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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

6 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Budget and Fiscal Officer, NFAC

VIA : Chief, Administrative Staff, NFAC  
Contract Personnel Division, OP

25X1 FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

25X1 SUBJECT : Approval of Personal Services Expenses  
for

1. This is to request funding for a one-day consultation, which took place on 5 December 1979.  a member of the Political Science Department at the US Military Academy, briefed Agency and Community persons on his recent visit to the PRC.

25X1 2. Personal services will be paid for at the maximum rate of  plus transportation and other expenses. Income taxes are not to be withheld from the requested compensation.



CONCUR: \_\_\_\_\_  
Chief, Planning, Management & Evaluation Staff Date

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Contracting Officer, OP Date

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

5 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [redacted]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

SUBJECT : East Asia-Pacific Monthly Warning Meeting [redacted]

The following items are suggested for consideration:

1. South Korea -- The general view is that the martial law authorities are doing a good job managing the transition to a new government in Seoul. Analysts noted, however, that much of what has been done thus far has been symbolic or promisory. All agreed that a failure of the leadership to deliver measurable progress toward reform at a reasonable pace could produce a return to serious tension between the government and the opposition. No consensus could be drawn on what a prudent schedule for reform might look like. Some analysts think the leadership must produce concrete results within 90 days, while others suggest the constitutional reform process could take two years. [redacted]


2. North Korea -- The DIA analyst noted indications and warning anomalies in North Korea continue -- diplomatic recalls, drop in training activity, and unexplained explosions along the DMZ -- but the group agreed these were not sufficiently unusual to sound the alarm. [redacted]

3. Japan -- The analysts did not challenge State's representative's thesis that Ohira can probably survive up to the upper house election next summer. The new cabinet is not substantially weaker than past Japanese cabinets, the factional

balance is typical, and there are no tough Diet fights coming up with the possible exception of the budget interpellation. None of the analysts feel a coalition government in Japan is imminent, and several doubted a coalition between moderates and conservatives would make much difference. [redacted]

4. Indochina -- Analysts continued to express concern over the influx of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. One estimate now projects that the total could reach 1.5 million. Everyone was impressed by Vietnamese efforts to consolidate their hold on Western Kampuchea. There was less agreement over the role the Chinese might ultimately play and the ability of the Thais to control the refugees and border area. Difficulties associated with managing the refugee population which covers armed Kampuchean resistance elements that are conducting cross border operations against the SRV, and the creation of a Thai-Vietnamese frontier should the SRV gain effective control of Kampuchea raises policy implications which go beyond supplying food and medicine. Analysts think the danger of SRV forays into Thailand aimed at neutralizing Kampuchean resistance have increased, but they are hard-pressed to project the tactics and intensity of those attacks. Several OSI analysts are now convinced reports that the SRV has used chemicals against Kampuchean forces are true, and a collection program has been initiated to get proof. [redacted]

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(w/Cover Memo)

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National Intelligence Officers

6 December 1979

25X1 NOTE FOR:

25X1 FROM :

National Intelligence Officer  
China-EAP

Herewith is the formal letter from  
State requesting the CIA study on  
Soviet activities in the Southwest Pacific.

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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

7 December 1979

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

The NSC paper and our comments  
(Tab B) and the Memorandum on the  
Refugee Food Problem (Tab F) will  
be provided over the weekend.



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NFAC 6623-79

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

7 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment *for*

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

SUBJECT : SCC Meeting on Kampuchean/Thailand  
Security Situation

1. Action Requested: Review talking points and related materials covering issues to be discussed at the SCC meeting scheduled for 10 December at 1000 hours.

2. Background: Concern has been building up at high levels of the US Government over the problems posed for US policy by the vast influx of Kampuchean refugees into Thailand and by the impending Vietnamese offensive in Western Kampuchea intended to seal off the Thai border and eliminate "once and for all" anti-Vietnamese resistance forces, principally those controlled by Pol Pot but including other lesser forces as well. As you know, we issued an Alert Memorandum on this subject on 7 December. Specifically, its message is that as Vietnamese pressure on the Thai builds, the Thai government will turn to the US for support, possibly invoking the Manila Pact, and also to the Chinese. If in the Thai view neither US or Chinese support is sufficient, they may feel impelled to seek an accommodation with Vietnam. The SCC meeting was called to address these concerns, to review all the political and military factors involved including a possible Chinese role, to discuss the refugee situation and steps being taken to provide relief, and to make recommendations for US policy responses.

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
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3. The agenda for the SCC meeting is attached. As indicated, you will be expected to address: a) the question of the prospects for Thailand/SRV hostility and, b) along with State, the Chinese role. Your talking points on a) follow along the lines of our Alert Memorandum, but go beyond this memorandum to outline some of the constraints operating on Hanoi which would cause it to hold back from launching heavy attacks on Thailand, as opposed to conducting relatively minor border penetrations in hot pursuit of Kampuchean units. (State, in fact, took a footnote in the Alert Memorandum noting that there are as yet no signs that Vietnam intends to attack Thailand.)



6. Under agenda item 6, "New Approaches to Kampuchean Relief," there is a reference to a safe haven concept. State's thought is to get the Vietnamese to agree on the establishment of zones in

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
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Agenda for SCC on Kampuchea/Thailand: Security Situation  
Monday, 10 December 1979

1. Prospects for Thailand/SRV Hostility (CIA brief)
2. Nature of US Security Commitment to Thailand  
(State lead, also DoD)
3. US Response to Additional Thai Request for US  
Military Assistance (DoD)
4. Chinese Role (CIA/State)
5. Status of Kampuchean Relief Efforts (State)
  - Thru Phnom Penh & Thailand
6. New Approaches to Kampuchean Relief (State)
  - Talk re air drop (ZB's idea)



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8. Recommendations

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BRIEFING NOTES

KAMPUCHEA-VIETNAM-THAILAND

Vietnamese troops will soon begin large-scale sweep operations along the Thai-Kampuchea border in an attempt to eliminate Pol Pot and resistance this dry season. Vietnam has some 20 divisions and as many as 200,000 troops in Kampuchea, and one-third are near the Thai border. Vietnamese and Thai gunners have exchanged artillery fire, and a Vietnamese battalion recently entered Thai territory on its own initiative while in "hot-pursuit" of Pol Pot guerrillas. There is tenuous evidence that larger Vietnamese forces could be preparing to drive across the border to attack Pol Pot bases and sanctuaries in Thailand, and this lead to serious clashes with Thai units stationed near the frontier. The eight Thai regiments in the area are no match for the Vietnamese forces.


CHINA-VIETNAM-LAOS

China does not appear to be preparing for a major "second-lesson" against Vietnam, but Chinese troops snipe at Vietnamese patrols, Chinese aircraft overfly the frontier, and logistical activity continues as China keeps the pressure on the Vietnamese. China has strengthened its forces opposite Vietnam but the 10 divisions and 150,000 or so troops are far fewer than were there in February. Moreover, Vietnam has massively augmented its border forces over the past six months and now has 18 to 26 divisions and 200,000 to 250,000 troops in the North. The Vietnamese should be able to handle any Chinese thrust into Vietnam, but they could not stop an attack into northern Laos.

