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Digest of Progress Report on the Central Intelligence Group

by Admiral Souers, DCI, June 7, 1946

1. Establishment

CIG officially activated February 8, 1946 (NIA Directive No. 2). Actually a small group from State, War and Navy had been assembled on 25 January (3 days after the President's Directive).

2. Organization

- Major components as of 7 June:
- Central Planning Staff
 - Central Reports Staff
 - Chief of Operational Services ("common concern")
 - Secretariat to serve NIA, CIG, IAB
 - Administrative Division
 - Administrative Officer
 - Security Officer
 - Personnel Officer

3. Personnel


Requested and selected for CIG from the Departments. "The responsible officers in the Departments have cooperated wholeheartedly toward this end, but a rather slow process because of demobilization and specific requirements of CIG. There followed a table showing the actual apportionment among State, War, Navy according to reports, planning, administration. The figures showed:

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Planning Staff was given priority as a necessary "prelude to accomplishment." Now (June 7) concentration was on Reports Staff. Stringency in administration was largely "alleviated" by part-time use of SSU persons and facilities. This division would require reinforcement when "centralized operations" were undertaken. A development considered of great importance was the designation of "consultants" to the DCI. Scientific consultant was Dr. H. P. Robertson. George Kennan was to be designated consultant particularly with regard to USSR.

4. Activities

These were primarily administrative details, urgent problems, and planning for future programs.

Coordination of Intelligence Activities

Since February 12 CIG had been receiving numerous suggestions. The report spoke of them however in general terms. It mentioned specifically: liquidation of SSU, development of intelligence on USSR. Then came a list of problems for which solutions were in progress:

- a. Monitoring Bress and Bropaganda Broadcasts - Foreign Powers
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. Coordination of Gollection
- d. Coordination of Intelligence Research
- e. Essential Elements of Information
- f. Collection Foreign Intelligence Clandestine Methods
- g. Foreign Industrial Establishments
- h. Interim Study, Collection in China
- i. Central Register of Intelligence Information

Projects in stages of study and planning:

- a. USSBS-Disposition of Files
- b. Censorship Planning
- c. Intelligence Terminology
- d. Resources Potential Program
- e. Sampling Techniques
- f. Coverage of Foreign Language Press United States
- g. Foreign Petroleum Developments
- h. Coordination of Geographical and Related Intelligence
- i. Disposition of Publications JIC
- j. Survey Joint Intelligence Study Publications Board
- k. Photographic Intelligence File in State
- l. Coordination Private Research in Social Sciences
- m. [REDACTED]
- n. [REDACTED]
- o. Plan for Psychological Warfare
- p. [REDACTED]

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"One of the functions of CIG which has assumed great importance is the support of adequate budgets for departmental intelligence. Coordinated representation to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress of the budgetary requirements for intelligence activities, promises to be one of the more effective means for guarding against arbitrary depletion of intelligence sources at the expense of national security. So long as the CIG is dependent upon the Departments for budgetary support however its authority to speak as an unbiased guardian of the national security will be suspect and therefore not wholly effective."

Production of National Policy Intelligence - Daily Summary (CRS)

First issue 13 February. Need for Weekly Summary. Produced first issue 14 June 1946. The concept of this is that it concentrate on "significant trends of events supplementing the normal intelligence produced by the Departments."

(Estimates) →
(ABD)

"The primary function of CIG in the production of intelligence, however, will be the preparation and dissemination of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries as they affect the national security of the United States. The necessity of assigning the best qualified and carefully selected personnel to this vital task has delayed its initiation. Solution of the relationship of this CIG activity to the Departments, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies concerned with the national security has also

been deferred pending the procurement of adequate personnel. This procurement has now been given priority and it is anticipated that the Central Reports Staff will be prepared to produce national policy intelligence at an early date."

Performance of Centralized Operational Services

The report spoke of the liquidation of SSU and the arrangement for operation by the War Department under directives from DCI.

Planning had progressed to the point where the following operations could be more efficiently accomplished "centrally":

- a. Monitoring foreign broadcasts
- b. Collection foreign intelligence, clandestine methods
- c. Production of static intelligence studies of foreign areas (to replace JANIS)
- d. Establishment of a central register of intelligence information
- e. Basic research and analysis (common interest to all Departments) of such subjects as economics, geography, sociology, etc.

The concluding paragraph in this section indicated administrative, budgetary, and legal difficulties of CIG. The reduction of Department funds and personnel had made it difficult for Departments to furnish CIG with necessary facilities. CIG could not recruit directly from civilian life. The lack of enabling legislation to make CIG a legal entity prevented contracts which were required for many operations such as monitoring of foreign broadcasts.

5. Conclusions

- a. The present relationship between NIA, CIG, and IAB is sound.
- b. The initial organizational and planning phase has been completed. Operation of centralized intelligence service should be undertaken by CIG "at the earliest practicable date."
- c. NIA and CIG should obtain "enabling legislation and an independent budget as soon as possible, either as part of a new national defense organization or as a separate agency."

To Secret

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
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d. Coordination of Intelligence Research

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i. Disposition of Publications JIC

j. Survey Joint Intelligence Study Publications Board

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m. [Redacted]

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1.3(a) (4)
Activities and Methods

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