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(part I)

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONITORING
SERVICE

By the end of 1940, the need of American officials for a service to monitor foreign radio broadcasts became fully apparent. That was a year before Pearl Harbor. The State Department was especially concerned with the tremendous volume of anti-U. S. propaganda being short-waved to Latin America. The Department of Justice was concerned with the extent to which Axis agents in the United States received direction and guidance from Nazi short-wave programs audible here; the use of radio by Herr Goebbels in hastening the fall of France and the Low Countries had shown how powerful an instrument for fomenting disruption radio could be in this respect.

Concern was also felt about the growing aggressiveness of Japan as reflected in her radio broadcasts; indeed, it is interesting to note that although the first draft of a proposed resolution establishing a United States monitoring service spoke of broadcasts "from Europe," a revision of that proposal by Maj. Gen. Joseph O. Mauborgne, then Chief Signal Officer of the Army, substituted for the phrase, "from Europe," the phrase, "from Europe and the Far East."

The Council of National Defense which the President had established in 1940 also felt the need of an American listening service; in January 1941 Prof. William Yandell Elliott of the Council's Advisory Commission wrote in that connection:

"I need not emphasize that radio as an instrument of propaganda has proved its importance beyond any doubt and that the methods employed by the British Broadcasting Corporation and other Governments to analyze the intentions of other Governments by study of their official broadcasts have been considered by General Staff officials to have the greatest military value and are a regular feature now in the British Intelligence Service. In this connection the assumption is that unconscious revelations of future strategic moves, despite attempts to conceal real intentions, may be revealed by the fixed patterns of enemy propaganda and by certain psychological traps that would be apparent to a trained psychologist."

This concern of many Government agencies with the need for a listening service to keep track of foreign broadcasts was crystallized toward the end of 1940 by the State Department, which made informal suggestions in this connection to the President. The President stated that jurisdiction over this matter was in the Defense Communications Board (later the Board of War Communications). This Board was composed of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, the Director of Naval Communications, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Communications, an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.

The State Department, through Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, accordingly brought the matter before the Defense Communications Board at a meeting on January 3, 1941. A proposed resolution establishing listening centers was presented by Assistant Secretary Long and was discussed by General Mauborgne, Admiral Noyes, and FCC Chief Engineer (later Commissioner) E. K. Jett.

The matter was again discussed at the next meeting of the Board January 13, 1941, and at this time the State Department resolution, as expanded by General Mauborgne to include Far East broadcasts, was adopted. In its final form the resolution reads in part as follows:

"Whereas the Government of the United States finds itself confronted with a system of radio-telephonic broadcasting emanating from countries abroad which is aggressive in character and frequently of subversive intent;

"Whereas, in the interest of the security of the United States, it behooves the American Government to keep itself informed of communications of all nature which are being broadcast from Europe and the Far East and are intended for persons in this country or neighboring countries so that it may have an entire view of the picture of propaganda intended for consumption in the American continent;

"Therefore be it resolved, That the Defense Communications Board shall request the Federal Communications Commission to submit to the Board at its next meeting a plan for the establishment of suitable additional monitoring facilities equipped for the purpose of monitoring foreign broadcasts; And be it further

"Resolved, That the Board shall present such a plan with such amendments as it may deem desirable to the President for his approval with the recommendation that he consider the allocation to the Commission of additional funds for the remainder of the current fiscal year not to exceed \$300,000, of which \$50,000 is for additional equipment and \$250,000 for personnel, and a corresponding provision for the fiscal year 1942, for the establishment and maintenance of additional monitoring facilities to give coverage not now projected."

At the next meeting of the Board, January 21, a memorandum to the President and a justification for funds were approved.

The Congress had provided funds for just such newly arising defense needs. In the Military Appropriations Act, 1941, it had set up a special fund "to enable the President, through the appropriate agencies of the Government * * * to provide for emergencies affecting the national security and defense." From the funds thus provided by Congress, the President on February 25, 1941, allotted the sum of \$150,000 to the Federal Communications Commission, and on the next day these funds were made available to the Commission "for expenses to analyze incoming short-wave radio propaganda, and so forth" by Treasury transfer appropriation warrant No. 435. In this way the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service was established.

