



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

25X1

NATO's 16th Nation: Spain's Prospective Role

25X1

A Research Paper

State Dept. review completed

DIA review
completed.

USAF review
completed.

Secret

*EUR 82-10084
September 1982*

Copy **347**

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

NATO's 16th Nation: Spain's Prospective Role

25X1

A Research Paper

The author of this paper is [redacted] European
Issues Division, Office of European Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, European Issues Division, on

25X1

[redacted]
25X1

This paper has been coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council [redacted]

25X1

Secret
EUR 82-10084
September 1982

Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

**NATO's 16th Nation:
Spain's Prospective Role** [Redacted]

25X1

Overview

*Information available
as of 20 August 1982
was used in this report.*

Spain formally joined NATO on 30 May 1982. The first new member since West Germany joined in 1955, Spain brings to the Alliance strategically valuable territory and facilities, a large and improving military force, and a substantial industrial base. Its entry provides NATO an important political and psychological boost at a time when other problems threaten the unity of the Alliance and leave an impression of decline. [Redacted]

25X1

Spanish entry is the culmination of a process under way since Spain began the transition to democracy following Franco's death. It also begins a new process in which the country's role in the Alliance—its share of the costs and benefits of membership—will be determined. There will be hard bargaining to resolve a number of sticky questions, such as:

- The forces Spain will contribute to Allied defense missions.
- The "ground rules" governing Spanish-Allied cooperation, particularly Allied use of Spanish facilities and the stationing of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory.
- Spain's role in the Alliance command structure and organization.
- The amount and type of Spain's financial contribution to joint budgets and programs. [Redacted]

25X1

The revision of the command structure is likely to be the most delicate problem. Portuguese fears of Spanish dominance are centered on this area, and Lisbon's strategy is to resist any compromise that might diminish its own role. Although neither Greece nor Turkey would be directly affected by changes made to accommodate Spain, Greece fears that such changes may bring into question the basic documents on which Athens rests its claim to Alliance commands covering most of the Aegean Sea. Turkey, on the other hand, hopes to use these changes to advance its position. Finding a way to restructure the Alliance commands while sidestepping this issue could prove the most difficult problem. Finally, Spanish claims to Gibraltar are likely to color the debate on new command arrangements. [Redacted]

25X1

Spanish expectations about the benefits of NATO membership are high; officials have stressed to the Allies their need to be able to show concrete results. Madrid's main objective—in addition to securing a role within the organization that accords with Spain's image of its importance to the Alliance and some progress on the issue of Gibraltar—is to obtain from the Allies financial assistance for ambitious modernization programs for the

Secret

25X1

Spanish armed forces. If these objectives are not met, Spain may become an additional source of tension within the Alliance, and the US-Spanish relationship could suffer. The problem could become particularly serious if the coming election brings to power a Socialist-led government, which would almost certainly be more demanding and less cooperative than the current one and which might even be committed to disruption of the integration process. [redacted]

25X1

Spain's key contribution to NATO will be its territory and facilities, with their potential for use as reinforcement or staging areas both in a European war and in a time of tension or conflict outside the NATO area. Because of its distance from Central Europe, the Iberian Peninsula would provide a secure rear area for logistic support in wartime and a good reception point for reinforcements from North America. Access to Spanish bases would assume special importance in the event that the United States planned to apply its military force in regions outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty—particularly the Persian Gulf. The value of these bases, however, would be limited by the extent to which Spain is willing to allow their use. Madrid has insisted upon case-by-case approval for flights to the Middle East and has generally been reluctant to grant such permission. It is possible—but in our opinion unlikely—that Spain would be more forthcoming if NATO were to provide an Alliance rationale for such operations. [redacted]

25X1

The Spanish armed forces, too, can make a modest but useful contribution to the conventional capability of the Alliance. The 58,000-man Navy is relatively modern in equipment and outlook. It has exercised often with other Alliance navies and operates regularly in the areas it is most likely to cover for NATO. The 37,000-man Air Force is a small but capable service, ready for integration into NATO plans. Spain's air defense surveillance system, Combat Grande, is one of the most modern in Europe. It is compatible with the French Strida II system and with NATO's NADGE¹ network. Although the Army is large—nearly 300,000 men—it is plagued by problems which will limit its effectiveness in a NATO context. These problems include major equipment deficiencies, inadequate training and logistic support, and an archaic command structure. All three services have ambitious modernization programs, which, if carried through, should improve their capabilities markedly during the next decade. [redacted]

25X1

¹ NATO Air Defense Ground Environment. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

Among the most significant contributions Spanish forces could make during the first few years are:

