


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THE
Forrestal
DIARIES

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to do and he would ultimately be in the hands of the Chiefs of Staff, which, I said, was my impression of what the Army wanted. . . .

Taft's son was in the Navy and he showed considerable knowledge of what I meant when I talked about the easy assumptions of the Army regarding control of the sea.

Regarding Air—I told him that the development of the Air arm was probably the most uncertain of all in modern war; that the phrase "guided missiles" was a misnomer because the missiles were not guided and it looked like a long time before they would be. When they were fully developed it would be a question then whether the airplane became a guided missile or the guided missile an airplane. Senator Taft said he would be here continuously from now on and we agreed that we would talk again before the first of the year.

[The diary records no further details of the unification discussions until January 3. Forrestal came away from the Cabinet meeting that day with Secretary Patterson.

3 January 1947

Cabinet Meeting

. . . Judge Patterson rode back with me from Cabinet to the Navy Department. He said he was much disturbed in the growing evidence of bitterness between the Services and mentioned the fate of the Japanese Army and Navy, referring particularly to a book by Kato. He said that if the Army and Navy officers went down to testify in a mood of bitterness and hatred, they would do serious damage to the Services and the national defense. I replied that he was simply stating what I had stated right along, that unless the two Services were honestly and thoroughly back of a plan for integration and coordination, it would not be successful. In fact, it would produce the opposite of the result we were after.

I told him that I had discovered a depth of feeling in Naval Aviation which had been very surprising to me—that it was not merely a question of the battleship admirals and the older men but of the younger ranks of officers—which had impressed me as quite dangerous. I told him that it came from various seg-

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ments of Naval Aviation who remembered that they had had to fight hard *within the Navy* to get recognition and *outside* of it to retain their independence against the assaults of the Army Air Forces.

Patterson said he was not rigidly or stubbornly committed to any one plan, that he was quite willing to be flexible on the question of roles and missions, and that everything that was done heavyhandedly or without the freely given support of the officers of all Services would not be successful. His concluding remark was "they must have the attitude that they're all truly brothers in arms."

I told him that was precisely the attitude of Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Ramsey and both had been at great pains to prevent the growth of bitterness within the Navy, and that I knew the President and he and I could rely on their efforts to create precisely the atmosphere which he indicated. But I said it was difficult to create such an atmosphere when we had such speeches as were made by General Armstrong at Norfolk, some excerpts from which I quoted to him.

He spoke highly of Admirals Nimitz, Ramsey and Sherman. The whole conversation was in an entirely different key and tenor than any talk I've ever had before with Patterson. He said he had not paid much attention to the conversations that Symington had had with Norstad and Sherman.

[This "new key" was evidently productive of results. Forrestal's appointment calendar over the next couple of weeks shows numerous meetings which must, from the persons present, have been devoted to unification, and on January 11 the whole day was given over to the subject. But there was no further diary note until January 16.

16 January 1947

Unification

Admiral Sherman, Symington and Norstad agreed today on the final draft of the letter [to be signed by the two Secretaries] reconciling the Army and Navy views on the integration of the Armed Services. Talked to Clark Clifford at the White House, who wanted to make an immediate release,

but I insisted that that not be done until I had an opportunity to inform the principal Navy friends in the House and Senate—Senators Robertson, Byrd, Tydings, Brooks, Russell and Austin, ex-Chairman Vinson of the Naval Affairs Committee, Cole, etc., in the House. I said this was desirable not merely from the standpoint of the Navy's obligation to these men, but also by way of enlisting their sympathetic cooperation in the future.

The documents were released to the newspapers at 6:00 p. m.

[These documents recorded a climactic milestone in a long, arduous and earnest effort. One, the joint letter from the two Secretaries to the President, was in the form of a sequel to their joint letter of May 31, 1946,⁸ in which they had reported disagreement on four important points. They were now completely agreed on all aspects of the proposed legislation. Their recommendations—calling for a single Secretary of Defense with coordinating powers, for a National Security Council, a smaller War Council, a National Security Resources Board, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a command structure headed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—in general accorded with the principles for which Forrestal had begun to search in the middle period of the war and which he had since so firmly argued for and upheld. It was agreed that the allocation of specific roles and missions among the three proposed Services should be dealt with not by law but by executive order, and a second document presented an agreed draft for such an order. Here the wording was less exact, although again the draft order represented an acceptance, in the main, of Forrestal's and the Navy's position. The Navy was given primary responsibility for its own land-based reconnaissance and patrol aircraft and the Marines were accorded primary responsibility for the techniques of amphibious warfare.

For Forrestal it was a very considerable success; but it was not, as he well knew, a final victory. The newspaper reaction on January 17 was highly favorable; but it remained actually to draft a bill and get it through Congress. "It is," Forrestal noted in his

⁸ See pp. 164-65.

[diary on the 17th, "most important that this drafting work be watched very carefully. I think we still have to face continued efforts on the part of the Army to enforce their conception of a single Department and a single Chief of Staff, each of which, in my opinion, would be disastrous." As it turned out, the bill was finally passed in midsummer in substantially the recommended form. The sound and satisfactory division of roles and missions was, however, to prove a more obstinate question; the draft executive order, clothed in the vagueness common to most products of compromise, was insufficient to settle the intricate problems involved, and, as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal was to find himself still struggling with them nearly two years later.

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[A few days before Christmas Forrestal entered a note in his diary that sheds an interesting light not only on the President but on Forrestal himself, and on the relations between the two men.

20 December 1946

The President

Last night the President came to dinner with Secretary of State Byrnes, Averell Harriman and a few others. Before dinner I showed him a copy of the *New Republic*, which I said I was going to give Jimmy Byrnes for Christmas. In it was a caricature of Senator Taft with a picture of his father in the background. Senator Taft and his father were represented in a caricature fashion. The President laughed at the caricature of Senator Taft but expressed himself that it was not in good taste and an impropriety to caricature an ex-President who is dead.

(I make note of this because it served to strengthen the impression I have had of the President's traditionalism and his sense of the importance of sustaining the dignity of government. His remarks to the Commission on Universal Training this morning reflected much of the same feeling, plus a deep and obviously very sincere devotion to the government and the people of the country.)

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inevitably that Britain's collapse meant the collapse of the rest of Europe. . . .

[. . . They were wrestling, as the summer waned, with many issues, doubts, possibilities, uncertain future considerations. At this moment, however, real and immediate crisis suddenly loomed, a crisis that was to propel Forrestal himself into his new office.

15 September 1947

Italian Peace Treaty

The Italian Peace Treaty became effective today. A line between Yugoslavia and Italy was originally determined by a crayon drawing on a map. When surveying parties undertook to establish this line in precise fashion it was found that it would go through the middle of cities and villages. A resurvey was ordered, the result of which, territory-wise, was disadvantageous to the Italians. American Ambassador Dunn [James C. Dunn, Ambassador to Italy] telephoned the State Department that adherence to this line was against the national interests of Italy, that it could be used to great advantage by Togliatti, the Communist leader, and probably would mean the fall of the De Gasperi government. Army people replied that any attempt to alter the line at this late date would almost inevitably result in fighting, with the strong possibility that American troops would be projected into the middle of it with obviously unforeseeable consequences. State then said it would adhere to the original line but made it clear that it was a War Department decision. The War Department people refused to accept this responsibility, saying that they were merely acting as transmitters of the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State Department, to the effect that the consequences of war had to be considered a possibility if the line was altered. The State Department finally agreed to accept the JCS paper in this spirit.

[Here was a vivid example of just that kind of disconnection in policy which the new defense structure had been devised to overcome. That real dangers were involved was apparent before the day was out.

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15 September 1947

Admiral Wooldridge

Wooldridge [Rear Admiral Edmund T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations] came in to see me this evening to say that the State Department had just had a message from Ambassador Dunn to the effect that Yugoslavia informed General Lee [Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, commanding Mediterranean Theater of Operations] that they proposed to occupy Trieste. Lee, after consultation with Ambassador Dunn, who in turn communicated with the State Department, replied that if they did he would resist with all the force at his disposal.

I asked Wooldridge to check with Admiral Nimitz on the wisdom of concentrating our naval forces—with particular reference to the aircraft carrier *Leyte* which is now at Smyrna.

I talked to Under Secretary Lovett of the State Department, who confirmed the information I had received from Wooldridge. He said the State Department was lodging a note of protest to the Yugoslav government in Belgrade. I asked him whether the British were taking parallel action. He said he assumed that they would because half of the troops in Trieste, although under Lee's command, were British. . . .

[President Truman at the moment was returning on board the U. S. S. *Missouri* from a visit to Brazil. As the crisis developed it seemed essential that the Secretary of Defense should assume his office.

16 September 1947

Clark Clifford

Clark Clifford informed me that he had yesterday afternoon radioed the President the central facts of the situation in Trieste and the Yugoslavia-Italian line. The President responded during the night with instructions that I should be sworn in immediately and take action to see that all available reinforcements were provided for General Lee. In the light of the failure of any worsening developments today, Clifford said he has decided to take the responsibility of not proceeding on this schedule and has cabled the President that conclusion with supporting reasons.

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[Forrestal was sworn in at noon the following day, September 17, as first Secretary of Defense; Sullivan and Symington were sworn in on the 18th as the new Secretaries of the Navy and of Air. The Trieste crisis passed, and there is no further reference to it in the diary. But the President's prompt order to "provide all available reinforcements" for General Lee left behind it an obvious and embarrassing question: What reinforcements, in fact, did the United States possess against menaces which were now apparent in nearly every quarter of the globe?

