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within the Soviet leadership. At the same time, Murphy reminds us that the post-Brezhnev generation are also political apprentices of the Brezhnev political structure. That political structure originated under

Stalin and promotes a basic underlying continuity in mentality of all those who achieve high office in the Soviet Union, whatever the disparate nature of their formative life experiences, careers, or backgrounds.

It is little consolation for any of us that such a political structure continues to single out future Soviet leaders more for their political cunning than for their abilities or policy views.

The "Action Arm" of the CPSU

By John J. Dziak

LENNARD D. GERSON. *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia*. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1976.

GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD. *The Storm Petrels: The Flight of the First Soviet Defectors*. London, Collins, 1977.

ALEKSEI MYAGKOV. *Inside the KGB: An Expose by an Officer of the Third Directorate*. Richmond, Surrey, England, The Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1976.

VLADIMIR SAKHAROV and UMBERTO TOSI. *High Treason*. New York, NY, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1980.

US CONGRESS, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. *Soviet Covert Action: the Forgery Offensive*, Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, February 6, 19, 1980. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980.

HARRY ROSITZKE. *The KGB: The Eyes of the People*. New York, NY, Doubleday and Company, 1981.

enjoyed a pervasive and powerful position since 1917. Created a little more than a month after the Bolshevik coup of November 7, 1917, these services—the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage (CHEKA) and its successors—soon became the mainstay of the party, a situation recognized by every Soviet leader from Vladimir Lenin through Leonid Brezhnev. Indeed, it is no accident that the KGB and its predecessors have occupied a special position as the cutting edge of party

authority domestically and the leading organ in Soviet foreign activities. Lenin consciously collaborated with F. Dzerzhinskiy, the head of the CHEKA, in granting the CHEKA the extralegal or translegal authority to employ special measures to guarantee the monopoly of power of his faction. Iosif Stalin built on such precedents, adroitly using them to his own advantage, though obviously at the party's (and country's) expense. Nikita Khrushchev may have reined the KGB in, but he did it primarily to insure its role as servant of the party and not the reverse. Moreover, he left the reins on it considerably more slack with respect to the country as a whole. Brezhnev has essentially followed the reorientation of his predecessor, carefully overseeing the return of the security organs to the tradition of Dzerzhinskiy and Lenin, that of "most trusted servant" and "action arm" of the party.²

² For a survey of the function of the KGB and its predecessors as well as its relationship to the party, see Ronald Hingley, *The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations 1565-1970*, New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1970.

IT HAS BEEN roughly seven years since John Barron's *KGB* attracted Western attention to the "action arm" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).¹ His study appropriately emphasized that the Committee for State Security (KGB) is something much more than just another police organ or foreign intelligence service.

In the Soviet Union, the intelligence and security services have

¹ John Barron, *KGB*, New York, NY, Bantam Books, 1974.

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It needs to be stressed that the position of the Soviet security organs, and principally the KGB relative to the party, is a special one unmatched by any other Soviet institution, including the military. As the party's praetorian guard, the KGB has been allowed, without interruption, to penetrate every facet of the Soviet system, domestic or foreign. This penetration extends to the military as well as to the KGB's sister services, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff. The KGB deploys its own armed forces—border guards, 9th Directorate troops, signal troops—and may extend this control to the internal security troops of the MVD, together comprising military forces of at least half a million men independent of Marshal D. F. Ustinov's Ministry of Defense. In foreign operations, the KGB clearly takes precedence over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, itself also subject to KGB penetration and co-optation of its personnel. KGB Chief Yu. V. Andropov, a Brezhnev confidante of long standing, is a voting member of the Politburo and reportedly one of the six or seven permanent members of the Defense Council, an elite inner group frequently rumored to be the true locus of central decision-making.³ Hence, when examining the KGB, we are dealing with something beyond just another state institution or another competitor in some interest-group model. The party without the KGB simply would not be the party as we know it.

UNFORTUNATELY, few scholars have paid the party-KGB phalanx the serious and in-depth attention it clearly merits. Many treatises on

³ For information on the Defense Council, see John J. Dziak, *Soviet Military Doctrine and Power*, New York, NY, National Strategy Information Center, 1981; and Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981.

Soviet politics and the Soviet system either ignore the security and intelligence apparatus or relegate it to the cursory coverage befitting a subject not open to meaningful scholarly inquiry. Furthermore, the specialized writings on the topic are quite sparse. For instance, there has yet to appear a definitive history of the Soviet intelligence and security services, notwithstanding commendable surveys such as Ronald Hingley's *The Russian Secret Police* or the valuable contributions of Robert Slusser.⁴ Since the publication of Barron's *KGB* in 1974, in fact, output on the subject has increased only slightly, and a lot of this has come from outside the academic community.

