

FORMATION

Monitoring of radio broadcasts as a source of international intelligence was a development of World War II. No such service existed prior to the late 1930s when the BBC established a monitoring post in London. By the end of 1940 American officials had become impressed with the desirability of establishing a monitoring service similar to that of the BBC and other governments. Certain private agencies in the United States were also monitoring foreign broadcasts but their reports were not readily available to government agencies.

In December 1940 the State Department suggested informally to the President that some such service be established. On January 3, 1941, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the question was brought to the attention of the Board of War Communications by Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State. Because it had the engineering personnel, equipment and experience FCC was ~~also~~ selected to perform the monitoring function. A resolution adopted by the Board on January 13 directed FCC to present plans for establishment of listening posts. At the January 21 meeting the plans were approved and a request for funds sent by the Board to the President. On February 25 the President allocated \$150,000 to FCC from funds made available to him in the Military Appropriations Act of 1941 and on February 26 the FCC formally authorized establishment of a broadcast monitoring service.

~~THE YEAR 1941~~²

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Actually the operating history of the organization predated the

administrative history by a few months for FCC engineers were recording broadcasts in the fall of 1940. This recording program was first confined to domestic foreign language programs which were believed to reflect the Axis propoganda line. The program was expanded in January 1941 to include broadcasts emanating from foreign transmitters and directed to this country. The program was operated by the International Division of FCC which increased its staff of translators and arranged for office space in a building on F street northeast. Following inauguration of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, as it was then known, on February 26 the work of recording and translating domestic and foreign broadcasts was assigned to it. The staff of translators and office space were transferred to FBMS.

Aside from the engineering aspects of FBMS operations there does not appear to have been any concrete plan for the organization until

after the arrival of [REDACTED], the first administrative officer. [REDACTED] came from the [REDACTED] late in

March. During the interim [REDACTED] of the International Division

continued to direct the recruitment of translators and transcribers.

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Not until June was [REDACTED] appointed Director.



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In the period following February 26 the engineers planned to set up six listening posts. [REDACTED] was to pick up broadcasts

from Latin America, Asiatic Russia and the Far East; [REDACTED] STATINTL

broadcasts from Asia and Latin America; [REDACTED] European STATINTL

and Russian shortwave broadcasts as well as certain transmissions from

South and West Africa and Australia; [REDACTED] transmissions STATINTL

from Europe, Central and South America; [REDACTED] Mexico and STATINTL

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Central America; and [REDACTED] specific European, Asiatic

and Latin American transmissions. To simplify the problem of

communications between the field and Washington offices, the [REDACTED] STATINTL

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and [REDACTED] were eliminated and [REDACTED] took on the additional STATINTL
programs.

Therefore ^{FCC} engineering personnel at these posts were assigned the task of recording international short wave broadcasts. These men were members of the RID staff but were designated as Broadcast Recording Unit (or BRU) personnel. In most cases they carried on their work on RID property. ~~On~~ ^{On} July 1, 1944 ~~these~~ these engineers were transferred to the FBIS staff.

Recording of broadcasts at the field posts was continued, although in a somewhat restricted fashion, until the end of the war. Up until March 1943 engineers recorded on Memovox discs all programs monitored. This took considerable time that might have been spent in tuning in programs and in cruising for new transmitters and programs. After March 1943 recordings were made only for broadcasts from Rome, Berlin and Tokyo. These were mailed from the field stations to Washington where they were filed.

The function of monitoring as distinguished from recording, translating and reporting on broadcasts was not introduced until October 1941. During the first months all broadcasts were translated in full. The process of monitoring was adapted by [REDACTED] from a system developed by the EBC and became a basic one in the operations of FBIS. It consisted of summarizing a given item or speech while the broadcast was coming over the air. This enabled the monitor who heard a broadcast or news item which seemed to him to be particularly significant to get it to other divisions with greater speed. He usually informed the monitoring supervisor about the content of the item and could turn to and translate it immediately without waiting for the end of the program. The announcement could then be given to the wire editors and moved on to other government agencies with a minimum amount of elapsed time. ~~Since~~ The broadcast was also being recorded simultaneously, ^{so} the translator could later translate the full material if desired. The system also made it possible to reduce the amount of translation since repeated or old items could be eliminated.

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~~amount of elapsed time. Since the broadcast was also being recorded~~

~~simultaneously the translator could later take the tape disc and~~

~~translate the full material.~~

Since the process was new to government it was almost impossible to hire experienced personnel. This difficulty was overcome by training translators.

During the formative period the typists, editors, translators and other personnel were allocated on what appears to have been a fairly informal basis for no divisions had been established as yet. Early plans ^{called} for setting up of Report and Analysis sections and the Report Section came into being with the employment of the first editor, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] in May. The translators, as did other units, continued to

work under the more or less direct supervision of [REDACTED] Analysts were

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assigned to the Report Section but actually worked under [REDACTED] and

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The translators continued to work under the supervision of [REDACTED]

although individuals were ^{singled} ~~signaled~~ out for supervisory duties from

time to time. Unsuccessful attempts were made throughout the summer

months to find a chief and two assistants for the embryonic division.

Finally, in November, two assistant chiefs were appointed from the staff and a Chief was appointed in December when [REDACTED] joined the staff.

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This difficulty in recruiting personnel for the translation staff was duplicated in other divisions but not in the same degree. The major difficulty appears to have been that Civil Service Commission examinations for translators did not test an individual's competence in translating the spoken, as distinguished from the written, language. The importance of this distinction was recognized early in the history of the organization and permission was finally secured to hire persons not on established registers. After that applicants were tested by the FCC which had been conducting such tests since the fall of 1940.

Analysts were also among those recruited in the spring and summer of 1941 and this process, too, encountered concrete obstacles resulting from civil service regulations. As was the case with [REDACTED] translators, the persons named on civil service registers did not possess the exact qualifications required since the work was new in government circles. However, the small group of analysts working

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under the supervision of [REDACTED] turned out analyses during the summer and fall of 1941. With the arrival of [REDACTED] chief analyst, in November, the Division took on more concrete form.

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Difficulties in securing trained personnel and adequate equipment caused postponement of the formal start of operations although the recording and translation of broadcasts was already in progress.