II

[Since his confirmation, Forrestal had of course been occupied with the problems of setting up the new Military Establishment. A memorandum of August 18 to Royall (now Secretary of the Army) noted "a few subjects that I would like to talk over with you sometime at your convenience"; they included the correlation of the Army and Navy Reserve Officers Training Corps programs, the use of the Office of Naval Research by the Army and Air Force rather than the creation of new research offices by the other two, and "a detailed and carefully thought-through plan" for universal military training. "I have the impression," he added to the last, "that this has not yet been done. I think it will need to be done if it is to be effectively and successfully presented to the public."

At the end of August he was discussing plans for the organization of the Joint Staff (which the unification act had provided to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with Major General A. M. Gruenther. Gruenther, who was to prove a valuable and able military administrator, was leaving his post as a deputy commandant of the War College to head the new body.

29 August 1947

Lunch—General Gruenther

... [Gruenther] made the observation that there was a fundamental difference in thinking between the Army and the Navy on the question of a Staff versus Committee system of arriving at decisions. I concurred, but I said the difference went deeper than that, that one had to realize and take into account a number of considerations: for example, the vast difference in

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the conduct of war on land masses and the kind of war that was fought in the Pacific; the inherent organizational differences between Army and Navy derived from the fact that the smallest unit the Army could employ was a division, whereas the Navy was accustomed to operating either a single PT or a task force of a thousand ships, and for that reason always had to be flexible. Gruenther admitted that there was this basic difference, both as regards the character of war and the character of organization.

I pointed out that the concept of the chain of command and the single commander simply could not operate in the South and Southwest Pacific where commanders were a thousand or two thousand miles apart, where communications were sporadic and unreliable, and where the fighting was of the most dispersed and varied character. I said I had the feeling that Eisenhower had no conception of the Pacific war and that our thinking in terms of planning for another war might have to be quite different from the planning and thinking for any aspect of the recent war. . . .

[On the day that Clifford told him that he should immediately take the oath, Forrestal was confronting further problems of adjustment raised by the act.

16 September 1947

Lunch—General Norstad
and Admiral Ramsey

General discussion about the functions of the National Security Council—its relation to the President, the Cabinet, and to the Bureau of the Budget.

Norstad confirmed my impression that State under Acheson's leadership had been very dubious about the creation of the Council and would undoubtedly try to castrate its effectiveness. It was his view, however, that it was an essential link because so many decisions that now had to be made were a composite of military and political questions. He did, however, express considerable misgivings about the extent of military participation in diplomatic decisions. This flowed, in his opinion, from the paucity of trained people in the State Department and the

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consequent necessity of drafting people from the military to fill in the gap. Continuance of this practice he regarded as not in the interests of the Military Establishment, which in due course would come to be attacked as exercising too powerful an influence upon our foreign policies. The actual facts of the matter, he said, were contrary to public impression—it was usually the military people who had to hold back the sporadic and truculent impulses of political people and diplomats who do not realize the consequences of aggressive action. He cited for an example the incident of last September when Yugoslavs shot down American fliers. Acheson was all for an immediate and aggressive use of American Air fighter power over Yugoslavia. Norstad at that time had to point out to him that such a demonstration would inevitably mean war and we would be exposing relatively green and untrained pilots to a superior and competent enemy. I said this was an example of what I believed the Security Council should be for: To make a careful examination of situations and incidents and to avoid “stumbling into war.” The opposite, I said, was the *Panay* incident [in 1937, when Japanese airplanes sank the U. S. S. *Panay*, a river gunboat, in the Yangtze], where we should have seen to it that we went to war—if we had it would probably have avoided World War II.

[Again, at a buffet luncheon the next day for the heads of the new organization, Forrestal realized that the National Security Council might bring friction.

17 September 1947

Meeting at 1:00 P. M.

It is apparent that there is going to be a difference between the Budget, some of the White House staff and ourselves and the National Security Council—its functions, its relationship to the President and myself. I regard it as an integral part of the national defense setup and believe it was so intended by the Congress. As I have said earlier I regard it also not as a place to make policies but certainly as a place to identify for the President those things upon which policy needs to be made.

[At this buffet luncheon Forrestal had called together all of the key figures in the new National Military Establishment. Together they formed a kind of *dramatis personae* of Forrestal's administration, and as such it is worth listing them. Those who attended were: the three Service Secretaries—Royall of the Army, Sullivan of the Navy, Symington of the Air Force; the three military chiefs—Eisenhower, Nimitz and Spaatz and the head of their joint staff, Gruenther; the heads of four of the new national Military Establishment boards—Arthur M. Hill of the National Security Resources Board, Thomas J. Hargrave of the Munitions Board, Vannevar Bush of the Joint Research and Development Board, and Admiral Sidney W. Souers, executive secretary of the National Security Council; the President's special counsel, Clifford; the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter; and Forrestal's own three assistants, Wilfred J. McNeil, Marx Leva and John H. Ohly.

A number of them were present at a meeting a few days later devoted to further discussion of the role of the National Security Council.

22 September 1947 Meeting with War and Security Councils

Meeting in my office today, following present: Royall, Symington and Sullivan, Eisenhower, Nimitz, Spaatz, Souers, Gruenther and Leva.

I said the purpose of the meeting was a preliminary discussion of procedures in the War Council [composed of the four Defense Secretaries and the three Chiefs of Staff] and in the Security Council, what category of subjects the War Council should discuss and what form they should be transmitted to the Security Council. The question arose as to whether the Security Council should make positive recommendations as to matters of policy and to whom they should make them. Secretary Royall stated that the council *should* make such recommendations. I expressed the view that we would have to be most careful to avoid (a) the appearance of either duplicating or replacing the functions of the Cabinet, and (b) giving the public the impression that our foreign policy was completely dominated by a military point of view.

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I reported a conversation I had this morning with [Under] Secretary Lovett of the State Department on the question of Italy—whether if upon evacuation by American troops there should be subsequent formation of a Communist republic in the north, we should encourage an invitation from De Gasperi's government to send a military mission to Italy to reconstitute their army and otherwise put them in a position to resist Communist domination. I said that Lovett had made the statement that neither he nor the State Department was in a position to evaluate our capabilities in this direction. I had responded, I said, that by the same token the military Services were in no position to determine national policy on such a matter; that it was our job only to state the capabilities and then await instructions. Lovett said because of this mixture of interest between our two sides of government, it was obvious to him that such a subject afforded an example of what kind of business should come before the Security Council. I agreed and set some time during Friday for such a meeting.

Other subjects discussed briefly were Korea, the United Nations Police Force, and the work of the Committee on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments.

[Forrestal took time out in these days for one of his reminiscent lunches with former Secretary Byrnes.

18 September 1947

James F. Byrnes

Lunched today with Jimmy Byrnes. We talked about Russian and American policy from 1943 on. He said one of the difficulties, he thought, after Roosevelt's death, was that Stalin did not like Truman and had told him (Byrnes) so. I made the observation that Mr. Truman was the first one who had ever said "no" to anything Stalin asked—that he had good reason for liking FDR because he got out of him the Yalta Agreement, anything he asked for during the war, and finally an opportunity to push Communist propaganda in the United States and throughout the world.

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The Atomic Energy Commission had been rigorously separated by law from the Military Establishment; but inevitably its operations came within the purview of the Secretary of Defense. The deepening atmosphere of suspicion and disagreement surrounding its activities was evident from a visit on September 23 of Lewis Strauss, a member of the commission. Strauss was worried over a recent action of the AEC (against which he alone had voted) in releasing information on isotopes to other nations. Forrestal had no scientific knowledge as to the possible importance of the information but he was disturbed by "the fact that the AEC had acted without first checking with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . . I told him that the impression I had from members of the Military Liaison Committee with the AEC was a very unhappy one; they felt that, contrary to the public statements of Dr. Lilienthal as to cooperation, we were actually getting none."

Another organizational problem was involved in the appointment of Bush as head of the Resources and Development Board. When Forrestal took him to see the President the latter made some pungent observations on the trials of his office. Bush was under the impression that he did not have the full backing of the President in scientific matters because of a difference between them the year before over the National Science Foundation bill.

25 September 1947

Meeting with President

. . . The President objected to this bill mainly because it removed from him the right of naming the head of the foundation, which he felt was transgression of the prerogatives of the presidential office. Dr. Bush mentioned this at his meeting with the President today and pointed out that in the handing out of federal funds the President would need the advice of some professional body to protect him against the importunities of states and regions of the country on a political basis. I supported this view. . . . The President interpolated the remark that the Chief Executive of the United States had to spend most of his time soothing the sensitivities of the people he wanted to get to work for him. He mentioned the fact that he had spent fifteen minutes this morning listening to a man he had asked to

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head up the Food Conservation program as to where he would rank as to protocol, this matter seeming to the individual concerned to be paramount to the job that he was asked to do. In short, the President said, the President of the United States has to spend a good part of his time saluting the backsides of a large number of people. . . .

[On September 26 the National Security Council held its first meeting, thus laying the cornerstone, as it were, of the new defense structure.

26 September 1947

National Security Council

First meeting of the National Security Council. *Present:* Royall, Sullivan, Symington, Hillenkoetter, Hill, Souers, Lovett and myself [in addition to the President].

Souers outlined the general scheme for organization of the Security Council. The President indicated that he regarded it as *his* council and that he expected everyone to work harmoniously without any manifestations of prima-donna qualities. I said that it was my conception of the Council that it would serve as an advisory body to the President, that he would take its advice in due consideration, but that determination of and decisions in the field of foreign policy would, of course, be his and the Secretary of State's. . . .