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(part II)

OPERATIONS: GENERAL

Operations of the FBIS are a belt-line process. This process can best be described in terms of nine simultaneous or successive steps. The steps are:

1. Scheduling.
2. Interception.
3. Monitoring and
4. Recording. (simultaneously)
5. Translating.
6. Wire Service Dissemination
7. Reports (Edited and mimeographed documents for intelligence dissemination)
8. Analyses.
9. Individual services of various kinds.

Step 1 -- Scheduling of Programs

First comes the scheduling of the programs to be intercepted at each listening post during a listening period. This is a highly complex process. It involves the compilation of as complete an index as possible to all foreign broadcasts, their frequencies, hours, languages, and program types, and then keeping this comprehensive index currently accurate from day to day. About 6,000 programs are listed. This work is done, not merely for the FBIS, but also for other United States and United Nations officials who rely on the FBIS for schedules. It is the task of our Program Information Unit. As foreign broadcast programs change, change sheets are supplied to users of the schedule book, so that all the agencies concerned are kept currently informed.

From the program schedule book each FBIS listening post has assigned to it a regular daily sample which forms the bulk of the monitoring task.

These are the programs known to be important and are listened to every day. This daily sample, however, does not fill all the time devoted to

monitoring. There are always special jobs to be done for a particular day, week, or month at the request of some user agency, or which need to be done as backstopping for another listening post temporarily blacked out by static or otherwise. Thus, there is a necessary element of flexibility in the day's schedule of programs assigned to the operators at each listening post.

Step 2 -- Interception

The second step in the FBIS operations is performed by the radio engineers. Each engineer is in charge of a battery of short-wave receivers, half of which at any given time are actually operating, while the other half are warming up. The engineer is supplied with a schedule of "program breaks," so that he will know at 11:45 a.m., for example, just which programs scheduled to come on at 12 noon he will be expected to cover. He tunes in the requisite number of receivers to the right wave lengths in advance, and makes sure that each receiver is functioning properly at the point of greatest audibility. Then, at precisely noon, he can be throwing a switch, break off the programs being intercepted during the 11:45-12 period and tie in the programs for the 12 o'clock period in such a way that each program will go by wire to the right monitor and to the right recording device. Then he proceeds to retune the unused receivers so that they will be ready for the 12:15 programs.

Seldom does everything go precisely according to schedule. An important broadcast, for example, may become inaudible due to atmospheric conditions. The experienced engineer knows where there are alternative frequencies carrying the same program and quickly turns his dial in search of the place where the program is coming through so that with only a few seconds delay the desired broadcast can be monitored.

In addition to this regular, methodical interception, the engineers "cruise" in search of new, changed and discontinued programs, so that the schedule makers will always have before them a complete and accurate record of the programs currently available for listening. As part of the information needed, the engineer makes a daily log report; i.e., a report on audibility and signal strength of each program he tunes in.

The larger part of the interception task involves voice broadcasts. A small but important part of it, however, is getting the enemy news agency programs transmitted in International Morse Code. Before the war, these were regular press transmissions to newspapers in foreign countries which paid for their use. The system broke down as between enemy countries at the outbreak of war. Germany, however, still sends out its Transocean News and Japan its Domei news (both Government controlled) in Morse Code for neutrals, friendly newspapers, and anyone else who wishes to get the news as they color it. These are intercepted by engineers versed in the Morse Code at two of our listening posts, one for Germany on the Atlantic and one for Japan on the Pacific Coast.

The Japanese Domei Morse in the Japanese language presents peculiar difficulties in handling. It is of such value that it is worth the difficulty, directed as it is from Tokyo to satellite newspapers in the Asiatic area.

The Japanese language itself is written in "ideographs" which cannot be transferred directly to dots and dashes. They must first be changed into a Roman alphabet rendering of the Japanese language on a phonetic basis. Then this Romanized Japanese, or Romaji, as it is called, is transmitted in Morse Code. At the engineers receive and type it out as so many meaningless letters. In this form it is teletyped to Washington, where translators render it in English. Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP83-00442R000100080002-9

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as long as for other languages.

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The FBIS receiving stations tune in the broadcast programs but do not listen to them or record their content. The receivers are attached to private telephone lines which end at monitors' booths 5, 10 or 15 miles away. The receiving stations themselves are located with a special view to erection of an adequate antennae system free from obstructions of any kind. In no cases are they satisfactory locations for office headquarters and editorial operations.