Engineers at the field stations sent the records of broadcasts in to Washington for translation and distribution. In the case of [REDACTED]

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the records were picked up by truck once or twice daily but the more distant stations relied upon Air Express. After translation in Washington the transcripts were duplicated and distributed to interested agencies. This method of distribution was a carry over from the period prior to June 1941 when FCC engineers made copies of broadcasts available to certain officials. This practice was continued in modified form for the duration of the agency. Some agencies, FEA in particular, received transcript copies in addition to the regular publications.

The first attempt to distribute broadcasts, or information about them, on a larger scale was a report entitled "German Broadcasts

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to North America, March - June 1941". This summary of broadcast charac-

teristics was originally prepared for the use of the staff and was later distributed to a small number of government agencies.

In July, after machinery for preparing Ditto copies had been installed in the [REDACTED] building, the analysts and editors started issuance of a publication identified as Spot Bulletins. The first such Bulletin summarized Axis broadcasts on the subject of the United States' actions in connection with the boundary dispute between Peru and Ecuador. The second Bulletin was issued on July 18 when Axis interpretation of alleged U. S. intentions toward Spain and Portugal ~~was~~ summarized. After that the Bulletins appeared with considerable regularity. Each dealt with but one topic although a series were issued on some days.

On August 11 the format of these reports was changed ~~for~~ ^{and} a general title "Foreign Broadcasts: Highlights of August 11th" replaced the former topical headings. The succeeding issues contained more extensive summaries of broadcasts dealing with a variety of topics rather than with a single subject. The reports no longer depended upon extensive quotations but were more largely summarization of

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broadcasts.

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During the next several weeks the analysts and reporters experimented with various types of publications. Late in September the daily issues were more or less routinized with the publication of four reports. Daily Digests of broadcasts to North and Latin America were issued separately. These contained excerpts and quotations from broadcasts arranged by transmitters. Daily Reports were also issued which contained analyses of broadcasts to North and Latin America also classified by transmitters. In addition there were special reports at irregular intervals containing analysis and summary of broadcasts on a given topic. Finally, on November 18, the daily publications were combined and published under the title of Daily Report of Foreign Radio Broadcasts. This is the title under which the report was issued for the duration of FBIS.

By this time the Report and Analysis sections were separate units operating independently of each other. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~

The contents of the Daily Report remained the same, i. e., broadcasts were summarized although verbatim quotations were included in many instances. The number of subscribers had reached 87 by the end of November.

Members of the Analysis Division, having discontinued publication of daily analyses, then turned their attention to preparation of a weekly publication. The first issue appeared on December 6. This first Weekly Analysis reported, significantly enough, that the tone of caution evident in Tokyo's previous broadcasts had been abandoned during the week under review and that belligerence now characterized the transmissions.

Still another means of communicating broadcasts to interested agencies was inaugurated about this same time. On October 26 FBMS sent, via a Western Union wire, broadcasts which had been requested by the [redacted] office of the Coordinator of Information. This was the beginning of the wire service. The first wire was later known as the B Wire and the A Wire, which provided general broadcast coverage for 22 government agencies was inaugurated in November. Each morning FBMS sent to the State Department a summary of radio broadcasts. The service expanded rapidly after Pearl Harbor.

Within a very few days after December 7 the A Wire was on a 24 hour basis. In the first days it carried summaries of news pertaining to the attack on Pearl Harbor but was soon expanded to give more general news coverage.

In addition to the usual problems inherent in organizing and staffing a new organization the administration was concerned to improve communications between the field and Washington offices. At first the field offices sent records ~~fax~~ to Washington for translation. This sometimes meant a ~~delay~~ of as much as a week in the transmission of broadcasts to interested agencies in Washington. One method of expediting the process was the transfer to the field of monitors, translators, editors, and transcribers. Transfer of such personnel to [redacted] took place in September, and to [redacted] in October, and to [redacted] in December 1941.

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When monitors and editors were sent to the field the problem of communications facilities became more serious. [redacted] relied upon the twx circuits of the telephone company to send urgent copy to Washington for the first year. [redacted] which was located on the RID post, used the twx also until RID established a teletypewriter circuit early in 194². After that FBMS used the teletypewriter circuit. Broadcasts were sent from [redacted] by telefax and from London by cable. Broadcasts not considered urgent were sent air mail from all field posts in transcript form.

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To expedite transfer of broadcasts from the [REDACTED] listening

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post, its location was moved from [REDACTED] in the summer of 1941. This brought the post within "pipe line" distance of Washington and enabled the engineers to transfer broadcasts to monitors in the Washington office as they were coming over the air. Records of broadcasts were then made in Washington for translation purposes.

Field operations in London, which were started on December 7,

1941, were of an entirely different character since the editors

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were to work on broadcasts [REDACTED] Necessarily the

problems inherent in such an operation differed from those of an

operation in the United States. The editors were working in a foreign

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[REDACTED] The problem of communications was even greater than for other

field stations. Not only did the editors have to develop channels

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for getting broadcasts from [REDACTED] they had to devise means of getting

them to Washington as soon as possible. The problem of communications

in the early weeks
within London was solved by having a member of the then 3 man staff

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call hourly [REDACTED] for material. In between important texts were

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telephoned to the FBMS office [REDACTED]

The next problem was that of getting material to Washington as fast as ~~practic~~ possible without incurring too great costs. The first proposal was to send material by radio telephone but because of security factors this was abandoned. Air mail was irregular and too slow so cable service became the only workable alternative. After editing, and reduction to a modified cablese, the copy was sent to the cable office by messenger or by telephone in the case of urgent copy. It was then sent via private cable service to Washington. After negotiations with the cable authorities it was possible to get a priority for FBMS copy which ~~was~~ ^{EXPEDITED} the process still more.

By the start of 1942 FBIS had taken on the structural pattern which characterized its operations for the duration of the war. During 1942 the name was changed to Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service since that seemed better to describe its functions. This was one of the earlier recommendations of [REDACTED] who became Director in

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July 1942 after [REDACTED] left for military service. [REDACTED] remained with FBIS for two years during which he devoted much of his time and energies to representing FBIS before the Cox and Lea Committees of Congress during their investigation of the FCC. This investigation brought considerable public attention to FBIS. The investigators appear to have been primarily concerned with personnel policies but did inquire into the usefulness of FBIS to other government agencies. In the final report of the Committee, which was not issued until January 1945, the Chairman reported that the evidence submitted indicated that clients found the services provided by FBIS "valuable in their own activities."