Admiral Hillenkoetter then presented a thumbnail review of the world situation in the order of priority of importance.

I then told the President that we had agreed yesterday that Mr. Lovett should present a review of one situation which he regarded as a typical example of the kind of subject upon which the Security Council's advice and thought would be useful to the State Department, namely, Italy.

Italy is in the middle of a struggle between the Communist Party on the extreme Left, the conservatives on the extreme Right, with the government of De Gasperi now in power representing the middle of the road. Togliatti leads the Communists and is mainly active in the north, where twenty-six million out of forty-five million Italians live. He has a working arrangement with Nenni, the leader of the Socialist Party.

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Nenni he described as being under the delusion that he could "control" the Communists. Lovett sketched various situations which, if they developed, would call for quick decisions by the United States (decisions which he hoped could be pondered over in advance so that they would not be made under the frenzy and fury of last-minute crisis): If the Communists in the north should seize power and set up a so-called People's government, invite Tito to "help them maintain order," and then threaten the De Gasperi government in the south, what does the United States do?

He pointed out that our failure to act would mean the negation of any effort we had made in Turkey and Greece for the obvious reason that Italy lies athwart the line of communications to those regions. Furthermore, he said the whole position in the Middle East would be threatened to the extent that, with the line of communications through the Mediterranean dominated by a Russian satellite, both Iran and Iraq and Saudi Arabia would have to reassess their position vis-à-vis Russia.

[The National Security Council's own first meeting thus clearly defined its function. Echoes of the initial misgivings could be heard as late as the presidential campaign of 1948, however, when the Republican candidate, Governor Dewey, attacked the preponderance of military figures in foreign-policy making. Ultimately the law was changed, dropping the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force from the council.

III

[Lovett's citation of Italy as a case in which quick decisions, which should be carefully pondered in advance, might have to be made was given only as an example; there were many others he might have chosen. A pregnant one came up at the Cabinet luncheon on the 29th.

29 September 1947

Cabinet Lunch

. . . Secretary Marshall said that he was giving close study to the question of getting out of Korea, that to many of his people in the State Department it seemed that the Russian offer to

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[proper role of the Marine Corps, the danger that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might become "fly-speckers," the desirability of commissioning a few outstanding officers in the Armed Forces rather than in any one of the three Services; but his major theme was the weakness of the United States Army. It was already a hundred thousand men short even of its authorized strength and was still dwindling; the "modest Emergency Force of 2½ divisions" maintained in the continental United States was below strength. "One of two things will now happen," Eisenhower observed; either there would have to be action to hold the Army at the existing level or it would continue to waste away until the occupation of Germany and the Far East would be no longer possible "and the areas involved would have to be abandoned to chaos and Communism."

It was this inability to maintain Army strength through recruitment that formed a main argument for UMT. But manpower deficiencies were only a part of it. "The problem of matériel," Eisenhower wrote, "is hardly less serious. . . . With certain negligible exceptions, we have purchased no new equipment since the war. Consequently we cannot arm even the few regular combat troops with new weapons developed late in the war but which had not achieved large-scale production. Obviously we have not been able to equip them with weapons developed since the war."

The true consequences of this situation were not to come fully home to the American people until the outbreak of the Korean War, nearly two and a half years later. It is a coincidence that on the day Eisenhower left office, February 7, Communist elements in South Korea precipitated a wave of sabotage, strikes and riots that may be regarded as one of the earliest engagements of the subsequent struggle. But in early 1948 Korea still seemed only one menace, and a relatively remote one, among many. On February 12 there was a significant meeting of the National Security Council.

12 February 1948

Meeting—National Security Council

At today's meeting of the Security Council (Present: Marshall, Sullivan, Whitney [Cornelius V. Whitney, Assistant Sec-

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retary of Air], Hill, Draper [William H. Draper, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army]) discussion dealt with our position and policy in Greece, Turkey, Italy, Palestine and China.

With respect to Italy, decision was reached to expedite the shipment of all available and surplus arms under the general plenary of the President.

With respect to the sending of military assistance to the Greek government in the form of U. S. troop units, reference was made to the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . to the effect that dispatch of any American forces to Greece in sufficient numbers to be of consequence would involve a partial mobilization by this country. . . . The question . . . was referred back to the JCS for further study.

With regard to Greece, there was discussion of various alternatives, including (a) withdrawal; (b) sending of American forces; and (c) standing pat on present policy. The Secretary of State asked what was the opinion of the meeting as to the size of forces that could be sent by this country without involving major political considerations. I said that any dispatch of forces would raise serious questions, but for purposes of discussion the largest unit that could be sent without too much commotion would be something on the order of a Regimental Combat Team of Marines.

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force at this point observed that the Air Force was most desirous of conducting flight training operations in as many strategic areas as possible and suggested that as a compromise there might be some flights of B-29s to Greek airfields which might accomplish at least a part of the purpose in mind in considering the dispatch of ground forces. The Secretary of State indicated interest in this latter suggestion and it was decided to proceed along those lines.

With reference to Palestine, the Secretary of State said that a paper had come to him this morning from his Department outlining three alternative courses as a guide to American policy. They are (a) direct abandonment of American support for the recommendation of the General Assembly; (b) vigorous support for the forcible implementation by the Security Coun-

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cil of that recommendation, which would involve the use of substantial American forces, either unilaterally or jointly with Russia; (c) an effort to refer the question back to the General Assembly and attempt to reshape the policy, not surrendering the principle of partition but adopting some temporary expedients such as a trusteeship, or a joint Anglo-French-American mandate with a revision of the partition decision along the lines of the original British cantonal plan.

The Secretary of State observed that these were simply the statement of alternatives and that none of them carries as yet the approval of the Secretary of State.

With reference to China, Marshall read two documents [which he intended to submit to the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees]. . . . The gist of both is that we regard the China problem under present conditions of disorder, of corruption, inefficiency and impotence of the Central government as being practically unsolvable; that we cannot afford to withdraw entirely from our support of the Chiang Kai-shek government and that neither can we afford to be drawn in on an unending drain upon our resources. He will recommend to the Congress a sum of about \$550 million for aid to China, to be administered by the director of the European Recovery Program.

At this juncture I made the observation that it seemed to me the Secretary of State would have increasing difficulty in dealing with the problems and complexities of our foreign affairs in this highly political year, unless he would have the support on an informed basis of both parties and of the candidates of both parties. Concretely, I suggested that he try to get Vandenberg to invite Taft, Stassen, Dewey and Martin to meet with him at Blair House and make an exposition of the entire field of our foreign policy, with particular reference to Palestine and the Middle East and to the fact that any serious attempt to implement the General Assembly's recommendation on Palestine would set in train events that must finally result in at least a partial mobilization of U. S. forces, including recourse to Selective Service.

At this juncture Secretary Marshall made some remarks on

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the question of universal military training. He said that the trouble was that we are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out. He questioned whether we should bring this Greek situation to an issue of the use of troops. On the other hand, he felt that if we appear to be weakening we will lose the game and prejudice our whole national position, particularly since we are now involved in the European Recovery Program.

[In a brilliant phrase Marshall had here stated the whole dilemma. We were playing with fire while we had nothing with which to put it out. On nearly every front we were facing essentially the same grim alternatives: to withdraw, to attempt to stand pat on positions obviously untenable, simply to confess (as Marshall suggested in the case of China) that the problem was "unsolvable," or to take vigorous action—for which the means and trained men did not exist.

What was to be done? Primarily, no doubt, this was a question for the newly unified structure of politico-military administration. Unfortunately the loosely "coordinated" system of unification on which Forrestal had insisted was in practice failing to unify.¹⁸ The Air Force had already manifested its dissatisfaction with the division of the restricted budget.¹⁹ "The process of unification," Forrestal observed in his letter to Admiral Sherman of February 14, "proceeds, but not always at an even pace—three steps forward and about one backward, I would say." There was no really unified military policy or even strategic plan to which the diplomats could appeal under a situation such as Marshall had set forth. And a more or less fortuitous factor had entered to complicate the problem of developing one.

In the previous year the President had appointed his Air Policy Committee, under the chairmanship of Thomas K. Finletter, to make a civilian review of the whole question of aviation policy; a parallel Joint Congressional Aviation Policy Board under

¹⁸ To grant this is by no means to say that the monolithic system advocated by others would have worked even as well. The matter might be argued at length; but to the editor it seems most unlikely that the unitary system would have worked at all.
¹⁹ See p. 352.

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[Senator Owen Brewster had been set up to study the same subject. Since the closing days of World War II the Air Force had been arguing vociferously for a permanent Air Establishment of seventy regular air groups (with numerous National Guard and Reserve groups in addition)—a goal much higher than the fifty-five groups allowed under the Truman peacetime military budgets. The Finletter report had been made public on January 13. It accepted the Air Force estimate of seventy groups as a measure of the need; in effect, the congressional board was to do the same when its report appeared a few weeks later.

The Finletter report had made a wide public impact, but it was not particularly helpful in the specific situation Marshall laid before the National Security Council on February 12. By its terms of reference, the Finletter Commission had concentrated upon air policy, not military policy as a whole; while its attention was plainly focused on a possible future "all-out" war with Russia rather than on the immediate military requirements of the moment. However necessary in the long view, atomic bombers were obviously no substitute for ground troops in the policing of Palestine or, say, the protection of Korea; and while a demonstration by B-29s might be helpful in Greece, it was not a very effective answer to the particular military menaces there confronting us.

