist-sponsored Coalition of the Left—formed to take advantage of the 1977 electoral reforms—garnered just 5 percent of the popular vote in the previous national election and	The Popular Action Movement was founded in 1981 but little is known of its organization or its leadership. A press report, however, indicates the party has some strength among electrical and nuclear workers labor unions.	25X1
holds only 18 of 400 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. recent electoral reforms will probably prevent the party from dramatically increasing its congressional representation.	In an apparent move to reinforce its image as a growing coalition, the PSUM has formed open electoral alliances with several leftist splinter parties, including the Socialist Current, the Unity of Communist Leftist Alliance, and the Party of Socialist Laborers. A similar alliance with the Worker, Peasant, and	25X
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Student Coalition (COCEI) of Oaxaca is probably designed to exploit antigovernment sentiment in parts of that state. Members of the four groups are among the Unified Socialist Party's list of congressional candidates.	leader from the northern state of Coahuila—is secretary general of the union's largest affiliate, the Syndicate of Workers of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. 25X1
Political unification of the Marxist left is a symbolic milestone, but it will not affect the outcome of this year's elections. Party leaders candidly admit that victory over the ruling party's presidential candidate is impossible and have told US Embassy officials that the center-right National Action Party (PAN) may be the chief benefactor of public dissatisfaction with the ruling party's recent economic policies. They view the	The union has not been granted official recognition by the government. According to US Embassy officials, Mexico City prohibits university unions from embracing more than one campus out of concern that the resulting, large organization might join forces with other anti-PRI unions. In addition, and perhaps more important, US officials report that the government feared broader Communist domination of Mexico's explosive university youth. 25X1
electoral process, however, as an opportunity to reach a wide audience and substantiate Communist claims that the Unified Socialist Party constitutes a viable alternative to continued PRI rule.	Communists also dominate the Revolutionary Teachers Movement, a vocal dissent group within the large government-controlled and traditionally leftist-leaning National Syndicate of Educational Workers, Re-
PSUM Recruitment, Affiliates, and Front Groups. According to numerous press and US Embassy reports, university professors and students have been more receptive to Communist organization than most elements of society, and college campuses—particularly Mexico City's huge National Autonomous University and the nearby University of Puebla—are traditional Communist strongholds. The Communists, however, have not been able to retain the support of most university students once they leave school and the emphasis on organizing students has made the party appear unsympathetic to the problems of workers and peasants. More significantly, the ruling par-	ing National Syndicate of Educational Workers. Recent dissident demands for salary increases and democratization of the union—old issues reinvigorated in part by inflation—were punctuated by protest 25X1 marches and strikes in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Morelos. US Embassy reporting, however, indicates that the Revolutionary Teachers Movement has managed to obtain only token concessions from the union's national leadership with these 25X1 tactics. Press and Embassy reporting suggests that a second dissident faction within the teachers union, the Confederation of National Educational Workers, probably has ties with the Communists.
ty's well-entrenched organizational structure and its policies of co-option and coercion have given it firm control of the nation's urban and rural workers.	Reflecting Communist problems in unionizing urban laborers, the Soviet-backed Permanent Committee for Latin American Trade Union Unity (CPUSTAL)—with headquarters in Mexico City since 1978—has
The Communist Party's most notable unionizing success has been among university workers and professors. The party's vehicle—the Single National Union of University Workers—seeks the nationwide integration of employees and teachers in all public universities. The union represented an estimated 60,000 persons at the time of its inception in 1979. Members of the union's executive council have included several Communist Party Central Committee members, and	only one Mexican affiliate. Statistically, 95 percent of Mexican workers are affiliated through their unions with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party, and although Marxist opposition pockets exist in most Mexican unions, labor dissidence has been inconsequential since the mid-1970s. A few unions that are part of the ruling party's system, including power and light workers and telephone workers, support Marxist-Leninist causes.

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Evaristo Perez Arreola—a prominent Communist

