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SECURITY INFORMATION

Liaison Officer, FBID

31 January 1953

Administrative Officer, FBID

Notes for Progress Report - January 1953

1. All positions in the Teletype Unit, Editorial Branch were upgraded by one grade. This development followed a survey of FBID's positions in relation to other Telegraphic Typewriter Operator positions in the Agency.

2. Classification's review of certain positions in the Department, U.S. and Overseas field has been commenced by Classification and Wage Division. The types of positions under review include Foreign-Language, Editorial, technical and clerical.

3. A forecast of procurement requirements for Fiscal Years 1954 and 1955 was submitted to the Chief, Procurement and Supply Office.

4. Budget instructions for Fiscal Year 1955 were prepared and forwarded to all Bureaus.

5. The Chief, Okinawa Bureau visited Tokyo on TDY for the purpose of purchasing furnishings for the first 16 new permanent-type houses.

6. An additional \$3,000 in unvouchered funds was transmitted to the Chief, Okinawa Bureau for dependent schooling expenditures through balance of Fiscal Year.

7. The Chief, Okinawa Bureau received information that the 25% Foreign Post Differential on Okinawa may be reduced or eliminated. A memorandum signed by the Assistant Director for Operations was forwarded to the Deputy Director for Administration requesting that measures be taken to obviate any such action.

8. Action was initiated to

a. Return the Emergency Complement equipment used by the [redacted] to the Mediterranean Bureau where it will be absorbed into [redacted] complement.

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b. Transfer from the East Coast Bureau to the Mediterranean Bureau all Emergency Complement equipment maintained at the East Coast Bureau, except one jeep.

[redacted]

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12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: FBID Progress Report 1952

A. Summary 1952 and Objectives for 1953

1. a. A small monitoring bureau was activated at [redacted]

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[redacted] as part of FBID's effort to provide radio monitoring coverage of Siberia, Northern Manchuria and the maritime provinces. See paragraph B. 3. g.

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b. Toward further closing of the Central Asian gap in FBID monitoring coverage, a survey team was sent to Pakistan to conduct reception tests. Its mission was completed late in November and as of the end of December their findings are being analyzed to determine what further action may appropriately be taken. See paragraph F. 2. a.

c. The coverage of the Baltic States and northwest USSR regional transmitters was discussed at the FBIS-BEC Joint Coordination Committee meeting in December of 1952. See paragraph F. 1. a.

d. Land in the Santa Rosa area of California was obtained through negotiated purchase and condemnation for the construction of a new West Coast Bureau. See paragraphs B. 3. f. and F. 1. c.

e. Several analyses of radio propaganda in connection with estimates being prepared by ONE were completed and in addition to

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their substantive contribution to intelligence production led to a recognition of the continuing need for propaganda analysis. During 1953 the staff of propaganda analysts will achieve greater competence, and it is planned that FBID's contribution to the intelligence production offices will be intensified both as regards quantity and quality. See paragraphs B. 1. b, C. 2. b, D. 1. a, and F. 1. f.

2. a. An unsolved problem of continuing nature is the desire of various psychological warfare activities to use classified FBID publications as operational and background material. It is believed that this problem cannot be satisfactorily resolved on the Division level but should be a policy decision on a high level to assess the risk in light of the degree of security clearances for psychological warfare offices' unclassified personnel.

b. Although good progress has been made in desk-level liaison designed to orient FBID production to the requirements of the intelligence offices, there is still a need for closer contact with psychological warfare offices, especially those which have operational requirements for monitoring support. The problem appears to be one of bringing an intelligence information collection activity into the confidence of the covert psychological warfare operators. See paragraph D. 3. c.

c. A threat to the Okinawa Bureau developed in the form of reactivation of the  adjacent to the FBID bureau, by the U. S. Air Force. See paragraphs B. 3. i. and F. 1. b.

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3. a. FBID hopes to form a joint operation with the Japanese Monitoring Service. See paragraph F. 2. c.

b. The major coverage expansion objective of FBID is the inclusion of Russian regional coverage, both northwestern USSR and Central Asia, and more dialectic coverage of Soviet regionals presently covered in Russian only. Successful conclusion of the initial steps described in paragraphs 1. b. and c. above will lead to substantial realization of this objective, and these subjects will be pursued in 1953.

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B. Organizational Progress Changes

1. During 1952 there were only two organizational changes, both of which were accompanied by increases in the classified Table of Organization. Several minor reclassifications of individual positions were made but these are not discussed in detail here.

a. On 29 March 1952 the T/O of the  Bureau was approved. This provided four classified and five native positions. The mission and product of this bureau are discussed in C. 1. below.

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b. On 30 September 1952 the reorganization of the Special Reports Branch was approved. This expanded the T/O of fifteen positions to a total of twenty-four in the Special Reports Branch. The T/O of the London Bureau was increased by three positions to be used in support of the Special Reports Branch propaganda analysis effort. These changes are reflected in Tab A, an organization chart of the Special Reports Branch and the London Bureau. The analysis of radio propaganda has been the subject of much discussion and research. The Dulles report recommended greater emphasis on analytical reporting of broadcast material, and later the Jackson report commended the quantitative analysis approach, but the extent to which interpretative and inferential analysis should be engaged in by an intelligence information collection activity, the propriety of engaging in a field not specifically authorized by NSCID 6, and recognition of the Department of State's primary interest in propaganda analysis were questions left unresolved. On 28 January 1952 a

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report was submitted by a team appointed by the Assistant Director for Operations and composed of members of FDD and FBID. This team was to explore the feasibility of joint analysis of press (FDD) and radio (FBID) propaganda. In the course of its exploration, however, it discovered widespread interest in the intelligence community. The Department of State agreed that propaganda analysis was needed. The Deputy Director (Intelligence) thereon approved the request for a change in Table of Organization to meet these requirements.