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


### Military Forces and Refugee Concentrations: Kampuchea



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### Military Forces: Sino-Vietnamese Border



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[redacted]

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KAMPUCHEA: Harsh Vietnamese Policies

*The Vietnamese appear to be pursuing policies designed to starve or drive out Kampuchean living in areas controlled by the Heng Samrin puppet government.* [redacted]

25X

Refugees recently arriving in Thailand report that the Vietnamese have been mining rice paddies, forbidding access to fields, and killing Kampuchean attempting to gather ripening rice. Vietnamese forces apparently have also been taking food out of the country and confiscating relief supplies for their own use. [redacted]

25X

The distribution of international relief stocks to Kampuchean is being limited, and Red Cross and UN officials say that large quantities of undistributed food are piling up in Phnom Penh. Other obstacles that the Vietnamese have placed in the way of relief efforts include refusing to permit trucking of supplies from Thailand, limiting air access, restricting the number of international relief personnel in Kampuchea, and curtailing movement of relief officials already in the country. [redacted]

25X

Some 400,000 to 500,000 refugees have fled to the Thai border area in recent months--the highest total ever. Refugees once came primarily from western Kampuchea, but many are now fleeing Heng Samrin - controlled areas in the central and eastern provinces. The refugees report that the same deteriorating food and health conditions exist in those provinces as in the areas controlled by Pol Pot's forces in the west. There are also reports that ethnic Chinese are being segregated and forced out of the country. [redacted]

X1

Expulsion of large numbers of Kampuchean will facilitate Vietnamese efforts to gain total control of Kampuchea and to establish a long-term presence. The presence of Vietnamese agricultural brigades, instructions to Vietnamese military cadre that they would be in Kampuchea for 10 to 15 years, and pervasive Vietnamese control over governmental functions in occupied areas are further indications of Hanoi's intent. [redacted]

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-CIA, DIA, NSA-

Top Secret  
[redacted]  
3 December 1979

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VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA-THAILAND: Border Situation

*Thailand seems to be adopting a firmer defensive posture in regard to the fighting taking place in Kampuchea, and Vietnam is sending reinforcements to the Thai border area.* [ ]

25X

Vietnamese and Thai forces continue to exchange artillery fire across the Thai-Kampuchean border. Thai reconnaissance units continue to monitor Vietnamese troop movements in Kampuchea. [ ]

25X

Vietnamese forces are preparing for larger clearing operations against Pol Pot's resistance forces and other anti-Vietnamese resistance groups in western Kampuchea. Units from Vietnam's 4th Corps are moving westward to reinforce divisions already near the Thai frontier. [ ]

25X

Vietnamese forces--possibly assisted by Soviet technicians--also are building at least one helicopter pad near the border, presumably to support helicopter gunships and resupply missions. [ ]

25X

Pol Pot's units in all parts of Kampuchea are continuing to evade the Vietnamese. Democratic Kampuchean guerrillas isolated east of the Mekong River since last December may be withdrawing westward to sanctuary areas north of the Cardamom Mountains where adequate supplies are available. The two divisions of Pol Pot's forces operating in northeastern Kampuchea have experienced severe shortages of food, medicine, and munitions. [ ]

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Top Secret

2 November 1979

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

THAILAND-US: Security Commitment

*Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak plans to ask the US to clarify and publicize its commitment to defend Thailand in the event of a Vietnamese invasion.* [redacted]

25X

Thai officials believe a major Vietnamese incursion is increasingly likely, and they fear that Hanoi's perception of a lack of US resolve to defend Thailand could encourage such an attack. According to a well-placed source, Kriangsak evidently believes a strong public US warning along the lines of US actions and statements following the death of South Korean President Pak would be the best deterrent. [redacted]

25X

Kriangsak's heightened concern about an invasion follows reports of increased cross-border shelling by the Vietnamese during the past week. On Sunday, Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery allegedly fired on an unarmed Thai reconnaissance plane. The Thai Air Force has been ordered to retaliate in response to future attacks on reconnaissance flights. Kriangsak has also instructed the Army to respond with 105-mm artillery to any new shelling of Thai territory. [redacted]

25X

Vietnam publicly maintains that its forces will not intrude upon Thai territory. In an interview on Tuesday, Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach claimed that Thailand had pledged not to aid Pol Pot and that the Vietnamese would not resort to hot pursuit. He declined to comment on whether he considered these assurances reciprocal. [redacted]

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1 November 1979

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[redacted]

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## BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

THAILAND-KAMPUCHEA: Potential Refugee Flood

*A massive new influx of refugees into Thailand that would overwhelm Thai refugee facilities and severely test Bangkok's recently announced lenient policies toward Khmer refugees may be in the offing.* [redacted]

Reports from various sources estimate there are at least 300,000 and possibly as many as 750,000 refugees along the Thai border inside Kampuchea. They are fleeing a near-total lack of food in western Kampuchea. Continued Vietnamese military operations in the border area would probably drive them into Thailand. [redacted]

Some 150,000 to 200,000 refugees are believed to be in groups inside Thailand but not in organized refugee camps. About 50,000 Khmer refugees are in UN-operated refugee camps, in addition to 145,000 from Laos and 7,900 from Vietnam. [redacted]

The rapid rise in the number of refugees may quickly overwhelm Thai support facilities. Thai and United Nations refugee officials have plans for makeshift holding centers with a maximum capacity of 300,000 persons. Construction has only just begun on some; none are finished. The main center, planned to accommodate 200,000 refugees, has not been started. [redacted]

A massive refugee influx now would test the confidence expressed by Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak in his nation's ability to deal with refugees "in the future" and would aggravate longstanding ill feelings between Thai and Khmer along the border. Some 88,000 Thai living near the border have already been forced from their homes by unsettled conditions. Antagonism will rise if further military activity and more refugees continue to dispossess Thai residents. [redacted] -CIA, DIA, NSA-

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[redacted]

24 November 1979

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  - 25 SWS



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Tab D

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
National Foreign Assessment Center  
28 November 1979

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Airdrop of Food Supplies to Kampuchea

A unilateral airdrop of food to concentrations of refugees in western Kampuchea would provide a dramatic demonstration of US humanitarian and moral commitment. A successful drop along the border, such as in the area north of Sisophon west of Provincial Highway 69 to Phum Thma Puok, would ensure that a significant amount of supplies reached needy individuals who are deliberately being neglected by the Vietnamese and the puppet Heng Samrin government. An airdrop would eliminate the need to work through the Phnom Penh authorities. Channeling aid through the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea would imply defacto recognition and also allow the Vietnamese to use aid as a weapon in their campaign to bring the country under control.

A unilateral airdrop would be vehemently opposed by Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea, however, and could have serious political and military consequences. An operation to supply concentrations of the most seriously stricken refugees would directly threaten efforts to suppress resistance by denying food to Kampuchean outside Vietnamese control. The region in greatest need of relief is also

*This paper, based on information as of 28 November 1979, was prepared by [redacted] East Asia Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis, with contributions from the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Comments and queries should be addressed to the Chief of the Southeast Asian Branch, OPA,*

[redacted]

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
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the area most actively contested militarily at present. An airdrop--or any direct relief effort in this part of the country--is certain to be regarded as a deliberate attempt to aid anti-Vietnamese forces.

#### The Target Area



Some 30,000 Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces are stationed in and around the area. All three Vietnamese divisions there should have some antiaircraft artillery, but the precise location of these highly mobile weapons is not known. Such artillery has been reported at Sisophon and Nimit as well as Samrong to the northeast. The Vietnamese have air surveillance radar installations at Battambang and Siem Reap to detect aircraft crossing the border. We do not know whether they have radar-guided antiaircraft artillery. Radar units at Siem Reap, Battambang, and possibly Sisophon are of a type associated with surface-to-air missiles, and SAM-2's and SAM-3's have been reported in the Battambang and Siem Reap areas. Vietnamese ground units may also be equipped with shoulder-fired SAM-7's. The appearance of US aircraft over Indochina would certainly elicit a strong response from the Vietnamese. Cargo planes would need fighter escort, and losses of US planes and personnel from hostile fire would be likely.

#### Who Gets the Food?

Troops on either side would not hesitate to interdict air-dropped supplies intended for refugees or to seize any food which unarmed civilians might be able to reach first. The probability of violent clashes over the supplies would be high. In a largely forested environment, waste would be great, and there could be no accounting for distribution.

Dropping small, scattered packages of food rather than large pallet loads would increase chances that the food would reach the civilian population. Given the high likelihood of hostility, prospects for continuing an airdrop over an extended period are poor. The odds on success and survival would rapidly diminish after the first few sorties, however.