- *“Presence” missions.* A 900-man Army parachute battalion and a squadron of Air Force air defense or attack aircraft could be made available for use with the ACE Mobile Force—a multinational organization intended to deploy rapidly to the Northern or Southern Flanks to demonstrate NATO’s resolve in periods of tension.
- *Amphibious landing missions.* Two battalion-sized naval infantry landing teams are among Spain’s best units, although they would require Allied assistance with amphibious lift and air support.
- *Reinforcement.* Only the naval infantry units and an Army parachute brigade are currently ready for deployment within 30 days. Over the next few years, the Army also could improve an existing brigade or division or put together a new unit, specialized for NATO reinforcement purposes. The Air Force might be able to send a wing of aircraft—three or four squadrons—to support Allied air defense efforts, and the Navy could put to sea a light carrier task force, although its current V/STOL carrier is antiquated.
- *Sea control missions.* In wartime the Spanish Navy could make a modest but useful contribution from the outset by providing several ships to conduct ASW and minesweeping operations in the waters near Spain and to assist in protecting Allied convoys en route to European ports. Three helicopter squadrons and six fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft also could contribute to NATO’s air surveillance and ASW effort. In peacetime, one or two Spanish ships might be assigned on a rotational basis to NATO task forces, and routine Spanish patrols and exercises in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea could be integrated with those of other NATO navies. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Note: The information and judgments in this paper are based primarily on reporting from the US Embassy in Madrid, [Redacted] and the US Mission at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, as well as open source material. NATO documents supplied needed background. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Assessments of the military responsibilities Spain might assume and the number and type of units it might assign to NATO are ours. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret**Contents**


	<i>Page</i>
Overview	iii
Introduction	1
The Spanish Dowry: A Strategic Location and Useful Facilities	1
Political and Economic Benefits	2
Military Missions	3
Sea Control	4
Amphibious Landing Missions	5
"Presence" Missions	5
Reinforcement Capabilities	5
Operational Benefits of Spanish Membership	5
Problems Associated With Spanish Entry	6
The Nuclear Question	6
NATO Command Questions	6
The Spanish Command Proposal	9
The Portuguese Problem	10
Other Potential Problems	11
Gibraltar	11
The Spanish Enclaves	12
Spanish Goals and Expectations	12
Potential Political Problems With the Allies	13

25X1

Secret

25X1

**Figure 1
Peninsular Spain and Spanish Possessions**



637665 9-82

Secret

25X1

Secret
[Redacted]

25X1

**NATO's 16th Nation:
Spain's Prospective Role** [Redacted]

25X1

Introduction

Spanish entry into NATO in late May marked the beginning of what probably will be a lengthy transition period during which the country and its armed forces will be integrated into the Alliance. The process almost certainly will take more than the year required for the integration of West Germany in 1955. The Spanish have moved quickly, however, to place their political/ military team in Brussels and to put forward a sweeping proposal to alter NATO's command structure. NATO Secretary General Luns has set in motion a process he hopes will lead to identification and early resolution of the significant problems associated with Spanish entry. [Redacted]

25X1

This paper examines Spain's armed forces and their likely contributions to the Alliance. It investigates what Spain wants in return and discusses problems that are likely to prove troublesome to the United States and the other Allies during the integration process. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The Spanish Dowry: A Strategic Location and Useful Facilities

Spain's territory and the use of its military facilities will be its most significant contributions to NATO. These assets have considerable potential importance for the Alliance both in peace and war, and during periods of tension or conflict outside the NATO area. (See figure 1.) [Redacted]

25X1

In wartime, the Iberian Peninsula would provide a secure rear area nearly 2,500 kilometers from likely Central European battlefields. A variety of well-developed Spanish ports and airfields significantly augment Allied reception facilities for reinforcements from the United States and Canada, and their easy accessibility from the Atlantic and their distance from Central Europe make them even more attractive. Allied forces could stage from Spanish air and sea bases and use them as primary bases if the Alliance

suffered serious reverses. Repair, resupply, storage, and transportation facilities in Spain provide badly needed rear-echelon support. [Redacted] 25X1


Air and naval forces based in Spain and the Balearic Islands would be in a strong position to counter the Soviet Navy in the western Mediterranean and the approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. Spaniards like to point out that the Strait of Gibraltar would be far better guarded and defended by a number of bases in its hinterland than from the constricted British facility on "the Rock." Spanish holdings in the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla would extend NATO's assets near the European theater, and—in the case of the Canaries—allow NATO to control sea traffic along the west coast of Africa.² [Redacted] 25X1

How important these facilities will be in peacetime will depend upon the extent to which the Spanish allow Allied use. Spanish agreement to allow Allied air forces to use the firing range at Bardenas Reales, near Zaragoza, for example, could ease one of NATO's most serious training problems—a shortage of weapons training areas in densely populated Central Europe. Combat aircraft of the US Air Force, Europe (USAFE) use the Bardenas Reales range for about 70 percent of their weapons training. Spain's climate makes it an ideal year-round site for such exercises. [Redacted] 25X1

[Redacted] 25X1
Spanish military officials have recently discussed limiting US access to the range in order to allow other countries to use it. In exchange, Spain would hope for additional economic assistance from these countries. For many years, local and regional leaders have taken a generally negative view of Bardenas Reales, complaining at rallies and to the press about the danger

² The Spanish Government has pledged not to allow foreign forces or facilities in the Canaries. Ceuta and Melilla would be excluded by their location from coverage by the Atlantic Treaty, but Spain's accession presumably would allow the Alliance to use all of these locations during wartime. [Redacted] 25X1

Secret



On 5 June 1982 Spanish Defense Minister Alberto Oliart and Foreign Minister Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, flanking NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, move into position for the ceremony marking Spain's accession to NATO. [redacted]