**2. Headquarters Organization and Activities**

a. The Division's personnel situation as regards T/O, ceiling, on-duty and in-process, and in-process is shown for 1951 and 1952 in Tab B. Tab C is an organization chart for the entire Division. A summary of personnel turnover is given in Tab D.

b. Training followed the usual pattern of brief orientation by the Agency followed by intensive on-the-job training. It becomes increasingly apparent that there is no substitute for on-the-job training, although it is believed the intelligence course for professional employees will provide them with a better background. FBID continued its policy of assigning one professional career employee to each of the Strategic Intelligence School courses. A group of Special Reports Branch personnel were authorized to attend a seminar in Communications at the American University. A class of thirty FBID personnel was given the Rapid Reading course by the Office of Training by special arrangement.

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Limited language training was given to a few employees having a specialized need. Additionally, clerical personnel were given Agency training in specialized fields as required, and there were eight cases in which, through sound career development programs, employees were enabled to progress from clerical to junior professional positions.

c. Communications were slightly altered and expanded to provide an additional teletype circuit from London to Heidelberg; a higher wordage limit (8,000 words a day) for Saigon; 8,000 words a day of teletype communications [redacted]; change of ACS routing from Reseda, California, through San Francisco rather than Los Angeles to Washington. A diagram of FBID communications is attached as Tab E.

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d. The departmental emergency plan progressed, and FBID is now prepared to operate the Division Headquarters [redacted] with full communications and to maintain an emergency staff without assistance for a two-month period.

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e. The Division has now accomplished about 90 per cent of its aimed equipment standardization with resultant savings in original cost, cost of maintenance, and cost of parts stocks. Implementation of the stockpiling project has eliminated delays in replacement of defective and worn out equipment and has made it possible for all bureaus to keep to a minimum the amount of equipment deadlined for maintenance parts.

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3. Field Organization and Activities

a. Mediterranean Bureau

(1) Personnel. The most significant development has been the recruiting and training of linguists for coverage of Soviet regional transmitters in the local dialects. Extensive recruiting effort has built up a reserve list in the more common languages.

(2) Operations. Coverage in Slovene, Byelorussian and Tadjik, as well as Urdu, Hungarian and Macedonian, was added to the regular coverage schedule. The Bureau file now averages approximately 25,000 words a day. Good coordination with the BBC effort has been developed through hour-by-hour communications between Caversham and Kyrenia. 50X1

(3) Communications. Continued representation through the



At the beginning of the year the restric- 50X1

tion was placed at 10 per cent of any one day's file, which limited the emergency use of this facility to approximately 2,500 words a day. This has now been relaxed to allow 10 per cent of a week's file to be transmitted during any given week. The result is that if signals between London and Washington are out for one day in a week, we may file through



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the Nicosia radio station 17,500 words or 10 per cent of a normal week's volume.

(4) Administration. The only significant administrative development for the year has been the action taken to protect the Bureau's housing situation against possible encroachment by an Air Force installation near Kyrenia or any other large influx of families which would create a housing shortage. A project was approved authorizing long-term rental by FBID of thirty houses and a small hotel for bachelor accommodations. When leased, these houses will be available to the classified and foreign national staff in lieu of quarters allowances for the former and a portion of the salary for the latter. A representative of the Real Estate and Construction Division will proceed to Cyprus early in 1953 to negotiate leases.

b. Austrian Bureau


(1) There have been no significant developments at the Austrian Bureau except a survey which was conducted to determine the possibility of covering certain Czechoslovakian broadcasts during the summer months when the BBC cannot monitor them. At the joint FBIS-BBC Coordination Committee meeting approval in principle was given to the stationing of the BBC Czech monitor at Vienna when his services at Caversham become unproductive.

(2) The Staff of the Austrian Bureau was allowed to drop one below the authorized three classified positions in view of an assessment of the relative intelligence value of West Austrian coverage.


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c. German Bureau



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Composite Group Headquarters, but housing and office space are supplied by the Department of State on a reimburseable basis. The Bureau moved to new offices 

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d. London Bureau

There have been no significant changes at the London Bureau except for the reorganization discussed in paragraph B. 1. b. above. The newly organized analysis section of the London Bureau was assigned projects designed to move certain elementary analytic operations closer to the source material and to expand analytic coverage in range and depth. In particular:

- (1) Intensive study of the Soviet Home Service as differentiated from broadcasts to foreign audiences;
- (2) Revision of reports on "Indications of Psychological Vulnerabilities" to point up the more fundamental vulnerabilities with greater clarity;
- (3) Study of European Satellite radio propaganda in comparison with Radio Moscow and with each other.

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e. East Coast Bureau

(1) The East Coast Bureau engaged in extensive cruising for productive broadcasts and the development of a potential in additional languages such as Russian, Danish and Arabic. This has improved the Bureau's contribution, and from the Headquarter's standpoint has improved the timeliness of information from Eastern and Western Europe and the Near East.