Of our four major receiving stations one is located at [redacted] where the maintask is receiving the programs from Japan proper. [redacted] also receives programs from Russia, Manila, and, at times, satellite stations in the South Pacific.

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A second post is at a point outside of [redacted] It receives programs from stations in Japanese-occupied territory, Japanese programs beamed to Latin America, and other Asiatic transmitters. [redacted]

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[redacted] operate actually as one unit, backstepping and supplementing each other as changing conditions dictate.

A third major receiving station is located at [redacted] Its assignment is listening to the programs beamed from and to the 20 Latin American Republics.

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The fourth and largest reception unit is located at [redacted]

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[redacted] Its task is that of listening to the programs from Europe beamed to, or audible in, North America.

Until recently there was a fifth small listening post in [redacted] with the maintask of intercepting broadcasts from and to the Antilles and from Europe and Africa to Central and South America. The work and personnel of this station have been transferred to [redacted]

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These four main stations cover the reception of foreign broadcasts available to the United States in the continental area. They are manned 24 hours a day by a force of [] engineers.

Affiliated listening posts -- The United Nations Network. In addition to the material monitored and recorded at the four major FCC listening posts, a significant volume of foreign broadcast material reaches FBIS from affiliated listening posts abroad and from the broadcast intelligence services of other countries among the United Nations. In this way texts of broadcasts which cannot be heard directly in our country are made available.

Various specific arrangements of a cooperative character were made even before the United States entered the war. These were expanded in July 1943, when a United Nations Monitoring Committee was created in London, with the object of pushing forward cooperative plans and specific exchange of material.



FBIS has its own teletype service in its office so that to all intents and purposes this important [redacted] unit serves as an additional field station for FBIS.

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Because of the very extensive use made of the Continental Europe domestic broadcasts by OWI for its special purposes, an arrangement was also made to assign an OWI editor round-the-clock to the FBIS office at the [redacted] listening post, to dispatch texts and summaries required by OWI. Administratively, the relationship with [redacted] was under FBIS, as also were the teletype services and personnel. In effect, the operation works with complete cooperation, to select and handle the large amount of [redacted] material. In order to obviate duplication in cable transmission, the FBIS and OWI wires are delivered in New York to OWI and FBIS in Washington simultaneously, so that an item sent by either editor is available at both places.

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The FBIS office in [redacted] distributes to various United States military and diplomatic units there, on a teletype service, the material [redacted] answering queries on specific items, also making special analytical studies.


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The FBIS staff [redacted] sends each day [redacted] a round-up of European broadcasts for the use of the Army's two Psychological Warfare Branch monitoring units in the Mediterranean Theater, both of which are in charge of an ex-FCC staff member assigned to PWB. This round-up saves these units the necessity of attempting a general European coverage. The cable file sent by FBIS [redacted] is included by PWB at these outposts as part of daily distribution of broadcast material to the 30 or 40 Allied intelligence and other units each serves locally.

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listens to many programs which duplicate those available to FBIS elsewhere. But it also receives programs which are not otherwise available to us. An FBIS editor (PWB, more correctly) stationed in [redacted] selects valuable summaries, texts and excerpts and cables the selected material to Washington.

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(C) [redacted] a listening post at [redacted] for Far East material. An OWI staff member, formerly head of the FBIS field station in [redacted] and familiar with FBIS needs for material that supplements rather than duplicates Pacific coast monitoring, selects items daily and cables them to OWI and FBIS in Washington.

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(D) The Mediterranean PWB Posts - In the Mediterranean Theater of Operations the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Army, with personnel assigned from OWI, OSS, and [redacted] maintains two major listening posts and several minor ones primarily for the purpose of providing broadcast intelligence for its immediate, local uses. Arrangements have been made, however, by which broadcasts monitorable at these posts and not available to FBIS elsewhere, especially Spanish, Portuguese, and Balkan broadcasts, are cabled daily to FBIS in Washington.