NATO Review ©

25X1

25X1

presented by the weapons there and the adverse impact of foreign personnel in the area. As a result, the government probably would hesitate to press for any additional use of Bardenas Reales. [redacted]

[redacted] in Madrid, there have been unofficial discussions with Spanish military officers about the possibility of constructing—with NATO assistance—new training facilities in unpopulated areas. [redacted]

25X1

Spanish facilities could be valuable when the United States wants to project military force into regions outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty—particularly the Persian Gulf. Madrid has persistently taken a restrictive view of US use of its bases for such purposes. It has usually refused to allow the use of its airfields for operations that might be offensive to Arab countries, especially those relating

to the Arab-Israeli confrontation.³ Spain insisted during the negotiations for a new US-Spanish security agreement on continued case-by-case clearance for US aircraft transiting to points outside Europe. Although there is some possibility that Spain would be more forthcoming if NATO supplied an “umbrella” by agreeing that certain kinds of out-of-area operations serve Alliance purposes, in our view, this likelihood is slight unless the Middle East political equation changes significantly. [redacted]

25X1

Political and Economic Benefits

Spanish entry also would provide a political and psychological shot in the arm to an Alliance that seems torn by doubts and unable to meet defense

³ The only major exception to this policy was permission for transit last fall by 100 US aircraft during the Bright Star exercise in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1 spending commitments and force goals. Moreover, Spanish accession should strengthen the Alliance's Southern Flank, which has been militarily weak and politically volatile throughout NATO's existence. The addition of Spanish territory could reinforce the usefulness of Portugal by tying its landmass directly to the rest of NATO. [redacted]

25X1 Spanish membership brings to the Alliance a country with the second-largest land area and fifth-largest population in Western Europe. Spain's GDP ranks toward the middle of West European countries, and it has a well-developed, reasonably modern industrial base and the capability to produce high-quality, less sophisticated armaments and to coproduce sophisticated weapons systems. Spain's entry also provides a "one-time bonus" of about 4 percent in real growth in the overall defense expenditures of the European NATO members. (See appendix B for a discussion of Spanish defense spending.) [redacted]

The Soviets have viewed the prospect of Spanish membership in NATO—and the addition of Spain's territory, manpower, and national resources—with some anxiety. They have tried in a variety of ways to derail the process, inveighing against it in the media and appealing directly and through intermediaries—

[redacted] Soviet statements have emphasized the increased danger Spain would face in the event of war, the threat to its nuclear-free status and national independence, and the heightening of East-West tensions that would result. [redacted]

[redacted] Their statements also have encouraged the impression that Spanish membership might bring pressure on the Yugoslavs to join the Warsaw Pact. [redacted] the Soviets tried in May to use the Falklands crisis to press Spain from going through with its application. Soviet approaches to Spanish leaders have included offers regarded by the Spaniards as veiled threats. [redacted]

[redacted] The Soviets also have tried both in public statements and diplomatic contacts to push the concept that both

blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—should refrain from expanding their memberships. In a demarche to Madrid last fall, sharply rejected by the Spaniards, the Soviets cited a United Nations resolution⁴ along these lines. [redacted] 25X1

Military Missions

As the Spanish Government began to focus during 1981 on the political process of NATO membership, Spanish military officers and journalists began to discuss [redacted] the ways in which their military forces might contribute to the Alliance. The Spanish National War College—CESEDEN—was commissioned to do a study of the problems and issues involved in joining NATO, among them the role Spain might play. While they clearly recognize that their country's strategic location is its most significant drawing card, these advocates of membership want the Spanish military to have meaningful and clearly defined missions. [redacted] 25X1

In many ways, the Spanish forces compare favorably with those of several of the NATO nations. With almost 400,000 men (see table 1) the armed forces are larger than most European NATO militaries. Only West Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and France have more men under arms. [redacted] 25X1

The Spaniards use much equipment that is similar or identical to that used by other NATO countries—for example, the AMX-30 tank and F-4, F-5, and Mirage aircraft. Moreover, modernization programs under way and planned should improve Spanish forces substantially over the next several years. Increased contact with NATO militaries, especially during joint 25X1 training exercises, is likely to give Spain an increasingly active role in Alliance military operations. [redacted] 25X1

Nevertheless, we think the Spanish military has a number of weaknesses that will affect its ability to contribute immediately to NATO defenses. The Army, in particular, is an unwieldy and deeply [redacted] 25X1

⁴ The preamble to UN Resolution 35/152G of 12 December 1980 contains language calling for the dissolution of existing military alliances and, as a first step, for refraining from actions conducive to expansion of existing military groupings. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Secret

Secret

Table 1
Personnel Strength of the
Spanish Armed Forces

	Number of Persons
Total ^a	391,000
Army	296,000
Navy	58,000
Air Force	37,000

^a This figure does not include paramilitary forces: the Civil Guard, which has 63,000 men and would come under Army control during wartime, and the National Police, which has 45,000 men and is responsible to the Ministry of the Interior.

conservative organization. The Navy and Air Force, with newer and better equipment and a more modern organization and outlook, are more ready for integration into NATO operations. (See appendix A for discussion of Spain's armed forces.)