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The main Communist organizations in the rural	generally abides by the restriction on interference in	
sector are the General Union of Workers and Farm-	domestic politics.	
ers-Jacinto Lopez and the Independent Center of		25X1
Agricultural Workers and Farmers. The former is an		20/(1
offshoot of the still active Popular Socialist Party's		
General Union of Workers and Farmers, but, according to US Embassy officials, it has probably no more		
than a few hundred members. It is, however, the only		^
Mexican affiliate of the Permanent Committee for		
Latin American Trade Union Unity.		25X1 ·
The Independent Center of Agricultural Workers and		
Farmers was created in 1976 by Communist Party		
official Danzos Palomino. Danzos Palomino's claims	An additional complication is that Cuba's formal	
that membership in his organization ranges from	relations with Mexican Marxist parties have not	25X1
200,000 to 500,000 are unsupported—the PRI refers	always been smooth. The Mexican Communist Party's move during the past decade toward an independ-	23/1
to it as a paper organization. The Center, according to press reports, is active in southern Mexico, particular-	ent Eurocommunist image has frequently led to dif-	051/4
ly in the state of Chiapas.	ferences with the Cubans over international issues.	25 X 1
	For example, the Mexican Communist Party vocifer-	
The Communist Party has had greater success in	ously criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.	25 X 1
sponsoring front groups that focus on foreign affairs. The government's foreign policies are much further to		
the left than its domestic programs, and this conver-		25X1
gence of interest enables the opposition left to be		
outspoken on most foreign affairs questions.	We believe Havana	25 X 1
The Mexican Peace Movement is the Communists'	has sought to skirt these ideological differences—and reduce the risk of offending the Mexican Govern-	
most important front group in this regard. It is	ment—by supporting ostensibly nonpartisan organiza-	
associated with the Soviet-dominated World Peace	tions like the Mexican Peace Movement and the	25 X 1
Council	Mexico City-based Latin American Federation of	
The Mexican Peace	Journalists.	25 X 1
Movement frequently sponsors solidarity conferences	While the USSR has stepped up its attempts to	25X1
and demonstrations with which established parties	expand state-to-state relations with Mexico, we be-	23/1
choose not to be formally associated. In recent years,	lieve it has continued to pursue active contacts with	
the movement has supported Puerto Rican independ-	local leftist groups. According to US Embassy offi- cials, Moscow dispatched a high-level party delega-	25 X 1
ence, Haitian Communists, the Castro regime, and it has staged anti-US rallies.	tion to Mexico last August to discuss the formation of	
has staged and 0.5 family.	a new Marxist party with Communist leaders.	•
Leftist Ties With Cuba and the USSR. Cuba highly		25 X 1
values its close diplomatic ties with Mexico and		
understands that the Mexican Government will not tolerate interference in internal politics.		25X1 ¹
totalita interretana in internar pontreo.		20/(1
Cuba		25 X 1
Cuoa		

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The Mexican Government, aware that the country is a traditional base for Soviet clandestine activities directed against the United States and mainland Latin America, sets limits on Soviet activities. The	Communist Party's gradual move toward a more Eurocommunist image can be viewed in part as an attempt to appeal to the same constituency as the PMT. 25X1	
expulsion of five senior Soviet officials from Mexico in 1971 for their minor role in the training of Mexican guerrillas in North Korea was a lesson the Soviet Union probably has not forgotten.	Castillo stands out as one of the system's rare failures to incorporate such a charismatic opposition figure 25X1 under the party's broad umbrella or to silence him before he gained nationwide recognition. Indeed, the party's chief strength lies in Castillo's personal appeal and in public acceptance of his nationalistic criticism of government oil and development policies. Recog- 25X1 nizing this, the government probably will continue to withhold official recognition, thus limiting the party's influence to its impact on public opinion and to	
Mexican Workers Party The Mexican Workers Party (PMT), one of the remaining leftist parties outside the PSUM, grew out of a mid-1970s reform movement inspired by disillusioned intellectuals and political ideologues such as Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes. Its current leader, Heberto Castillo, is nationally known and, according to US Embassy reports, the government—which refuses to grant the party official status—recognizes	possible participation in the United Socialist Party or another leftist coalition. 25X1 Socialist Workers Party The Socialist Workers Party was established in 1973 when party leader Rafael Aguilar Talamantes split from Heberto Castillo's organization. The party was granted conditional registration in 1979.	
that the charismatic Castillo could help unify the left. The government estimates party membership at 19,000, more than triple the 5,000 loyalists government officials estimated in early 1979. The PMT's appeal has never been tested at the polls, but US Embassy officials indicate the party's major goals—to transform society by peaceful means and to "end the PRI-orchestrated sham democracy"—are attractive to a wide range of nationalistic, reform-minded Mexicans who do not find political expression in the PRI, its rightist opposition, or the Communists. Consequently, Communist efforts to unite the Marxist left were dealt a blow when party leader Castillo refused to join.	According to US Embassy reporting, the party embraces Marxist-Leninist principles by favoring the creation of a government of the workers, but it does not accept the supervision of foreign powers or organizations. Moreover, the group views elements in the ruling party's left wing—a so-called political bourgeoisie—as capable of bringing about the transformation of Mexican society. Hence, although the party is radical in doctrine, its acceptance of government financing appears to put it in the ruling party's fold. Critics of the Socialist Workers Party label it a PRI clone.	
Embassy reporting indicates that the PMT does not challenge Communist dominance among students, but	The party has occasionally taken some actions that appeared independent. In 1980 land seizures in Chiapas by the party's campesino wing—the National	

