

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

25X1 FROM :
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT : East Asia Warning Meeting

1. Following is the agenda for the East Asia Warning Meeting, scheduled for Wednesday, 23 July at 1400 hours in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters.

China

- Preparations for NPC: what is Hua Guofeng's staying power?
- Reaction to Indian recognition of Heng Samrin -- will rapprochement live?
- "Second lesson" prospects in wake of Thai border incursions.

Southeast Asia

- What is purpose of "summit meeting" in Laos?
- The Soviet Vietnamese connection after the meeting in Moscow
- Will there be more attacks along the Thai border?
- How serious the Lao-Thai border closing?
- Long-term Thai reaction to the Vietnamese incursion?
- How well is Prem doing?

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON JULY 1986
Derived from Multiple

South Korea

- Public reaction to the purification campaign, new issue of military promotion and the appointment of General Yoo as the new KCIA chief.

North Korea

- Possibility succession issue might be resolved at the Party Congress.



Indonesia

- How serious are the current strains in US-Indonesian relations?



25X1

25X1

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070004-3

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070004-3

SECRET

2 July 1980

5 July Staff Meeting

→ JHH

NIC Warning Agenda: Potential Warning Developments over the next 90 days.I. Vietnam-Thailand-China:

A. Do the Vietnamese incursions into Thailand on 23-25 June signify a change in Hanoi's policy or were they simply a short-lived reaction to the Thai decision to begin repatriating Khmer refugees?

1. Can a case be made that the Vietnamese misjudged Thai intentions and had not expected the Prem government to begin repatriation? Did Hanoi share Beijing's judgment this spring that Prem wished to stop Chinese assistance to Pol Pot's forces through Thailand? Foreign Minister Thach's suggestion during his visit to Bangkok in May that Hanoi and Bangkok let the Kampuchea question rest for 3 or 4 months implied that the Vietnamese were confident that they would be able to bring about a gradual Thai disengagement from collaborating with China on Kampuchea. But following his talks with Thach, Prem reportedly concluded that Beijing was correct regarding the necessity of applying military pressure on Vietnam to force a withdrawal of its forces from Kampuchea.

B. If Hanoi has in fact concluded that Prem has abandoned his initial intent to back away from a collision course with Vietnam, the Vietnamese may be contemplating a significant shift toward confrontation tactics in dealing with Thailand. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap are said to be in Moscow for consultations on policy toward Kampuchea and Thailand.

1. Foreign Minister Thach stated on 26 June that Vietnamese forces would now move against Pol Pot's forces south of Aranyaprathet in an attempt to stop the repatriation of these guerrillas.

2. Does Hanoi intend to maintain military pressure with the object of forcing the Thai to halt repatriation and end their resupply of DK forces?
Will the Vietnamese withhold further cross-border operations for several weeks

25X1

SECRET

in order to gauge Bangkok's response to the initial incursions? According to press reports, Thai authorities, citing border tensions, announced a suspension of repatriation on 27 June. On 30 June, Foreign Minister Sitthi postponed indefinitely his planned trip to China.

C. China's response: Following Thach's visit to Bangkok, the Chinese claimed to be increasingly confident that the Thai would not yield to Vietnamese pressure to prevent Chinese supplies from reaching Pol Pot's forces. The Chinese Foreign Ministry warned the Vietnamese on 25 June that they would face "grave danger" if they "persist in military adventures,"

25X1

25X1

1. The NID of 26 June judged that, "If attacks into Thailand continue or escalate, Beijing may feel compelled to increase its military activity along the Sino-Vietnamese border."

2. Deng Xiaoping, the prime mover in China's attack on Vietnam in February 1979, told a Thai cabinet minister on 26 May that a second and perhaps stronger military strike into Vietnam remained a serious option.