Sea Control. The area in which Spain should be able immediately to make a modest but useful contribution is that of sea control. Budgetary pressures are steadily reducing the number of ships NATO navies have available for this mission. NATO naval officials have worried in articles in military journals and at NATO meetings that the quality gained by adding more modern and capable ships will not make up for the larger number of ships leaving service. Therefore, the addition of some 31 Spanish surface combatants and seven submarines—several of them recently constructed—is welcome.

Under NATO, the Spanish Navy would work in concert with Allied forces to patrol the western Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, and the Atlantic approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar—areas in which it already operates.⁵ If Spain follows the lead of several of its NATO Allies, including Italy and West

⁵ Assessments of the military responsibilities Spain might assume and the number and type of units it might assign to NATO missions are ours. We have taken information about forces normally available and adjusted it on the assumption that some units will need to be withheld for competing national missions.

Germany, it would commit the bulk of its naval combatant forces to NATO missions, although it may retain many of the corvettes for national missions related to the defense of Ceuta and Melilla, the Canaries, and even antiterrorist patrols.

During wartime the Navy could put to sea a light carrier task force composed of a V/STOL carrier, about six destroyers, one or two frigates or corvettes, and perhaps three submarines. Associated aircraft could include six AV-8A Harriers and eight ASW helicopters. The Navy could play an important part in guarding Allied ships transporting troops and supplies from North America as they neared their European terminus. The major Soviet naval threat to this area in the initial stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war probably would consist of a small number of submarines deployed near Gibraltar to attack high-value NATO targets such as aircraft carriers. Spanish ASW forces, integrated with those of other Western navies, could make a small but significant contribution to the effort to search out and destroy Soviet submarines.

In peacetime, Spanish ASW units would assist in monitoring Soviet submarine traffic in and near the Strait, and three naval ASW helicopter squadrons and one squadron of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft belonging to the Air Force could contribute to NATO's air surveillance mission there. One or two ASW and surface attack units—destroyers and frigates—might be assigned to NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED). One or two minesweepers might even be assigned to the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), a small multilateral mine warfare force that operates in the English Channel.⁶

⁶ STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORCHAN are made up of ships from the NATO navies that normally operate in each area. Each nation assigns one or two ships for tours of duty normally lasting six or 12 months. Ships are earmarked for NAVOCFORMED, which is periodically activated for exercises. It is not a standing force.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Amphibious Landing Missions. Two well-trained battalion-sized naval infantry landing teams, totaling about 2,000 men, are available for use on the Southern Flank. Some Allied amphibious lift assistance almost certainly would be required to deliver and support them. Moreover, because they lack dedicated air support, these units are ready to assault only a lightly defended enemy beach [redacted]

25X1

"Presence" Missions. Battalion-sized or squadron-sized ground and air units are available to be assigned to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (ACE Mobile Force or AMF). This organization, which consists of military units from several NATO members, is intended to deploy rapidly to the Northern or Southern Flanks to demonstrate NATO's resolve during periods of tension. Madrid could earmark a squadron of Air Force air defense or attack aircraft for AMF operations. The only Spanish Army unit that could currently be made available for quick response missions is a 900-man parachute battalion. (Units earmarked for the AMF must be available in fewer than three days.) Spanish Air Force medium-range transport aircraft probably are able to support deployment of an Air Force combat squadron or the parachute battalion. [redacted]

25X1

Reinforcement Capabilities. Spanish political and military leaders have said that no Spanish forces will be stationed outside the country in peacetime and that the principal mission of these forces will continue to be the defense of Spanish territory. Nevertheless, their recent public statements about NATO membership make it clear that they expect to earmark some of these forces for reinforcement missions elsewhere in Europe [redacted]

25X1

Spain currently has only a modest capability for rapid reinforcement of NATO forces. The only ground forces that now could be employed within 30 days are one parachute brigade and (with US logistic assistance) the two naval infantry landing teams. None of the Army's divisions could be transported promptly, nor do they have the modern equipment, training, and mobility to perform well against the Warsaw Pact. [redacted]

25X1

If planned equipment modernization programs are successful, the Army may, within a few years, be able

to deploy at least one additional brigade within 30 days after mobilization. If improvement of an existing Army unit is made a high-priority objective in allocation of modernization resources, a division could probably be readied. Spanish defense officials currently seem to be thinking in terms of developing—as the Portuguese have done—a special air-transportable, mechanized unit that would be earmarked for rapid reinforcement. Defense Minister Oliart has referred to the unit as a "so-called Immediate Intervention Force," and it probably would receive a high priority for modern equipment and training. Its practical usefulness would depend, however, upon the availability of dedicated air transport resources. [redacted]

25X1

senior Spanish military officers are determined that any reinforcement unit would be designated for duty in Central rather than Southern Europe.⁷ These military officers evidently see Central Europe as the most important and prestigious NATO area, and they want their role to reflect what they see as the importance of their contribution. [redacted]