The acutely felt want was for currently useful ground forces. What was "lamentably clear" to Forrestal, as he put it some days later, were "the limitations of our military power to deal with the various potentially explosive areas over the world" there and then. The want was so acute that on February 18 there was a formal review of the situation before the President at the White House. In the presence of Marshall, Forrestal, Royall and the full membership of the Joint Chiefs, General Gruenther gave the President a summary presentation showing how appalling the "limitations" actually were.

18 February 1948

Meeting—White House

... General Gruenther made a presentation concerning our available military strength balanced against present and possible commitments:

"PLAYING WITH FIRE"

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STRENGTHS—1 FEBRUARY 1948

	Actual	Budget Authorization	Congressional Authorization
Army	552,000	560,000	669,000
Navy	476,000	526,000	664,000
(includes USMC	79,000	87,000	108,000)
Air Force	346,000	362,000	382,000

Deployments of Major Army Elements

Far East: 140,000 against requirement of 180,000. (Includes 20,000 in Korea as of 1 March 1948 against requirement of 40,000. Department of Army has cut Korea allotment to 30,000.)

Eucom: 98,000 against requirement of 116,000. (In addition, 10,000 in Austria and 5,000 in Trieste.)

Zone of Interior [U. S.] operating 155,000 against requirement of 166,000. This figure does not include the General Reserve.

The total Army shortage will be 165,000 by the end of 1948. The Navy has an acute personnel shortage now which requires the immobilization of 107 ships, but this condition is expected to improve by July 1. The personnel situation in the Air Force is satisfactory.

In Korea JCS face major problem how to secure 10,000 additional troops needed urgently by Hodge [commanding in Korea] for critical period ahead. Choices are: (1) Japan, where already under strength; (2) send Marines; (3) take from General Reserve.

Status of Army Reserves and Marines is:

	Peace Authorization	Actual
82nd Airborne Division	12,200	13,300
2nd Inf. Division	11,400	7,300
(T/O strength [i.e. full war strength] of Inf. Div. is 15,900)		
Combat Command A	2,380	2,000
Task Force and Corps Support		24,000
		46,600

CHAPTER X

The March Crisis

1

[On February 24, 1948, an armed and violent Communist *coup d'état* abruptly seized power in Czechoslovakia. Communist "action committees" roamed the country, suppressing all possible opposition; the Communist Premier, Klement Gottwald, formed his new Cabinet the next day, and the Czechoslovak Republic, which from its foundation at the end of the First World War had been a model of successful democratic governance in Central Europe, was subverted at a stroke into a satellite Communist dictatorship, or "people's democracy," on the already familiar pattern. Throughout the West the shock was profound. The methods used did not differ greatly from those which had already been applied in the Balkans and elsewhere; this was, however, the first forcible Communist conquest of a strongly based free government, and in the eyes of most Western publics it put an altogether new light upon the power, ferocity and scope of Communist aggression.

Forrestal made no diary entries during the next few days, and there is no specific diary reference to Czechoslovakia. His appointment calendar, however, is unusually full of engagements with high military and diplomatic officials; he lunched with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 25 and with the State and Army leaders on the 26th; he saw Gruenther, Bush of the Research and Development Board, Hillenkoetter of CIA, Whitney of the Department of Air, Souers of NSC and officials of the Budget Bureau in these days, and it is scarcely possible that

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[Czechoslovakia failed to figure in the discussions. Neither is it surprising that the first diary note subsequent to the crisis should have dealt with the altogether different subject of China, for it was clearly a moment inviting a stock-taking of our position all around the world.

1 March 1948

General Wedemeyer

Meeting this morning with General Wedemeyer [who had returned from the Far East to become Director of Plans and Operations, Army General Staff]. I asked him his view about China and our present policy. It is obvious that he feels it is unrealistic and that Marshall is not facing up to the problem because he has a feeling of frustration and failure. Wedemeyer said that when he first met General Marshall after the latter's appointment as ambassador he, that is Marshall, had shown him the directive written for him by the State Department (John Carter Vincent and Company), the objective of which was a government based upon a coalition of the Kuomintang Party and the Communists. Wedemeyer said he had informed Marshall immediately that such an objective was impossible of attainment because of the completely differing nature of the two organizations and the fundamental fallacy of assuming that there could be political association with any Communist group without ultimate absorption by it. He said the present Army representative in China, Major General David G. Barr, is polite and loyal, a good officer, but almost entirely lacking in force.

Italy was another possible "explosive point," as Forrestal heard on the following evening when he met with Representative John Lodge and Alberto Tarchiani, the Italian Ambassador. The Ambassador was concerned about the election to be held on April 18. "He said the Communists were spending from twenty-five to thirty millions of dollars in addition to lire brought in from Yugoslavia. He said De Gasperi [the Premier] would not give in as Beneš [President of Czechoslovakia] had done, that the Italian people, he was confident, did not want Communism, but that there was an undercurrent of fear which made the

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[outcome unpredictable—the same kind of fear which had made many who did not believe in Mussolini join his party. . . . I asked the Ambassador about the loyalty of the Army and he said there was no question as to the loyalty of its top command, but that there might be some Communist infiltration at the lower levels.¹]

The administration's first concrete response to the Czech overturn seems to have been an effort to push through UMT. On March 2 Forrestal lunched with the Secretary of State.

2 March 1948

Lunch

Lunch today with Marshall, Lovett, McCloy [at this time president of the International Bank] and Souers. The Secretary of State reported a meeting he had this morning with members of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, Senators Gurney, Saltonstall, Bridges, Byrd, Hill and Kilgore.

Saltonstall told him that it would be impossible for the Senate committee to make any progress unless he, Marshall, made it clear to the country through either a speech or statement, which would have wide circulation and receive broad attention, of the relation of universal military training to his conduct of foreign policy. Subsequently Senator Gurney called me to say that the visit had been most interesting and had impressed people like Senator Byrd and Senator Bridges. The Secretary of State said he believed the Armed Forces would have to modify their ideas of what they needed to implement universal military training. He recalled the fact that when he got Selective Service through [in 1940], the Army had practically nothing to implement it whereas now we at least have the camps, buildings and so forth. The important thing from his point of view is to get the adoption of UMT in order to make inescapably clear both to our friends and non-friends that there is continuity, firmness and will behind our foreign policy.

He said that Bridges at the end of the conversation told him he should be sure that the Armed Services, and in part

¹Diary, 2 March 1948.

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icular the wives of leading officers, be brought into line. The Senator mentioned a dinner which he attended last evening at which he said the wife of an officer had expressed the strongest views against UMT. I gave it as my opinion that the command in both the Air Force and the Navy were now solidly behind UMT—that the Navy had been lukewarm about it originally but were now convinced that even they had to have it, and that the Air Force, possibly a more recent convert, was also ready to give more than lip service in support. I mentioned the fact that I had talked about it this morning with Mr. Symington, who was anxious to make any contribution he could to a renewed campaign on behalf of such a bill. . . .

Both Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Lovett are now ready for him, Marshall, to take the lead in renewing the drive for UMT either through the occasion of a speech in California on 19 March or before the Senate Armed Services Committee, or possibly the entire Senate. (After the manner of his, Marshall's, appearances before the entire Congress during the war.)

On my part, I agreed to get hold of the appropriate people in the Army to endeavor to bring our figures within more reasonable limits and also to try to have them reconciled with Navy and Air Force figures.

There was some consideration given to a joint effort by Marshall and myself to get a concurrent resolution through the House and Senate giving approval immediately to the principle of UMT, linking the implementation to a subsequent bill, the thought being to capitalize on the present concern of the country over the events of the last week in Europe.

Senator Gurney called me up after lunch to say that his meeting with the Secretary of State had been excellent and to advise me that he was calling me and the three Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff before his committee on Monday morning to tell us that we had to get a more realistic approach from a budget point of view. . . .

[On the day after this meeting there was a development of an alarming kind, recorded only in a terse note:

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3 March 1948 Submarine Sighting—Eniwetok Atoll

Word today from Eniwetok that there was affirmative identification of a non-U. S. submarine with schnorkel on the surface in the neighborhood of Eniwetok.

[It was at Eniwetok atoll that the second series of atomic tests (of which there had been no public announcement) was to be held in the following month.

It can only have increased an already rising tension. In a telephone conversation with Representative Walter G. Andrews that day, Forrestal had agreed that the President would have to give serious thought not simply to UMT but to a revival of Selective Service. On March 4 Forrestal called on Senator Walter F. George of Georgia, ranking minority member of the Finance Committee, member of the Foreign Relations Committee and one of the most powerful of the conservative Democratic senators. Forrestal wanted George and some of his colleagues to hear a "presentation of the world situation by a member of the Army Staff" (presumably this was Gruenther's summary as given at the White House two weeks before). It is an example of Forrestal's constant care for congressional relations, and at least suggests that already the administration was realizing that more would be required in the way of rearmament than UMT.

4 March 1948 Meeting—Senator George

. . . I mentioned particularly Palestine, and said that many people were saying we should implement the recommendation of the General Assembly with vigor and promptness, who did not realize the fact that the deployable Army troops left in this country total less than 30,000, to which might be added 23,000 Marines, whereas the British had to employ 90,000 troops merely to *police* the Palestine area, without trying to impose any political partition or to create a new state. . . .

The people I have in mind [to hear the proposed presentation] are Senator George, Senators Millikin, Baldwin, Robertson (Wyoming), Knowland, Hickenlooper, Ives (?), Byrd, Vandenberg and Gurney if they choose to come, Saltonstall and Cabot Lodge (?).