One fine exception to this generally dismal state of affairs is Lennard Gerson's *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia*. This superior inquiry deserves inclusion on required reading lists for Soviet history and government courses. Among the several conclusions one may draw from Gerson's research, two merit highlighting for present purposes. First, the author convincingly demonstrates that productive analysis of the Soviet secret police is possible from open and available sources. Too often the argument is proffered that the very nature of the subject inhibits meaningful inquiry, for the data are buried in party/KGB archives, destroyed, or manipulated according to the changing interpretations of Soviet historiography. While these are real limitations which render the scholar's task especially onerous, Gerson has shown that it can be done and done well. The pertinent Soviet party and state documents and memoir literature which he has surfaced in themselves provide the necessary points

⁴ See Hingley, op. cit.; Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, *The Soviet Secret Police*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1975.

of departure for still further lines of investigation.

Second, Gerson has meticulously chronicled the Leninist roots of party/state-directed terror as an institutionalized instrument of party control. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has so poignantly witnessed, *katorga* and *Gulag* were not mere aberrations attributable to the whims of a *vozhd'* (Stalin) who betrayed the noble ideals of a new era of history ushered in by Lenin.⁵ Gerson concludes that it was "during the formative years of Bolshevik rule, when violence and terror were extolled by men of theory and freely indulged in by men of action, [that] they had imprisoned and executed thousands upon thousands to preserve the Bolshevik monopoly of power. For this they earned the sincere gratitude of the Party's leaders" (p. 274).

Internal repression and the dynamics of party-police interaction constitute but one facet of the activities of the Soviet security organs. Intelligence, espionage, covert action, disinformation and deception undertakings, and counterintelligence are others, and they are dealt with in the rest of the works under review. Gordon Brook-Shepherd elucidates the workings of the Soviet power elite and its foreign operations by retelling the odysseys of several Soviet officials who defected to the West before World War II. *The Storm Petrels* focuses on five prominent Soviet defectors, ranging from Boris Bajanov, who had been Stalin's personal assistant and secretary to the Politburo before he left the USSR in 1928, to Alexander Orlov, one of the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officers ever to flee the system. Though each of the defectors—Bajanov, Georges Agabekov, Grigoriy Bessedovsky, Walter

⁵ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Gulag Archipelago*, New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1979.

Krivitsky, and Orlov—wrote his own memoirs, Brook-Shepherd relies more on hitherto unpublished Western official sources and, in the case of Bajanov, on a lengthy personal interview.

The result is an intriguing tapestry of vignettes. Some of the most intriguing points, however, Brook-Shepherd was not able to follow up on. There is a possibility, for example, that Bessedovsky was "turned back" to Soviet service, especially in the immediate postwar years in Paris, where the KGB's I. I. Agayants (later to head the KGB's new Disinformation Department) was operating (p. 105).⁶ Bessedovsky's trail simply disappeared in the French Riviera during the early years after the war. Similarly, Orlov hinted tantalizingly that a Ukrainian faction of the Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU) had intrigued, with possible army complicity, against Stalin before both the military and the police were savaged in the purges of the 1930's, but he would say no more. An intelligence officer to the end, he revealed only what he wished and took the rest with him when he died in April 1973.

Nevertheless, Brook-Shepherd's account has the highly readable style of an accomplished journalist. Its major drawback from a researcher's perspective is the lack of bibliography and pertinent citations.

IN THE STUDY of Soviet intelligence and security services, defector testimony provides some of the most telling detail available, especially on operational specifics. Much of this information has become available as published testimony before various governmental commissions and Congressional hearings. The rest has appeared in the form of memoir

⁶ On Agayants, see also Barron, *op. cit.*; and Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare*, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972.

literature, although this seems to have had an impact only well after the events described. Many of the early defectors from the security or state *apparat* were disillusioned revolutionaries, themselves participants in the drama of the construction of the Soviet state. More recent arrivals have manifested a different type of disillusionment, coming as they have from an ensconced elite long since purged of early doubters. They have also brought with them experiences honed in the milieu of post-Stalin developments.

Former KGB Captain Alexei Myagkov's *Inside the KGB* may strike some readers at first as merely another exposé by a disaffected insider. Yet an appreciation of *where* in the KGB Myagkov worked and a careful reading of his narrative as well as of the documents he brought with him reveals this book to be one of the more significant contributions to the literature on Soviet intelligence. Myagkov was an officer of the KGB's Third Directorate, the successor to the Soviet military counterespionage organs known as SMERSH and counterintelligence watchdog over the Soviet military. To this reviewer's knowledge, he is the only defector since the immediate postwar years from within the Third Directorate.