25X1

We believe the Air Force probably could deploy a composite wing of three or four squadrons of F-4C and Mirage F-1C aircraft for Allied air defense missions within 30 days. Alternatively, one or two Spanish F-5 squadrons might be deployed for ground support and tactical reconnaissance, but Spanish attack squadrons would require additional training to be effective in a high-threat environment. Spain's inability to provide adequate logistic support outside the country almost certainly would require colocating any of these aircraft with similar models belonging to the host NATO countries. Air and naval transport resources, if not heavily involved in transporting men and materiel, could be used to support Alliance supply and replenishment efforts in the Mediterranean. [redacted]

25X1

Operational Benefits of Spanish Membership

Spanish forces—particularly the Navy—currently cooperate and exercise with those of a number of NATO nations, including the United States, Portugal, France, and Italy. Spain's air defense system

⁷ The Portuguese brigade has been earmarked for northern Italy. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

already is connected with that of France and, through it, to NATO's NADGE radar system. Nevertheless, NATO membership will allow a much greater degree of preplanning, intelligence sharing, and joint training. The thorough integration of the Spanish air defense system and ASW efforts with Allied plans and operations will strengthen both Spanish defenses and Alliance capabilities. The development in peacetime of plans for the integration of Spanish forces and the use of Spanish facilities avoids losing time in negotiating complicated arrangements during a time of crisis and assures that political consent will be forthcoming—at least for contingencies within the NATO area. [redacted]

25X1

Problems Associated With Spanish Entry

Integration of Spain into NATO will involve multilateral bargaining over such questions as the nature of the Spanish military contribution. It also will require internal Spanish actions and adjustments on a range of small but important subjects. For example, Spain has no central governmental body authorized to grant security clearances and maintain records of them. The Spanish Government has been working since spring on secrecy regulations that would accord with those in use in NATO. Although it will take time to sort out such matters, they should be resolved without great difficulty. A number of questions do pose difficult problems, however, and there is some potential for disappointment and frustration on both sides as negotiations proceed. [redacted]

25X1

The Nuclear Question. Because of its distance from Eastern Europe and the USSR, Spain is probably an unlikely site for basing NATO's new intermediate-range nuclear missile systems—the Pershing II ballistic missile with a 1,800-km range and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range of 2,500 km. Nevertheless an explicit Spanish refusal to participate in Alliance nuclear programs could create problems for other countries—such as Italy, Germany, and Belgium—which have accepted or are considering fielding such weapons and, in the process, “unhinge” NATO's program to upgrade its intermediate-range nuclear forces. Moreover, if Spain ultimately were to refuse to allow any nuclear weapons in its territory—even in transit—the flexibility of Alliance military operations would be limited. [redacted]

25X1

By the time Spain's Parliament began formal consideration of the accession instrument last fall, NATO Secretary General Luns and several of the Allies most interested in the question had made the government well aware that it could not present the Alliance with preconditions making Spain a nuclear free zone, and the government pressed Parliament not to establish any preconditions. Nevertheless, the Parliament did add to the resolution several “recommendations,” including a reaffirmation of national policy opposing the presence of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil. In accepting the amendments, the government pledged itself to consult Parliament before proposing any change in the policy. [redacted]

25X1

The current attitude of the Spanish Government toward the nuclear question has not been clearly defined. The Suarez government in 1976 took credit for the US agreement not to store nuclear weapons in Spain and the subsequent withdrawal of ballistic missile submarines from Rota in 1979. However, the issue at that time concerned foreign nuclear weapons and was argued in the context of bilateral strains and resentments. The present government, however, seems at least interested in preserving its options for the future, and Spain continues to refuse to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past, the Spanish Navy gave some consideration to building nuclear-powered submarines with French assistance, and some in the Spanish Army even seem interested in possible acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. The Spanish Socialists—who have an excellent chance of coming to power—have continued to favor nonnuclear policies across the board. [redacted]

25X1

NATO Command Questions. The question of where Spain will fit in the NATO command structure is the most delicate problem posed by Spanish membership. (See figures 2, foldout at end, and 3.) The current command organization was laboriously worked out and revised as circumstances demanded to balance the competing claims of the members. Geographic boundaries between subcommands were drawn to follow strictly the territorial claims of the members and to reflect their historic sensitivities. The commands were parceled out by a complicated formula,


Secret

Approved For Release 2008/08/28 : CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8

Page Denied

Secret

Figure 3
NATO Command Boundaries



25X1

632666 9-82

which clearly reflected the capabilities and roles of the larger members, but also respected the pride of the smaller ones. Where disagreements exist—as between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea—they can present the Alliance with monumental problems.