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[REDACTED] was also active in eliminating duplication of functions in FBIS and other agencies and in establishment of the United Nations

monitoring activities of the various Allies. When he resigned in 1944

25X1A the post was filled by [redacted] who remained one year.

25X1A [redacted] special concern was the internal organization of the Service which he attempted to unify. ~~When he~~ resigned ^{in August 1945} to join the staff of

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STATINTL [redacted] had previously served as administrative officer ^{in Washington} and as

STATINTL Chief of the [redacted].

At the beginning of 1942 the Service included the following Divisions: Monitoring and Translation; Reports, which was responsible for the Daily Report and wire services; and the Analysis Division. Field operations were supervised by the Director's office and by the Chief Editor. This ^{SUPERVISION} continued, as a matter of fact, until 1944 when ^{IT} ~~the~~ ~~supervision~~ was combined in the office of the Chief of the Monitoring Division. The change was made to eliminate difficulties which had arisen in field administration from lack of ^{COHERENT} ~~coherent~~ administration in Washington.

The work of duplicating productions, handling files and other administrative duties ~~was~~ was assigned to the Mail and Files

Division which was subsequently renamed Administrative Services.

MONITORING

The Monitoring and Translating Division was in the process of expansion ~~work~~ in 1942. This continued until, in the spring of 1943, the Division had a total of [REDACTED] employees. These were divided among monitors, translators, and clerks. All told they covered 45 languages and dialects in the Washington and field offices. As the result of the Congressional budget cut of \$500,000 in 1943 it was necessary to reduce the size of the staff. This was done by elimination from the monitoring schedules of certain south European languages including Bulgarian, Hungarian, Slovene, Rumanian, Arabic, Hindustani, Armenian, and Serbo-croat. A further reduction was made in 1944 when Polish and Czechoslovak were eliminated.

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At the same time coverage was reduced for certain Allied transmissions but, at the insistence of the OWI, [REDACTED] was continued. This meant, in August 1944 ^{AFTER} ~~the~~ the severest cuts had been made, that out of 268 programs monitored daily by the Washington staff, 93 were [REDACTED] programs in various languages.

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In an effort to fit the staff ~~to~~ to the budget it was decided to combine the functions of monitoring and translating and the same people then did both. This was introduced in the fall of 1943.

These reductions brought the staff down to a low of 35 when FBIS was liquidated in December 1945. They were covering 15 languages in the Washington and field offices.

Throughout this time the monitoring process was being perfected.

A system of code abbreviations was developed which enabled the monitor-translator to reduce the amount of translation and still make broadcast items available to the rest of FBIS and to the client agencies. As he listened to and summarized a news announcement the monitor indicated, on his summary, whether or not the item was a repeat, whether it was new but of comparatively little value, and whether or not the editors and analysts who used the summaries could expect a full translation immediately. Thus if an item was new but appeared of little value to the monitor it was marked "hold". An editor or analyst who was interested could then request a full translation. Since the records were kept the translation could be prepared in the field and sent marked for the attention of the person requesting it. Records were kept for varying lengths of time depending upon the storage facilities available. The usual period was 72 hours.

This system of marking items repeat, new, or hold was followed in all the Pacific area field offices and reduced the load on translators and on wire facilities to an appreciable degree.

One translating job which required establishment of a separate post was that of Japanese language programs. Military regulations prohibited

STATINTL Nisei in [redacted] so the first [redacted] office was opened in [redacted] STATINTL

STATINTL [redacted] where Nisei were permitted but in limited numbers. To get around these regulations OWI established a translation unit in [redacted] and FBIS STATINTL

STATINTL quickly followed suit in 1943. The raw material, that is broadcast^{S/} in Romaji, was sent from [redacted] by teletype and the translations done there.

This office was in existence but a short while, however. The translators were brought to Washington where they worked in the [redacted] building. The STATINTL

STATINTL Romaji was sent from [redacted] by teletype, translated and re-sent to [redacted] ATINTL

so that the editors would be informed of its contents. It also went to San Francisco for use of the OWI there. Transcripts of the Romaji translations were mimeographed in Washington for many months after this practice was stopped for other transcripts.

The Program Information Unit, which was started ~~in September 1941~~ IN SEPTEMBER 1941, was originally intended as an information service for members of the monitoring staff. Its function was to locate new or changed transmissions and

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and transmitters so that monitors could be kept abreast of any changes in
broadcast schedules.

This function was gradually enlarged until the Unit was issuing five
regular publications. The Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasts was started
in March 1942 and contained a list of all known international transmissions for
each 15 minute period of the day. Broadcasts were classified by language, *etc.*
frequency, *etc.* Any additional information at hand was also given. The complete
volume was revised twice each year and other revisions were issued as often
as necessary, sometimes several times a week. Station and Program Notes
was inaugurated in July 1942 and was a two to four page bulletin issues several
times a week. It contained notes on new stations and programs, schedule changes,
and so forth.

Broadcasting Stations of the World was first issued in February and March
1944. It was a four volume publication which classified all known stations,
except United States domestic stations, by wave length, location and call letter.
Suppliments were issues from time to time.

Morse and Hellschreiber Schedules of the World was first issued in August
1944. It contained a list of all such known transmissions and showed time,
direction and language. Revisions were issued twice yearly following seasonal

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changes in frequency and time.

These publications ~~was~~ ^{were} delivered to the International and Radio Intelli-

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gence Divisions of FCC, to [redacted] the Bureau

of Standards, CIAA, military agencies and the OWI which valued them because

they provided information useful to OWI in planning broadcast schedules from

this country.

Still another series was the daily coverage list which showed all programs

covered by FBIS stations. These were shown by time, language, beam and trans-

mitter.

Shortwave Schedule and Reception Notes was prepared by the Program

Information Unit from material sent in by a group of approximately 12



private listeners in this country, Hawaii and New Zealand. This was issued

semi-monthly and was circulated to the FBIS field offices, OWI, Bureau of

Standards and to the CIAA.

Material for these various publications was gathered not only from BRU

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personnel, FBIS translators and Observation Monitors but from the [redacted]

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[redacted] CIAA, OWI and the FBIS special consultant in

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[redacted] This consultant, [redacted] a 19 year old boy living in ILLEGIB

St. Petersburg, has been working for FBIS since the spring of 1943. Not

only does he provide information about new or changed programs, he has from time to time recorded broadcasts which were not available in Washington because of reception conditions.