An alternative and potentially more effective approach would be to make use of the non-Communist Khmer Serei resistance groups that control many of the refugee camps in the western border region. These forces have fairly easy access to markets in Thailand and claim to have distributed some relief on their own already. They could provide a conduit for food at many points along the border, fulfilling the requirement for an operation of limited geographic scope without aircraft. Overt US involvement could thus be kept to a minimum. Nevertheless, any aid program trespassing on Kampuchea runs the risk of inspiring Vietnamese reprisals against the intended recipients.

#### Political Implications

The Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea insists that it alone must distribute all aid. Through conscious design and inherent ineptitude, relief is not reaching the people who need it most. An airdrop in the western border area might solve some of the humanitarian problems, but the Phnom Penh regime will regard such an operation as a violation of its sovereignty.

In a backlash to such unilateral US action, the Heng Samrin government could stiffen its terms for accepting aid which now is being pressed upon it by a variety of international agencies. Aware of this possibility, aid organizations patiently negotiating with Phnom Penh might also oppose the uninvited humanitarian gesture.

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

10 DEC 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs


SUBJECT : Vietnamese Starvation Policy in Kampuchea

The three items attached are in response to your  
request of 6 December 1979 for a discussion of the  
Vietnamese Starvation Policy in Kampuchea and Soviet  
Support of that Policy.

15/

Frank C. Carlucci

Attachments: 3  
As Stated



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8 December 1979

SUBJECT: Harsh Vietnamese Policies in Kampuchea

1. Since their occupation of Kampuchea, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) policies have been to control food supplies to the civilian population and to allow a refugee movement to Thailand. [redacted]

25X1

2. The current constraints to international relief efforts to distribute food to the Kampucheans are a furtherance of earlier actions to deny food. Rice, draft animals, and livestock, as well as dismantled machinery and irrigation pumps, were observed being shipped into Vietnam between January and April. No food rations were distributed after April and the people were left to forage or exist on the small amounts of food they could grow quickly. In October, SRV troops were confiscating rice obtained in house-to-house searches in the western areas of the country and were shipping draft animals out of the country. Recent Kampuchean refugees to Thailand claim that the Vietnamese are mining rice paddies, forbidding access to fields, and killing Kampucheans attempting to gather ripening rice. [redacted]

25X1

3. The distribution of international relief supplies has been limited by the Vietnamese to selected people in and around Phnom Penh; government cadres and workers have received minimal quantities of food. The relief agencies have been hindered in their efforts to mount a food aid program by SRV/PRK refusal to open a truck route from Thailand; by allowing air access only to Phnom Penh; by restricting the number of international relief personnel in Kampuchea (ICRC/UNICEF are permitted only 11 persons in-country); and by curtailing movement of the relief officials already in the country. According to the ICRC officials, there are serious discrepancies between the amounts of food aid delivered and the amount actually distributed. [redacted]

25X1

4. The increased flow of refugees to the Thai border camps in the past few months attests to the miserable conditions affecting the majority of the Khmers. Some 725,000 people are in the Thai camps and most of them have arrived since October (see photos G, H). Refugees once came primarily from western Kampuchea, but many are now fleeing Heng Samrin-controlled areas in the central and eastern provinces. The refugees report that the same deteriorating food and health conditions exist in those provinces as in the areas controlled by Pol Pot's forces in the west. No harassment by SRV troops is reported by the refugees as long as war zones are avoided. [redacted]

25X1

5. Most of the Khmers in Kampuchea are clustered around Phnom Penh and in camps surrounding the cities and towns east of the Mekong (photos A through F). The people are denied access to housing in the cities and are consequently forced to live in makeshift shelters or flee to Thailand. Refugees from these

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X1 camps indicate that although they had heard that food aid was available, they knew of no one who had actually received the food. While some food is undoubtedly available to people concentrated around the cities, people in the countryside apparently have no food. The choice for them is to either head towards Thailand, locate in a camp where the Vietnamese are supplying food, or starve. Furthermore, the lack of basic farming provisions, the disrepair and breaks in irrigation dikes, and insecurity in the countryside make prospects bleak for the individual farmer to be able to grow enough food for subsistence. [REDACTED]

6. Harsh Vietnamese policies toward the Khmers are probably designed to facilitate efforts to gain total control over Kampuchea and to establish a long-term presence. By restricting the remaining Khmers to camps around the cities, the Vietnamese are able to exert better control over the population. The Vietnamese recruit farmers from the camps to work on collective farms as part of production solidarity teams, a hated concept to the Khmers after the four years of Pol Pot control. The presence of Vietnamese agricultural brigades and instructions to Vietnamese military cadre that they would be in Kampuchea for 10 to 15 years are further indications of Hanoi's intent. [REDACTED]

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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10 December 1979

SUBJECT: The Soviets and Kampuchean Relief

1. The Soviets are supporting the Vietnamese in their efforts to deny food aid to the opponents of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea and have been unyielding in their opposition to the notion of establishing a "land bridge" relief effort through Thailand. US and other Western demarches to the Soviets to encourage greater Hanoi/Phnom Penh cooperation with international relief efforts have met the rebuff that the issue is an internal affair that must be handled with the Phnom Penh authorities. The Soviets are somewhat more sensitive than the Vietnamese to the negative international repercussions of Vietnamese policy toward Kampuchea, however, and will find it more difficult to oppose or frustrate the "safehaven" concept. But Moscow is unlikely to approve any UN Security Council mandate to establish a permanent UN presence along the Thai-Kampuchean border. [redacted]

X1

2. Graphic evidence of the Soviet support of the Vietnamese food denial policy was provided by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in a conversation with Counselor Nemetz at the State Department on 15 November. Dobrynin said that although the "Kampuchean and Vietnamese" were Marxists they had their own brand of "Oriental Communism" and would do things in their own way. Dobrynin emphasized that we would have to accept the fact that there was a war on, and that the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh forces would do nothing to strengthen the remnants of the Pol Pot forces, even if this meant suffering for thousands. [redacted] (See State Cable #298308, dated 17 November 1979.)

X1

3. The Soviets are, of course, not opposed to international relief for the Heng Samrin regime. In fact, they probably are being truthful when they maintain that they pressed the Vietnamese and their Kampuchean allies to accept international relief. For one thing, whatever the West provides, the Soviets themselves would not have to. For another, acceptance of some international relief might mitigate the damage to broader Soviet and Vietnamese interests in Asia caused by the notoriety of Hanoi's food denial policies. Finally, there is the chance that cooperation with international relief efforts might enhance the Heng Samrin regime's international standing and result in additional recognitions by other governments. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
TOP SECRET

X1 4. Moscow has responded to international criticism of its own indifference to the suffering of the Kampuchean people by providing some details on the extent of its aid to Kampuchea thus far this year. The most detailed account was contained in a TASS broadcast in English on 21 November, echoing a Phnom Penh claim that the Soviets had provided about \$100 million in economic assistance that included 159,000 tons of food. US embassies in Moscow and Bangkok question whether Soviet food deliveries of this magnitude have reached Kampuchea.

X1 5. The International Red Cross (ICRC) chief in Phnom Penh told Ambassador Abramowitz on 3 November that as of that date Moscow had delivered only 18,000 tons of foodstuffs and 50 trucks for the Kampuchean relief effort -- a figure consistent with what we know of Soviet shipping to Kampuchea. Soviet relief supplies have been entering the country via the ports of Kompong Som [redacted] and Phnom Penh and the airport at Phnom Penh. [redacted]

X1 6. Activity at Kompong Som has picked up at recent days; between 5 December and 8 December five additional cargo ships have arrived. One of these was identified as a Soviet "Skulptor" class roll-on/roll-off ship carrying some 100 vehicles/pieces of equipment. No personnel or military equipment was discernible in the port area. Some half dozen Soviet freighters have called at Kompong Som over the previous three months. Moscow has also dispatched dockworkers from four Soviet Far Eastern ports to Kompong Som to help unload supplies [redacted]

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8 December 1979

SUBJECT: The Agricultural Situation in Kampuchea

1. Information current as of late October-early November indicates that very little land in Kampuchea is currently being cropped and that agricultural activity of any kind is at a virtual standstill. The absence of agricultural activity in key cropping areas, at a time when the main rice crop should be maturing, offers convincing evidence that Vietnamese and Heng Samrin government statements concerning the amount of land currently planted to rice are grossly exaggerated.