The Third Directorate, among other things, runs in the military what the Second Chief Directorate does in the rest of Soviet society—an intricate informant network. The organizational means for this activity are known as Special Departments, and it was in one of these units in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany that Myagkov worked from 1969 until his defection in early 1974. His service in this capacity provides insight into the nature of the day-to-day interaction of the KGB and the military, the superior position of the former, and the mandatory system for unmasking enemies within the

ranks of the Soviet armed forces.

In addition to the operational aspects of Myagkov's KGB duties, his book provides glimpses into the functioning and privileges of the Soviet elite, including the party's "nomenclature" system within the armed forces and the attendant overlap of privilege, bribery, and the second economy. What emerges from his brief memoir is a compact case study of how the party, the military, and the KGB function in mutually beneficial symbiosis, and this in spite of the frictions generated by KGB penetration of the armed forces. Myagkov's microcosmic view adds valuable KGB-party-military detail to the broader phenomenon of an established self-perpetuating elite first scrutinized by that early believer-turned-dissident, Milovan Djilas.⁷

Myagkov's perspective is essentially one from the bottom up—i.e., that of a former enlisted man who moved into the operational levels of the KGB as a junior officer. In this sense, it is the tactical-operational perspective of the raw material of the party's "action arm." A more "strategic" panorama is provided by Vladimir Sakharov's *High Treason*. The son of a well-connected KGB father, Sakharov was a member of the Soviet aristocracy, thereby enjoying both privilege and access. Membership in such an elite helped provide Sakharov entrance to the Institute of International Relations in preparation for service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to that most desired perquisite, foreign travel. Though not a KGB officer, Sakharov was a co-optee. His father's influence was used to ensure that this institutional connection progressed no further, even after the KGB had pressed young Sakharov to integrate as a KGB reg-

⁷ See Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974.

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ular. Still, Sakharov served the KGB—not uncommon for many, if not most, Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel overseas.

Sakharov's activities in the Middle East were first mentioned in John Barron's *KGB*, not long after Sakharov's defection to the US in 1971. *High Treason* adds intimate detail, ranging from Sakharov's connections to elite KGB and party families, to the Soviet penetration of Abdel Nasser's Egypt and KGB/GRU operations involving guerrilla and terrorist groups in the Middle East. Like Oleg Penkovskiy,⁸ Sakharov was a defector/agent-in-place, having been recruited by the US some time (undisclosed) before his actual flight in 1971.

High Treason is the first account since Alexander Kaznacheyev's *Inside a Soviet Embassy* to provide working details on the structure and operations of Soviet intelligence residencies abroad.⁹ Confirming the continued preeminence of the KGB over the Foreign Ministry both in Moscow and abroad, Sakharov adds other information pointing to an enhanced role in foreign affairs for certain higher party organs. Specifically, B. N. Ponomarëv's International Department of the Central Committee, besides having a central role in foreign policy formulation, is a critical player in policy execution. Sakharov observes that International Department representatives at important foreign posts outranked both the KGB resident and the ambassador, serving as the senior Soviet authorities overseeing all activities, whether diplomatic, subversive, or intelligence. Some analysts, like Leonard Schapiro, have long held that Ponomarëv's department and not the Foreign Ministry is the true locus of foreign policy.¹⁰ Sakharov's revelations support this contention and indicate another dimension to the Department's activities: on-site supervision of all

Soviet intelligence, subversion, disinformation, and other covert action operations.

When viewed in the context of the reorientation of the KGB's role initiated by Khrushchev and KGB chief A. N. Shelepin in late 1958, such a situation is not all that surprising. The objective of these two men was to refocus the secret police along the lines initially established by Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy—i.e., to return it to being an action instrument of the party, fulfilling party objectives and responding to party direction. Indeed, that appeared to be the primary rationale for the appointment of Shelepin and the dropping of General I. A. Serov (who moved to the GRU) as head of the organization. A clean leadership break was made to prepare the KGB for the more sophisticated operations mandated by Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy. While this step made good foreign policy sense, it may, of course, have been a foolish internal political move, for both Shelepin and his handpicked successor, V. Ye. Semichastnyy, were among the plotters of Khrushchev's downfall in 1964.