(2) An encroachment problem seemed to be developing when the owners of an adjacent tract of land declared their intention to build a motorcycle race track. This was stopped by discussion with the owners, the County Commissioner and the local citizens association. As matters now stand, the Veteran's Administration and the Federal Housing Administration are to notify the Agency promptly if any applications for loans are received to build on an extensive scale near the station.

f. West Coast Bureau

(1) A tract of land near Santa Rosa, California, was tested and found suitable for a monitoring station and subsequently procured, partially through purchase and partially through condemnation. The purchased tract was procured from Messrs. Peterson, and condemnation proceedings were initiated on the tract owned by Mr. Fred MacMurray. Plans and specifications for the new station were begun by the Real Estate and Construction Division in coordination with FBID and are approximately 60 per cent complete. The present schedule calls for

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bid invitations to be let in the spring with construction to start in late May or June of 1953.

(2) A potential threat to Bureau reception developed in the case of the Los Angeles Water and Power Department plan to build an overhead power line to service the San Fernando Valley. The Assistant Director for Operations protested, and an exchange of correspondence resulted in the Los Angeles Water and Power Department agreeing to install filters at appropriate intervals to eliminate any interference to the Bureau's reception. It is expected, however, that transfer to the new site will be accomplished before activation of the power line.

g.  Bureau

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(1) The  Bureau was activated on 17 June 1952

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and is now covering the following stations in Russian:

Birobidzhan	Magadan
Blazovishchensk	Nikolayevsk
Chelyabinsk	Novosibirsk
Chita	Tyumen
Karagunda	Ulan Bator
Kharbarovsk	Ulan Ude
Krasnoyarsk	Vladivostok
Yakutsk	Yuzhno-Sakholinsk

The file from the Bureau consists of about 3,500 words per day, consisting mostly of economic information in brief which is used extensively by the USSR Economic Abstracts.

(2) In the summer FBID learned informally that the Army planned to evacuate the garrison at Camp Crawford and return the

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installation to the Japanese. Since the operations building had been completed and the antennas installed, it was decided to maintain the operation at Camp Crawford for as long as possible, but funds authorized for the construction of housing were not used. It is now rumored that the Air Force may retain at least part of Camp Crawford for the dependents of Air Force personnel stationed at Chitose. FBID is watching this situation and will ask the Air Force to include housing for its classified personnel and the area occupied by the operations building and antenna field in its overall arrangement. Should the Army evacuate Camp Crawford on 1 July 1953 as planned and should the Air Force not retain any portion thereof for its dependent housing, FBID will be forced to close the Bureau. Consideration will be given to re-establishing it at another site, but no specific arrangements have been made as yet.

## h. Tokyo Bureau

(1) The Tokyo Bureau has transferred most Korean language monitoring to the Okinawa Bureau and is concentrating its effort on Japan and broadcasts to Japan.

(2) The Bureau has been forced to relocate its office in a building leased by the Department of State for occupancy by several U. S. Government agencies. The building previously occupied is being returned to the Japanese by the Department of the Army in the very near future.

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(3) The housing situation is acute and government quarters are available only to the Bureau Chief. For that reason the balance of the classified staff is composed of bachelors except for one [ ] who has been there long enough to have acquired quarters through longevity.

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**1. Okinawa Bureau**

(1) The problems of the Okinawa Bureau have been essentially construction problems. The housing plan which calls for the construction of thirty-six permanent-type houses over a period of five years was begun, and an agreement was negotiated with the VOA to include the first eight houses in their overall contract with Grove, Shepherd, Wilson and Kruge. These houses are expected to be completed in March of 1953. Preliminary arrangements were made for the contract to be expanded to include the second eight houses, which were included in the FBID Fiscal Year 53 budget.

(2) A project for the construction of a Club-Shelter-BOQ was approved, and a contract for its construction was let through the 20th Air Force Engineer. Progress on this construction is slow, and a second project will be required for improving the building. As it now stands, it is only a rough structure without furnishings and the conveniences required to make it a pleasant place for social gatherings, shelter during typhoons and other emergencies, and for occupancy by bachelors.

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(3) During the year it was discovered that the Strategic Air Command had placed a requirement on USAF for a 10,500-foot airstrip at Bolo Point. A hasty estimate by the Air Force resulted in \$10,000,000 being allocated for the extension of the existing Bolo Point airstrip. Later investigation showed that this sum was inadequate by some \$3,000,000. Furthermore, it was determined that the required airstrip could be constructed for \$8,500,000 without using the old field but moving to a parallel site on smoother terrain. This plan would, however, cut across FBID's antenna field and preclude the possibility of joint occupancy of the area. The Air Force asked FBID's position in this matter, and in view of the substantial saving to the taxpayer, FBID agreed that it could move provided space in the Sobe area could be found and provided all costs of relocation would be borne by the Air Force. The Air Force thereupon addressed a request to the Department of the Army asking that space  be made available to FBID. The Department of the Army authorized CINCPAC to make the decision, and the space problem was worked out locally on Okinawa among FBIS, ACAN and ASA. As matters stand at the end of the year, Air Force will include FBID requirements in their project submission to the Secretary of Defense. These requirements are estimated to cost in the neighborhood of \$900,000. Certain advantages will accrue to FBID from the relocation, such as being closer to the housing area, the sharing of utilities and roads with ACAN, etc.

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**j. Saigon Bureau**

There have been no significant developments at the Saigon Bureau. It has continued with its mission of processing the product of the French monitoring service's coverage of Viet Minh broadcasts and scrutiny of the local press.