FIELD OPERATIONS

It was the field monitoring stations, of course, which enabled FBIS to get its wide coverage of the world's transmitters. Through its own monitoring operations and in collaboration with monitoring units of other Allied countries, FBIS was able to get coverage of 1800 transmitters.

Although the Washington office was receiving monitored broadcasts from the field stations in the summer of 1941, field operations by FBIS personnel did not start until the [REDACTED] office was opened in October 1941. Within the next two months personnel was sent to field stations in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. These stations were not all operating completely by the end of 1941 but the preliminary steps had been taken.

During 1942 these offices gradually expanded their operations, although they encountered considerable difficulty. [REDACTED] for example, such

essential equipment as typewriters had to be obtained from Washington. *OFFICE*

equipment was hard to acquire in Washington and when a shipment was finally sent to [REDACTED] it was lost at sea. The next attempt was somewhat more successful for the machines arrived. But they were so badly damaged they had

STATINTL to be repaired. At [REDACTED] the equipment problem was even more severe because of the military operations in progress there. Another stumbling block was the fact that during the first three months the actual monitoring

STATINTL was conducted in a hotel in downtown [REDACTED] The post was then moved to a more favorable location on the outskirts.

STATINTL The [REDACTED] posts encountered fewer mechanical difficulties but were constantly in need of increased personnel.

In London the problems were somewhat more complex. Although [REDACTED] STATINTL and FBIS personnel were eager to cooperate there were obstacles to a smooth operation, ~~that had to be arranged~~ FBIS had to make arrangements for the

STATINTL speedy reception [REDACTED] monitoring although they were not permitted to station editors at the [REDACTED] STATINTL


Not until June 1942 did the FBIS have a large enough staff to permit STATSPEC stationing an editor at the country monitoring post and the [REDACTED] agreed to such an arrangement. This meant that the FBIS could have access to all the material monitored rather than just that sent in to London [REDACTED] STATSPEC

But not until September 1942 were they able to procure a teletype line ^{FROM THE COUNTRY} to

London. The delay in transmitting copy to the Washington office was only

gradually overcome. In March 1942, when the London bureau was returned to the

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The London Office also had personnel problems since it was necessary to get Washington approval for all employees who were hired in England. This difficulty, too, was overcome when the field office was given permission to employ such workers as were necessary without previous approval from Washington.

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The [redacted] posts encountered this same difficulty but solved it by getting civil service approval from local offices of the Civil Service Commission before sending the papers to Washington.

Despite all these administrative problems the London bureau was able to

provide the Washington office with a daily file of material [REDACTED]

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STATINTL [REDACTED] This gave the U. S. coverage of European broadcasters, principally

local or home service, which were not received in this country. This material

was also made available to U. S. agencies in London who received duplicate

copies of all cables sent to the Washington office. In May 1945, just prior

to the end of the European war, the London bureau was sending some 42,000 words

per day over Western Union, Press Wireless, Signal Corps and OWI circuits.

In August of 1942, FBIS added to its field posts the monitoring station

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[REDACTED]

STATINTL Operation of this [REDACTED] post enabled FBIS to intercept certain

Russian transmissions which were sometimes inaudible in [REDACTED] due to

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atmospheric conditions. The [REDACTED] had overlapping program STATINTL

schedules and duplicate personnel in some languages. The final decision as to

which should monitor a given program was based on manpower and atmospherics.

STATINTL Because ^{OF} the prohibition against Nisei [REDACTED] all Japanese language

STATINTL work was done in [REDACTED]

The fact that the OWI had a staff of translators in [REDACTED] made it STATINTL possible for FBIS to get translations of programs for which the agency itself did not have translators. Certain Indian programs, and broadcasts in Annamese and Thai were translated by members of the OWI staff. In return FBIS provided OWI with rapid coverage of Far Eastern broadcasts for the counter-propaganda unit located in [REDACTED]

STATINTL Meanwhile the Allied invasion of Africa took place and brought with it a request from the Army for establishment of a monitoring post at [REDACTED] STATINTL

STATINTL [REDACTED] chief of the London Bureau, went to [REDACTED] in December 1942 to STATINTL establish a post for monitoring broadcasts from Axis and Allied countries to

Arabic, French, Spanish, Italian and German language groups. This post served a

~~special~~ ^{special} purpose in that it provided information about broadcasts to military

officials on the spot as well as ^{to} the Washington office. [REDACTED] red a daily STATINTL

mimeographed report which was distributed to military officials ^{THERE,} [REDACTED] STATINTL

^{IT} ~~They~~ also prepared a daily summary which was sent to Washington via the Signal

Corps circuits. Although the staff ultimately grew to [REDACTED] people only 5 were STATINTL

FBIS members. These were editors from London and a monitor from the Washington

office.

In addition ^{this} the post sent out field teams which covered broadcasts for the intelligence units of combat forces. Such teams took part in the several campaigns in Africa, Sicily and Italy. They reported to the intelligence units to which they were attached but made no report to the [REDACTED] office on the broad-STATINTL casts they monitored. These teams provided the nucleus for the monitoring posts which were ultimately established in [REDACTED] to monitor Italian home STATINTL service, Balkan and German controlled broadcasts for the information of military officials.

STATINTL FBIS participation in these [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] operations ceased with the STATINTL transfer of the personnel concerned to the OWI in 1943 and 1944. [REDACTED] TINTL

STATINTL who had been in charge of the [REDACTED] returned to the United States in February 1944 and was not replaced.

STATINTL [REDACTED] was also the focal point for distribution of the daily cable from London of 10,000 words concerning European transmissions not available in Africa. This round-up was prepared by the country staff in England

STATINTL and sent via teletype [REDACTED] This service was started in May 1943 at the request of the [REDACTED] office. STATINTL

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STATINTL [REDACTED] employees, like those in London, ran into trouble with pay roll and accounting procedures. These difficulties indicate^d clearly, in the minds of those stationed at those posts, the need for clarification of these procedures as well as the need for training field employees in their application.

