

Tab

1

[Redacted]

STA

2

Paper by [Redacted] dtd 1 Feb
Subj: Input to DCI Worldwide Brief on Thailand

3

Paper by [Redacted] dtd 1 Feb
Subj: Input on South Korea to DCI Worldwide Brief

4

Memo to DCI from JHH, dtd 1 Feb
Subj: Ltr from DCI to [Redacted] (NFAC 0845-80)
(DCI's ltr to [Redacted] signed 8 Feb)

5

Note to OWI, OSI, OER, OPA, & OSR from JHH, dtd 4 Feb
Subj: Disseminating [Redacted] from his China trip

6

Note to DD/NFA from JHH, dtd 7 Feb
Subj: Re [Redacted] paper [Redacted] to do)

7

Alert Memo, dtd 8 Feb
Subj: Threat of Military Counteraction in South Korea [Redacted]

8

Note to CAR from JHH, dtd 8 Feb
Subj: Request from Rand to receive "China Review"

9

[Redacted]

10

Memo to DCI from JHH, dtd 12 Feb
Subj: NIE 56-1-80, The Philippines (NFAC 1055-80)

11

Ltr to [Redacted] from JHH, dtd 13 Feb
Subj: Re his expenses incurred in Dec 79

12

Note to [Redacted] from JHH, dtd 14 Feb
Subj: Transmitting Note on Maps

13

Memo to DD/NFA from JHH, dtd 15 Feb
Subj: Senior Review Panel Comments on Final Draft on
NIE 56-1-80, The Philippines (NFAC 1171-80)

14

Memo to C/NIC from JHH, dtd 15 Feb
Subj: NIE Item on South Korea

15

Memo to C/NIC from JHH, dtd 15 Feb
Subj: Korean Situation

16

[Redacted]

STA

- STAT Tab
17 Handwritten note to [redacted] from JHH, dtd 15 Feb
Subj: Hours spent in preparation of Worldwide Brief
- STAT 18 LDX to Armacost from [redacted] dtd 19 Feb
Subj: PRC Economic & Military Assistance to Pakistan
- STAT 19 LDX to [redacted] from JHH, dtd 20 Feb
Subj: Unsigned memo to D/DIA on NIE on Warning in Korea
- 20 Memo to NFIB Principals, from [redacted] dtd 21 Feb
Subj: NIE 56-1-80: The Philippines: A Difficult Road Ahead STAT
- STAT 21 LDX to [redacted] dtd 22 Feb
Subj: Text of Memo from Seoul
- 22 Note to the Director from JHH, dtd 25 Feb
Subj: Input on Thai-Kampuchean for DCI Worldwide Brief
- 23 Warning Memo from JHH, dtd 26 Feb
Subj: Warning Assessment for China-East Asia Pacific [redacted] STAT

STAT

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 80-3307/1

8 Feb 80

25X1



I much appreciated receiving your report of your visit to China last August and found it to be of great interest in providing a feel for the state of Chinese technology in a number of critical military-related areas. I will see to it that your report is given to our analysts who cover these matters, but I hope that it will also be possible for you to meet directly with some of them in Washington for a follow-up when you find it convenient to take the time.

Yours,

H

STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1



Distribution

Orig - Addressee

✓ 1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - DD/NFA

1 - C/NIC

2 - NIO/China-EAP

1 - NFAC Registry

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

4 February 1980

NOTE FOR:

FROM : [REDACTED]
NIO/China-EAP

The attached report from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is the result
of his trip to China last August. We have
asked him to spend some time with us to
discuss his trip the next time he is in
this area.

Copies sent to

OWI

DSI

DER

OFA

OSR



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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

7 February 1980

NOTE FOR DD/NFA

STAT

You asked whether we could get out
[redacted] Defense Paper in
another format. We will discuss contracting
that project with [redacted] when she
returns from her Southeast Asian trip on
18 February. The original research is a
document of about 260 pages. We share
OPA's view that she might be interested in
the project. She plans to retire at the
end of the month.