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### C. Functional Progress in Collection

#### 1. Coverage and Exploitation

a. Coverage of the USSR, especially Central Asia, and of other high priority targets was expanded and now is near to the full potential of existing facilities. Some further expansion is desired and is possible if linguists in some dialects such as Kirgiz, Turkmen and Uzbek can be found. Languages in which the joint FBIS-BBC operation has competence at this time are shown in Tab F.

b. During the year the machinery for utilizing the economic information which comprises the greater portion of the content of Soviet regional broadcasts was perfected, and close liaison with elements of the Office of the Director of Intelligence USAF, ORR and OCD has provided a means for utilizing all material received even though it may not be included in regular publications.

c. For those offices which are primarily interested in the highlights of political developments and which are not staffed or equipped to read through the great mass of material appearing in the Daily Reports, a condensation covering political developments only was developed and has been well received by interested offices. The document, which is produced weekly, is called "Political Abstracts from Foreign Radio Broadcasts."

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d. Although not a collection activity, great progress was made in the analysis of radio propaganda. The change in organization for this is described in paragraph B. 1. b. above. In essence the Division is now able, within coverage limitations and within the limitations of records and staff, to produce studies on specific questions regarding the propaganda output of critical areas and the propaganda beamed to those areas by other countries.

**2. Divisional Information Output**

a. During 1952 the Division maintained its daily issuance of some 80,000 words of broadcast material in the Daily Report. Economic Abstracts for the USSR and Eastern Europe and for the Far East were continued on a weekly basis. The new issuance, Political Abstracts from Foreign Radio Broadcasts, was begun 13 February 1952 and is a regular weekly issuance now. See Tabs H and I.

b. The Special Reports Branch, in addition to carrying on previously established analysis of Communist propaganda as reported in its regular issuances of "Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts," "Survey of USSR Broadcasts," and "Survey of Far East Broadcasts,"

(1) Initiated on 1 October 1952 systematic quantitative analysis of Communist Chinese broadcasts, reported in the new weekly "Trends and Highlights of Peking Broadcasts;"

(2) Issued two reports in a series analyzing indicators of imminent hostilities in Soviet domestic newscasts;

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(3) Prepared the first in a series of 00 "Research Aids," reviewing in depth the evidence for a stepped-up Soviet "Hate America" campaign;

(4) Initiated the practice of issuing brief analyses of Orbit propaganda on individual current topics, as on the Slansky trial in Prague;

(5) Continued the "Counterpsychological Warfare Reports" from London and Okinawa. Close liaison with the PP Staff resulted in the Far East CPW report being refined, shortened, and pointed to the particular use of PP activities.

c. The Broadcast Information Section with the excellent support of Contact Division's Index Unit completed a reissuance of "Broadcasting Stations of the World," both by city and country and by frequency, the latter being divided as usual into short wave and long and medium wave books. The Section also completed a new listing of "Morse, Hellschreiber and Radioteletype Press Transmission Schedules" and issued this document on 1 March 1952. A fourth edition of "Standard Broadcast Logographs" was issued on 1 October 1952. Additionally, the Section completed a new "Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasting Stations." The new book consists of nine sections and each section may be issued separately in the future. The book continues to be maintained by frequent issuance of replacement pages under cover of the Section's regular information sheet, which is called "Station and Program Notes."

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d. A list of all FBID publications, reports, and other issuances is given in Tab G.

e. The B Wire continued to send approximately 11,000 words a day of newsworthy intelligence information to G-2, OCI, PP Staff, Department of State, VOA, and the Psychological Strategy Board was added for this service late in 1952. Through the Department of State the Canadian Broadcasting Company secured the B Wire service by extending a line from New York to Montreal. Although technically a local service, arrangements were completed in Washington for providing the VOA Munich Radio Center with a daily file by teletype of broadcast material from London. This service amounts to approximately 20,000 words a day and was arranged at no cost to FBID, although special selection is required to meet the MRC requirement.

f. The Division adopted a new form of statistical reporting, which is believed to be more informative. It is considered that "items filed" and "items published" have more significance than wordage figures alone, and therefore reports are made by bureau for hours monitored, words filed, items filed and items published. Since this method of reporting was adopted during 1952, comparison with previous years cannot be made. However, a comparison of hours monitored between December 1951 and December 1952 shows an increase of approximately twenty hours a day in hours monitored and 58,700 words a day filed for December 1952. The total figures for December 1952 were:

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	<u>Daily Averages</u>			
Field Bureau	Hours Monitored	Wordage Filed	Items Filed	Items Published
Tokyo	26 1/4	7,400	35	32
Hokkaido	7	3,200	30	8
Okinawa	8 1/2	29,500	135	97
Saigon	1 1/2	5,000*	22	8
West Coast	89 1/4	33,000	176	100
East Coast	129	30,500	164	66
London	290	58,300	150	60
Germany	4 3/4	5,700*	41	30
Austria	6 1/2	6,900*	34	20
Mediterranean	62	38,000	222	76
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	713 3/4	217,500	1,009	497

\*Includes press scrutiny.

### 3. Requirements and Priorities

FBID maintained its weekly collection of requirements from intelligence offices and issued them as "Targets" for guided collection from radio monitoring. The master target list was changed to quarterly issuance rather than monthly. It was found that these targets were of such a nature that the list changed only slightly from month to month, thereby justifying the less frequent issuance. Special requirements for specific monitoring continued to be received at infrequent intervals. While most of them were received from OGD, the effect of closer desk-to-desk liaison with the intelligence offices encouraged many unclassified

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requirements to be transmitted by phone. OIR, OGI, ONE and the former OPC were all extremely helpful in meeting with FBID editors and analysts in an attempt to provide the background information prerequisite to better directed collection and in supplying specific requirements.