2. About nine percent of Kampuchea's farmable land -- which can be immediately planted to crops -- now is being cultivated.\* About one-third of this cultivated land is planted to rice and another third possibly growing rice. The remaining land is either devoted to other crops or is in a non-growth stage of agricultural activity, such as harvesting. In aggregate terms this suggests that land now planted to rice amounts to between 65,000 and 112,000 hectares -- far less than the 550,000 to 570,000 hectares claimed by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin government officials. In more normal times, approximately 1.1 to 1.2 million hectares would be in rice at this time of the year.

3. Signs of normal agricultural activity are minimal or absent throughout the country: there are few draft animals available; irrigation canals and drainage ditches are often clogged with silt or mud; and dike walls have broken down. In places where crops are being grown, they are almost always limited to fields in or immediately adjacent to villages while more distant fields are left uncultivated.

4. Regionally, agricultural activity is most extensive in the southeastern portion of Kampuchea where control by the Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese forces is best established. Even here probably only 12 percent of the farmable land is being cultivated. Near Phnom Penh and in the area south of the capital only about 5 percent of the farmable land is cropped. The situation is worse in the northwestern portion of the country where Vietnamese forces are still fighting with Pol Pot's guerillas and Free Khmer forces. Here less than 3 percent of the farmable land is being cultivated.

5. Since the main Kampuchean rice crop is normally harvested during the December-February period, the small amount of land now in cultivation indicates that only a very meager harvest can be expected. This would provide enough rice to last 2 to 5 weeks -- supplies that probably would be consumed

\*Farmable land constitutes only about 65 percent of all land that might be cropped. The remaining 35 percent consists of fields not readily available for planting because of flooding and damage to dikes, drainage ditches, and irrigation canals.

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as soon as they come off the fields. Using the crop area figures claimed by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin government officials would provide rice sufficient for 3.5 to 5.5 months.

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All of the above paragraphs are classified TOP SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET RUFF~~

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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

12 December 1979

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central  
Intelligence

Attached for your information are my  
notes from the 10 December 1979 SCC meeting  
on Thailand/Kampuchea Security Situation.



NIO/China-EAP

cc: DD/NFA  
DD/NFAC  
DDO

Distribution

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N10/Ch-

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

13 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Publications Review Board

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM : [redacted]  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer  
for China

SUBJECT : Request to Submit Article for Publication

1. I request permission to submit for publication the attached articles entitled: a) [redacted]

[redacted]

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2. When approved, [redacted] intends to submit the articles for publication in China Quarterly.

3. The versions of these articles herewith submitted were produced based on research from open sources in this country, Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong. They were prepared prior [redacted] investigation of classified material in Agency archives. None of the material is therefore classified.

25

4. [redacted] is not under cover. He intends to identify me and I presume the Agency as facilitating work on this project and he may indicate Agency funding of the project. He will append, if appropriate, the standard disclaimer indicating the views expressed are his own and not those of the Agency.

2

[redacted]

Attachments (3)  
As Stated

SUBJECT: Request to Submit Article for Publication

25X1 AUTHOR'S NAME:

TITLES OF PUBLICATION:

I have reviewed the attached articles, to the best of my knowledge have found them to be unclassified, and approve them for publication.

25X1

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

23 DEC 1979

Date

25X1 CONCUR:

*W*  
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

26 DEC 1979

Date

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

13 December 1979


Dear Ty:

Thanks for the materials on SALT II, which I have read with interest (and agree with in many respects). I would be happy to hear from you concerning further discussions of issues of concern to us all.

Also, let me turn your kind offer to be helpful around -- please call on us for any assistance which we may be able to render.

It was good to meet you, and best regards.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a black border, used to redact the signature of the sender.

National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

Mr. Tidal W. McCoy  
Assistant for National Security Affairs  
Office of Senator E.J. Garn  
5121 Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

E. J. (JAKE) GARN  
UTAH

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5121 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
TELEPHONE: 202-224-5444

JEFF M. BINGHAM  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:  
APPROPRIATIONS  
BANKING, HOUSING AND  
URBAN AFFAIRS  
INTELLIGENCE

December 6, 1979

25X1 [redacted]  
National Intelligence Officer  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC

25X1 Dear [redacted]


The program on "The Future of Sino-Soviet Relations" was most interesting, and I enjoyed the opportunity to visit with you. The kind of thinking represented by the discussion is most useful to those of us who are running around "putting out fires".

I hope to call you soon for a lunch and chat. If I or Senator Garn can be of help to you or the Agency, please call upon us.

For your information, I am enclosing some materials on the SALT II Treaty.

With best wishes for a Happy Holiday Season.

Sincerely,

  
Tidal W. McCoy  
Assistant for  
National Security Affairs

TM/nf  
Enclosure

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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

14 December 1979

NOTE FOR: Michel Oksenberg  
NSC Staff

Attached are the documents we discussed  
this morning.

  
NIO/China-EAP

2

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Date

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As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

#### REMARKS

*more of the same - but from yet another out-post!*

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Room No.—Bldg.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM :   
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

SUBJECT : SCC Meeting on Kampuchean/Thailand  
Security Situation, 18 December 1979

1. Action Requested: Review talking points and related materials covering issues to be discussed at the SCC meeting, which is scheduled for 18 December at 1000 hours.


2. Background: This SCC meeting is a follow-up to the 10 December meeting on the same subject. At the 10 December session and at a subsequent Working Group discussion on 11 December a number of issues requiring further action were identified and reflected in the Agenda for 18 December.

3. You will be asked to provide an assessment of the latest developments, and State will also be asked to comment. Your talking points are at Tab A.



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REVIEW ON DEC 99



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5. The rest of the agenda deals with means of deterring greater Vietnamese pressure on Thailand, as follows:

a. Development of safehaven concept. State is asking a number of countries to make unilateral declaration favoring safehavens into which refugees could be moved without fear of Vietnamese attack, and to gain Waldheim's support as well. State continues to favor as a step toward safehavens the disarmament of all Kampuchean resistance forces located in refugee camps north of Aranyaprattet (the Pol Pot forces to the south would not be touched because of the "Chinese connection"), but appears to overlook the fact that among these units are a growing number trained by the Thai with Chinese backing. Neither the Thai nor the Chinese want to impair the ability of resistance forces to block the Vietnamese from consolidating control over Kampuchea. There are, though, some armed units led by people best described as "crazies."

b. Increasing flow of food supplies into Kampuchea. State will talk about relief efforts inside Kampuchea and through Thailand. There may also be discussion of a proposal to airdrop supplies to refugees inside Kampuchea or send high visibility truck convoys through Thailand to the border. OGCR has provided you with imagery and descriptions of improved port and transportation facilities in Kampuchea which could improve distribution of relief supplies. Soviet help has been evident, e.g., in providing trucks. However, it is important to note that if these improvements could benefit the distribution of refugee aid, they will also strengthen Vietnam's logistical support for operations against the DK and other Kampuchean resistance forces, including those based in Thailand. At Tab D are the OGCR items and an OCO item pointing out the logistical importance of these same developments to Vietnamese military operations.

c. US responses to Thai requests for aid. State will review what is being done, which involves stepped-up military assistance as well as economic help.

d. Approaches to Hanoi. State has been maintaining intermittent contact with the Vietnamese in New York and elsewhere and may bring the SCC participants up-to-date.

e. Approaches to the PRC. State and Defense will discuss what position on Thailand/Kampuchea/Vietnam, if any, Secretary Brown should take on his visit to China.

f. Pressures on Moscow. The President has sent a letter to Brezhnev concerning the "dangerous situation which now exists on the Thai-Kampuchean border," which points out the grave threat to peace posed by Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, notes that the US could not remain indifferent to an expansion of the conflict due to our close relationship to Thailand and obligations under the Manila Pact, and urges Brezhnev to use his influence with the Vietnamese to ensure that their troops do not again violate Thai territory. This letter is at Tab E. State may review the possible Soviet reaction and any further actions contemplated.

g. Approaches to ASEAN. We have been in consultation with the ASEAN countries to help keep them united and their spines stiffened against Vietnam. An ASEAN Foreign Minister's declaration of 14 December indicates they are still holding together on the joint demand for a withdrawal of all "foreign forces" from Kampuchea. They have also called for a UN team to visit the Thai-Kampuchean border area and for an international conference on Kampuchea. Foreign Minister Rithauddeen of Malaysia will visit Hanoi to discuss resolution of the situation. However, the Indonesians are wavering (they fear China more than Vietnam) and there is some pessimism among other members over Pol Pot's chances of survival coupled with some feeling that Pol Pot should be replaced by a leader more acceptable to world and Kampuchean opinion -- a move opposed by the Chinese. State will discuss. At Tab F is an OPA item on this subject.


h. Other US Actions. Defense will review our military assets in the region and possible steps to improve our position.