About this time, the summer of 1943, negotiations were begun with the

STATINTL [REDACTED] then monitoring Balkan broadcasts [REDACTED] TATINTL

who went to London in June 1943, conferred with the official in charge of that post with a view to making its output available to FBIS. The Congressional Budget cut of that year, however, made it impossible to send

STATINTL an FBIS editor to [REDACTED] and arrangements were made whereby the OWI financed the project although the editor was an FBIS employee. This same system was

STATINTL [REDACTED] followed in [REDACTED] An editor who had been trained in FBIS techniques and needs was sent to India in 1943 at the expense of the OWI to procure copies of broadcasts from transmitters in southeast Asia [REDACTED] STATINTL

Unfortunately this cooperativeness was not always present in FBIS-OWI relations in London where OWI attempted to duplicate the work being done by FBIS. These initial conflicts were ultimately ironed out in a series of

conferences in Washington and New York but the extent to which OWI failed to acknowledge that FBIS should be the sole monitoring agency of the U. S. is indicated by the fact that they carried on monitoring operations at [REDACTED] STATINTL

Latin American transmitters were intercepted by the field stations at

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[REDACTED] These stations were smaller than those at [REDACTED] STATINTL

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and [REDACTED] and, contrary to the evidence presented by earlier tests, reception was never as good as was desired. When budget cuts brought about reduction in the attention given Latin American affairs, the operations were

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curtailed. The [REDACTED] staff was reduced in the summer of 1943, out to a minimum of two or three employees in the summer of 1944 and finally eliminated

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later in 1944. [REDACTED] was eliminated in May 1944. After that time

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Washington and [REDACTED] took over monitoring of Latin American transmissions.

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The summer of 1943 also saw the start of FBIS monitoring [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The transmitters located in the Baltic countries and German controlled parts of Russia were not usually heard in London and this new post was expected to fill in one of the blanks in total coverage of European transmitters. Monitoring on a small scale was already being done by the State

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Department [REDACTED] and this operation was expanded by

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[REDACTED] who arrived there in August 1943. With a staff of translators he was able to secure texts of broadcasts from these ^{BALTIC} and [REDACTED] clandestine transmitters. The copy was cabled to London where it was re-sent to the Washington office. Here again successful cooperation with OWI reportedly enhanced the success of the work. With the progress into western Europe of Russian forces in the fall of 1944, the broadcasts intercepted at

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[REDACTED] became less valuable and the post was abandoned in December 1944.

As official attention in the Far East ^{INCREASED} ~~became greater~~ with the progress of the war, FBIS decided to increase its coverage of Asiatic transmitters.

With this in mind tests were made in [REDACTED] where reception STATINTL

was found to be better than [REDACTED] for certain programs. STATINTL

Because of local conditions, there it was decided to establish the post [REDACTED] STATINTL

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[REDACTED] using facilities formerly occupied by a private club.

This post was opened in the summer of 1944 and was staffed by engineers,

editors, translators and clerical employees sent from the [REDACTED] and STATINTL

Washington offices. In addition, residents of the area were hired as trans-

lators. It was possible by this move to increase the staff of Japanese trans-

lators since restrictions against Nisei did not apply there. This made

possible increased coverage of Japanese language transmissions. Kauai was

STATINTL also able to intercept the Yanan transmitter ~~which was~~ from Communist China which was not heard in [REDACTED] because it was powered by a hand generator.

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When these three [redacted] stations were in full operation, they

covered between them on an average day 324 programs of varying length from

25X1A

transmitters in Latin America and Asia.

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Because these [redacted] operations made it no longer necessary, the

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[redacted] office was closed in January 1945.

Plans were being laid for monitoring posts even closer to Japan.

Tests were made of reception conditions at various Pacific islands and the

station was finally established [redacted] in the spring of 1945. This

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facilitated interception of home service programs on medium and long waves.

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The [redacted] operation, which was supplimented for a few months in the summer

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of 1945 by a station [redacted] was on a smaller scale than that at [redacted]

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The staff of engineers, translators, editors and teletypists worked in

quonset huts and lived in military barracks. The important monitored mate-

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rial was sent to [redacted] via naval communications channels. From there it was

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sent, along with the [redacted] copy, by Signal Corps circuits to the mainland

for transmission to Washington. More routine translations, including

monitors summaries, were usually sent by airmail.

In August 1945 when FBIS monitoring of Asiatic transmitters reached a

STATINTL

peak, these [redacted] bureaus were averaging 51,000 words per day over Signal

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As was the case in Europe, FBIS worked directly with military officials

STATINTL at the [redacted] posts. For example, the Navy high command in Hawaii received

a daily summary of Far Eastern broadcasts monitored at [redacted]

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DAILY REPORT

The Report Section, too, went through ^a ~~this~~ process of expansion and

contraction -- as did its products. At the end of 1941 the Daily Report

was a comparatively small publication containing summaries of broadcasts

and a certain amount of editorial comment.

In the early months of 1942 an attempt was made to include in the Report verbatim copies of broadcasts using the words of the broadcaster rather than of ~~the~~ the editor. By summer of that year texts had almost completely replaced summaries in the Report. Editors' summaries were still used where reception made direct quotation impracticable but experience proved that users of the report preferred verbatim texts.

Meanwhile the contents of the Report were increasing in volume as FBIS coverage of world transmitters increased. This process continued, paralleled by increases in the personnel of the Division until the budget cut of 1943 made it necessary to reduce the space devoted to Allied transmitters and to broadcasts in languages which had proved to be of little value for either propaganda or intelligence purposes.

This meant elimination of broadcasts to and about Latin America and reduction in the space devoted to purely military reporting. Again in 1944 the size of the Report and of the staff were reduced to conform to budget requirements.

Despite these reductions the circulation of the Report continued to increase. Just before the end of the war, in August 1945, the number of copies distributed to other agencies had reached a peak of 800. This had dropped to 600 by the time the Report was discontinued in December. The staff also dwindled -- from [redacted] employees in the spring of 1943, [redacted] of whom were editors, to [redacted] in December 1945 of whom [redacted] were editors.

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Until 1944 arrangement of material within the Report was based upon transmitters. That is, all broadcasts from a given transmitter were grouped together despite the fact that the subject matter might vary from reporting of domestic affairs to reports of alleged conditions on the other side of the globe.