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I said I didn't want to have it so large as to take on the character of a sales talk or a persuasive presentation—I had merely been so impressed with this particular global recital that I felt it would be both interesting and instructive to people like himself—that in fact I felt it my duty to make such facts available.

[Tension was rising. The Czechoslovak *coup* had spread a sense of nervousness and excitement through the free world. Washington, already alarmed by the perils it faced and its powerlessness to meet them, had clearly begun to move in the direction of a more effective military policy. And then on March 5 there arrived a top-secret telegram from General Clay in Berlin, which fell with the force of a blockbuster bomb. Forrestal copied the text in his diary:

5 March 1948

War—Likelihood in near Future
—Message from Clay

FROM CLAY EYES ONLY TO CHAMBERLIN [LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEPHEN J. CHAMBERLIN, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ARMY GENERAL STAFF]

FOR MANY MONTHS, BASED ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS, I HAVE FELT AND HELD THAT WAR WAS UNLIKELY FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS. WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, I HAVE FELT A SUBTLE CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE WHICH I CANNOT DEFINE BUT WHICH NOW GIVES ME A FEELING THAT IT MAY COME WITH DRAMATIC SUDDENNESS. I CANNOT SUPPORT THIS CHANGE IN MY OWN THINKING WITH ANY DATA OR OUTWARD EVIDENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS OTHER THAN TO DESCRIBE IT AS A FEELING OF A NEW TENSENESS IN EVERY SOVIET INDIVIDUAL WITH WHOM WE HAVE OFFICIAL RELATIONS. I AM UNABLE TO SUBMIT ANY OFFICIAL REPORT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORTING DATA BUT MY FEELING IS REAL. YOU MAY ADVISE THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THIS FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH IF YOU FEEL IT ADVISABLE.

[Again the diary makes no comment on this alarming telegram. But that it did cause intense alarm among those in Washington who were aware of it is now well known, while its influence seems clearly traceable in the events of the next few days.

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The Clay telegram came on a Friday. Gurney had called his meeting of the Armed Services Committee and the military heads on the subject of UMT for the following Monday; its purpose, he had said to Forrestal, was "to tell us that we had to get a more realistic approach from a budget point of view."² When the meeting took place there were, to be sure, plenty of objections voiced to UMT on budgetary and other grounds. But the result was a unanimous committee decision to proceed forthwith on hearings on the measure.

8 March 1948

Armed Services Committee

... The objections, chiefly voiced by Senator Byrd, although shared to some degree by Senator Saltonstall, were as follows:

1. The ultimate amount of the money involved in UMT is around \$4 billion. To add this to the already large sum appropriated for military purposes would mean a \$50 billion national budget, which would wreck the country.

2. So far as the effect on Russia and the rest of Europe is concerned on the passage of UMT, the passage by the Senate and rejection by the House would not merely rob the discussions of any value in the implementation of our foreign policy, but would actually weaken that policy because it would show a split in the country which would be interpreted as a vote against war or against our determination to resist the over-running of Europe.

3. The effect of the Finletter report and of the Brewster-Hinshaw Board [this was the parallel Congressional Aviation Policy Board which had reported on March 1] has been to convince the country that by a substantial increase in appropriations for Air, there would be no necessity for UMT. . . .

Senator Morse said he felt there was a need for a review and presentation to the country of the facts about the world situation and our present military weakness. He said he had spoken in many parts of the country over the past few months and wherever he went he encountered the impression that

² See p. 385.

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there was no real or serious danger of war, and that while the Russians were truculent and difficult, the situation would be ironed out without breaching the peace.

[The diary does not say so, but according to news reports at the time the committee was told, in answer to the objections, that UMT had become "not only mandatory but necessary." The committee unanimously voted to start hearings. Forrestal told reporters after the vote that "events are making progress for us,"³ and it is not difficult to guess what event he had in mind. "The atmosphere I'd say is considerably improved," he said to Robert Cutler two days later, "the improvement derived from other events that one can't take much pleasure in. I think the political aspect of it is much better." And he added, "It is always the difficulty of not being hysterical and at the same time giving them the grim facts, and the facts are grim enough."⁴

Events were making progress; yet at the meeting with the committee there had already appeared the shadow of what was to become an embittered controversy, seriously hampering the course to rearmament. The Finletter and Brewster reports had fostered the notion that by increasing expenditures on Air, "there would be no necessity for UMT." Actually—and it was a weakness in the administration position—UMT was scarcely a more relevant answer than Air expansion to the pressing immediate need, which was for some readily available forces, not to fight a possible future third world war but to deal on the ground at that time with the "various potentially explosive areas," as Forrestal put it, out of which alone the danger of a future world war could come.

The need for better Service integration and consistency of basic strategic plan was urgent. Forrestal had already told the President that if the Joint Chiefs did not produce decision on the roles and missions of the Services, he would make some decisions himself. On March 10 he informed his press conference that he was summoning a prolonged meeting, outside of Washington, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to thrash out the whole controversy over

³ *The New York Times*, 9 March 1948.

⁴ Telephone conversation with Robert Cutler, 10 March 1948.

[missions and to decide "who will do what with what." If they failed, he said, "I shall have to make my own decisions"; and he added—it seemed almost as an afterthought—that the Services were now agreed that some form of compulsory military service was a necessity. It was no longer a question of whether or not to adopt UMT; if there were no UMT there would have to be a revival of the draft.⁵ The meeting of the JCS was actually convened on the following day at Key West.

It was also on March 10 that Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, son of the country's first President and liberator, and a figure well known and well liked in all Western capitals, fell to his death from a window of his official residence. According to the official announcement, he had committed suicide. The event added enormously to the initial shock of Czechoslovakia's subversion.

II

[The conference—it lasted from the 11th to the 14th of March—to which Forrestal summoned the Joint Chiefs (Leahy, Bradley, Denfeld and Spaatz) and their aides, in the seclusion of the Key West Naval Base, marked the beginning of the effort to rebuild the Armed Forces of the United States. It also marked the first really serious attempt to grapple with the paralyzing divisions between the Services and to re-form the Military Establishment as a whole into a genuinely integrated team, designed to meet the actual rather than the theoretic military problems confronting the country. Both efforts were to progress, unevenly and with many difficulties and discouragements, down to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

Forrestal prepared some terse "Notes for Friday—Opening of Meeting," which he later entered in his diary. They are sketchy, but they clearly show the searching significance which he saw in the seemingly technical question of "roles and missions." "We must be guided," the notes began, "by the National Security Act, but I don't want the impression that we are engaged in legalistic discussions." The Navy, they continued, would keep its own air

⁵ *New York Herald Tribune*, 11 March 1948.

[power but would have to realize that budget limitations might compel it to "make-do" with help from others; that it would, for example, have to give Air Force crews training in antisubmarine work and the close support of amphibious landings. The notes go on:

11 March 1948

Notes for Friday

. . . 3. There should be certain studies inaugurated now looking to reciprocal use of personnel in the event of emergency. For example, I doubt if the Navy will require the number of pilots that were in training at the end of the last war. *Question*: Could any of these be made available to meet deficiencies of the Air Force?

4. *Question*: What is being done about joint amphibious training operations between Army and Marines and Navy, so that techniques and tactics will be identical?

5. *Question*: Are there any plans for the use of Marine commanders with Army units on tactical maneuvers?

6. Function of strategic bombing is the Air Force's.

7. The Navy is to have the Air necessary for its mission, but its mission does not include the creation of a strategic air force.

8. Both Services, that is, Navy and Air Force, have to give much more thought and help to the third Department, the Ground Forces, who are the catch-all for the unwanted and unglamorous jobs.

9. The mission of the Navy which was inescapable in the Pacific war was the knocking out of enemy-held land bases which were unreachable by land-based Air. I should like to see some study given to the possibility of passing surplus Navy air power into the Air Force when such missions are no longer necessary. For example, the closing phases of the Japanese war. . . .

[Without a clear definition of the responsibilities of the several Services, without plain answers to these questions on the integration of function, no intelligent division of military manpower, munitions or money could be made.

[As the discussion got under way on Friday there arrived a dispatch from the Secretary of State, advising them of still another area of tension and carrying, incidentally, an early suggestion of the North Atlantic alliance which was later to take so important a place in American military planning.

12 March 1948 *International Situation—Russian Expansion*

Dispatch from Marshall today reflecting deep apprehension on the part of Great Britain over the evident intention of the Soviet Union to bring immediate pressure upon Norway to negotiate a pact similar to that which they are now asking of Finland. Bevin makes three proposals:

- (1) Build around the five-nation (U. K., France, Benelux, etc.) pact.
- (2) A plan for Atlantic security.
- (3) A Mediterranean system of security.

Bevin suggests a meeting in Washington between British and American representatives early next week.

[Apparently, the Joint Chiefs had not reached a point where they could consider such larger possibilities as these. At Key West they continued to thrash out the issues of inter-service relations. Even here they seem not to have answered all of Forrestal's penetrating questions, but by Sunday noon (March 14) they had arrived at certain "broad, basic decisions." The diary summarizes them as follows:

1. For planning purposes, Marine Corps to be limited to four divisions with the inclusion of a sentence in the final document that the Marines are not to create another land army.
2. Air Force recognizes right of Navy to proceed with the development of weapons the Navy considers essential to its function but with the proviso that the Navy will not develop a separate strategic air force, this function being reserved to the Air Force. However, the Navy in the carrying out of its function is to have the right to attack inland targets—for example, to reduce and neutralize airfields from which enemy aircraft may be sortying to attack the Fleet.