25X1

The Spanish Command Proposal. In early June, during a press conference in Brussels, Defense Minister Oliart announced that Spain intended to propose to NATO a fourth major command—comparable to ACE, ACLANT, and ACCHAN. The proposed command would comprise all of the territory and waters

Secret

Secret

in which Spain is directly interested—peninsular Spain, Gibraltar, the Balearic and Canary Islands, and the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, Ceuta, and Melilla. [redacted]

25X1

Madrid probably sent aloft this trial balloon primarily for domestic reasons. In our view, it likely represents an effort by a weak government to carve out a defensible position on emotional issues such as Gibraltar and the status of the enclaves in advance of elections likely to be held this fall. Several of the Allies have indicated in discussions at NATO Headquarters that they would not accept such a major revision of the Alliance's current organization, or such a major role for Spain. Moreover, the Spanish proposal includes a number of elements, such as the inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla, that will be difficult if not impossible to resolve to Madrid's satisfaction. It does, however, delineate the areas Spain will expect to command in the name of the Alliance. It would, moreover, sidestep the knottiest problem facing the negotiators—the problem of Portugal. Thus, the Alliance command structure that eventually emerges from the negotiations may contain at least elements of the Spanish proposal. [redacted]

25X1

The Portuguese Problem. In integrating Spain into its existing structure, the Alliance will need not only to satisfy Spanish ambitions but also to assuage Portuguese anxieties. Comments by Portuguese officials over several years reflect a fear that Spain, with its larger and somewhat more modern armed forces, will naturally come to dominate Portugal in Alliance planning and operations. This fear has deep historical roots, and it is reflected in Portuguese ambivalence toward Spain's applications to NATO and the European Community and her general reintegration into Western Europe. In the case of NATO, this anxiety is chiefly expressed in terms of the command structure. [redacted]

25X1

In September 1982 a Portuguese admiral for the first time will become Commander of IBERLANT, which is responsible for the ground and air defense of the Iberian Peninsula as well as the waters around it. Lisbon, determined to retain this position, has told the Allies that it will never accept a Spanish commander for IBERLANT and has pressed the notion that

Spain should focus its efforts in the Mediterranean and Central Europe. Still, the Portuguese cannot avoid recognizing that Spanish ground and air forces logically fit under IBERLANT, and that some of Spain's most vital interests lie in the waters covered by the Iberian Command. [redacted]

25X1

On 9 July a Portuguese Foreign Ministry official told a US diplomat that his country would accept one of two alternatives:

- Putting IBERLANT under overall Portuguese command with two subcommands—one Spanish, extending from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Canaries, and one Portuguese, covering the rest of IBERLANT.
- Putting the area from Gibraltar to the Canaries under a separate Spanish command and extending IBERLANT to include the Azores, which now come under WESTLANT.

The Portuguese official indicated that his government recognizes that the first alternative probably will not be acceptable to the Spanish. [redacted]

25X1

Statements by Spanish officials in NATO and to US officials suggest that the Spanish Government understands Portuguese sensitivity on the issue, and we believe Spain probably will compromise to respect this sensitivity. Nevertheless, Spain sees itself as potentially a strong, valued NATO member, and wants its role in the Alliance command structure to reflect its status. [redacted]

25X1

In the meantime, the Portuguese are trying to settle several matters before Spanish accession. They have proposed in NATO the shift of the Azores Island Command from WESTLANT to IBERLANT—a move they apparently believe would consolidate their holdings and strengthen their claim to the Iberian command. Portuguese officials in NATO also are anxious to nail down Allied funding for programs to modernize their armed forces so they can play a valid part in NATO activities. They want prompt NATO infrastructure funding for an independent Portuguese

Secret

Secret

air defense warning and control system because they hope to obtain an Iberian air defense command before the far more modern and effective Spanish air defense system can be integrated.

[Redacted]

25X1

.25X1

Portuguese statements—both public and private—make it clear that the leadership is concerned not only about protecting its practical interests as the Spanish join, but also about “staking out” Portugal’s proper position as one of the founding members of NATO.

25X1

25X1

Other Potential Problems. Although Spain’s geographic location makes it the logical successor to the naval subcommands in the western Mediterranean (MEDOC) and Bay of Biscay (BISCLANT) abandoned by France when it left the military side of NATO in 1966, the French are likely to be sensitive to any arrangement that might seem to give Madrid control over French coastal waters. French Foreign Minister Hernu recently commented to Portuguese officials that Spanish accession poses “not insignificant” difficulties for both France and Portugal. Further subdivision of these command areas might solve the problem.

25X1

Rome’s interests do not appear to conflict directly with those of Madrid, but statements by Italian officials in Brussels suggest that the Italians will be watching very closely to see that their control of the major naval command in the Mediterranean is not threatened.

25X1

The problem with the most serious potential to derail the process of Spanish integration, however, involves two countries not directly affected—Greece and Turkey. Greek officials in Brussels have stated both publicly and privately their fears that the negotiations could throw open the whole question of NATO arrangements in the Mediterranean and jeopardize the control Greece currently enjoys over most of the Aegean by encouraging Turkish objections. Athens argues that MC 38/4, the 1956 Military Committee document setting out the organization of Alliance

commands in the Mediterranean, is applicable; Ankara claims that it is not. The Turkish Permanent Representative recently linked his approval of Spanish command arrangements to disavowal or revision of MC 38/4. The Allies eventually may have to pressure Greece and Turkey to accept revisions in the western Mediterranean without prejudice to command questions in the Aegean.