STAT

STAT

[redacted]

NIO/China-EAP

SECRET

0562-80

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

25X1

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

17 January 1980

NOTE FOR: NIO/China-East Asia/Pacific

1. I have read into the draft of the NIE on [] Defense Policy and I think you have some work to do. Neither the message nor the way of saying it seems to me to be up to NIE standards. The paper needs greater clarity, economy of words, and elaboration of some of the key points. Before you go to the Community for coordination, I recommend a careful redraft, taking into consideration the comments of the Senior Review Panel.

25X1

2. I have never thought this ought to be an NIE. It always has seemed to me more suitable for my understanding of what we mean by an IIM and this draft doesn't alter my view of that.

25X1

[]

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

cc: Chairman, NIC
Senior Review Panel

SECRET

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

8 February 1980

NOTE FOR:

FROM :

[REDACTED]
NIO/China-EAP

I would appreciate any thoughts as to
[REDACTED] request to be placed on the
distribution list of "China Review" and
also to provide access to classified
materials to [REDACTED]

25X1

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

12 February 1980

25X NOTE FOR [REDACTED]

25X FROM: [REDACTED]
NIO/China-EAP

Attached for your information is a
25X copy of a research paper done by [REDACTED]
on "Political Trends in Taiwan." The report
should be administratively controlled to
protect sources.

9

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

13 February 1980

STAT

[Redacted]

My belated thanks for your presentation here in Washington -- I had been waiting to hear from you on your expenses and when this particular jog to my memory didn't come through I'm afraid things got lost in the shuffle. Anyway, I know that the analysts appreciated the insights that you gave them on the PRC military and allied matters, as did I. We all are very grateful for the time and effort that you put into coming down here.

STAT

[Redacted]

On your expenses, let us know how much you spent and we will reimburse you as promptly as we can. You can send the details to me, and I will take care of them.

I assume that the Gloom Period up your way is beginning to end, and that just a little bit of light is now appearing in the sky at reveille. I wish the same could be said about the world scene in general.

All the best to you and your wife.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

STAT

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

12 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM :
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : NIE 56-1-80, The Philippines: A Difficult
Road Ahead

25X1

The attached copy of the Estimate on the Philippines has been approved by the NFIB Representatives. I request your approval to place it on the NFIB agenda at an early time.

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

DERIVATIVE CL BY Signer
 DECL REVW ON Feb 2000
DERIVED FROM Multiple

Distribution

1 each - DCI

DDCI

ER

DD/NFA

C/NIC

NIO/China-EAP Chrono

NIO/China-EAP File

NFAC Registry

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

14 February 1980

NOTE FOR:

I have called this to
attention and asked him to tell us precisely
what it is that they want. With this
information in hand, I will arrange to
obtain the necessary maps. agreed.

WIO/China-EAP

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)
Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	X (for para 2 action)			
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	NIO/CH	X (for para 1 action)			
19	C/EA/DDO		X		
20	PB/NSC		X		
21	ES		X		
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

→ CH

Executive Secretary

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

15 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM :
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Senior Review Panel Comments on Final Draft on
NIE 56-1-80, The Philippines

REFERENCE : Memo from SRP, dated 14 February 1980,
Same Subject (NFAC 1132-80)

25X1

1. I have noted the Senior Review Panel's comments on the final draft of NIE 56-1-80, and I disagree. As I understand it, the Key Judgments are not intended to provide a full discussion of all the issues involved (else what's a discussion section for?) but only the conclusions which would be of interest to US policymakers. Moreover, my own reading of the Key Judgments versus the discussion does not indicate the degree of disparity noted by the SRP.

2. The recent Philippine elections were certainly not a conclusive factor in the ongoing trend of Philippine political developments, and accordingly it was not considered either necessary or desirable to highlight them in the Key Judgments.

13



cc: SRP

ORIGINAL CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON FEB 00
All Portions of this

NFAC 1132-80
14 February 1980

Memorandum for DD/NFA

Subject: Senior Review Panel Comments on Final Draft
on NIE 56-1-80, The Philippines, dated
12 February 1980 (NFAC 1055-80)

1. The estimate represents careful research and the Discussion presents balanced estimative judgments.

2. We believe, however, that the Key Judgments are less balanced. While they reflect the main analytical conclusions on the weaknesses of the Marcos regime and on the opposition, the Key Judgments do not adequately represent the Discussion on the regime's strengths and achievements. The reader who reads only the Key Judgments is therefore likely to get a skewed impression.