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(E) [redacted] some time ago instituted a small monitoring unit which has been expanded by OWI for its local uses. An FBIS editor assigned to this post supervises general operations, especially selecting programs from and to the Baltic and Scandinavian areas which are not elsewhere available, and cabling material to FBIS in Washington via [redacted]

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Thus FBIS, in addition to its four major listening posts, has direct access by cable to the monitored programs at five other listening posts where valuable material is available. At each of the posts, [redacted]

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[redacted] neither adequate equipment nor manpower is available, the monitoring-recording-translating process is the same as in the United States.

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(G) [redacted] The FBIS Pacific coast monitoring units and a small [redacted] unit on the Pacific coast, both receiving prisoner-of-war messages from Japan, exchange messages concerning [redacted] and American prisoners-of-war, in order to assure full coverage and to provide a check on accuracy of names and addresses. Similarly, Washington and [redacted] exchange [redacted] and United States prisoner-of-war messages from Germany.

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Aside from separate monitoring of [redacted] prisoner-of-war messages,

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[redacted]

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Steps 3 and 4 -- Monitoring and Recording

The third step in FBIS operations is monitoring and the fourth is recording of the broadcasts intercepted. These are key activities in the whole process. As a broadcast is tuned in by the engineers in a particular language, a person called a monitor, thoroughly familiar with the language and also at home in the English language, sits before a typewriter with earphones on, listening to the broadcast as it is delivered. As he listens, he translates and makes a typewritten summary of the broadcast in English. The items of the broadcasts he numbers as he summarizes. The program finished, he goes on to the next program on his schedule and so on through his 8-hour day or night.

If, however, the broadcast he is monitoring contains items of real importance in the judgment of the supervising editor-monitor (significant items are called to his attention by the monitor at once), the monitor turns aside from listening in a succeeding period and translates the full text.

The full text is available for translation, even though the program is ended, because, at the very time that one wire from the receiver is carrying the program to the monitor's headphones, a connecting wire is carrying it to a recording dictaphone which makes a semi-permanent record of the broadcast. The dictaphone record can be played back by the monitor to catch anything of importance missed during the actual broadcast; more commonly it is picked up by a messenger, properly identified by a time-station-program slip, and filed away for later translation, in full if that becomes necessary.

The monitoring process is thus a means of reducing the immense volume of monitorable words to a manageable amount. The duplication of material which appears in the foreign broadcasts (Radio Tokyo, for example, may broadcast the same item on a dozen or more occasions during the course of a day) is eliminated and the agencies using FBIS are in a position to get full translation of precisely the material they want. As a result only 6 to 10 per cent of the broadcast programs are fully translated.

Step 5 -- Translation

The fifth step in the FBIS operations is interposed between monitoring and editing for a portion of the recorded broadcasts. This is the translation of texts. By standing orders of Government users, there are a certain number of broadcasts for which the full text is always wanted. Examples are

the official daily military communiques and the weekly article. These form a basic translation load. The recordings are sent to the translation room as soon as recorded, to be rendered into English text.

The FBIS translator must have good hearing, excellent aural knowledge of one or more foreign languages, good command of the English language, and a good knowledge of the country from which the program is broadcast so as to identify readily names, dates, places and events. He listens with earphones as the record is played back. Unlike the monitor, he can play a difficult passage over several times in order to catch a word or phrase correctly. In the case of a particularly difficult passage, two or even three translators or monitors may compare notes on it. Where the translator is unsure, he puts a question mark after the questioned words or sentences. Asterisks mark words left out entirely because they are inaudible or unintelligible.

STATINTL There are translators in the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, with ability to translate 34 languages and 30 additional dialects. These people are attached to the posts at and

STATINTL Obviously, the quality of monitors and translators determines to an important extent the reliability of the whole service. Monitoring of this kind had not been developed in or outside the Government until the present war. FBIS has had to train practically all of its monitors by apprenticeship on the job.

Step 6 -- The Wire Services

The sixth, seventh, and eighth steps in FBIS operations have to do with the distribution of the monitoring results to the various Government agencies using them. From the four FBIS and various affiliated listening

centers the summaries, texts, and daily round-ups flow into Washington headquarters minute by minute through the day and night. They come by typed transcript, by teletype, by cable, by airmail, and are then distributed to the ultimate users in three ways.