25X1

Gibraltar. Spanish discussions and debates about NATO membership over the last six or seven years have suggested that Madrid expected that the problem of Gibraltar would somehow be resolved if Spain joined NATO. We believe that the government now understands that this expectation is unrealistic, but—as evidenced in the “fourth command” proposal—it still seems to hope that a revision in NATO’s structure might offer it some satisfaction. Madrid probably would prefer to see a Spanish admiral installed as NATO’s commander at Gibraltar—a development the government could sell to the Spanish public as a major step forward—but it is a solution we believe the British would be even less likely to accept in the wake of the Falklands crisis than before. Another Spanish proposal calls for the Gibraltar base to be labeled a NATO base under joint UK-Spanish command. Spain’s most basic concern with respect to Gibraltar, however, seems to be that no one mistake the arrangements it accepts as acquiescence to continued British rule.

25X1

In the meantime, a bilateral effort by the British and the Spanish to lower tensions over Gibraltar has encountered difficulties. Spain was to reopen its border with the colony on 20 April, and the two countries were to begin negotiations on “all issues” concerning Gibraltar. Because of the Falklands crisis and what the Spanish see as British rigidity on the question, Madrid deferred these actions and finally postponed them indefinitely.

25X1

The positions of Britain and Spain remain far apart, and a full resolution of the issues is likely to take years—if it ever occurs. Spanish support for Argentina during the Falklands conflict may make agreement

Secret

Secret

even more difficult. Ultimately, however, Spain's membership in NATO could provide both sides with a fig leaf for whatever concessions they might finally agree on. [redacted]

25X1

The Spanish Enclaves. Parliamentary debates last fall focused as well on the failure of the North Atlantic Treaty to provide protection for the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which lie outside the NATO region in North Africa. By the time Spain formally joined the Alliance, the government seemed to have accepted that it could extract no explicit arrangements for Ceuta and Melilla—although the recent Spanish command proposals raise the question again. The government “fudged” the issue last fall in responding to parliamentary questions, knowing that the enclaves raise strong emotions, especially in the military, and lend themselves to demagoguery. The government's position essentially was that “NATO membership will protect Spanish territory; Ceuta and Melilla are part of Spanish territory.” The US Ambassador has observed that on this, as on some other issues, the government may have allowed the Parliament and the public to believe that parliamentary “recommendations” on the NATO legislation mean more than they do, betting that the issues will fade with time or that the perceived benefits of NATO membership will outweigh disadvantages. [redacted]

25X1

Many Spaniards continue to believe—as evidenced in the parliamentary debates and writings by military officers and journalists—that the most serious threat to their security comes from the south—from potential instability and Soviet meddling in North Africa. NATO membership does nothing, in their view, to meet that threat. Some military officers, writing on Spain's potential military contributions to the Alliance, have pointed out that it will be necessary to withhold from NATO control the forces necessary to defend Ceuta and Melilla. [redacted]

25X1

The Canary Islands have not presented a comparable problem. They are included in the area covered by the Treaty, whose southern ocean boundary is the Tropic of Cancer. [redacted]

25X1

Spanish Goals and Expectations. The Spanish Government found that the process of weighing potential costs and benefits before deciding to join the Alliance

was time consuming; few interest groups were truly enthusiastic about the notion and [redacted] large numbers of officers, especially in the Army, did not approve of joining NATO. A poll taken in October 1981 indicated that 52 percent of Spaniards opposed joining NATO, while 18 percent favored entry. In the end, however, the government decided that entry might help to achieve several goals. Among these were:

25X1

25X1

- The acceleration of Spain's full integration into Western Europe, including membership in the European Community.
- The redirection of the armed forces toward a European-oriented military mission; with the virtual end of Spanish colonial involvement in Africa, the military had little to do and strong motivation to meddle in domestic politics.
- The modernization of the armed forces to “NATO standards,” both through increased contact with better organized, more capable Western militaries and through greatly increased financial aid. [redacted]

25X1

We believe that most of these objectives will be met to some extent, but that Madrid holds some unrealistic expectations about the economic benefits of NATO membership [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the Spanish believe that they would receive substantially more military assistance as a member of NATO than they would if they did not join—both from the United States, in the context of the new Treaty of Cooperation to cover US use of Spanish facilities, and from other NATO countries. We believe that Spain is counting on aid from its allies to help fund ambitious modernization programs. [redacted]

25X1

These expectations are likely to confront some harsh realities during the next year. Clearly, Spain stands to receive substantial military assistance from the United States under the new treaty, and Spain will become eligible as an ally for speedier transfer of certain kinds of defense technology. Spanish industry may also find more opportunities to participate in European defense

Secret

Secret

cooperation programs to develop new weapons systems. Nevertheless, we believe that US assistance is unlikely to approach levels that would satisfy the Spaniards, or to provide the kind of grant assistance or concessionary terms they believe they deserve. West Germany is already pressed to meet its own force improvement goals, while aiding other Southern Flank countries. Few other NATO members have the resources for more than token assistance to poor Allies—and Spain's economic development places it well ahead of the poorest NATO nations, Turkey, Portugal, and Greece. [redacted]