4. Consumer Reaction and Evaluations

FBID surveyed the recipients of its regular publications. Replies were not critical and therefore not informative. It is planned that in future surveys FBID will attempt to draw constructive criticism of its product from the consumer offices. Special commendations were received from ONE, VOA and OGI for specific services rendered to those offices.

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**D. Progress in Support Function**

**1. Departmental**

a. Support functions were modified principally by changing the analysis of propaganda from a weekly survey type of activity to concentration on the chief intelligence and psychological warfare requirements to which propaganda analysis may contribute. Preparations were made for long-term reviews of basic patterns in Soviet radio treatment of individual areas and perennial topics.

b. Through orientation in VOA Headquarters, New York, FBID Wire editors sharpened the focus on VOA requirements of material sent over the "B" Wire by altering the editorial handling and selection. Wordage was increased slightly. Care was exercised to insure that the value of the service to other recipients did not diminish.

c. During the United Nations session at New York a service to the U. S. Delegation consisting of a daily roundup of foreign radio comment on U. N. proceedings and a weekly survey of same was sent to the Delegation over the VOA wire to New York. Additionally, certain FBID publications were sent through the Department of State.

d. More attention was given to inclusion of the original language of significant phrases in publications used by psychological warfare activities. In this connection note is also made of the changes in the Far East CFW Report for the immediate benefit of the former OPC, PY Division, and the concomitant benefit to all users.

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e. The handling of POW messages was adjusted to the greater convenience of the several interested agencies.

f. The support effect of the Broadcast Information Section issuances should be noted, especially in view of the number of publications which were completely brought up to date and reissued during 1952.

**2. Field Bureaus**

a. The London Bureau prepared daily roundups of USSR, Satellite and German broadcasts which were delivered to the Embassy in London and sent by teletype to consumers in Paris, the Hague, G-2 EUCOM, G-2 Frankfurt, HICOG Frankfurt, NATO and SHAPE. Also, a 20,000-word daily selection from Soviet and Satellite broadcasts transmitted by wire from London to Munich was instituted as noted in paragraph C. 2. e.

b. The German Bureau continued making all processed material available to HICOG in Bonn and in Frankfurt and to the 7997th Composite Group, Frankfurt Military Post. It also completed arrangements for monitoring of Radio Volga, which broadcasts to Russian troops in East Germany, for certain Frankfurt offices.

c. The Austrian Bureau continued filing all processed material to the Public Affairs Division, USCOA, Salzburg. The Public Affairs Division relays this to G-2 USAF and the U. S. Consulate in Salzburg. Also, the complete file is sent to the Public Information Division Headquarters USFA and a daily press review is given to the Political Division, U. S. Embassy, Vienna. A monthly economic report to the

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Reports and Statistical Branch, U. S. Special Mission for Economic Cooperation, Vienna, is prepared. Departmental liaison with OIR, Department of State, has enabled USCOA officials to pinpoint certain portions of the Austrian Bureau file for the attention of the Austrian Desk in the Department of State.

d. The Mediterranean Bureau airmails copies of all processed Soviet Kurdish language intercepts to the American Embassies in Baghdad and Teheran. Monitored summaries of Soviet Kurdish language broadcasts and processed Arabic material from Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria are sent to Baghdad only. Selected Balkan material is airmailed to the American Embassy in Athens for use by psychological warfare elements there. Items relating to Cyprus of interest to the Cyprus Government are sent to the Colonial Secretary in Nicosia. Monitored summaries and processed material of all Soviet regionals in the Pakistan area are airmailed to the American Embassy, Karachi.

e. The Okinawa Bureau files all processed intercepts to Tokyo for FEC Staff Sections. Peking material dealing with FEAF aerial action and POW's, and Pyongyang POW broadcast material is transmitted to the Intelligence Section FEAF. All Korean material is filed to the U. S. Embassy, Pusan. A selected file of Korean intercepts is sent to G-2 Eighth Army. Weekly analyses of Chinese Communist international and regional broadcasts are filed to FEC Tokyo. A log of Vietnam News Agency (Ho Government) and CMH (unidentified Communist station) items and all Cao Dai National Resistance Front material are transmitted to FBIS Saigon

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for local dissemination. A selected file of Pyongyang, Peking and Vietnam material is transmitted to G-2, RYCOM. Experiments were conducted in mailing all Chinese material processed to the U. S. Consulate, Hong Kong, for comment by political officers there to the Department of State. After two failures (due to excessive time in transit) the third experiment was successful, and it is likely that the Department of State will wish this service on a continuing basis in 1953.

f. All processed material of the Saigon Bureau is filed to *Embassies?* FEC Tokyo for staff distribution. Copies are delivered to the American Legation in Saigon and the Consulate in Phnom Penh, to USIS Saigon, and to the Office of the Army Attache in Saigon. Selected material is furnished to the Mutual Security Agency Information Division and to the MAAG.

g. All Tokyo Bureau processed intercepts are sent to Staff Sections of FEC. Tibetan material; Japanese material from Pyongyang, Moscow and Peking; and Mandarin material from Moscow is furnished to FEAF. The Eighth Army and the American Embassy, Pusan, receive all Korean material. Selected material from the Chinese International Service programs is filed to USIS Formosa. Unprocessed monitor's summaries are furnished Paywar FEC. The American Embassy, Tokyo, receives all material monitored in Japanese. Copies of all processed intercepts are furnished to the Field Reception Unit, FEC. Selected material is given to Civil Information and Education Section, U. S. Civil Administration, Ryukyus.