One is by the wire services. A copy of the incoming material of all kinds goes directly to the FBIS headquarters wire desks where, in order of urgency, the items are selected and put on one of the six wires. The most important of these six wires is the A wire, carrying various types of intelligence to the State Department, to five points in the War Department, to two points in the Navy Department, to OWI, to OSS, to Censorship, CIAA,

[redacted] STATINTL

[redacted] The B Wire, with propaganda summaries and texts, goes to OWI in New York and Washington. The

C Wire, with Latin American material, goes to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The D wire is a cable [redacted] STATINTL

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The wire services are an essential part of the service rendered by FBIS. It is the central point at which decisions regarding immediate coverage are made.

Step 7 -- Daily Reports

The seventh step in FBIS operations is simultaneous with the Wire Service activities. It is the preparation and issuance of two mimeographed reports daily, one containing the logically organized and carefully checked

texts, excerpts, and summaries received during each 24-hour period. These reports go to a much larger number of offices than the wire services. The mailing list is at present 464 copies to 360 offices in 58 different agencies.

Step 8 -- Analyzes and Queries

The eighth step in FBIS operations is the analysis of the volume of the recorded broadcast output, the preparation of periodic reviews of broadcasts from and to particular areas, and the answers to the steady volume of queries regarding a particular subject, trend, or transmitter. The small group of FBIS analysts who perform these tasks are organized into geographical regions and are specialized on the broadcasts of these regions. They read, count, sift, and analyze the whole volume of broadcasts from week to week and are in the best position to give quick answers to queries regarding them.

It should be noted here that queries come into FBIS at various points. Telephone questions come to the wire desk at any time of day and night for verification of a text or a request for a full text. Queries for extra copies of transcripts come to the Information Unit (Library) which furnishes them directly. Only queries which require an hour, day, or several days of search of broadcasts over a period of time are handled by the Analysis Division.

Also, it should be noted that wire services, daily reports, analyses, and queries are not successive steps in a process but operate simultaneously with the same material, furnishing to users directly what they want.

Step 9 -- Individual Special Services

Wire services, daily reports, and analyses have been built up as the most economical means of meeting the needs of most Government departments. In addition, there are important individual services furnished single agencies.

Military Intelligence, nearly 2 years ago, stationed one of its officers at FBIS headquarters. Thus, G-2 obtains prompt access to all the raw material available to FBIS itself. In addition, it subscribes to the wire service and other reports. OSS has had a similar liaison officer at our headquarters.

For more than a year the Foreign Economic Administration -- and its predecessor, BEW -- has had a small staff located at FBIS headquarters to comb through the raw material for all the economic items. The FEA staff collects, arranges, and edits the items and issues economic intelligence reports which are in fact a joint FEA-FBIS document.

STAT In are special arrangements whereby typed copies of all transcripts of Far Eastern broadcasts are flown daily to Hawaii by bomber for use of the Army Headquarters there. Also, by special arrangement specified types of information appearing in Far Eastern broadcasts are delivered immediately to Pacific Naval Headquarters by cable.

There have been other special services for short periods afforded to Government officials requesting them. At the time ^{of} Hitler's speech following the Italian surrender, the White House had a special telephone installation with Hitler's voice on one end, and Churchill, General Marshall, and others on the receiving end. During the 2 days beginning with the Badoglio surrender a special order asked FBIS to deliver all radio references to the surrender by TWX to the Army Signal Corps headquarters. The State Department has made similar kinds of requests.

Principal speeches by German and Japanese leaders, by standing order are recorded as received on permanent, high-fidelity disks and are furnished the OWI and library of direct quotation. Thus, 6 months after Tojo has broadcast a

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boast about the impregnability of the Marshall Islands, there comes bouncing over the airwaves back to Japan his actual voice with its 6-month-old boast accompanied by the damning facts of the actual Marshall Islands' invasion.

NOTES ON LISTENING POSTS

1. [redacted] Bureau was established in August, 1942, curtailed during 1944, and discontinued in January, 1945.

2. The [redacted] post was established in the summer of 1944.

3. The [redacted] post was established in the late fall of 1941, and discontinued in 1944.

4. The [redacted] post was established in the late fall of 1941 and discontinued in 1944.

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7. The Mediterranean posts arrangements were abandoned during 1943 and 1944.

8. Arrangements for access to the monitoring output [redacted] were made in the summer of 1943 and abandoned in the fall of 1944.