AT ANY RATE, the changes begun in 1958 ushered in a new phase of KGB foreign operations. Concurrent with the appointment of Shelepin was the selection of Colonel I. I. Agayants—who, as noted earlier, had run disinformation operations in Paris—to head the new Disinforma-

tion Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Although the Soviets had for years carried out centrally directed deception and disinformation activities—the highly successful "Trust" operation of 1922–27 was an almost textbook example¹¹—the institutionalization of such a function portended more and better-organized efforts. By the time of Agayants's death in 1968, he had been a KGB general for several years; and by the early 1970's, the Disinformation Department itself had been bureaucratically upgraded to the level of Service ("Sluzhba A"). Both developments were clear indicators of the accomplishments and weight of Agayants and his organization.

Further signs of an intent to conduct a full range of "active measures" came in March 1978 with the creation of the Central Committee's International Information Department, under the direction of Léonid Zamyatin, Brezhnev intimate and former chief of the press agency TASS. In the same year, the KGB itself was formally redesignated the KGB of the USSR and thereby relieved of its titular subordination to the Council of Ministers. Thus, Brezhnev not only has continued the reorientation that Khrushchev set in motion in 1958 but has strengthened it by fashioning a party conglomerate composed of the International Department, the International Information Department, and the KGB itself. The board of directors of the "active measures" apparatus are all members of the Politburo, Secretariat, or Central Committee, and include such prominent figures as Brezhnev, M. A. Suslov, Andropov (also KGB chief), Ponomarëv, K. V. Rusakov, and Zamyatin.

Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, issued in 1980 by the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, deals with the results of these post-Khrushchev de-

⁸ See Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, London, Collins, 1965.

⁹ Alexander Kaznacheyev, *Inside a Soviet Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma*, Philadelphia, PA, Lippincott, 1962.

¹⁰ Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976-1977, pp. 41-58.

¹¹ On the "Trust" operation, see Geoffrey Bailey, *The Conspirators*, New York, NY, Harpers, 1960; S. L. Voytsekhovskiy, *Trest—Vospominaniya i dokumenty* (The Trust—Recollections and Documents), London, Ontario, Zarya Publishers, 1974.

velopments—specifically, the role of both propaganda and covert action in Soviet foreign policy. It includes a study and testimony on Soviet “active measures,” plus documentation on Soviet or Soviet-inspired forgeries, by the Central Intelligence Agency and testimony by Ladislav Bittman, former deputy chief of the Czech intelligence service’s Disinformation Department. The document is highly useful on several counts. It provides valuable specifics on the centralized party-KGB phalanx for conceiving and executing/overseeing broad covert action and propaganda initiatives. There are several excellent case studies of Soviet action—e.g., against US production of neutron weapons and the modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces. It contains important analysis of the increase in Soviet bloc forgeries aimed at discrediting the US and allied countries, as well as facsimiles of many of the forged materials. Finally, the testimony of Bittman places such “active measures” in the context of broader objectives and operations of Soviet bloc foreign policy. In sum, *Soviet Covert Action* is one of the more valuable additions to the small body of dependable literature treating Soviet intelligence and merits careful reading by those interested in that realm of Soviet foreign policy which transcends traditional diplomacy.

The last work under consideration, Harry Rositzke’s *The KGB: The Eyes of the People*, is the only study of those reviewed here produced by a former US intelligence officer. Rositzke began his intelligence career in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and then spent the bulk of his service in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the operational side, “viewing the KGB in action both at home and abroad” (p. x).

The book is also the most difficult

of the items under review to come to grips with. It seems to abound with stark declarations such as the jacket characterization of the KGB as the “world’s best intelligence organization,” or—more troublesome—robust assertions such as “it [the KGB] is a straightforward, secret service, even in its more devious and deceptive practices” (p. ix); or “organized ethnic and religious minorities face the KGB with the least problem of security control” (p. 254). The problem with such statements is that they are, at the least, debatable and merit much more in the way of explication, rationale, and convincing supporting development.

While the KGB qualifies as one of the most pervasive and powerful security services the world has ever seen, this reviewer would hesitate to characterize it as the world’s best *intelligence* organization. To be sure, it is probably the largest single intelligence service, but a judicious comparison with others, including smaller intelligence services such as the Israeli organization, is warranted before any sweeping conclusion can be drawn about the quality of its efforts.

Moreover, the fact that the KGB, unfettered by many of the governmental, constitutional, and societal checks imposed on Western services, has a unique mandate, argues against characterization of it as just a “straightforward secret service.” Differences in degree ultimately add up to differences in kind. Although KGB officers are not giants of capability, the position of their service in the Soviet system imposes far fewer restraints on them in both internal and international operations, than intelligence officers in constitutionally limited systems face.