3. We also wonder whether the Key Judgments should not refer at least briefly to the recent elections which the Discussion covers in para 53.

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cc: C/NIC
NIO/China-EAP

ALL PORTIONS ARE
CLASSIFIED SECRET

SIGNERS
XX 14 Feb 1986

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

15 February 1980

Dear Ed:

25X1 I am delighted that you can participate in our seminar [redacted] and we are set on April 10 and 11, which was your second suggestion. My staff is at work on arrangements and program and we will be back to you with more details in a week or so.

Any suggestions on subjects which in your opinion should be covered will be most welcome.

Warm regards, and I'm looking forward to seeing you.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

16

25X1

15 February 1980

NOTE FOR:

Regarding Dick Lehman's call at yesterday's NIC staff meeting for statistics from each NIO on the amount of time that you and your assistant(s) spent on Congressional support during January and February, reports that each of you spent roughly an hour and a half in one joint session with the DCI on 21 or 22 January in preparation for Round One in the Worldwide briefing. (This does not include, of course, any time you may have spent one-on-one with the DCI earlier or later.) Please provide me with figures for (a) hours spent by you and your assistant(s) on the Worldwide briefing exercise; and (b) hours spent in any other Congressional work for those two months. Thanks.

29 Jan All Afternoon 4 hrs.
30 Jan Morning (most of day) 5 hrs.
6 Feb Morning (3/4 of day) 6 hrs.

15 hrs.

Drafting 8 hrs.

DCI pro-brief $1\frac{1}{2}$ hrs.

24 $\frac{1}{2}$ hrs.

LDX TO: Michael Armacost
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs
Room 6208
Department of State

632-3368

19 February 1980

From:

[Redacted]

Assistant NIO for
China
7 E 62
CIA Hqs

[Redacted]

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18

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20 February 1980

25X1 LDX TO:
DIO/East Asia & Pacific
Room 2 C 2238, The Pentagon
695-0416

From:
Assistant NIO/China-EAP
CIA Hqs

Please LDX Via

CIA Rep, NMCC

4 19

CONFIDENTIAL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : NIE on Warning in Korea

25X1 1. As you will remember, our attempt to do a Korean Warning NIE
in 1978 was overtaken by events when the order of battle reassessment
occurred. [redacted] then DIA/DE, and Bob Bowie exchanged cor-
25X1 respondence on the subject last spring in which it was agreed that we
would begin the NIE as soon as the Pre-H Hour Scenario Study was far
25X1 enough down the track to give us something to work with. I subse-
quently wrote you in November, communicating my view that we were far
enough along to get started. [redacted] responded to my letter in
early December, expressing his view that we should wait until the
collection analysis phase of the Scenario Study is complete, probably
this spring or early summer. [redacted]

2. My concern is that if we wait to start the NIE until after
completion of your collection assessment, our consumers will be with-
out a community warning judgment until late in the year. Since our
understanding of necessary North Korean preparations is already good,
based in large part on the DIA Scenario Study, I believe we can, and
should, get started on the NIE now. [redacted] 25X

25X1 3. I have reviewed the draft of the Korean Scenario Study and am
impressed with the exhaustive analysis reflected therein. It provides
a solid foundation on which to build. The study represents only one
case, however -- a premeditated 60 day preparation to attack. While
plausible, this scenario is but one end of the spectrum. It is the
best case from a warning viewpoint, and I am concerned that, if not
counterbalanced, it might imbue our consumers with unwarranted op-
timism. [redacted] 25X

[redacted]

25X1

25X1
5. I agree with [] letter in which he pointed out the perceived shortcomings of NIE 4-1-78. We must not allow the Korean Warning NIE to be suspect because of a lack of supporting analysis. I believe, however, that our understanding of how the North Koreans might go to war, at least in the case of a deliberate buildup, is far enough along that we can proceed. Hopefully, those steps necessary to prepare for a reactive, flat-footed attack are imbedded in the 60 day scenario. []

25X1
6. In any case, I propose we undertake now to:

- Obtain community approval of a concept paper;
- Draft and negotiate terms of reference;
- Develop a second scenario;
- Begin drafting the NIE.