D. The Chinese have an obvious interest in stiffening Thai resistance to Vietnamese pressures, but if their public and private warnings fail to deter further Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, and if the Thai back away from confrontation with Vietnam, Beijing will have to confront some hard decisions. The Chinese military attache in Bangkok has said that China does not expect Vietnam to launch additional attacks against the Thai on a scale that the Thai military cannot handle on their own. INR on 1 July noted that the Chinese would be faced with a dilemma if the Vietnamese should ignore Beijing's warnings, and judged that if the Chinese feel the need for military-psychological

SECRET

pressure, a ground or air exercise conducted so as to be clearly detectable to the Vietnamese might serve China's purpose.

E. Should consideration be given to issuing an Alert Memorandum calling attention to possible Chinese military moves against Vietnam if Hanoi disregards China's warnings?

II. The Two Koreas:

A. The central question for warning over the next three months focuses on measures North Korea might take in an attempt to halt the growing consolidation and institutionalization of the authority of Lt.Gen. Chun Doo Hwan and his core group in Seoul. Developments in the South since the military takeover of Kwangju on 27 May almost certainly are viewed by the North Koreans as having demolished their hopes for an early "revolutionary uprising," i.e., internal confusion and divisions and violent demonstrations leading to the weakening of South Korea's political and military posture vis-a-vis the North.

B. Although the North Koreans so far have been unwilling to terminate the bilateral preparatory talks for a meeting between the two prime ministers, they insisted on delaying the next session until late August, presumably to gain time for judging trends in the South and in US-ROK relations.

C. The attempted seaborne infiltration on 20 June and indications of a simultaneous overland infiltration raised potentially serious questions about North Korean intentions. The NID played down this incident by noting that "North Korean infiltration missions normally are at their high point between March and early fall." DIA, on the other hand, took a more serious view, stating that the infiltration attempts, coupled with more vitriolic propaganda attacks on South Korean leaders, suggest that the North may be moving toward "a more confrontational stance."

D. If Chun Doo Hwan and his supporters succeed in keeping the lid on and make steady progress in consolidating their power in the next few months,

the North Koreans will either have to acquiesce in a fait accompli ending their hope for a "revolutionary uprising" in the South or gamble on high risk measures to reverse the trend.

1. If Kim Il-song opts for bold measures, he may first withdraw from the Panmunjom preparatory talks, perhaps before the next scheduled meeting in late August. The North Koreans have prepared the ground for a walkout by questioning the credentials of the ROK delegates following the imposition of nationwide martial law in the South.

- Kim may (a) order a step up in infiltration attempts with the mission of provoking violence that could be turned against the Seoul regime;
- (b) provoke a clash along the DMZ which would be blamed on the "fascist clique" in Seoul;
- (c) order an attempt to assassinate Chun Doo Hwan and other ROK military leaders. (The abortive Blue House raid to eliminate President Pak Chong-hui in January 1968 was conceived as "the spark that would touch off the revolution.

III. Ethiopia-Somalia:

A. Ethiopian plans for a large military exercise near Dire Dawa in mid-July, with the participation of Cuban troops, have heightened Somali convictions that Ethiopia will stage an attack into northern Somalia before the end of the year. A Somali faction headed by Defense Minister Ali Samantar reportedly believes that the Ethiopian military buildup in the Ogaden has created a critical need for an early agreement with the US for the use of Somali military facilities in exchange for US military aid. In the absence of such an agreement, Ali Samantar believes a large-scale Ethiopian invasion would be inevitable before the end of 1980. He doubts that President Siad Barre's

regime could repel such an attack or survive in its present form.

B. The Ethiopians, for their part, seem to attach equal importance to a US-Somali agreement which would strengthen Somalia's ability to resist Ethiopian pressures. The mid-May DDO report stated that an attack into northern Somalia would be carried out before the Somalis can acquire foreign military support. At the end of May, Foreign Minister Feleke mentioned the US-Somali negotiations in a talk with the US ambassador and emphasized that Ethiopia "should not be provoked" or its "integrity threatened." The Ethiopian military buildup and the exercise in mid-July could thus be assessed in this context of Ethiopian concern that a US-Somali agreement would present a long-term threat to their position in the Ogaden and, more generally, in the Horn of Africa.