At the request of clients this plan was changed in the spring of 1944 to one whereby broadcasts pertaining to a particular region were grouped together. Thus the Report was divided

into sections dealing with Europe and Asia and with regional subsections which were determined by the content of a given day's broadcasts.


This plan was altered again in the summer of 1945. At the request of certain agencies, particularly the State Department, which wished to see all the output of ~~transmitters~~ Russian and Russian controlled transmitters together all broadcasts from a transmitter ~~xxxxxx~~ were placed together in the European Daily Report. This practice was not followed completely in the other sections.

Actual content of the Report has varied considerably. At first it contained a section entitled Highlights in which important broadcasts were indicated. This was replaced ultimately and the same purpose accomplished by the ^{daily} roundups of European and Japanese propaganda.

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 These were prepared in the London and

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 offices respectively and were usually fairly detailed

discussions of trends in radio reporting during the 24 hours. After the close of the war and largely because of transmission difficulties between London and Washington, the surveys were eliminated.

For many months the Personal Intelligence section led off the Daily. This contained information about the comings and goings of

leading personalities all over the world. Latin American personalities

were included here although no Latin American material was contained in the rest of the Report. This entire section was eliminated after the cessation of hostilities since it was felt that individual comings and goings were of less importance in peacetime.

In September 1945 the Report was broken ~~up~~ up into three ~~distinct~~ volumes. Separate sections were issued for European, Latin American and Far Eastern broadcasts. These were all discontinued December 4.

The Daily Report was supplimented from time to time by other publications prepared by the section. In December 1943 the Morning Preview was started. This was a round up of propaganda themes for the Axis transmitters plus brief summaries of important news taken from radio sources as of 8 a. m. each day. It was delivered to other agencies by 11 a. m. each day to give government officials an indication of the days broadcasts. In order to scale FBIS activities down to budget allotments the Preview was suspended in March 1944. At about this same time the section issued Special Releases ^{ON OCCASION} [REDACTED] ILLEGIB

These included broadcasts about particular news events or leaders speeches.

This series, too, was discontinued when staff shortages necessitated

WIRE SERVICES

During 1942 the wire services appear to have gone through the same process of choosing between editors' summaries and texts as did the Daily Report. At first summaries were used rather fully but the clients soon made known their preference for full texts and this preference was followed wherever possible. As with the Daily Report, too, the editing process involved selection of important broadcasts, substitution of full wordage where cablese was used, and insertion of punctuation. After the Japanese surrender the practice of placing headlines on wire copy was instituted.

Throughout the war years the wire services operated on a round the clock basis. This meant that at any time during the day or night broadcasts given a priority rating could be rushed to the proper agency while nonpriority material reached them without delay. The editors received transcripts directly from the translators (by wire in the case of programs received at field stations) and from the total take selected broadcasts of interest ^{to} a subscriber or a group of subscribers. Special bulletins were indicated by the teletypewriter operation who pushed a key causing three bells to ring on the receiving machines and thereby call attention to flash news.

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An example of the speed with which wire clients received current news was the report of the surrender of Italy on September 8, 1943. General Eisenhower's 12:30^{P.M.} announcement was reported by the A wire at 12:35 in what was described as "close to text" and in full text at 12:41.

In addition to transmitting texts of broadcasts the ~~x~~ wires provided clients with information on broadcasting conditions. ~~THEY~~ *THEY* usually reported, for example, when specified transmissions were not heard. Furthermore ~~xxx~~ they carried information items in which clients were given data on changes in techniques of a given transmitter or ~~xxxx~~ news considered to be of especial importance. Such information was readily available in the wire rooms since the A wire editors acted as a clearing house for field offices in this connection. Thus if a program regularly monitored at one station was inaudible at a given time the wire desk asked another field station to monitor the program. Because of the speed of FBIS communications this sort of interchange was possible with a minimum of delay.

The Italian surrender also provided an example of the use

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of the "For your information" bulleting. At 12:11 on September 8, 1943

the A wire transmitted the following message:

"Bulletin

For your information

FCC London advises that Reuters quotes New York radio stating

Italy surrenders. [REDACTED] heard nothing on this so far -- Editor"

During the war the A wire, at its peak, averaged 53,000 words of copy per day. This was made up of texts containing political, diplomatic, ~~xxx~~ economic, military and propaganda intelligence. A survey made in 1943 showed that almost 75 percent of this material was not made available to the government agencies through any other channels.

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The A Wire usually carried the German communique in the German language for the special attention of military intelligence officials as well as daily digests of propaganda themes of Axis radios. These digests were ^{THOSE} prepared in the field offices. At intervals during the day the wire carried reviews of developments during a given period of hours. For example, developments as reported by broadcasts were listed for the periods 6 a. m. to 6 p. m., 6 p. m. to midnight and midnight to 6 a. m.

In September 1945 the A Wire was cut down to an 8 a. m. to 10 p. m. operation and in November, because of staff shortages, it was cut again to 8 a. m. to 4 p. m. The wire ceased operation on December 6, 1945.

The B Wire was used only by the OWI in New York and Washington. That agency asked ~~that~~^{for} texts of broadcasts to be used in connection with counter propaganda. For this reason the content of the B Wire had a different emphasis than did the A Wire. The copy, which averaged 45,000 words per day, was prepared by a separate group of editors until August 1945.

Other wire services and their special uses were as follows:

C Wire -- This circuit was inaugurated in 1942 at the request of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. It provided that agency with 8,500 words daily of copy pertinent to Latin American affairs. It included broadcasts from and to Latin America. Copy for this wire, too, was prepared by a special editor until after the end of the war.

D or PW Wire -- This circuit serviced the [REDACTED]

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with information taken from Far Eastern broadcasts not monitored in

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[REDACTED] After a few months of operating on a Western Union circuit

it was changed to a Press Wireless circuit which was cheaper. It

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carried basic military, diplomatic, political and economic intelligence

intercepted in the Pacific coast area. Among other things this wire

carried the daily roundup of Far Eastern propaganda prepared by FBIS

STATINTL offices [REDACTED]. The material was sent in cablese and ^{the project} was

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financed by the OWI [REDACTED]. During the summer of

1945 Press Wireless was replaced by Western Union as the transmission

channel. ^{After} ~~Since~~ the end of the war it has been used only when [REDACTED]

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STATINTL [REDACTED] requested a certain broadcast. During the war it averaged

2,500 words per day.