6. The meeting will close with recommendations and decisions on further moves to deal with this situation.

7. To recapitulate, your talking points and other materials for the SCC meeting are as follows:

Tab A -- Talking Points keyed to Agenda Item 1.

Tab B -- NSC Paper on Kampuchea/Thailand Situation with our Comments



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Tab E -- Text of Presidential Letter to Brezhnev

Tab F -- ASEAN Foreign Minister's Statement and OPA Commentary

Tab G -- Minutes of the 10 December SCC Meeting.

Tab H -- OSR Conclusions



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**SECRET**

**Agenda for 18 December SCC Meeting on Thailand-Cambodia Situation**

1. **Assessment of latest developments (CIA and State) (U)**
2. **Means of deterring development of greater pressure on Thailand**
  - a. **Development of safehaven concept (State)**
  - b. **Increasing flow of food supplies into Cambodia (State)**
  - c. **US responses to Thai requests for aid (State)**
  - d. **Approaches to Hanoi (State)**
  - e. **Approaches to the PRC (State and Defense)**
  - f. **Pressures on Moscow (State)**
  - g. **Approaches to Asean (State)**
  - h. **Other US Actions (Defense) (S)**
3. **Recommendations (U)**

[REDACTED]  
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TALKING POINTS SCC MEETING

1. The situation along the Thai/Kampuchean border remains tense as the Vietnamese continue preparations for their offensive in western Kampuchea expected to begin 22 December.

-- According to intercepted communications, the Vietnamese plan to send reconnaissance patrols into Thailand to identify resistance concentrations and supply routes.

[REDACTED] DK headquarters has been moved deep inside Thailand. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
 -- Thai units in the border area have serious manpower and supply problems and could not counter a serious Vietnamese attack.

-- The Thai would like the UN to station civilian teams in the refugee enclaves in hopes this would help deter a Vietnamese attack.

II. An unconfirmed report [REDACTED] states that Khieu Samphan has replaced Pol Pot as Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea.

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-- If true, such a change would be cosmetic only, intended to facilitate efforts to form a united front and to make the DK more palatable to international supporters such as ASEAN.

-- The ASEAN foreign ministers reconfirmed their diplomatic support of the DK at a meeting last Thursday, but behind the scenes, some ASEAN leaders are suggesting it is time to consider alternatives such as Sihanouk or another non-Communist leader.

III. Refugee reports confirm earlier indications that the Vietnamese are using food as a weapon to pacify Kampuchea.

-- The Vietnamese distribute minimal food even in areas they control and prevent shipments to other areas.

-- Refugees believe supplies are being diverted to Vietnamese military

units.  
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NSC Paper has not yet been  
received.

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Tab D

Relief Aid to Kampuchea

X1 The ports of Phnom Penh and Kompong Som, and the Phnom Penh airport are the only entry points open to western relief assistance [redacted] Approximately 10 ships have called at Kompong Som since early December, and the amount of equipment in open storage has increased markedly. Most of the ships have been Soviet freighters, and much of the cargo appears to be trucks, small vehicles, and other bulk items. Ships that have arrived over the past several days were unloaded promptly. Earlier reports indicate that the warehouses in Kompong Som and Phnom Penh are nearly full and that 80 to 90 percent of all aid received is still in storage. As of December 7 over 20,000 tons of rice, supplied by international relief agencies, has been delivered to Kompong Som, and 2,500 tons to Phnom Penh. The recent arrival of large numbers of trucks should ease the movement of relief supplies to other areas of Kampuchea. [redacted]

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TOP SECRET [redacted]

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VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Logistic Activity

*Vietnam, with Soviet assistance, is improving its capability to provide logistic support to its forces in Kampuchea, especially in areas west of the Mekong River.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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the Vietnamese have reopened a portion of the rail line between Phnom Penh and Sisophon. The railroad, which had been unusable since the Vietnamese invasion, will improve Hanoi's ability to move bulk cargo and large quantities of supplies to central and western Kampuchea. In early September the Vietnamese opened the rail line between Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. [Redacted]

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The railroad improvements will enhance Vietnam's capability to distribute foreign relief to western Kampuchea; there is no indication to date, however, that the Vietnamese intend to do so. The rail system passes through contested areas and could be interdicted by Pol Pot's forces. [Redacted]

X1

The Vietnamese have been using trucks and Soviet aircraft to move military hardware. Soviet merchant ships recently delivered nearly 500 motor vehicles--including jeeps, buses, and trucks--to the port at Kompong Som. [Redacted]

X1

Fighting is continuing along the Thai-Kampuchean border. According to a recent Vietnamese military report, the Vietnamese are planning to form a 20-man combat team to go into Thailand, possibly opposite the Preah Vihear area of Kampuchea, and lay 400 to 500 mines. The Vietnamese are building several helicopter pads along the Kampuchean side of the border and are clearing obstacles at the Tonle Sap Airfield. [Redacted] -CIA, DIA, NSA-

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[Redacted]

17 December 1979

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting

*The communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after their meeting Friday in Kuala Lumpur attempted to convince Vietnam that ASEAN is united in opposing its actions in Kampuchea while agreeing to open a dialogue with the Vietnamese to seek a solution.* [redacted]

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Malaysian Foreign Minister Rithauddeen was delegated to visit Hanoi to discuss resolution of the Kampuchean situation, which the Foreign Ministers noted jeopardizes the stability of the entire region. The ministers supported Thailand's request for a UN team to visit the Thai-Kampuchean border and called for implementation of the UN resolution to convene an international conference on Kampuchea. The communique acknowledged that the ASEAN states have always had reservations about Kampuchean leader Pol Pot's regime, but said that withdrawing recognition of his government would be tantamount to approving foreign military intervention. [redacted]

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Reports of growing pessimism about Pol Pot's chances by Thailand and other ASEAN members had suggested that the Foreign Ministers might recommend changing diplomatic support to another resistance leader. Thailand reportedly planned to propose backing Son Sann, leader of a non-Communist resistance group along the Thai border, but Singapore strongly favors Prince Sihanouk, whom the Thai flatly oppose. This disagreement plus concern that other states might consider abandonment of Pol Pot as de facto recognition of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime probably explains the compromise language of the communique. Any erosion of ASEAN diplomatic support would encourage other Third World states to switch recognition to Heng Samrin. [redacted]

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The Foreign Ministers probably also hope the communique will discourage Hanoi's attempts to sow dissension among them over Kampuchean policy. Vietnam has been trying especially to cultivate Indonesia, which is the least happy with ASEAN policy in Kampuchea because it aligns the group with China. Jakarta's overwhelming interest in strengthening ASEAN, however, will probably keep it from breaking ranks publicly. [redacted] -CIA, DIA, NSA-

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17 December 1979

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TAKE 1--ASEAN STATEMENT

BANGKOK RADIO CARRIES 14 DEC STATEMENT BY ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS

BK151104 BANGKOK DOMESTIC SERVICE IN THAI 0530 GMT 15 DEC 79 BK

("APPARENT TEXT" OF 14 DECEMBER JOINT STATEMENT BY ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS FOLLOWING MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR--READ BY ANNOUNCER)

(TEXT) ASEAN'S JOINT STATEMENT:

1. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HELD AN INFORMAL MEETING KUALA LUMPUR ON 14 DECEMBER 1979 AND EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA AND THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER AREAS AS WELL AS CONSIDERED ASEAN'S EFFORTS TO HELP WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNGENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 43/22 DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1979 ON THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA. THEY EXCHANGED VIEWS ON ASEAN COOPERATION AND OTHER ISSUES OF COMMON CONCERN INCLUDING THE PROBLEMS OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.

2. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR GRAVE CONCERN OVER THE GROWING SERIOUSNESS OF THE FIGHTING IN KAMPUCHEA, PARTICULARLY THE SITUATION ALONG THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER, AS INDICATED BY INCREASING ARMED INCURSIONS OF FOREIGN FORCES AND CROSS-BORDER SHELLINGS INTO THAI TERRITORY. THIS HAS HEIGHTENED TENSION, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE AREA OF THE FIGHTING ALONG THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER, CAUSED THE INFLOX OF 120,000 KAMPUCHEAN INTO THAILAND WHILE OTHER 600,000 ARE MASSING ALONG THE BORDER WAITING TO ENTER THAI TERRITORY AND RESULTED IN THE DISPLACEMENT OF ABOUT 80,000 THAI PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMES ALONG THE BORDER.

ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE SITUATION ALONG THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER GRAVELY JEOPARDIZES THE PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE WHOLE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION.

3. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS CALLED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSION AND TO PREVENT INCURSIONS AND EXPANSION OF THE AREA OF FIGHTING WHICH MAY OCCUR IN THE FUTURE. AN INCREASE IN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA WILL BE BENEFICIAL TO THE SITUATION ALONG THE BORDER. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED TO SUPPORT THAILAND'S REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A DELEGATION TO THAILAND AND INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS RELIEF PERSONNEL ALONG THE THAI SIDE OF THE BORDER WITH KAMPUCHEA.

SECRETARY GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES IN THEIR EFFORTS TO GIVE URGENT RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO ALL THE NEEDY PEOPLE WHO ARE AFFECTED BY THE FIGHTING IN KAMPUCHEA. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT RELIEF AID HAD NOT REACHED THE HANDS OF THE RECIPIENTS AT WHICH IT WAS AIMED. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS CALLED UPON THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO URGENTLY FIND EFFECTIVE WAYS TO DISTRIBUTE THE RELIEF SUPPLIES TO ALL OF THE NEEDY KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND URGED ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO FULLY COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

5. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THE ASEAN JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED IN BANGKOK ON 12 JANUARY 1979, AGREED TO WORK ACTIVELY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN KAMPUCHEA AND EMPHASIZED FULL SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA WHICH REGULATES A WIDE FRAME FOR THE SOLUTION TO THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM AND, PARTICULARLY, CALLS FOR THE END OF THE FIGHTING AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT ON THE BASIS OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA, SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE AND NONINTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

6. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ALSO DECIDED TO INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN KAMPUCHEA WHICH WILL RESTORE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND FREEDOM IN KAMPUCHEA. TO ACHIEVE THIS, ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, THEREFORE, CALLED UPON THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION INCLUDING THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA.

7. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ALSO AGREED TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH CONCERNED COUNTRIES TOWARD ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN KAMPUCHEA. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY REQUESTED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF MALAYSIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ASEAN STANDING COMMITTEE, VISIT HANOI AND INDICATE THAT ASEAN IS PREPARED TO HAVE DIALOG WITH THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

(MORE)

15 DEC 1208Z BCS/KK

FBIS 32

TAKE 2 OF 2--31 (ASEAN STATEMENT)

//REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM;

(TEXT) 8. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAVE ALWAYS HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT POL POT AND HAVE MADE THIS CLEAR IN THEIR STATEMENTS. THEY STATED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA AS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DID IN ITS RECENT 34TH SESSION. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO APPROVING THE ACT OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE IMPOSITION OF A REGIME WHICH IS SUSTAINED BY FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES WHICH WILL OBSTRUCT EFFORTS TO SEEK A LASTING POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM. IN THIS CONTEXT, ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE FAR-SIGHTED STATEMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND TO CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA.

9. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS STRESSED THAT THEY, IN CALLING FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IN KAMPUCHEA, WERE MOTIVATED SOLELY BY THEIR DESIRE TO INSURE THAT ALL COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ENJOY PEACE AND STABILITY, BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, NONINTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES AND FREEDOM FROM SUBVERSION OR COERCION BY OUTSIDE POWERS. THEY STRESSED THAT THEIR GOAL IS TO MAKE SOUTHEAST ASIA FREE FROM EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE OR INVOLVEMENT IN THE RIVALRY OF MAJOR POWERS WITHOUT TAKING SIDES WITH ANY PARTY OR MAJOR POWER.

10. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES COMING OVERLAND INTO THAILAND HAS BECOME MORE SERIOUS AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUED FIGHTING IN KAMPUCHEA. THE FOUR ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED WITH THE THAI GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OPEN-ARMS POLICY BASED ON HUMANITARIANISM. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVED THAT LAND REFUGEES SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR HOMELANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND CALLED UPON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS ORGANS TO GIVE ASSISTANCE OF ALL KINDS TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THEY FURTHER URGED THE SETTLEMENT COUNTRIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO INCREASE AND SPEED UP THE RETURN OF REFUGEES.

11. ON THE PROCEED OF THE VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS NOTED THAT VIETNAM IS COOPERATING IN TACKLING THE PROBLEM AT ITS SOURCE. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT VIETNAM WOULD CONTINUE TO COOPERATE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. THEY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE SETTLEMENT COUNTRIES AND FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE UNHCR TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WHICH ARE INTENDED TO BRING AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE PROBLEM SO THAT ASEAN WILL NOT HAVE TO SHOULDER IT. THEY ALSO URGED THE SETTLEMENT COUNTRIES TO SPEED UP THE INTAKE OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS FROM ASEAN COUNTRIES.

12. ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE DELEGATIONS OF INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE AND THAILAND EXPRESSED THEIR SINCERE THANKS TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA FOR THE WARM HOSPITALITY AND THE EXCELLENT PREPARATIONS WHICH MADE THE MEETING PROCEED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY.

KUALA LUMPUR, 14 DECEMBER 1979.

(ENDALL)

15 DEC 1227Z BCS/KK

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Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5

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Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5



**Top Secret**  
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# Vietnamese Plans for a December Offensive on the Thai-Kampuchean Border

An Intelligence Memorandum

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

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Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000200180001-5

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**Vietnamese Plans for a  
December Offensive on  
the Thai-Kampuchean Border** [Redacted]

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**Summary**

Vietnam's military forces are poised for a new stage in their military operations in Kampuchea. Approximately 75,000 Vietnamese troops equipped with armor and artillery are deployed along the full length of the Kampuchean border with Thailand. They appear to be preparing for a full-scale, coordinated assault against at least 10,000 Pol Pot and other resistance forces in the border areas. [Redacted]

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In a strategy designed to minimize Thai response, Vietnamese forces will probably launch a series of simultaneous, shallow attacks across the border to envelop concentrations of resistance forces and destroy stockpiles of supplies. [Redacted]

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Although the total eradication of anti-Vietnamese forces is unlikely, the projected campaign against their strongholds on both sides of the Thai-Kampuchean border is likely to greatly weaken these forces, making further resistance far more difficult. [Redacted]

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<sup>1</sup> Figures for anti-Vietnamese troop strength are rough estimates only. Precise information is presently unavailable.