9. The post [redacted] was set up in the spring of 1945.

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(part III)

WIRE SERVICES

The main function of the FBIS wire services is to operate six different teletype circuits carrying foreign broadcast intelligence information to U. S. Government and other users of FBIS material.

A secondary, but highly important, function of wire desk editors is to exercise continuous supervision over the current intercept activities of the various FBIS listening posts. This second function will be described first.

Directing and coordinating the actual listening activities is essential to the whole FBIS process. Shall a particularly important Japanese broadcast be covered from What if reports at the last moment that it is blacked out? To which listening post shall we assign a new enemy transmitter which has just appeared on the air for the first time? Our function is to answer these questions in such a way that the flow of intelligence into the wire-service desks will include all the items we need. Wire Division personnel are held responsible for immediate direction and integration, minute by minute, of the monitoring activities of the listening posts within the more permanent framework of program schedules.

An average of 167,700 words daily is transmitted to headquarters of FBIS in Washington. The material arrives in Washington via land lines from the domestic bureaus and by cable and wireless from stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

The 167,700 words per day come from field editors who select it from the 2,523,000 words heard at the listening posts. These field editors are guided in the first instance by general intelligence instructions based on the needs of all the agencies using FBIS services. Their general or standing

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instructions are supplemented, from hour to hour, by specific Wire Division instructions from Washington.

Under normal conditions of reception, each listening post covers the area regularly assigned to it, monitoring all desired broadcasts originating in that area. Unusual atmospheric conditions occasionally, however, make it necessary to amend the area assignments, on the spur of the moment, in order to provide the required broadcasts. For example, Hsinking, in Manchuria, is normally covered by [] post. Freak reception conditions will sometimes render the Hsinking broadcasts unintelligible on the West Coast. The Washington wire editor is advised of this by teletype, and immediately shifts coverage of that particular transmitter to another listening post, probably []

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During periods of solar disturbances or other phenomena affecting short wave reception, one station may be covered successively at various periods of the day by as many as four different listening posts as conditions change, with no overlapping of coverage and no loss of significant material.

This close coordination of the editorial and coverage activities of the field stations from one central point where all required information is available eliminates duplication of effort, waste motion, and needless coverage, thus insuring that all transmissions to Washington are of real significance to one or more of the agencies served by FBIS.

Circuits to Agencies

The six teletype circuits giving wire service to intelligence agencies are known as the A, B, C, D, X, and PW wires. It was for this primary function that the Wire Service of the FBIS was created in 1941.

The various wire circuits were set up in response to specific requests from agencies. The essence of these FBIS wire services is speed of transmission, and the material sent out is arranged with that in mind. In contrast to the Daily Report, for example, which classifies items by region or topic, the wire services handle material in order of urgency.

Each FBIS wire has its specific function. Material carried on each wire is selected and edited on the basis of instructions provided by the users of that particular wire.

The A Wire

The A wire, our main intelligence circuit, was inaugurated December 7, 1941, at the request of the Department of State which had a particular need for 24-hour intelligence reporting via teletype. During the next few days various sections in the Departments of War and the Navy requested that they also be provided with this service. Since that time other agencies have been added, at their request. The agencies on the A wire now number 16. They are:

Department of State
Office of Naval Intelligence
War Department Public Relations
Military Intelligence
A-2 (Air Intelligence), War Department
Air Transport Command, War Department
Office of Censorship
Foreign News Bureau, Office of War Information

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
Office of Public Relations, Navy Department

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Office of Strategic Services
Chemical Warfare Service, War Department

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The A wire carries about 53,000 words of priority intelligence each 24 hours. Material selected for use on this wire can be broadly defined as: (1) political and diplomatic intelligence, (2) military intelligence,

(3) economic intelligence, and (4) propaganda trend intelligence.

Editorial personnel, under the direction of the chief of wire services, select and file intelligence in the categories on the basis of requirements specified by the agencies receiving the service. These agencies, in addition to the general standing directives, make specific requests from day to day for types of material most needed. Editors of the Wire Division are in constant communication with these agencies in order to maintain a current picture of their constantly shifting needs.

The B Wire

This wire is a specialized counterpropaganda circuit serving exclusively the Office of War Information in New York and Washington. It was inaugurated in November 1941 at the request of the Coordinator of Information.