X Wire -- This service was inaugurated in September 1943 at the request

of the OWI Propaganda Analysis section in San Francisco. It carried a

3,000 word daily selection of intercepts from European transmitters

for use in counterpropaganda activities in Asia. In addition to more

or less routine broadcasts the wire carried texts of speeches by such

Axis leaders as Hitler, Goering and Goebbels. The material was actually

ILLEGIB carried on the FBIS ^{two way} [REDACTED] circuit which connected [REDACTED] TATINTL

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[REDACTED] and Washington. By means of switching arrangements

it was possible to send material to the [REDACTED] office of

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FBIS with OWI receiving a copy simultaneously. This made it possible

to send not only the European material listed ^babove but texts of the Romaji and kana material translated in Washington. The X wire also

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carried, for [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the text of [REDACTED] broadcast.

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P M Wire -- This wire, which at one time was known as the E Wire, was in operation from December 1942 until September 1945 and was the means by which FBIS informed the Provost Marshal General of the Army of information from and about prisoners of war broadcast by the Axis stations. The wire carried approximately 6,000 words per day of messages from prisoners and references to specific men as reported by Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo.

S Wire -- This service was of very short duration. It was in operation only from September 8 to September 10, 1943 and was a direct connection to the State Department. Texts and excerpts of broadcasts relating to the surrender of Italy were carried on the wire.

ANALYSIS

The Analysis Division followed the same pattern of expansion and contraction as the other divisions with the exception that the process of contraction was more rapid. During 1942 more and more persons were

added to the Division until it reached a maximum of [REDACTED] in the summer

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of 1943.

In 1943, however, the function of analysis came under Congressional scrutiny as did the rest of FBIS. Because of cuts in budgetary allotments it was necessary to reduce the size of the Division and the quantity of its output. In the spring of 1944 as a result of these pressures the Division was dissolved. The Far Eastern section was *continued* combined with the like section of the Report Division to form a Far Eastern Division while the remaining sections, European, of the former Analysis Division were reconstituted into a Special Reports Section. This new section continued, although in modified degree, to turn out the same kind of reports until December 1944 when it was dissolved completely. For the remainder of the war the only work^k of broadcast analysis was carried on in the Far Eastern Division. With the end of the war this too was abandoned since radio materials from Asia were no longer the exclusive source of intelligence from that area.

The process of analysis as applied in the Division was the separation of broadcasts and items therein into various categories such as topic, place of origin, propaganda theme. These categories were

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then combined in one or more ways to produce a summary discussion of a great number of broadcast words. This method was supplemented by the use of statistical or quantitative analysis until the summer of 1942. This process, known as coding, involved classification of broadcast content to show the amount of time devoted to a given topic or topics. It was eliminated when a survey of clients showed that the results were little used.

In the fall of 1942 an effort was made to decentralize the work of the Division to the extent of sending representatives to London.

The two men had access to [REDACTED] of a greater volume of European broadcasts than was available in this country. From it they prepared summaries and analyses which were sent to Washington by cable and included in the regular reports of the Division. Early in 1943 this theory of having analysts at the spot where broadcasts were being intercepted was duplicated [REDACTED] where one of the editors, having received instruction in needs of the Division, prepared informational reports.

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From the description given on the title page of the first issue of the Weekly Review may be gained an idea of the purposes of

~~the~~ the Division. The Analysis was intended, according to that description, to "single out for discussion and interpretation broadcast material which may be significant from the point of view of propaganda and intelligence, show trends in broadcasting as they develop from week to week and suggest, wherever possible, what continuing or changing national policy is reflected in the broadcasts of foreign countries."

During the spring and summer months of 1942 the Weekly Analysis expanded along with the Analysis Division. During this period the Division was made up of sections dealing with enemy and Allied transmitters. This pattern was fairly amorphous, however, and was abandoned completely in 1943 at which time each area became an independent section of the Division. There were sections dealing with Germany and German occupied areas, Italy, British Empire, Soviet Union, and the Far East. Broadcasts to and from Latin America were handled by a separate section.

As users' interest in certain Allied transmitters declined the work on those broadcasts was eliminated. Russian broadcasts continued to attract interest during the entire war and were consequently empha-

sized in analysis publications but [redacted] were given

less and less attention. Broadcasts from China also received less

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attention with the exception of the Yen-an transmitter from Communist China which was the only source of intelligence on that area.

By the summer of 1942 the Analysis had become so large as to make its processing unwieldy and its usefulness to government officials questionable. After making a survey of clients it was decided to revise the Weekly. In August it was changed to the Weekly Review. Each section was reduced in length, the statistics which been found to be of little use, were eliminated, and an effort was made to streamline the reports so as to give users the most useful information about propaganda trends in a concise fashion.

Certain
~~The following~~ sections were included in the Review more or less regularly: Fighting Fronts under which heading were grouped discussions of such topics as propaganda treatment and radio reports of the Russian, Second, North African, Far Eastern, and submarine fronts. Then there were regional sections for Latin America, British Empire, Western, Central and Southern Europe, Soviet Union, ^W Near and Middle East and Far East. The final decision as to which sections should be included was based not only on the availability of radio material on a given

topic but also on the state of the Division staff at any given time.

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In the spring of 1944, just before it was discontinued, the Review was being sent to 550 government offices.

In an attempt to supplement this general Review with publications of interest to specialized clients the Division undertook preparation of weekly ~~issues~~ dealing with such topics as propaganda to and about the United States, suggestions for counter propaganda and blunders in Axis propaganda. These various issues were distributed in the fall of 1942. They were all abandoned by the end of that year.

*Analysis
Factors*

In a further attempt to meet the needs of clients having specialized interests the Division undertook preparation of regional publications. In August 1942 the Radio Report on the Far East and the Daily Analysis of Latin American Broadcasts were instituted. The second of these ~~factor~~ discussed radio propaganda from Axis and Allied countries dealing with events in Latin American countries. At the request of the CIAA this report was sent out early each morning until May 1943 when it was changed to a weekly. This change followed the discovery that CIAA was also issuing a daily report. This analysis report was discontinued in August 1943 when the State Department indicated that it was no longer

The Radio Report on the Far East was issued twice each month until after the war. It contained regular reports ^{recounting} ~~describing~~ political, social and economic developments in the various countries of occupied Asia in addition to special reports on such topics as Japan's religious propaganda, changing propaganda in China, tabulations of interpellations in the Japanese Diet, and health conditions in Asia. Circulation of this fortnightly reached a top of 600 in August 1945.