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h. The Hokkaido Bureau supplies Headquarters FEC, FEAF Tokyo and G-2 First Cavalry Division with all processed intercepts. Weather reports from USSR regional coverage are furnished the Field Reception Unit FEC.

i. The West Coast Bureau files selected material to FEC and FEAF Tokyo.

j. The East Coast Bureau makes daily distribution of an epidemiological bulletin of the World Health Organization to OSI.

3. Special problems in providing operational and informational support arise in the following:

a. The classification of analytical work and specially processed FBID material reduces its utility to covert offices desiring to pass the data on to non-fully-cleared personnel, especially in the psychological warfare field.

b. The restricted classification superimposed on intercepted press broadcasts does not accurately reflect the nature of press material. The restricted classification has been used since the type of handling which it then receives is desirable. If the same handling could be accomplished through some other designation, such as "For Official Use Only," the Daily Report would have more value to offices operating in the field, especially abroad.

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c. There is still some reluctance on the part of certain covert and overt activities to make their needs known and to discuss their problems with FBID. It is believed that this results in waste and duplication of effort. With particular reference to Army Psychological Warfare Division, FBID has attempted to coordinate with them both in current operations and in planned operations for wartime. It is noted, however, that FBID was not approached for discussion of RFE's need for monitoring support, and it is known that RFE maintains an extensive staff of monitors in Munich.

4. FBID has never had any internal conflict between its collection and support functions. In this respect FBID is believed to be well integrated.

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**SECURITY INFORMATION****E. Assessment of Division Operations**

1. Much of the Divisional effort does not lend itself to statistical reporting. It is, however, significant that no request for a special study on any subject within the purview of foreign radio monitoring was refused, and the number and scope of such studies is reflected in Tab G.

2. Increased production was accompanied by a higher degree of selectivity, without which an increase in figures is meaningless. Since FBID has established no machinery for evaluation, it is not possible to document this higher selectivity. It is, however, reasonable to assume that increased attention given to the training of editors and monitors in intelligence collection and objectives is responsible for the favorable reaction of consumers to the FBID product, and this in turn is due to greater selectivity rather than increased volume. The increased volume is believed to be due to expanded coverage of critical areas and developments.

3. Deficiencies in coverage are discussed in detail as objectives in paragraphs F. 1. a. and F. 2. a. There are other deficiencies in coverage but of a less critical nature, and therefore no plans are made to eliminate them. Specifically, coverage of Southeast Asia is not as full as the tense situation in the area would seem to require, but the program content, judging from available samples, is of small interest at this time.

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4. Two major problems in equipment remain to be solved:

a. Improvement of the signal-to-noise ratio in antenna multicoupler equipment, and

b. Procurement of reasonably priced long and medium wave receivers to meet upcoming replacement requirements.

Equipment to meet these requirements is not now available. FBID has no plan to correct this deficiency but is constantly alert to developments in technical equipment and in contact with both manufacturers and the Office of Communications with a view to solution of these problems.

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**SECURITY INFORMATION****F. Objectives for 1953****1. Likely to be Accomplished in 1953**

a. In 1952 the BBC completed a survey at Stockholm, Sweden, of monitoring capabilities for the Baltic States and other Northwestern USSR regional transmitters. The results of this survey were analyzed by both BBC and FBID, and it was concluded that the product of monitoring operations at Stockholm for this area would be valuable to both British and American intelligence agencies. FBID made representations to the BBC urging them to undertake the project at the Sixth Joint Coordination Committee meeting. Later the BBC submitted the project to the British JIC, which approved it. It is expected that in the course of 1953 the BBC Monitoring Service will be able to organize and activate a monitoring operation in Stockholm for the coverage of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and many western and northwestern USSR regional transmitters heretofore unmonitorable.

b. It is expected that during 1953 a new FBID station at  Okinawa, will be constructed to replace the station . 550X1  
Activation of the new station may be delayed until sometime in 1954 due to the presence of an AACS transmitter in the area which is not only objectionable to FBID but interferes with ACAN and ASA, also in the Sobe area.

c. In 1953 construction will be started on the new FBID station near Santa Rosa, California. This station will replace the

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existing station at Reseda. Activation of the new station will probably be deferred until October of 1954.

d. In 1953 FBID will attempt to satisfactorily resolve the potential housing problem at Cyprus, either through long-term leasing of existing houses or other means.

e. FBID intends to continue the construction of housing on Okinawa in implementation of the overall housing plan, which should be completed in 1955.

f. Propaganda analysis capabilities are discussed in paragraph C. 1. d. For 1953 FBID intends to use these capabilities in the fullest possible support of ONE and OCI. The DD(I) has said that it is his desire that closer liaison be established and maintained.

g. Technical objectives for 1953 include:

(1) Refine the stockpile of technical equipment and supplies based on 1952 experience.

(2) Initiate procurement of long and medium wave receivers.

(3) Standardize field bureau parts stock and use records.

(4) Design some method of improving antenna multicoupler signal-to-noise ratio.