25X1
Phase II of the DIA Scenario Study, the collection assessment, should proceed in parallel. []

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

21 FEB 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: NFIB Principals

SUBJECT : NIE 56-1-80: The Philippines: A Difficult
Road Ahead [REDACTED]

1. The attached draft National Intelligence Estimate, The Philippines: A Difficult Road Ahead, has been authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence for consideration by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. [REDACTED]

2. The NFIB meeting will be held in early March 1980. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

Attachment
NIE 56-1-80

Distribution A

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON FEB 86
Derived from Multiple

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

25 February 1980

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

In addition to the analysis set forth in the accompanying NID article, with which I agree, I would add that if the Vietnamese military forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border penetrate deeply into Thailand and/or engage in a major clash with Thai army forces along the border, Kriangsak's problems would be greatly compounded.



NIO/China-EAP

25X

22 February 1980

LDX TO: NMCC LDX Pentagon

From:

[Redacted]

Assistant NIO/China-EAP
7 E 62, CIA

[Redacted]

Please call on receipt
and pass directly to

[Redacted]

(695-0257), Room 2 C 238

25X1

3/

dated 23 Feb 80

Classified

THAILAND: Political Crisis

Prime Minister Kriangsak's recent decision to raise energy prices has sparked a series of antigovernment demonstrations which could further undermine his government. [redacted]

Kriangsak raised fuel and utility rates by 24 to 60 percent, aggravating an already high rate of inflation and further eroding the standard of living of the average Thai. Labor and student groups have organized a series of peaceful rallies protesting the price hikes and calling for Kriangsak's resignation; the demonstrations are attracting growing numbers of people. [redacted]

The Prime Minister's attempt last week to reverse waning confidence in his regime by reorganizing his cabinet has had little effect. Kriangsak's political opponents hope to exploit public dissatisfaction to further their cause and have called for a vote of no-confidence against him. He hopes to survive the challenge by retaining a majority in the Senate, which is composed primarily of military officers appointed by the Prime Minister. [redacted]

Kriangsak's ability to survive depends largely on the continued loyalty of Defense Minister Prem, who also heads the Thai Army. Prem ostensibly harbors no political ambitions of his own, but he has indicated that he would assume power if Kriangsak were incapacitated or if he believed Thai national security were endangered. If antigovernment protests lead to widespread civil unrest, Prem may come under pressure from the military to step in. [redacted]

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 February 1980


MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : [redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment for China-East Asia
Pacific

1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of the Community views expressed at the China-East Asia Pacific warning meeting. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the participants but is being circulated among them.

2. You or your representative are cordially invited to attend the February warning meeting for China-East Asia Pacific in Room 7 E 62, CIA Headquarters, at 1400 on Wednesday, 19 March. Please provide the name of your representative to [redacted] by COB 18 March.



Attachment
As Stated

Distribution

- State - Mr. Robert Drexler
- Air Force - Maj. Wally Astor
- Army - Col. Jack Churchill
- Navy - Cdr. Robert Cyboron
- DIA - [redacted]
- Treasury - Mr. Arthur Long
- SWS - Mr. John Bird
- NSA - [redacted]

Attachment contains
SI Material

DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON FEB86
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE

SECRET

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
 National Intelligence Officer for Warning *SI/*

FROM : [Redacted] *for*
 National Intelligence Officer for China-EAP

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: China-East Asia Pacific

The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives at the 20 February Warning Meeting.

Sino-Soviet

[Redacted]

2. It was assumed that the Chinese were providing assistance to the Afghan rebels, but they were not telling us what they were doing in this regard. The Soviets were closely watching presumed Sino-US collaboration in aiding the rebels and were alleging the US was playing the "China card," but were not stressing this issue. Chinese arms aid to Pakistan was continuing, with 15 MIG 19s recently delivered (not 16 as reported in last month's Warning Memorandum); it was anticipated that further Chinese assistance would be discussed when Zia visited China later this year. The Chinese were capable of making modest increases but could not supply high-technology items; they were, in fact, looking to the US in this regard and were exhorting us to make our own aid to Pakistan worthwhile. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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25X1

3. As a consequence of the Afghanistan situation and Chinese involvement in helping Pakistan, the Chinese were attempting to improve their relations with India and to assure the Indians that the Sino-Pakistan relationship did not constitute a threat to them. [REDACTED]