3. Air Force recognizes the right and need for the Navy to participate in an all-out air campaign.

[With this decided, there was still a half-hour left before lunch. Gruenther brought up a Staff paper that would otherwise have awaited their next meeting. This paper laid down five propositions: The joint war plan of the Joint Chiefs called for larger Armed Forces than Congress had authorized; existing forces had shrunk to levels below even those which had been authorized; therefore voluntary enlistment was a failure; UMT could not furnish additional men fast enough; therefore the Joint Chiefs should recommend immediate re-enactment of the draft law. The conference accepted the conclusion, and Forrestal's summary ends:

It was concluded that it is now necessary to ask immediately for a restoration of Selective Service.

It was concluded that an immediate examination of atomic energy matters is required, including the decision on whether or not now is the time for turning custody of the weapons over to the Armed Services.⁶

[Though the diary does not mention it, it was also decided, according to a subsequent public statement of Forrestal's, to request the President to ask a supplemental appropriation from Congress "in order to bring our total strength up to the point where it more nearly met the realities of the world situation."⁷

Forrestal left Key West the same afternoon. He stopped overnight at West Palm Beach and did not reach Washington until Monday afternoon. It was not until 5:15 that day that he reported to the President. His account of the Key West decisions included one or two additional points: "Navy not to be denied use of A-bomb"; "Navy to proceed with development of 80,000-ton carrier and development of HA [high altitude] aircraft to carry heavy missiles therefrom"; and he also reported that the Joint Chiefs were of the opinion that custody of the completed atomic

⁶The Diary note bears the date 11 March 1948, but covers the whole conference.
⁷Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, 22 April, *New York Herald Tribune*, 23 April 1948.

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[bombs should be turned over to the military. "I said the condition of readiness of these weapons was highly uncertain—that what a civilian might think was ready would be a long way from readiness for battle use."

More important at the moment than his own report, however, was what Forrestal learned. The President, already advised of the Joint Chiefs' conclusion that revival of the draft was essential, had a couple of hours before announced a dramatic decision.⁸

President Truman had an engagement of some weeks' standing to speak at the St. Patrick's Day dinner in New York City on March 17, and he had intended to use the occasion for a plug for UMT. The Joint Chiefs' demand for Selective Service had put the matter into a much more serious context. According to Forrestal's diary note:

15 March 1948

Meeting with the President

The President said he was going to deliver a message to Congress on Wednesday going all out for Selective Service and UMT. He said the original idea had been that he would make reference to this in the St. Patrick's Day speech that evening, but Marshall had felt that that was not a proper forum. We have arranged to have the UMT initial testimony-taking deferred until Thursday, when Marshall will be the first witness.

[In changing his "forum" the President had changed to one that would give his remarks the very maximum of solemnity, urgency and effect. The news of Monday afternoon that he was taking the unusual course of addressing a joint session of the House and Senate two days later (in addition to making an important policy speech in New York the same evening) came with a sensational impact. It is reflected in Forrestal's diary note of the next day.

16 March 1948

International Situation

Papers this morning full of rumors and portents of war. Wallace in New York interview yesterday charged that United

⁸The announcement was given out at the White House at 3:35 p.m. *New York Herald Tribune*, 16 March 1948.

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States was fomenting war and the Czech *coup* was an act of desperation by the Communists to which they were driven by threat of a Rightist *coup*. Nothing could be sillier, but such statements, even from Wallace, will have their effect. The fact is that this country and its government are desperately anxious to avoid war. It is simply a question of how best to do it. If all Europe lies flat while the Russian mob tramps over it, we will then be faced with a war under difficult circumstances, and with a very good chance of losing it.

It is inconceivable that even the gang who run Russia would be willing to take on war, but one always has to remember that there seemed to be no reason in 1939 for Hitler to start war, and yet he did, and he started it with a world practically unprepared. Our effort now is to try to make the Russians see the folly of continuing an aggression which will lead to war, or, if it is impossible to restore them to sanity, that we at least have a start which will enable us to prevent our being caught flat-footed as we were in 1941.

[Since General Clay's telegram of ten days before, the intelligence services had been working at high pressure. Not until this Tuesday, March 16, was the CIA able to hand the President a brief combined estimate by State, Army, Navy and Air Force, saying that war was not probable within sixty days; and not for another two weeks was CIA able to extend even this tenuous forecast of peace.⁹ In the meantime, even before the President's message had been delivered, there was already evidence that the decisions of Key West would be insufficient to control the quarrel over the allocation of the rearmament effort for which everyone now assumed that the President was about to call.

16 March 1948

Press Release—Key West Conference

Secretary Symington called this morning to say that Norstad and Spatz were not in agreement on the press release to the effect that there had been agreement in all major areas at Key West. I said I believed this referred to the preamble or statement of philosophy. I subsequently talked to General Spatz

⁹Diary, 23 December 1948, which gives a summary report of the March crisis.

CHAPTER XI
The Effort to Rearm

I

[The fact that there was another aspect to the problem of defense has already appeared, fragmentarily, in this record. In the midst of the Key West discussions Marshall's telegram had arrived, reporting Foreign Minister Bevin's proposal for a "plan for Atlantic security" to be built around the five-power Brussels Pact.¹ One of Forrestal's first queries, after the presentation on March 25 of the original rearmament program, was whether the JCS had any plans to equip European defense forces.² At the height of the argument over the domestic military program this important subject had recurred.

9 April 1948 *Conversation—General Gruenther—Western European Pact*

General Gruenther informed me today of the progress of the conversations between the British and the United States staffs on European security.

1. The five nations concerned in the Western European Pact are extremely anxious for the United States to associate itself with that pact. The present American attitude is that the President should make a fair statement giving his blessing to the organization of the five-nation alliance but without formalizing it in the form of a treaty or even a protocol. This

¹ See p. 392.
² See p. 403.

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would not be satisfactory to the Europeans. A curious fact is that Canada is equally as strong as Britain for the formation of the alliance. More understandably, Mr. Spaak, of Belgium [Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister], also supports it most strongly.

2. The British have always held to the view of what they call the three pillars of strategy: Britain itself, the Mediterranean and the sea lanes. To these they now add a line in Europe which they consider to be the present line and the time for announcing Allied policy concerning which, to be now.

[On April 22, the day after Forrestal's presentation of the revised military program, the subject was before the National Security Council. The extreme delicacy with which it was approached is indicated by the fact that this diary note ("ribbon copy only") is one of the very few in which Forrestal designated the participants only by initials.

22 April 1948 *National Security Council Meeting of the National Security Council at the White House today. Subject: Western Union.*

"L" outlined tentative proposals for as nearly concurrent action as possible by the Senate and the President, not in terms of a treaty, but a statement that we were willing to consider, under Article 51 of the United Nations, steps looking to the construction of a regional agreement, if it proves to be in the interests of the security of the United States. The tactics would be to have this action initiated by the Republicans and to have the ball picked up immediately by the President, who would state his interest in the plan and make some further appropriate comments.

"R" raised the question of whether this was not provocative, whether it did not raise the fear in another mind even if one did not presently exist. "L" pointed out we were trying to get this group to say what they would do to help themselves in addition to taking help from us, and that this proposed step was part of that action. It was designed to indicate to any-

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one that there would be a price to any decision to overrun—that it would not be simply a walk-in.

[At the Cabinet next day Lovett first reported that the atomic energy negotiations in the United Nations had “come to a point of standstill.” The discussion then turned to the fundamentals of Soviet-American relations.

23 April 1948

Cabinet

... Mr. Lovett spoke of meetings which he and Bohlen [Charles E., or “Chip”, Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department] have had recently with Panyushkin [Alexander S. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador] and members of the Embassy staff. These conversations have taken the form of apparent probing by the Russians as to our real position vis-à-vis the Russians. They asked, for example, at the first meeting between him and Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson, whether America really intended to stay in Europe. The Americans at the meeting restated the question and said that the real question is: Do the Russians mean to push beyond the line of their troops' advance at the end of the war?

Mr. Lovett summed up the position of Russia in his opinion as being of a dual nature at the moment: (1) constant probing to find out the solidity of our intent; and (2) a reflection of their own fear of a preventive or aggressive war on our part. Two things he felt were contributing to their motivations—the overexcitable statements, some by military people, on a preventive war, and the activities of Henry Wallace and his proposal that the President sit down with Stalin and make a world agreement.

He read a cable, which is to be sent to Bedell Smith, outlining in general terms our position and our desire for accommodation with Russia plus our apprehension that any meeting between the heads of the states would prove as futile and as nonproductive as in the past. Smith was asked his opinion as to whether a communication addressed to Stalin along these lines—namely, that America has no aggressive intent but neither did she intend to let Russia dominate Europe—should be sent

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by the President or should be explored on a personal basis by Smith himself. . . .

After Cabinet I talked to Mr. Lovett about the implications of the Western Union conversation which we had at the Security Council yesterday, when he related the substance of conversations between France, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, *et al.*, on the question of Western Union and the political and military implications thereof. This morning I asked him how far we were getting committed to such countries on a military basis. He said the whole point of the conversations was that we wanted to make it clear that we were not willing to become bound to an unequivocal contract to come to their assistance unless and until they manifested a desire to help themselves. Such assistance by us, he said, would of course have to take the form of some kind of lend-lease. I asked him what he would guess the total of arms procurement might be, and he replied, “Not less than \$3 billion.”