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## 2. Long Range Objectives Toward Which FBID Will Work During 1953

a. In 1952 a three-man survey team was sent to Pakistan to determine the coverage potential of Central Asian regional transmitters from various areas within Pakistan. Arrangements for this survey were made through the American Ambassador and coordinated with area offices and the Department of State. Due to the internal political situation the team operated as a Department of State advisory team and not as an FBID unit. The results of the survey are presently under study. In 1953 it is hoped that the evaluation of the team's findings coupled with consideration of the difficulties inherent in negotiating an arrangement with the Government of Pakistan and consideration of the cost and administrative problems will lead to a firm determination of whether or not FBID should pursue further the establishment of a Pakistan station. If the conclusion is affirmative, negotiations will be commenced in coordination with the Near East Division and the Department of State.

b. The ever-present problem of providing communications for FBID traffic in time of war will be reconsidered in 1953 with the hope that some means will be found, safe from military seizure, to provide communications from London to Washington. Other communications facilities in time of war seem either fairly secure or irreplaceable by an alternate system, e.g., communications from Okinawa, which will always be dependent on the Army.

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c. As a long range objective FBID hopes to establish a joint operation with the Japanese monitoring service, in or near Tokyo. Such an arrangement would parallel the reciprocal arrangement with the BBC. It is believed that the present Tokyo Staff and expenses could be substantially reduced. FBID would try to provide for a limited exchange of monitored material in the arrangement and to have the Japanese monitoring service provide office space and antenna facilities.

ALAN M. WARFIELD

Tabs A thru I

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**SPECIAL REPORTS BRANCH**

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Deputy Chief GS-14

Publications Unit  
Publications Ed. GS-7  
Stenographer GS-5  
Clerk-Typist GS-5  
Clerk-Typist GS-5

Far East Section  
Chief GS-13  
Analyst GS-12  
Analyst GS-11  
Analyst GS-11  
Res. Asst. GS-7

Research Section  
Chief GS-13

Soviet Section  
Chief GS-13

Projects Unit  
Analyst GS-12  
Analyst GS-11  
Analyst GS-11  
Res. Asst. GS-7

Special Studies Unit  
Analyst GS-12  
Res. Asst. GS-7

Topics Unit  
Analyst GS-12  
Analyst GS-11  
Analyst GS-11

Areas Unit  
Analyst GS-12  
Analyst GS-11

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LONDON BUREAU

Bureau Chief GS-11

Administrative Officer GS-9

Chief Analyst GS-13

Chief Editor GS-13

Propaganda Analyst GS-12

PsyWar Analyst GS-12  
PsyWar Analyst GS-11

3 Report Writers GS-11

9 Editors GS-11

A

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
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SECURITY INFORMATION

1 January 1953

**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION**



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LANGUAGES MONITORED BY FBI AND BEC

Afrikaans	Kazakh
Albanian	Korean
Amoy	Kurdish
Annamese	
Arabic	Laotian
Armenian	Latvian
Azerbaijani	Lithuanian
Bulgarian	Macedonian
Burmese	Mandarin
Byelorussian	Moldavian
	Mongolian
Cantonese	Norwegian
Chaochow	
Cochin-Chinese	Persian
Czech	Polish
	Portuguese
Danish	
Dutch	Rumanian
	Russian
English	
Estonian	Serbo-Croat
	Slovak
Finnish	Slovene
French	Spanish
	Swedish
Georgian	
German	Tadzhik
Greek	Thai
	Tibetan
Hakka	Tonkinese
Hebrew	Turkish
Hindi (Hindustani)	
Hungarian	Uighur
	Ukrainian
Indonesian	Urdu
Italian	
	Vietnamese
Japanese	
Javanese	Yakut
	Yiddish

Total: 63

30 December 1952

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**SECURITY INFORMATION****FBI REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS FOR 1952**

<u>Name of Report or Publication</u>	<u>Date of Report or Frequency of Publication</u>	<u>Dist. per Issue</u>
<b>I. Regular Publications</b>		
1. <u>Unclassified Daily Report of Foreign Radio Broadcasts</u>	Daily (5 days per week)	390
2. <u>Restricted Latin America Daily Report</u>	Daily (5 days per week)	261
3. <u>Restricted Far East Daily Report</u>	Daily (5 days per week)	443
4. <u>Restricted USSR and Eastern Europe Daily Report</u>	Daily (5 days per week)	512
5. <u>Restricted Western Europe and Near East Daily Report</u>	Daily (5 days per week)	425
6. <u>Confidential Survey of USSR Broadcasts</u>	Bi-weekly	316
7. <u>Confidential Survey of Far East Broadcasts</u>	Bi-weekly	348
8. <u>Confidential Economic Abstracts from Radio Broadcasts: USSR and Eastern Europe</u>	Weekly	230
9. <u>Confidential Economic Abstracts from Radio Broadcasts: Far East</u>	Weekly	219
10. <u>Confidential Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts</u>	Weekly	342
11. <u>Confidential Trends and Highlights of Peking Broadcasts</u>	Weekly	389
12. <u>Confidential Political Abstracts from Foreign Radio Broadcasts</u>	Weekly	131
13. <u>Technical Publications</u>		
a. <u>Restricted Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasting Stations</u>	Yearly	
b. <u>Restricted Station and Program Notes (supplements Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasting Stations)</u>	Periodic (last published 17 Dec 52)	
c. <u>Unclassified Broadcasting Stations of the World (in 3 volumes)</u>	Yearly	
1. According to Country and City		
2. According to Frequency		
3. According to Call Letters and Station Name		
d. <u>Restricted Press Transmission Schedules (supplements are issued at various times)</u>	Periodic (last published 12 Jun 52)	
e. <u>Restricted Program Schedules of Communist-Controlled Broadcasting Stations</u>	Periodic (last published 15 Jul 52)	