China Internal

4. In discussing the implications of Deng Xiaoping's 16 January speech, analysts were in general agreement that Deng has succeeded in reestablishing political momentum since the beginning of the year and was now tackling in more direct fashion the question of the leftists within the Party. It was noted, however, that leftist influence persisted, as evidenced from the contrast between Peoples Daily editorials in early February stressing the need for stability and unity within the Party and a 5 February Peoples Daily "Commentator" article saying in effect that stability and unity could not be achieved unless those who undermined the Party line were removed. [REDACTED]

5. It was pointed out in addition that although recent personnel shifts in the provinces and in Beijing had appeared to bring into greater prominence a number of supporters of Deng Xiaoping, leftists were still in place in senior positions in Fujien and in the Northeast; Han Xianchu, a presumed leftist in command of the Lanzhou Military Region, had also just been named to the Military Control Commission. (A possible compromise was indicated by the simultaneous appointment of three supporters of Deng to the MAC.) [REDACTED]

6. Some analysts suggested that Deng had also reached a critical point in his relations with those who, while not disagreeing with his policy objectives, wanted to take a more conservative route. Given the fact, though, that Deng's line on modernization as established at the 3d Plenum of December 1978, appeared to have become firmly established, the possibility was raised that Deng may have made some trade-offs with the more conservative elements (e.g., by backing away from "big character posters") to assure their support. [REDACTED]

7. Altogether, the chances of a donnybrook appeared to analysts to be remote. Nevertheless, personnel and leadership problems persisted. More light should be shed on this issue at the Party Plenum which began several days after our meeting. [REDACTED]

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TOP SECRET

Indochina

25X1



11. The question of Soviet logistical support for the DRV was addressed. Two of the SU-7 aircraft provided by the Soviets had now been assembled, and the Soviets evidently were also providing the Vietnamese with the 300 km. SCUD missile -- an addition which would certainly be of concern to the Chinese. On the other hand, Soviet logistical support flights by Soviet aircraft (which had stopped entirely in mid-January) had resumed at a level of less than half of what had been the previous norm. The reason for this reduced level of flights remained obscure, and any relationship to the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was considered problematical. In physical terms the Soviet military presence in and around Vietnam was reported

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as being at a high level: 13 ships operating in the South China Sea, some of which had touched at Danang; two TU-95s conducting surveillance missions, and for the first time, two TU-142 antisubmarine aircraft, all out of Danang. The first visit by a Soviet combat vessel (an AGOR) to Ho Chi Minh City had occurred in this period. [redacted]

25X

12. No change had been observed in the force structures of the respective protagonists on each side of the Sino-Vietnamese border; approximately 250,000 Vietnamese troops vs 200,000 Chinese. [redacted]

25X

North Asia

25X

[redacted]

14. Analysts see the North still committed to following up on its initiative to reopen talks with the South to exploit a difficult period of political adjustment in Seoul after Pak's death. North Korean I&W indicators were judged normal although analysts noted that in February, for the first time in over two years, two DPRK Air Force exercises included offensive as well as defensive operations. [redacted]

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[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

Distribution for

- Copy 1 - DCI
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- 9 - NSC Coordinator
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- 13 - NIO/GPF
- 14 - NIO/USSR-EE
- 15 - NIO/PE
- 16 - NIO/SP
- 17 - NIO/LA
- 18 - NIO/WE
- 19 - SA/NP
- 20 - D/OCO
- 21 - DD/OCO
- 22 - D/OCR
- 23 - D/OER
- 24 - D/OPA
- 25 - D/OSR
- 26 - D/OGCR
- 27 - D/OIA
- 28 - D/OSI
- 29 - D/OWI
- 30 - NFAC/REG/RSG
- 31 - OER/EAP *JJP 4631*
- 32 - OPA/EA
- 33 - C/DDO/EA

34 -

35 -

36 -

37 -

38 - NITO

39 - Ch/AF/FBIS

40 - FBIS

41 - OIA/LFD

42 - OPA/EA/CH

43 - OER/EA/CH *DC*

44 - OSR/EAP

45 - State (Drexler)

46 - Air Force (Astor)

47 - Army (Churchill)

48 - Navy (Cyboron)

49 - DIA

50 - Treasury (Long)

51 - SWS (Bird)

52 -

53 - NSA

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