Essentially an anecdotal treatment, Rositzke’s *KGB* includes many fascinating cases from before World War II as well as from the con-

temporary period, yet a connective theme is difficult to pinpoint because of skips in chronology, case flashbacks, and undeveloped assertions which do not build a compelling narrative. This is an interesting work, but it leaves too many loose ends.

IN CONCLUSION, one may say that despite some of the fine contributions discussed above, there is much more work that needs to be done on the Soviet intelligence and security services. To supplement the necessarily sporadic information that is available from the infrequent “petrels,” solidly researched inquiries are essential. This is especially the case with regard to the original formation and role of the political police under Lenin. George Leggett’s forthcoming volume on the CHEKA is most welcome in this respect and promises to be a solid complement to Gerson’s book.¹²

However, later periods also deserve further scrutiny, especially relative to the role of the KGB within the party-state structure. Indeed, a case can be made for examining the party and police apparatuses together rather than as entirely separate institutional entities. For example, Brezhnev has staffed the security services with close party associates from earlier days (Andropov, S. K. Tsvigun, G. K. Tsinev, V. M. Chebrikov, and others in the KGB; N. A. Shchëlov and the late V. S. Paputin in the MVD). Moreover, because the chairman of the KGB, the party’s “action arm,” is a member of the Politburo and reputedly a Defense Council member as well, the KGB today appears to be in a stronger position than at any time since Stalin’s death and the fall of L. P. Beriia, yet it achieved this

¹² (George Leggett’s, *The CHEKA: Lenin’s Political Police*, was released by Oxford University Press after this essay-review was written—Eds.)

status under and through Brezhnev and not through any free-wheeling maneuverings of its own. Brezhnev,

it would seem, has successfully carried the reorientation begun by Khrushchev to its logical end—the

shaping of a faithful servant of the party and a partner for the party in pursuit of the party's objectives.

Psychiatry and the Soviet State

By Harvey Fireside

ALEXANDER PODRABINEK. *Punitive Medicine*. Ann Arbor, MI, Karoma Publishers, 1980.

SIDNEY BLOCH AND PETER REDDAWAY. *Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry Is Used to Suppress Dissent*. New York, NY, Basic Books, 1977.

P.S. GRIGORENKO. *The Grigorenko Papers*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

VICTOR NEKIPELOV. *Institute of Fools: Notes from the Serbsky*. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980.

LEONID PLYUSHCH. *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography*. New York, NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

TATYANA KHODOROVICH, Ed. *The Case of Leonid Plyushch*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

experts examine a suspect referred to them by the "security organs," routinely supply a diagnosis of psychopathy, paranoia, or "creeping schizophrenia" to justify a judicial determination of legal nonresponsibility, and order a new inmate to be drugged into stuporous submission. The dissident's trial is conducted in absentia, so that he has no opportunity to offer a plea that his supporters might publicize and relay to the West. His eventual release is made contingent on a recantation of offending opinions stigmatized as "reformist delusions."

The existence of punitive psychiatry was revealed to the West in June 1970, when the noted biologist Zhores Medvedev was detained at the Kaluga mental hospital for his "schizophrenic" concern with political reforms. It was immediately recognized by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as a metastasis of the cancerous Gulag archipelago of Stalin's time. "Servile psychiatrists who break their Hippocratic oath," observed Solzhenitsyn, "are able to describe concern for social problems as 'mental illness,' can declare a man insane for being too passionate or for being too calm, for the bright-

WESTERN CHARGES that Soviet psychiatry has been corrupted by the political bias of its practitioners rest on hundreds of well-documented cases over the past decade. Alexander Podrabinek inscribes 200 names on a "white list" of inmates of the "special" psychiatric hospitals whose only crime was political or religious dissent. Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway's "register of victims of Soviet psychiatric abuse" runs to 210, half of them supplementary to Podrabinek's list. From these and other sources, such as the London-based human rights organization Amnesty International, it is possible to estimate that be-

tween 1,000 and 2,000 persons are being forcibly treated in institutions for the criminally insane to "cure" them of their urges for free expression.

There are upwards of a dozen "special" hospitals, or psychoprisons, operated by the Ministry of the Interior (MVD). Conditions in these institutions resemble the worst snakepits of the psychiatric dark ages. In addition, there is an extensive network of "ordinary" hospitals and local clinics to frighten would-be dissenters into conformity.

What all these facilities have in common is that they are run under the cover of "socialist legality." Their