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Unity of Agrarian Workers—embarrassed the gov-

ernment. According to US Embassy officials, the

rather seems to attract university-educated Mexicans

who—while part of the system—are as displeased with the ruling party's failures as they are with orthodox Communist rhetoric. In our judgment, the

party apparently has political contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and party leader Aguilar is associated with Latin American socialist leaders as well as the Socialist International.	energy workers unions. Embassy officials report the party also has links with other small Trotskyite groups, including the Mexican Workers League and a splinter organization, the Party of Socialist Workers. Given its heretical Marxist philosophy, we believe this group could aggravate disunity among the Mexican	25 X 1
Popular Socialist Party The Popular Socialist Party was founded in 1948 by disparate, nondoctrinaire Communist Party members led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The party had an anti-US tilt and favored greater state participation in the economy; by 1955 it had become a professed Marxist party. Current membership is estimated by	left; this could be the reason for the government's decision to recognize the party. Party presidential nominee Rosario Ibarra de Piedra—the first woman presidential candidate in Mexico—is not a Trotskyite. She founded the Com-	25X1
the government at 25,000. According to US Embassy officials, party Secretary General Jorge Cruickshank Garcia holds a seat in the Mexican Senate as a reward for not opposing PRI election fraud in Nayarit in 1976. The party's decision not to join the PSUM may engender additional benefits.	mittee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, Exiles, Fugitives, and Disappeared Persons when her son disappeared after being arrested several years ago, and has gained some national prominence as a result. The party apparently believes that her broader appeal will enable it to garner sufficient votes to retain its official status.	25X1
The party has steadily supported the PRI and currently endorses ruling party presidential candidate Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. Nevertheless, officials of the US Embassy in Mexico indicate that the party's rural	Social Democratic Party The Social Democratic Party was formed in 1978. It grew out of a university organization—Communitar-	25X1
wing continues organizational efforts among rural laborers.	ian Action—which was once associated with the ruling party's popular sector. The Social Democrats, headed by Ernesto Sanchez Aguilar, call for nationalization of the steel, glass, cement, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries as well as federalization and/or municipalization of all mass transportation.	25X1 25X1
Revolutionary Workers Party The Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party was founded in 1976 and granted conditional registration	The party would also place under state ownership the administration of banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies.	25 X 1
in 1981. Jose Aguilar-Mora is the party's general secretary. Its ideology supposedly eschews multiclass coalitions in the drive to bring Communism to Mexico, but press reports suggest it is interested in forming an electoral alliance with other leftist opposition parties.	Membership is unknown, but US Embassy reporting suggests that the party probably comprises primarily academics and will play only a minor role in the July elections. To take advantage of their official status, press reports indicate the Social Democrats discussed formal electoral alliances with several parties, including the Mexican Workers Party and the Unified	25 X 1
The party underwent a major schism in 1979, and membership is currently estimated at 8,000. According to US Embassy officials,	Socialist Party of Mexico, before nominating ex-PRI official Manuel Moreno Sanchez as their presidential candidate.	25X1
party members are primarily students, professors,		20/(1
public school teachers, and doctors and, while labor and campesino representation appears slight, the par-		25X1
ty has some strength within the electrical and nuclear		25 X 1

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Party of Socialist Laborers

The Party of Socialist Laborers was formally established in 1980, a year after its founders split from the Revolutionary Workers Party. A triumvirate—
Cuauhtemoc Ruiz, Raul Lezcas, and Alfonso Moro—
currently heads the organization. Membership, probably concentrated in Mexico City, is estimated by Mexican officials at 3,000.

Socialist Current

The Socialist Current, not recognized by the government as an official party, was formed in 1979. According to US Embassy officials, party leaders consider the organization a revolutionary vanguard and hope to unite urban and rural workers, campesinos, and the progressive middle class. Four members of its central committee have served jail sentences for political crimes, and one, Jorge Sanchez Hirales, was in exile in Cuba. Allied with the PSUM for the election, the party has at best a handful of adherents.

Unity of Communist Leftist Alliance

The Unity of Communist Leftist Alliance is a small (perhaps 200 members), fledgling political organization, which has recently entered into an electoral alliance with the PSUM. It is headed by Manuel Terrazas Guerrero.

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Other Leftist Groups

A number of organizations—which may function in the political arena but about which we have little information—are considered by the Mexican Government to be Marxist entities. Among them are: Independent Workers Union, National Democratic Popular Front, Popular Union of Naucalpan Colonies, National Federation of Bolshevik Organizations, National Front Against Repression, and the "Plan de Ayala" National Committee.

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