C. From the warning standpoint, the near-term risk of a sharp military escalation may center more on Somali reactions to the Ethiopian exercise and attempts to keep Ethiopian forces away from the border than on the longer-term prospect of an Ethiopian attack into northern Somalia.

IV. Cuba: Castro's Next Move:

A. Is Castro preparing new initiatives on the refugees-negotiations complex of issues before the US elections? The regime remains formally committed to using the refugees—particularly the 360 who remain in the US Interests Section—to draw the US into talks on "basic problems" of the trade embargo, Guantanamo, and reconnaissance overflights. NID articles have suggested that Castro might (1) revive the Florida boat-lift by promising to release relatives of Cubans in the US; (2) encourage refugees to enter the Guantanamo base.

B. The Soviet dimension: hypothetical scenario:

Might Castro seek Soviet approval of a negotiating package that would include a guarded and vague Soviet offer to consider withdrawing the combat

SECRET

SECRET

6

brigade from Cuba if the US agrees to Castro's terms for "normalizing" US-Cuban relations? It might be recalled that the circumstances that prompted the Soviet decision to have the brigade conduct conspicuous field maneuvers last August have never been fully explained. This episode may still have an important bearing on future Soviet-Cuban initiatives. The decision was made in the knowledge that public controversy over the Soviet military presence was developing in the US. (Senator Stone's initial public statement was made on 15 July) The timing of the field maneuvers presumably was related in part to Cuban objectives at the Nonaligned Summit in Havana in September. Soviet media at that time devoted unusual attention to the "US military presence on Cuban territory as a permanent threat to that country's sovereignty." Moscow radio said the Cubans "have made it abundantly clear that resolution of this issue cannot be put off indefinitely." Soviet media drew an implicit parallel between Guantanamo and the Soviet brigade. In his first public reaction to US statements regarding the Soviet brigade, Castro on 28 September demanded that the Guantanamo base be "dismantled." He argued that "Carter's moral duty is to withdraw the troops and remove the naval base from Guantanamo because its existence is illegal and immoral."

C. If the Soviet leaders should authorize Castro to put forward a package which linked, explicitly or implicitly, Guantanamo with the combat brigade, they presumably would do so on the assumption that the US administration—given the exigencies of the election campaign—would reject such a package. The Soviets probably would calculate that this outcome would damage the credibility of Washington's case for remaining in Guantanamo and strengthen Moscow's case for maintaining the brigade in Cuba.

D. The "logic" of this scenario suggests that Castro would time the package initiative for the greatest impact on the US election campaign—perhaps in late summer following the nominating conventions.

SECRET

SECRET

7

Brief Items:

A. USSR: possible post-Olympics initiatives:

—Afghanistan: (1) Proposals designed to broaden Kabul's 14 May formula for a "settlement," including a demand that the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces be accompanied by the "neutralization" of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, i.e., withdrawal of both US and Soviet naval units from these waters. (2) Moscow almost certainly would advance such a "comprehensive" settlement plan on the calculation that it would be unacceptable to the US. The Soviets would then contend that US rejection confirms their charges about US objectives in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia and justifies the introduction of additional Soviet forces into Afghanistan before the end of the year.

—TNF modernization: A new negotiating initiative that would build on Schmidt's concept of a freeze and drop or fuzz Moscow's precondition that NATO must cancel or postpone implementation of the December deployment decision before negotiations can take place. Any Soviet TNF initiative would be aimed squarely at the US failure to ratify SALT II and be designed to exploit the vulnerabilities represented by the SALT III proviso in the December deployment decision.

B. Iran: Effects of the Shah's death on the internal power struggle. Beheshti's faction is already positioning itself to block any efforts by Bani-Sadr and Ghotbazadeh to use the Shah's demise for another attempt to break the impasse on the hostages.

SECRET