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Date of Report

or

Frequency of PublicationName of Report or Publication**B. Reports for the President**

- |     |   |     |
|-----|---|-----|
| 1.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to Prime Minister Churchill's Visit to Washington"                     | Jan |
| 2.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to Prime Minister Churchill's Visit to Washington" No. 2               | Jan |
| 3.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to the President's State of the Union Message"                         | Jan |
| 4.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to the President's State of the Union Message" No. 2                   | Jan |
| 5.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to President Truman's Budget Message"                                  | Jan |
| 6.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to President Truman's Address of 29 March"                             | Mar |
| 7.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to President Truman's Address of 29 March" No. 2                       | Apr |
| 8.  | "Foreign Radio Reactions to Marshal Stalin's Statement to James Wick"                           | Apr |
| 9.  | "Text of TASS Statement Concerning President Truman's Press Conference of 24 April 1952"        | Apr |
| 10. | "Text of Governor's May Day Address"  | May |
| 11. | "Foreign Radio Reactions to the Nomination of General Eisenhower"                               | Jul |
| 12. | "Foreign Radio Reactions to the Nomination of Adlai Stevenson"                                  | Jul |
| 13. | "Foreign Radio Reactions to the Soviet Demand for the Recall of George Kennan"                  | Oct |
| 14. | "Text of Stalin's 15 Oct Address to the 19th Party Congress"                                    | Oct |
| 15. | "Foreign Radio Reactions to the Election of General Eisenhower"                                 | Nov |
| 16. | "Foreign Radio Reactions to Premier Stalin's Replies to the New York Times, 25-29 December '52" | Dec |

**C. Special Reports (prepared upon request)**

- |    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| 1. | "Faking and Ho Government Propaganda on Vietnam" (prepared for State Dept.)   | Jan |
| 2. | "Weekly Report on World Radio Reaction to and Comment on the General Assembly Sessions" (prepared for US Delegation at Paris meeting) | Jan |
| 3. | "Moscow's and Berlin's Radio Treatment of the Issue of German Remilitarization" (prepared for OSI)                                    | Mar |

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<u>Name of Report or Publication</u>	<u>Date of Report or Frequency of Publication</u>
4. "Non-Communist Radio Comment on BW Charges" (prepared for DD/I; later reproduced as [redacted])	Apr
5. "Propaganda Evidences Concerning Sino- Soviet Relations" (prepared for ONE)	Apr
6. "TIBID Comments on SE-26" (prepared for DD/I)	Apr
7. "Trends on Psychological Preparation of the Russian People for War" (prepared for OIR)	May
8. "Soviet Radio Propaganda Regarding Negro Persecution in the United States" (prepared for OCI)	Jun
9. "Radio Moscow's Use of Salisbury's Dispatches" (prepared for DD/I)	Jun
10. "Radio Propaganda Indications Concerning Communist Intentions at Panmunjom" (prepared as contribution to report NIE 55/1)	Jul
11. "Supplement to Radio Propaganda Indications Concerning Communist Intentions at Panmunjom"	Jul
12. "Chinese/Korean Propaganda Indications Concerning Effectiveness of UN Bombings" (prepared in response to request from OIR)	Sep
13. "Analysis of Soviet 'Hat America' Campaign" (prepared for ONE for contribution to National Estimate)	Sep
14. "Soviet Radio Propaganda Regarding Yugoslavia and Albania" (prepared for OCI)	Sep
15. "Moscow Radio Propaganda to and about the Arab World - April-September 1952" (prepared for OIR)	Oct
16. "Comparison of Moscow Radio's Presentation of U.S. Elections in 1948 and 1952" (prepared for A. Dulles, DD, in response to request)	Nov
17. "Moscow Radio Propaganda on Indonesia and Egypt" (2 reports, on memo to ONE contributing to National Estimate)	Nov
18. "Radio Moscow Propaganda on Albania" (on memo for ONE contributing to National Estimate)	Dec
19. "Radio Propaganda Before and After Iran's Diplomatic Break with Britain" (prepared as special report on memo to OCI)	Dec
<b>D. <u>Supplements to USSR and Eastern Europe Daily Report</u></b>	
1. "Draft Test of the Revised Statutes of the Communist Party" and "Draft Directives of the Fifth Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union" (both from the proceedings of the 19th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)	Aug


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<u>Name of Report or Publication</u>	<u>Date of Report or Frequency of Publication</u>
2. Stalin article in magazine <u>Dolshovik</u> : "The Economic Problems of Socialism"	Oct
3. "Marshal Tito's Report to the Sixth Yugoslavian Communist Party Congress"	Nov
<b>E. <u>Supplements to Survey of USSR Broadcasts</u></b>	
1. "Total Soviet Radio Output to Foreign Countries"	Jan
2. "Soviet Propaganda on Moscow International Economic Conference"	Apr
3. "Analysis of Soviet Newscasts"	Jun
4. "Indications in Soviet Newscasts of Psychological Preparation of the Russian People for War"	Oct
5. "Pervukhin's October Revolution Speech compared with Speeches of Previous Anniversaries"	Nov
6. "Communist Radio Propaganda on the Slansky Trial"	Dec
<b>F. <u>Supplement to Survey of Far East Broadcasts</u></b>	
1. "Radio Free Japan"	Jun

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