*This memorandum was prepared [Redacted] Eastern Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research. It was coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the Office of Imagery Analysis, and with the National Intelligence Officers for Warning and for China - East Asia and Pacific. Information available as of 17 December 1979 was used in its preparation. Questions or comments should be directed to Chief, Eastern Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research, telephone [Redacted]*

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**Vietnamese Plans for a December Offensive on the Thai-Kampuchean Border**

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**Background**

Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea have stepped up their military operations against Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean (DK) and other resistance forces since the end of the rainy season in late September. While Hanoi has not deployed additional divisions from Vietnam for this year's offensive in Kampuchea, the 20 to 22 People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) infantry divisions already in Kampuchea have been strengthened by fresh troops, antiaircraft and field artillery, and armored vehicles. Three naval brigades, an AAA brigade, an armored brigade, and an engineering division swell the Vietnamese military strength in Kampuchea to approximately 200,000 men.




Pol Pot's DK forces, estimated to total about 20,000 men, have been ordered to disperse into small units to wage their guerrilla war against PAVN supply routes and outposts throughout Kampuchea. To counter DK tactics, PAVN units have conducted widespread sweeps of the countryside at the company level. In addition, Hanoi has resorted to a strategy of food denial designed to weaken and subjugate the civilian population and prevent guerrilla units from receiving local support.




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This combination of increased military pressure and famine conditions has fostered a general westward movement of a large portion of the Khmer population toward the Thai border. Almost 750,000 refugees have already crossed into Thailand, and another quarter of a million are camped on the Kampuchean side of the border ready to cross if fighting intensifies.




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Although DK elements remain active throughout Kampuchea, the largest concentrations of anti-Vietnamese forces are in the Thai-Kampuchean border area. The 5,000 to 10,000 hardcore DK troops there have established an uneasy truce with several thousand non-Communist guerrillas in an attempt to direct a collective effort against the Vietnamese.




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In terms of equipment, the guerrillas are clearly no match for the heavily armed PAVN units opposing them in the border areas. Although resistance forces are reportedly well provided with small arms, the 82-millimeter mortar remains the largest caliber weapon in their arsenal. The anti-Vietnamese groups have had to rely for survival on mobility, knowledge of the terrain, and the sympathy of the local population.



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[redacted]

Some Khmer units have crossed the border into Thailand along with the flood of civilian refugees and have established base camps on Thai territory. Despite official statements to the contrary, the Thai Government accepts the presence of armed elements among the refugees, facilitates the delivery of international relief supplies to these camps, and continues to assist in delivering Chinese weapons and ammunition to Khmer insurgent groups. The Thai reportedly are also trucking DK troops along the border for reinsertion into Kampuchea at strategic locations. [redacted]

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**PAVN Strategy  
Since the End  
of the Rainy Season**

Aware of the importance of the "Thai connection" to Khmer resistance groups, the Vietnamese have increasingly deployed their forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border. By early October, the 59th, 75th, and 72nd PAVN Infantry Divisions (subordinate to Front 479) had taken up forward positions in immediate border areas to the west and northwest. After the forward headquarters of Military Region 5 was airlifted to the vicinity of the Preah Vihear Temple in mid-October, units of the PAVN 307th Division moved into positions along the border in the north. [redacted]

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With the 950th Naval Brigade operationally responsible for the southern tip of the border, PAVN units now form a chain along the nearly 800 kilometers of the Thai-Kampuchean border. Regiments of the four infantry divisions have fanned out and have set up base camps to maintain operational control over their designated sectors of the border. Units were also instructed to build defensive fortifications, to lay mines along the border, and to eliminate gaps between areas of operation by linking up with other units. This stage of deployment has largely been completed. Current PAVN sweep operations and training activities occur around fixed base areas. [redacted]

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In November, the Vietnamese began sending additional troops toward the border. Defectors reported the deployment of the PAVN 4th Division to northern Koh Kong Province with orders to meet units moving south from Battambang. Communications intercepts indicated that the 341st Division was scheduled to travel northwest from Pursat to Battambang, while the 73rd Division would move from central Kampuchea to Siem Reap. Although these units have not yet been confirmed in their new locations, their indicated destinations suggest that the Vietnamese are positioning them as a backup tier of forces along the border. [redacted]

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Many PAVN infantry divisions in the border area are overstrength. The 75th Division, for example, contains five infantry regiments (each with 1,500 men), instead of the standard three, plus a border defense regiment


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### PAVN Deployments Toward Thai-Kampuchean Border, September-December 1979



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(1,500), an artillery regiment (800), an armored battalion (500), and a headquarters component with eight support battalions (300 men each). These additional units bring the division total to about 12,700 troops. The 72nd Division is about the same size, whereas the 59th and 307th appear slightly smaller at about 10,000 each. The three additional divisions moving westward (8,000 men each), plus a naval brigade at the southern tip of the border, would bring total PAVN strength in western Kampuchea to about 75,000 troops. [redacted]

### Plans for a December Offensive

For several weeks, Vietnamese military communications throughout Kampuchea have been referring to a new mission scheduled to begin around 22 December, the anniversary of the establishment of the Vietnamese Army. Many PAVN divisions in central and western Kampuchea have been directed to study and prepare for a "December Mission." One division, currently scheduled for redeployment, has been ordered to train for the "new situation mission plan" and to restrict its regiments to their existing areas of operation "until the last minute." Crack troops of IV Corps, only recently active in southwest Kampuchea, have been instructed after 16 December "to regroup into compact forces in preparation and on standby for yet another mission which is on the heels of this one." Rumors have circulated about high-level military strategy planning sessions in Kampuchea purported to involve Soviet advisers. [redacted]

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Political rhetoric in the PAVN reportedly has reached a magnitude not heard since the original Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea a year ago. During the month of November, PAVN political cadres held widespread meetings in Kampuchea to discuss the "22 December Mission," and in early December high-level military officials were called back to Ho Chi Minh City for a major political conference. Political directives have included a general call for greater solidarity in carrying out duties as well as specific references to the need to achieve 100-percent effectiveness and security in communications. A three-minute limit on long-distance calls in Kampuchea is to be imposed between 16 and 23 December. [redacted]

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Although the stepped-up offensive in December will affect all areas of Kampuchea, the most intense military action is likely to occur along the border with Thailand. Since the end of the rainy season, all major deployments of PAVN troops have been toward the western border regions, where the major concentrations of DK and non-Communist resistance forces are now located. [redacted]

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In a parallel move, Hanoi is steadily improving the logistical network in western Kampuchea. Soviet AN-12 cargo flights from Tan Son Nhut in Vietnam to Battambang and Siem Reap airfields increased dramatically in November. Satellite photography shows that the railroad yard at Sisophon has reopened. This rail line links Poipet, Sisophon, Battambang, Pursat, and Phnom Penh, although only certain sections may currently be operational. The recent construction in forward border areas of five permanent helipads suitable for MI-6 and MI-8 transport helicopters significantly improves Vietnamese abilities to resupply frontline troops. [redacted]

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Vietnamese communications suggest that the three divisions of Front 479 will bear the brunt of the December offensive in the west. The front's forward headquarters is reported to be moving from Siem Reap to the border area around Sisophon in order to maintain tactical communications with its divisions, which will be "on the move." [redacted]

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**Limited Cross-Border Operations**

The buildup of Vietnamese forces near the Thai-Kampuchean border, coupled with Hanoi's stated goal of crushing the Khmer resistance groups during the current dry season, strongly suggest that PAVN troops will deliberately move across the border in December to attack guerrilla encampments in Thailand. [redacted]

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Although the Vietnamese command appears to have hitherto discouraged spontaneous pursuit of DK forces by PAVN troops, reconnaissance patrols have regularly operated in Thai territory. Most recently, Front 479 ordered all subordinate divisions to complete reconnaissance on enemy "corridors, storage areas, command posts, and artillery positions" on the Thai side of the border and report all information to the front headquarters by 20 December. [redacted]

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During the coming offensive, Vietnamese forces will probably move across the border at the regimental level or below in a series of simultaneous drives to envelop the resistance forces based in Thailand, despite the proximity of some resistance groups to large refugee settlements. Individual regiments will probably launch multiple attacks from their current dispersed positions along the border. There have been no indications of troops massing for a single large-scale thrust against Thailand. The fact that the 59th, 75th, and 72nd Divisions have been operating under a coordinated command structure for some time will enhance their prospects for success in carrying out simultaneous small-scale attacks along a wide front. [redacted]