[Such demands from Europe would, of course, only aggravate the already acute dilemma between unpreparedness and inflation. On April 24 Forrestal dictated two memoranda. The first considered the “economic factors”—employment already at 50% million with the prospect of reaching 62½ million by July, “the highest in history,” and leaving “practically no employable without a job”; and the demands for ERP, atomic energy and expanded armament which would fall upon “this tight economy.” These were “very great pressures,” as he wrote at this time to Mrs. Ogden Reid, thanking her for an editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune* supporting his stand; “we have to keep America militarily strong, but we have to be sure she does not become economically or socially impotent in the process.”³ The second memorandum considered the probable impact of these economic factors on the fate of the defense program in Congress.

24 April 1948

Alternate Courses

1. The President wishes to adhere to UMT program.
2. There is some chance, in my opinion, of getting the

³To Mrs. Ogden Reid, 28 April 1948.

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patience, and everyone in the Armed Services is most grateful—not merely for the result itself but for the size of the favorable vote. . . .

[Thus the curtain was rung down upon the dramatic passage which had begun with the March crisis some three and a half months before. It represented the first effort to rebuild the Military Establishment, the first serious attempt to grapple with the underlying issues of unification and the first important test of the new machinery for national security as established by the act of 1947. In each respect the results were mixed; they were also complex and difficult properly to evaluate. Forrestal had not gained in popular esteem. Yet his answer to an appreciative note from a friend was essentially correct.

To Roger W. Cutler, 12 June 1948

. . . It is always helpful to have the old troops rally around. In spite of all the commotion there is substantial progress being made on the foundation of this structure, but there is work which has to be done before the ornaments become visible. Furthermore I want to be sure we do not destroy existing organizations until we are sure of what is going to replace them. Nothing could be more fatal at this juncture of world affairs.

[Some of the "ornaments," few though they still were, did unquestionably become visible in the tragic summer of 1950. And perhaps the most penetrating comment on the episode was Forrestal's own, in a letter to Hanson Baldwin.

To Hanson W. Baldwin, 16 June 1948

. . . I haven't the faintest idea what I am going to do when I get out of here—I never have planned my life except at the beginning when it was necessary to get enough money to eat and pay debts.

With regard to unification, the most substantial accomplishments are of an unspectacular character. There are things that

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had to be done before superficial problems are tackled: the creation of an efficient and clear-headed approach to the budget. The 1948-49 budget was already in last September, so the plans, in my judgment, had to be for the 1949-50 budget. On that I believe the foundations are laid for a rational and logical method by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff will participate in, and share, responsibility. This is the greatest central problem of unification, and everything else, more or less, stems from it. In other areas the ancillary bodies created by the Security Act of 1947 had to be brought into being and staffed. . . . There is, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency, on which, I am sure you will agree, if one is to secure improvement, one must undertake to secure it without fanfare, and that I believe we shall be able to do. . . .

There is, of course, a great additional spate of things that have to be done, most of which are all obvious to you. The coordination of publicity will have to be brought together into one central spot and there will have to be a more vigorous approach to stockpiling. Much more detailed planning has to be done, through the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board, regarding the relationship of our raw materials, manpower and industrial capacity to our war capabilities.

Two fields I almost forgot are of the highest importance: civilian defense and special weapons, including atomic energy and B. W. [Biological Warfare]. . . . There will be some public announcements in the near future.

[In all these basic matters—of more critical significance in the long run than current budget levels—progress was being made. But the core of the whole problem, as Forrestal clearly saw after the almost grotesque experiences of the spring, lay in the budget, in the manner of its construction, in the responsibility for its allocation and for its adjustment both to logical strategic plan and to the nonmilitary limitations which could not be disregarded. By June 23 he had prepared the rough draft of a memorandum for the three Secretaries which clearly defined the issue and indicated what he intended to do about it.

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Berlin (sometime in 1944), provided that the United States had free access to that area. It is believed there followed an exchange of messages between Stalin and Roosevelt in which Stalin agreed, in principle, to the stipulation that the United States should have complete right of entry of persons and goods into the Berlin area; that Stalin replied to this message with one of his own, stating that he agreed in principle but that the terms would be worked out by the Russian, American and British commanders in the field. Apparently this was never done, although it is General Parks' recollection [presumably Major General Floyd L. Parks, chief of the Public Information Division of the Army Special Staff, who in 1945 had been the first commander of the American military sector in Berlin] that in conversations between Eisenhower and the Russians there was a clear verbal agreement in the sense of the above. . . .

Lovett observed that the casualness of this procedure stemmed from the attitude prevailing at that time in the minds of Roosevelt, Stimson, Hopkins, Eisenhower, etc., that we would have no trouble in dealing with the Russians.

[But the present was more urgent than the past; the legalities less important than the problem of what to do. On Sunday, the 27th, there was a conference in Royall's office of Forrestal, Lovett, Royall, Sullivan, Bradley, Norstad and a number of other State, Defense and military officers. Once more they found themselves facing the now wearisomely familiar dilemma: to fight, to get out or to try to stand on some uneasy middle ground.

27 June 1948

Berlin Situation

. . . Discussion proceeded on the assumption that with existing food stocks, plus supplies which might be brought in by air, serious food shortages would not occur for approximately thirty days, and the German population could perhaps be fed for sixty or more days if dried foods were introduced. The three possible courses of action discussed were the following:

1. Decide now to withdraw from our position in Berlin, in concert with the other Western powers, at an appropriate time in the future, presumably when a constituent assembly for a

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Western German government is called on September 1, and plan accordingly.

2. Decide at this time to retain our position in Berlin by all possible means, including supplying Berlin by convoy or using force in some other manner, such action to be only as a last resort after utilizing all diplomatic and other means to stay in Berlin without force to avoid war, but accepting the possibility of war as a consequence if necessary.

3. To maintain our unprovocative but firm stand in Berlin, utilizing first every local means, and subsequently every diplomatic means, to obtain recognition and assertion of our rights while postponing ultimate decision to stay in Berlin or withdraw.

Secretary Royall felt that a decision should be reached now concerning our ultimate position, since our actions in the immediate future should be patterned in the light of this decision. There was considerable discussion concerning (a) the effect of withdrawing from Berlin on our position in Europe, on the spread of Communism and on the success of the European program as contrasted with (b) remaining in Berlin under the stress of consistently recurring crises and frequent humiliation, or (c) running the risk of war through efforts to supply Berlin by force. There was also preliminary discussion of the various steps which might be taken, on the one hand either to minimize or cover our withdrawal from Berlin, and on the other hand to augment our position vis-à-vis the Russians. Consideration was given to whether two B-29 squadrons now in Goose Bay should proceed to Germany, and as to whether it would be advisable to base two B-29 groups in England.

Definite conclusions reached at the meeting were the following:

1. That State and Civil Affairs Division should prepare a currency paper for transmittal to Clay which might be used by him as a basis for resuming discussions with Sokolovsky.
2. That Secretary Royall, Mr. Lovett and I should meet with the President the next morning and present the major issues involved for his decision, and that in the meantime De-

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realize, of course, that these are questions which involve many imponderables, and that a letter in precise language is not an easy one to draft. I do feel, however, that I must seek every avenue of judgment in order to supplement my own. . . .

In addition to submitting a budget within the President's tentative ceiling of 14.4 billion, I feel an obligation to inform him of the weakening of our strength which this budget entails, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I am also considering sending the President, as my own recommendation, a proposal that he lift the ceiling to approximately 17.5 billion—which, in my opinion, while involving some risks, would provide us with forces capable of taking effective action in the event of trouble.

I am writing this letter to obtain from you as much guidance as possible in determining the degree of vigor with which I should support the recommendation which I propose to submit, as outlined above.

[An accompanying memorandum explained the effects of the budgetary limitation on troop strengths. The April program as finally adopted would "if fully implemented" provide on 30 June 1949 a total strength of 1,964,000 men [including 161,000 one-year trainees) and a sixty-six-group Air Force. The \$14.4 billion ceiling would permit the maintenance in fiscal 1950 of an aggregate strength (including one-year trainees) of only 1,625,000 and a fifty-one-group Air Force. It was estimated that "to construct forces with a capability of effective reaction immediately at the outset of a war" would require an aggregate strength of 1,975,000 and seventy groups. The cost for fiscal 1950 would be about \$21 billion. "Specifically, these estimates are based upon a war plan which—in the event of hostilities—would contemplate securing of the Mediterranean line of communications." The immediate program on which the Defense Department was working would come to about \$17.5 billion and would provide strengths approximating those originally contemplated for the end of fiscal 1949.

At the time this letter was written, Marshall had already returned to Europe. Lovett promptly telephoned.

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1 November 1948

Letter to Secretary of State

Lovett called me this morning to inquire as to the speed with which I desire an answer to this letter. I told him that the important part of it obviously dealt with the larger amount, namely, 17.5 billion, and that I would like to have Mr. Marshall's view by 15 November in order to help me in determining the degree of importunity that I put into my recommendation to the President. . . . [After promising swift delivery of the letter] he said that in an effort to be helpful he would make his own responses to the questions, observing that to the first question, which was whether or not the international situation has improved sufficiently since last spring to warrant a decline in our military strength, the answer is: no. He remarked that he felt that the answer to the first question pretty much provided the answers to the other two. In brief, he would say that he would respond, no, to the first and third, and make no comment on the second.

[But when Marshall's own answer came back from Paris a week later, it evaded the real issue by answering the third question—"Is the situation about the same?"—in the affirmative, and then returning to his familiar theme. The important task, Marshall insisted, was to rearm Western Europe. In the specific dilemma in which he was trapped, Forrestal was apparently to get little more help from the Secretary of State than he had been getting from the Joint Chiefs. But by the time the answer was returned there had been a dramatic reversal in the whole position.

III

[Not until October 26, exactly one week before the election, does the diary record any intimation that the Republicans might not, after all, be the certain winners; and even this intimation was disputed by a distinguished political commentator.

