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23 April 1951

**PROBLEM -- The Determination of Intelligence Requirements for
Collection Agencies of the Government.**

1. In an effort to clarify intelligence requirements for covert operations, OSO has requested the assistance of the coordinating agencies of CIA.
2. Several meetings have been held with representatives of collection agencies of the Government which have resulted in the recognition of OSO as a catch-all for intelligence requirements, because of the fact that the problem was not considered from the point of view of all agencies. A misconception of the requirement has been apparent throughout our conversations, e.g., representatives of the Defense Services in two meetings indicated that the papers prepared by the Defense Services were intended for OSO because they believe that the information required on the USSR and its Satellites can only be obtained through covert operations.
3. The Defense Services are most advanced in their preparation of collection requirements, but between the three principal agencies of Defense there is little inter-relationship of priorities.
4. The State Department and the using offices of CIA have not presented over-all requirements, nor apparently has there been an effort to correlate the specific requirements.
5. The discussions of this subject have indicated a need felt to be soluble only by the CIA, whose charter places on it the responsibility for such coordination. It is above and beyond the scope of the needs presented in this problem by OSO. For these reasons, a paper has been initiated by OSO requesting that a National Intelligence Requirements Board be established to meet this problem.
6. To stimulate action on this request, it is felt that an expression of the thoughts of the Assistant Directors at this meeting would be healthy.

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. OSO believes that it is a joint IAC or National responsibility to determine:
 - (a) What intelligence is required by the US.
 - (b) The order in which it should be obtained.
 - (c) Who is to collect the intelligence.
2. OSO also believes that no member of the IAC or individual office of CIA is competent to make these decisions for the others.
3. Virtually all the arguments used in support of the production of National Estimates can be used to support the production of National Intelligence Requirements.
4. Currently all the IAC members draw up their requirements independently, without adequate indications of priorities, and direct them to the collection agencies.
5. The collection agencies are compelled to try to reconcile these conflicting requirements and establish collection priorities.
6. The collection agencies, individually or collectively, have neither the facilities nor the competence to determine the intelligence collection requirements of the US.
7. As matters now stand, the collection agencies are buried under an avalanche of uncoordinated collection requirements that are far beyond their present and probable future collection capabilities.
8. In the event of a serious "intelligence failure", those drawing up intelligence requirements can be reasonably sure that they are "protected" by having called for practically all conceivable information and the collection agencies can be almost equally certain that they will not have been able to obtain it.
9. Certain steps have already been taken pointing toward the production of National Intelligence Requirements. These are summarized in Tab "A".
10. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that a National Intelligence Requirement Board be established in CIA, at the earliest possible moment, in order to:
 - (a) Receive all intelligence requirements.
 - (b) Establish intelligence priorities.
 - (c) Assign collection responsibilities.
11. It is further recommended that the proposed National Intelligence Requirements Board be placed under such coordinating agency as may be deemed appropriate, and that it work with representatives of the collecting as well as the requiring agencies in order to coordinate collection.

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TAB "A"

SURVEY OF PAPERS BEARING ON NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1. DCI 4/1 states general, over-all principles applicable to all areas. Paragraph 3 notes the obligation of CIA to establish and maintain on a current basis priority listings of National Intelligence Objectives, by country and/or subject; this is to be done in collaboration with other agencies concerned.

2. DCI 4/2 gives seven over-all objectives which are, however, limited to the production of intelligence on Soviet capabilities and intentions. These topics are very general and are confined to the USSR. It is assumed that there are other areas of strategic interest in a descending order of importance on which intelligence must be procured.

3. Appendices to SM-626-51, "Fields in Which a Lack of Intelligence Exists." These three separate appendices of the Department of Army, Air, and Navy are excellent forward steps in presenting intelligence requirements. Their weaknesses are that:

(a) They are actually written only against the USSR and Satellites.

(b) Only one Department has roughly arranged the requirements on a priority basis.

(c) They contain no reconciliation of the separate requirements of the three Departments.

Parallel requirements of the Department of State and interested Offices of CIA have not been submitted.

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