25X1

It is also clear from remarks by Spanish officials that Spain, like most of the lesser NATO countries, expects to receive much more in benefits from the Alliance infrastructure program—funds allocated to improve facilities for joint use—than it contributes.⁸ As a NATO member, Spain will almost certainly benefit from the infrastructure program, but it will find competition keen for these funds. Spanish firms will be able to compete for infrastructure projects throughout the Alliance, but their competitive advantage will be strongest on Spanish projects. Ultimately, the amount of infrastructure that is built in Spain will depend directly on its participation in NATO defense efforts and the extent to which it allows Allied forces to use its facilities. Discussions about assistance levels and infrastructure funds will be difficult and protracted and the Spaniards are likely to feel some disappointment. [redacted]

25X1

Spanish Government officials and those parliamentarians and military officials who favor accession have stressed to US and Allied officials their need to be able to show real benefits from NATO membership. Many of the advantages to be derived from participation as equals in NATO councils and committees and regular contact with Allied militaries will be intangible and difficult to measure. Spanish perceptions about such benefits will, however, be extremely important in coloring Madrid's attitudes concerning the more difficult questions of assistance levels. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the Spanish military currently views the

⁸ For a discussion of the potential costs to Spain of membership, see appendix B.

NATO connection with ambivalence. Some elements, especially in the Army, remain anxious about the changes membership seems certain to bring, worried about the loss of sovereignty implied in joining the Alliance, and aware that their equipment and capabilities do not currently measure up to NATO standards. Other military officers, generally those in the Air Force and Navy, regard with considerable enthusiasm the new opportunities for assignments at NATO headquarters and commands and professional contact with NATO officers, and hope that membership will bring practical benefits like modern equipment and more sophisticated training. [redacted] 25X1

On balance, the armed forces seem to have accepted NATO membership as a positive step. Their leadership actively supported the government during the accession process. They will play a major role in hammering out the new arrangements for Spanish participation in Brussels; the new Spanish Ambassador to NATO has indicated to US officials that his government hopes to engage the military so deeply in the process that it will become an advocate for NATO should the Socialist Party come to power. [redacted] 25X1

Potential Political Problems With the Allies. Because of its particular perspective and, in part, because of its isolation from the European mainstream over the past four decades, Spain may view some political issues differently from the other Allies. Although expressing sympathy for both sides during the Falklands crisis, for example, Spain eventually came down on the side of Argentina. The Spanish Foreign Minister used his maiden speech to the North Atlantic Council to remind the Allies of Spain's Latin vocation and to hope—evenhandedly—that the two sides would negotiate a solution "which would respect both the territorial integrity of Argentina and the well-being of the population." [redacted] 25X1

On a number of other questions, Spain has differences with individual members. The Gibraltar question, the rivalry with Portugal, problems over French harboring of Basque terrorists in southern France, economic and trade issues with all the Allies—any of these could tarnish the image of heightened cooperation

Secret

Secret

between Spain and its NATO partners and make the technical issues of integration harder to solve. It is true that bilateral issues frequently divide other members of NATO, but Spain is the "new kid on the block," and the Allies will be looking to Madrid for signs that it can get along and add to rather than detract from Allied harmony. [redacted]

25X1

The problem could become very serious if the current government collapses soon, leading to early elections, and even more critical if the opposition Socialist Party (PSOE) should win the elections. The PSOE has publicly opposed Spanish membership, insisting that a referendum should be held to decide the question, and recently has adopted policies that combine opposition to NATO with politically popular patriotic demands on Gibraltar and the Spanish enclaves. An election campaign also would put pressure on the parties of the center right to adopt strident positions on such questions. The Spanish debate could, therefore, needlessly exacerbate relations with the Allies, and the parties may establish positions that will be difficult to back off from after the elections. [redacted]

25X1

US Embassy officials believe, based on conversations with PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez and other Socialists, that Gonzalez is inclined to allow the integration progress to continue even if he comes to power. This change of heart reportedly is based on Gonzalez's fear that the military will stage a coup if his party takes power and a belief that a rash act such as a sudden withdrawal from NATO might provide the pretext. His thinking may also reflect a growing realization that NATO membership would be good for the Spanish military, deflecting them from their concentration on internal strains and domestic politics. Nevertheless, we believe that a new government dominated by the Socialists would take a more confrontational line on the difficult issues involved in Spain's integration. Moreover, if the Socialists win a majority of parliamentary seats, their campaign rhetoric could impose on the leadership the referendum on NATO membership they have said they favor. [redacted]

25X1

If the Socialists dominate the next government, their political behavior in the Alliance will be shaped in part by the pattern of cooperation they choose with other Socialist-led governments. If they often make common cause with Greece's nonconformist and nationalistic Prime Minister Papandreu, Spain will be a divisive force within the Alliance rather than a strengthening one. On the other hand, if Gonzalez forges special ties within the Alliance with the French Socialists or a Schmidt-dominated West German SPD, those ties will help smooth Spain's integration.

25X1

The PSOE already has ties to all three parties— [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Gonzalez

25X1

visited Greece for consultations with Papandreu shortly after he became Prime Minister. Nevertheless, we expect that a PSOE-led government would retain an independent point of view on issues before the Alliance; it would likely choose its allies because of their positions on questions of mutual interest, and not be led by any foreign ally. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

Approved For Release 2008/08/28 : CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8

Secret

Approved For Release 2008/08/28 : CIA-RDP83-00857R000100100003-8