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Troop activities reported by PAVN forces in the border areas have been consistent with a projected move into Thailand. These include studying the "December Mission," improving communications, engaging in weapons drills, securing transportation routes, and pacifying rear areas by registering and indoctrinating the local population. The 75th Division has reported it is training for "mobile" operations, building bridges, constructing a new transportation route, and resurfacing an existing gravel road "to military standards." [redacted]

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PAVN battalion-level operations in recent weeks have focused on locating and cutting guerrilla supply routes in the border areas. The Vietnamese took particular pains to capture a major border-crossing point at Ban Laem, north of Pailin. While serving the immediate purpose of interdicting supplies destined for resistance forces within Kampuchea, the securing of such routes and points will also facilitate expected PAVN cross-border operations. [redacted]

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The 59th, 75th, and 72nd PAVN Divisions are equipped with armored vehicles which could enhance the speed and strength of the upcoming incursions into Thailand. Although the terrain is difficult, the Thai have already carved a military road along much of their border, and this could be used by Vietnamese engaged in shallow incursions. [redacted]

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The heaviest fighting is likely to occur along a 160-kilometer stretch of border from south of Pailin to north of Poipet. Vietnamese troops are deployed in great strength in this region, four of the five frontline helicopter resupply zones are located along this stretch, and several main-force DK units— numbering at least 4,000 troops—are known to be operating out of Thailand in this area. [redacted]

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The Vietnamese will probably bring in tactical air support for the December ground offensive. A mobile forward controller was reportedly deployed to western Kampuchea in November. In a possible related action, Vietnamese F-5 and A-37 aircraft conducted training in ground attack techniques at a target range in southern Vietnam in late November. If deployed to the front, the 13 older MIG-19s located at Pochentong Airfield outside Phnom Penh would probably be used in a ground support role. There have been no deployments of Vietnamese MIG-21 interceptors to Kampuchea. [redacted]

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Although Hanoi has strongly criticized the Thai for their continued and ostensibly growing support for anti-Vietnamese armed groups, the Vietnamese probably will refrain in the short run from launching a punitive attack

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[redacted]

directly against the weak Thai forces in the border region. External conditions inhibiting a major Vietnamese offensive into Thailand include the focus of world attention on the refugees in the Thai border area, the reiterated (although unclarified) promises of the United States and China to aid Thailand in the event of invasion, and the growing tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border to the north. For similar reasons, the USSR, which has been the principal source of Vietnam's military equipment and supplies, probably would not support an invasion directed against the Thai at this time. [ ]

The projected Vietnamese strategy appears designed to minimize Thai military response. Small-scale, shallow moves to envelop guerrilla encampments would not differ significantly from the instances of hot pursuit by PAVN troops that have already taken place. To date, Thai Army units on the border have fired artillery rounds to deter Vietnamese encroachment but appear to have deliberately avoided ground engagements. The 12,000 Thai troops deployed north and south of Aranyaprathet remain so dispersed along the border opposite the PAVN 59th and 75th Divisions that they would have to regroup significantly in order to counter a single Vietnamese thrust. Thai units in other border areas are even more thinly deployed. The expected simultaneous attacks by PAVN units along a wide front would give the Thai no time to regroup and no single target to repulse. [ ]

A report from Thai sources predicts that the Vietnamese will announce the limited nature of their military objectives in advance to the Thai, with a warning not to grant sanctuary and a suggestion that the Thai push the resistance forces back into Kampuchea during the upcoming major sweep operations. Recent reports indicate that the Thai are increasing their efforts to separate combatants from civilian refugees, who are to be moved to holding areas back from the border. It is highly unlikely, however, that Thailand will aid the PAVN operation by any direct military action against the Khmer camps. Nevertheless, there is a real danger that small Thai units already in the immediate border area may be caught up in the action as the Vietnamese offensive unfolds. [ ]

### Prospects

While in Thailand, the Vietnamese can be expected to uproot base camps, destroy supply caches, and entrap as many resistance forces as possible. PAVN troops remaining in Kampuchea during the December offensive will be in position to attack guerrilla remnants attempting to recross the border. Vietnamese attention in recent weeks to restricting movement and otherwise controlling the Kampuchean population in border areas will make it difficult for surviving guerrillas to reestablish support relationships with local villagers. All Vietnamese troops involved in the Thai operation are likely to

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[Redacted]

return to their prepared positions along the full length of the Thai-Kampuchean border, continue sweep operations as necessary, monitor border-crossing points, and maintain a ready posture for some time. [Redacted]

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A Soviet diplomat in Bangkok recently hinted to an Asian colleague that Hanoi hopes to declare victory over all resistance forces by 7 January, the first anniversary of the capture of Phnom Penh. Although the total eradication of anti-Vietnamese forces is unlikely, the projected campaign against guerrilla strongholds on both sides of the Thai-Kampuchean border is likely to greatly weaken the resistance movement, both by the destruction of military units in the border area and by the further interruption of supply lines from Thailand to anti-Vietnamese remnants in the interior of Kampuchea. [Redacted]

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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

18 December 1979

NOTE FOR: NFAC Registry

25X1

FROM :   
NIO/China-EAP

SUBJECT : NIO Reading Board

1. What ever happened to the weekly publication Aviation Week and Space Technology in the NIO Reading Board in 7 E 62? The last issue available is for 26 November.

2. I find the publication very useful in keeping up with aerospace developments affecting the EAP region in general and China in particular. Quite frequently information is available which has not been reported from other sources, e.g., Chinese negotiations with the UK on the Harrier.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry  
79-8903/1

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

14 Dec 1979  
*File*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : SNIE 42/14.2-79: North Korean Reactions  
to Instability in the South

1. Action Requested: Your approval of the Draft SNIE on North Korean Reactions to Instability in the South.

2. Background: The SNIE was requested by Dr. Brzezinski on 14 December 1979 with a deadline of 20 December. Final working level coordination is due by close of business 19 December, and we plan to coordinate telephonically with NFIB principals tomorrow morning in order to meet the deadline.

3. Recommendation: That you approve the attached Draft SNIE.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

APPROVED:

*[Handwritten Signature]*

Director of Central Intelligence

20 DEC 1979

Date

1. Fine.  
2. Lto.  
3. shouldn't we add # on how likely we are to detect massive attacks in advance?  
(Don't delay publication, but add as addendum)

[Redacted Signature Box]

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NFAC 6885-79

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

118 DEC 1979

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14

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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[Redacted Signature]

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

APPROVED:

H/S  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

12-19-79  
Date

[Redacted Box]

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Chuvos*

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

21 December 1979

15

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : John H. Holdridge  
National Intelligence Officer  
for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Meeting for East Asia Pacific

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1. The December monthly warning meeting for East Asia and the Pacific was cancelled inasmuch as the recently completed Alert Memorandum on Kampuchea and the Korean SNIE distributed on 20 December were considered to have covered the warning problems in that part of the world.

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2. You or your representative are cordially invited to attend the January warning meeting for East Asia Pacific in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters, at 1400 hours on Wednesday, 23 January. Please provide the name of your representative to  by COB 22 January.

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NIO/USSR-EE  
NIO/PE  
NIO/SP  
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NIO/WE  
NIO/NP  
NIO/SS  
D/OCO  
DD/OCO  
D/OCR  
D/OER  
D/OGCR  
D/OPA  
D/OSI  
D/OWI  
D/OIA  
D/OSR  
NFAC/RES/RSG  
OER/EAP  
OPA/EA  
C/DDO  
DDO/EA  
DDO/EA  
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NITO  
FBIS  
OIA/LFD  
OSR/EAP  
NFAC/REG



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Date

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As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

Since this manuscript was approved for publication by Mr. Hineman, it is not necessary that it be reviewed by the PRB.

Acting Exec. Sec.  
PRB

28 December 79

*Such a disclaimer as discussed in PRB is an essential part of approval for publication and should be included.*

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