The final issue in the series, no. 81, was distributed in October 1945 and was an index to the issues appearing between January and August 1945.

Publication of other regional series was begun in the early months of 1943. These were prepared for central, southern and Eastern Europe and were continued, sometimes under varying titles, until the fall of 1944. The ^{EUROPEAN} ~~Eastern~~ Analysis, which contained press and radio material from the Soviet Union was continued until December 1944.

Each of these reports contained discussions, sometimes in considerable detail, of developments or conditions within the specific area intended to serve officials working in that area.

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In addition to working on these regular publications members of the Division prepared special reports on occasion. These were sometimes included in a ^Rregular publication and ~~was~~ at other times were distributed separately. In this category was the Quarterly Review issued in March 1942. A review of three months propaganda, it was intended to be the first of a regular series but no later reviews were prepared. Also in this category was the Propaganda Man series issued in the fall and winter of 1942 - 1943. This dealt with the characteristics of the average listener in different countries. Other such special reports were concerned with analysis of speeches by Hitler, cabinet changes in Japan, radio treatment of UNRRA, events in Argentina, etc. In some cases these reports were the result of collaboration between members of the different sections in the Divisions while others were prepared by one or more members of a specific section.

A major and continuing problem of the Division was that of liaison not ^{only} with other agencies but within FBIS ~~at~~ itself. Because of the differences in the functions performed, and sometimes of personalities involved, there appears to have been considerable lack

of understanding between members of the Analysis Division and other.

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Divisions of FBIS. During the existence of the Analysis Division no adequate solution was found for this problem.

~~Inter~~ Relations with other governmental agencies also presented obstacles since members of the Division were frequently unsure of the types of materials desired by those clients and of the uses to which the analyses and reports were put. Attempts were made to fill this gap by conferences with the users and by questionnaires submitted to them from time to time. On the basis of the information thus gained changes were made in content and style of reports and in the mailing lists.

With respect to the OWI the problem was intensified by the degree to which its various divisions relied upon radio materials. In 1943 the suggestion was made that the Division be transferred en bloc to OWI to facilitate increased collaboration. The suggestion was turned down by FBIS, however, on the grounds that such a transfer would impair the usefulness of the Division to ~~other~~ ^{other} agencies than OWI. Instead the members of the Division were moved to the OWI offices in May 1943 although administratively they were still part of FBIS. The move made

it possible for analysts to work with personnel of the OWI Bureau of
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Overseas Intelligence in the preparation of regular FBIS reports, in

answering queries and in conferences leading to formulation of OWI

directives.

SPECIAL SERVICES

MISCELLANEOUS

Throughout the war FBIS provided additional services for other

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agencies. During the [redacted] Conference in April 1945, for

example, editors in Washington prepared a daily roundup of radio

reactions to the Conference. This was sent by teletype to [redacted]

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[redacted] where the State Department mimeographed it for distribution

to the delegates.

Probably the most noteworthy of these special services was

that concerned with prisoners of war. In 1942 FBIS kept files of

prisoners of war broadcasts emanating from the Axis stations. In December

of that year, at the request of the War Department, FBIS instituted the

Prisoner of War Wire by which daily lists of prisoners mentioned or

quoted on the radios were sent to the Army's Provost Marshal General.

These lists were made up of names monitored by FBIS as well as those

monitored [redacted]

The [redacted] service

STATINTL

was discontinued in September 1945 when it became unnecessary.

For a time FBIS sent messages to next of kin of persons mentioned

in these prisoner broadcasts. This was done as the result of conferences between Government officials who were anxious to put a stop to the practice of casual private listeners so informing next of kin.

By means of Western Union channels the following notification form was sent to persons mentioned in the broadcast as being the next of kin:

"The name of John Jones has been mentioned in an enemy broadcast as a German (Japanese) prisoner. These enemy broadcasts aim at getting listeners for their propaganda. However, the Army (Navy) is checking for accuracy and will advise you as soon as possible."

The messages were charged to FBIS at Western Union's regular commercial rate and in August 1944 the service was discontinued as an economy measure.

Another phase of the prisoner of war services was the sending to Army Air Forces in London of names of airmen listed as captured in ~~the~~ ^{Berlin} broadcasts monitored in this country. They were sent by teletype to London where the FBIS made them available to Army officials.

The Army reported that this service was effective not only in computing

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statistics of personnel losses but in improving the morale of airmen

by letting them know that friends who ~~failed~~ ^{FAILED} to return had been captured
and were still alive.

During the entire war FBIS was faced with the task of answering
inquiries from relatives of service personnel mentioned in prisoner
broadcasts. This continued even after the sending of notices had been
discontinued and was frequently a task of some dimensions for a clerical
staff which was shorthanded most of the time. To facilitate this
process name files were kept of persons mentioned in the ^{Axis} broadcasts.

This file was started in the spring of 1943 and was handled by the
Library staff in Washington until September 1943 at which time it was
assigned to the clerical staff of the Wire Service Section. Because
of personnel shortages the file was stopped in August 1944 although
that of prisoners mentioned in Japanese broadcasts was continued in

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██████████ In most cases the card contained the name of the
prisoner, ^{and source} ~~date~~ of the broadcast ██████████ as well

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as the name of the next of kin when such information was given. If
the notification telegrams were not delivered that fact was mentioned
on the card.

In 1944 a Special Services ~~Director~~ ^{Section} was set up in which were

centralized a variety of functions formerly performed by ~~various~~ *different*

sections. These included the selection of items not distributed

through regular FBIS channels and which were believed to be of

interest to special clients. Such a service had been performed by

various sections from time to time but was formalized with the

setting up of this Section. Items dealing with ~~financial~~ ^{crop} conditions,

for example, might be discarded from the Daily Report and Wire Services

due to lack of space. The Special Services Section, having a list

of clients and their special interests, sent such an item to the

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Department of Agriculture. When FBIS

was liquidated the total number of persons receiving such special

service had reached *65*.

At the time of liquidation this section was maintaining records

of personalities mentioned in broadcasts, indexing the Daily Report

and maintaining mailing lists for the three regular publications.