26 October 1948

Conversation with Leslie Biffle

Leslie Biffle told me that he thought the President had made very substantial gains in the last two weeks. He thought he would carry Massachusetts, Rhode Island and possibly Con-

necticut. The Senate, he thinks, will be Democratic by a majority of five, and thinks there is a possibility of the House also being Democratic.

On the contrary, I asked Arthur Krock [Washington correspondent of the *New York Times*] his view this morning and he saw no change. So far as the Senate and House are concerned, he thinks that "the hair will go with the hide"; in other words, Dewey's strength will counterbalance local tendencies.

[Other prophets were also seeing dimly. When Forrestal two days later had Admiral Hillenkoetter, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, in for breakfast, the admiral was apparently "assuming Mr. Dewey's election." The intelligence chief also predicted "no war in the immediate future," in which he was right, and that De Gaulle would be "in power in France next March," in which he was as wrong as he was about Dewey.¹¹ Whatever the voters might do, Forrestal still seems to have considered his own public career as approaching its end, and there was much unfinished business. On October 7 he had appeared before the Eberstadt "task force" of the Hoover Commission, to testify for the strengthening (which he had already outlined to the President) of the powers of the Secretary of Defense. One of the "task force" members, the Chicago industrialist General Robert E. Wood, wrote to say that he had been "very much impressed" both by Forrestal's appearance and by the inordinate difficulty of the military problem in a capitalist democracy. Forrestal's answer put it well.

To Robert E. Wood, 18 October 1948

... There are no easy black and white solutions for the problems which face this country. How to secure the formation of capital necessary to our plant replenishment, how to secure a tax system which will provide the incentive and the opportunity for the individual acquisition of capital, how to balance between a military organization sufficiently formidable to give any other country reason to stop, look and listen, without at the same time its eating our national heads off—these

¹¹ Diary, 28 October 1948.

are segments of a very complex matter which must trouble any citizen who understands it. . . .

[There has seldom been a better statement of the searching socio-political implications of the military problem in democratic societies, which have rarely paused even to consider that the problem exists. Forrestal was not having much success in getting either the military or the civil arms of government to face these implications; but it is a measure of his stature that he was throughout acutely aware of them himself.

The "task force" hearings had afforded a forum in which to revive the old demands for the absorption of Naval Aviation in the Air Force. Forrestal dictated a memorandum which was a shrewd and penetrating comment not only on air strategy but on the whole strategic problem.

27 October 1948 *General Notes on the Question Naval Air—
Air Force*

1. We now have in existence strategic air forces of great potential power in terms of weight-lifting capacity and range. The unresolved question, however, is whether unescorted big bombers can penetrate to targets that have a vigorous fighter defense.¹²

2. We also have in existence a nucleus of carrier aircraft and in reserve an additional number of carriers which can provide tremendous striking power.

3. Strategic air warfare is the assigned responsibility of the Air Force with the proviso that they are to call upon Naval Air for whatever help Naval Air can provide. It is my opinion that if war came the Air Force itself would immediately, or shortly after the outbreak, realize the diversionary possibilities necessarily of the aircraft carrier task forces.

4. No one knows the form and character of any war of the future. War planning—so-called strategic plans—are largely an intellectual exercise in which the planners make the best estimate of the form of a war against possible enemies. But the ac-

¹² Forrestal considered it "unresolved" in spite of the Air Force's confidence of a month before. See p. 493.

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laid and whether the distribution of supplies and equipment in China could be controlled.

No decision was reached on the general China situation, which will be studied further.

[In the abruptness of the political reversal there were many decisions which had to be "studied further." It obviously transformed Forrestal's entire personal and official problem. He had been expecting a probably automatic solution for the constantly vexing dilemma about resignation, by which he would go out gracefully with a defeated administration, under circumstances that would leave him no option but would imply no reflection on him. Now the administration had not been defeated; but it was doubtful whether he himself would survive, and he may well have begun to wonder if the administration any longer regarded him as an asset.

In his differences with the President over military budget policy, the latter's hand (and the hand of his Budget Bureau) had of course been greatly strengthened. The congressional committee chairmen, with whom Forrestal had been working so carefully over the past two years, would now all be changed; he would have to go over much of the old ground with new faces or with old faces now suddenly restored to power. Forrestal had antagonized important groups—the always numerous and ardent friends of the Air Force, the professional Democratic politicians who resented his refusal to participate in the party battle, influential sections of the Jewish community who resented his stand on Palestine, labor and "liberal" groups who thought him too closely identified with the industrialists. The newspaper columnists were already beginning to circle, vulture-like, for the kill; and soon after the election, the more responsible Washington correspondents began to disseminate the speculation that when the President re-formed his Cabinet, Forrestal would no longer be a member. Among Forrestal's personal papers there is a scrapbook in which are entered samples of these newspaper predictions of his early downfall. And against all this, there was little or no real public understanding of what he had been trying to do and of the very great services he had rendered to the nation in

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[the attempt. As he had himself written the year before, the difficulty of government work was that it "not only has to be well done, but the public has to be convinced that it is being well done."¹⁶

Forrestal wired the President his "congratulations on a gallant fight and a splendid victory"; and went down with the others to the Union Station on November 5 to greet the President's triumphant return. At 12:30 the same day there was a brief Cabinet meeting.

5 November 1948

Cabinet

Cabinet meeting today. The President said that he wanted his Cabinet members to go to work on the preparation of material for his policy message on the state of the Union which is due for delivery to the Congress on the first of January. He asked to have these suggestions available to him at the time of his return, in about two weeks.

[The President was leaving on Sunday, the 7th, for a vacation at Key West; and on Saturday he made it known that there would be no decision on Cabinet changes until he got back. Forrestal, called again to the White House the same day, had to run a gantlet of reporters; he told them "jokingly" that his resignation had been on file with the President ever since he had assumed office, and he did not intend to "reiterate it."¹⁷ The President duly departed for his Florida vacation. A couple of days later Forrestal took off for a rapid, one-week flying trip through Western Europe.

IV

[For this final trip to Europe, Forrestal kept unusually extensive diary notes, partly, perhaps, because he had Gruenther (always exact and efficient, and who took some of the notes himself) along. The survey really began in Washington, in a conversation with Lewis Douglas and Allen Dulles, who were at his house for dinner on Saturday evening.

¹⁶ See p. 300.¹⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, 7 November 1948.

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7 November 1948 *Conversation with Ambassador Douglas—
Allen Dulles*

Highlights of conversation with Ambassador Douglas last evening.

It is essential to get a settlement of the Berlin impasse. He believes that the Russians are equally desirous of it provided some face-saving formula can be found. He thinks that a solution may lie something along the lines of my suggestion that a neutral group . . . suggest a formula dealing with economic matters.¹⁸ . . . The British have not yet solved the problem of costs, and it is doubtful if they will solve it in the next three or four years since the government is unwilling to face the political consequences of asking for more work and longer hours. . . . He is very deeply concerned about the Middle East, and believes the consequences of the creation of the Israeli state will flow for a long time. . . .

With regard to France: I gave him my view that we should not permit ourselves to become frozen into a state of aloofness from De Gaulle. . . . He expressed complete agreement in view of the fact that he believes De Gaulle will come to power in France within a matter of months.

Allen Dulles said he thought the greatest mistake in Mr. Dewey's campaign strategy was the failure to attack the Democratic record more vigorously. This stemmed from the failure to realize that they were the challenger and not the challenged. Among other areas in which they restrained Mr. Dewey was the sequence of diplomatic decisions at Tehran, Cairo and Yalta. They did not do so [*sic*] because they felt that injecting these issues into the campaign would have been destructive of the effort toward bipartisan foreign policy.

[On Tuesday afternoon, November 9, Forrestal, with Gruenther and two or three other aides, took off from Washington. The trip was doubtless due to a suggestion from Harriman, in the preceding month, that he should come over and see for himself the urgent necessity for getting ahead with Atlantic union and military aid; and on Wednesday evening he dined with Harriman

¹⁸ See p. 491.

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[and Marshall in Paris. His diary entry was dictated the following day.

11 November 1948

Aid to France

Marshall returned to the theme which he had developed in his last visit to Washington: the importance of making available, to France in particular, but also to other countries of the Western Union, arms on a sufficient scale to give these countries the feeling that we were back of them. . . . I made the observation, which was supported by Harriman, that we need to have a clear and focused policy, embracing political, military and economic matters. . . .

In a conversation with Harriman this morning, he returned to this subject and said there was a great need for coordination of our policies in these three areas, and that otherwise our strength would be frittered away without relation to the accomplishment of the result that fundamentally we are after: the re-creation of stable conditions throughout Europe. He said he believes that this idea could be sold on the basis of its being a sound investment—that money spent on a carefully thought-out and phased program would . . . have the result of lifting a great continuing burden from the American taxpayer. . . . Such a program could not, however, be imposed by fiat on these countries, all of whom are made even more sensitive by the fact of their poverty and present straits. . . .

11 November 1948

Aid to France

Conversation with M. Ramadier [Paul Ramadier, the Prime Minister] this evening. Central points of his conversation were:

France must be defended at or east of the Rhine. There is manpower sufficient for the creation of thirty divisions, but the French must have equipment. I asked whether this equipment could take the form of small arms, etc. He said that was not their need, but rather for heavy equipment—tanks, anti-aircraft, vehicles. . . .

They are considering the building of carrier, to be finished in 1952. I said I hoped they would not divert too much of their effort to naval power, particularly in the field of aircraft car-