The B Wire carries an average of 45,000 words per day. The copy is provided OWI for use in connection with its work in preparing United States short wave broadcasts to the rest of the world.

In addition to providing general coverage of the radio propaganda picture, the B wire takes up special assignments for OWI, such as following the development of a particular enemy propaganda offensive from transmitter to transmitter through Axis and neutral countries, thus enabling OWI to know among which peoples the poison was spread and, therefore, where it must be countered.

The C Wire


This 24-hour circuit, inaugurated in 1942 at the request of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, serves that agency with 8,500 words daily of copy pertinent to CIAA affairs.

The copy carried on the C wire may be divided into three classes: intercepts of broadcasts from radio stations operating in Latin America; broadcasts from enemy transmitters beamed at Latin America, usually in an effort to stir up anti-Allied feeling there; other broadcasts from Axis and neutral radios which, while not specifically directed to Latin-American audiences, nevertheless deal with Latin-American affairs.

The C wire serves the News and Radio Divisions, the Propaganda Analysis Section, and other units of CIAA. Unlike the A wire, which maintains a balanced intelligence file suited to the need of 16 different users, the C wire is to CIAA, as the B wire is to OWI, exclusively for the use of one agency engaged in operations in one sphere, and the copy carried is keyed to that reality.

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The D Wire



The X Wire

Inaugurated in September 1943 at the request of the Propaganda Analysis Section of the Office of War Information in San Francisco, this wire carries from FBI headquarters in Washington to OWI in the West Coast

Appendix V

Editorial Division:

- "German Broadcasts to North America, March-June 1941", -- June 1941 to 18 July 1941
- 18 July 1941 "Spot Bulletins," (on an irregular basis)-- discontinued 11 Aug. 41
- 11 August 1941 "Foreign Broadcasts: Highlights of (date) " -- " " 18 Nov. 41
- 18 November 1941 "Daily Report of Foreign Radio Broadcasts" -- to present
- 27 February 1947-- Issued in Restricted and Unrestricted form
- 23 June 1948 -- Issued as separate area books (Far East, Europe, Latin America) of restricted classification, and one inclusive unrestricted book (Far East, Europe, Latin America).
- April 26 1949 -- European book was separated into two volumes, USSR and Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Near East.
- 25 May 1949 -- "Abstracts From Radio Broadcasts, USSR and Eastern Europe", and "Abstracts From Radio Broadcasts, Far East" issued.

Analysis Division:

- "Weekly Analysis" (later Weekly Review) published from Dec. 6 1941 to Spring 1944 (when di-^{scussed} was discontinued).
- Aug. 1942-- Radio Report on the Far East (issued every two weeks)
- Aug 1942* Daily Analysis of Latin American Broadcasts (daily until May 3 1943 when it became a weekly). Discontinued in August 1943 when *SA* began similar daily publication.
- 1943-1944 Regional reports were issued on Central, Southern and Eastern Europe until the di-ision was dissolved.

*The Coordinator of
Inter-American
Affairs*

Special Reports:

- 22 April 1947 "Survey of USSR Broadcasts" (issued as weekly until 5 October 1950, when it was published biweekly)
- 12 October 1950 "Survey of Far East Broadcasts"
- 5 October 1950 "Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts"

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a 3,000 word daily selection of intercepts from European transmitters for OWI use in connection with a specific counterpropaganda job in the Far East.

The PW Wire

The PW wire is a 24-hour teletype circuit linking the FBIS and the Office of the Provost Marshal General. It carries approximately 6,000 words per day devoted exclusively to messages from and mention of American service-men held captive by the enemy. These messages and mentions are transmitted by the enemy radio for the purpose of building up a listening audience in the United States for the propaganda which is woven in with the prisoner transmissions.

The staff of the Wire Service Division consists of wire editors and teletype operators. The editors are selected for experience in international reporting and ability to handle accurately and rapidly a large volume of broadcast intelligence copy.

As a consequence of the cessation of hostilities, the wire services of the FBIS were in 1945 considerably curtailed in number, volume, and period of open operation. The A wire and C wire only remained in operation, the A wire on a 5-days-a-week, 18-hours-a-day basis, the C wire on a 5-days-a-week, 8-hours-a-day basis. Peace-time A wire wordage runs to about 20,000 daily, C wire wordage to about 5,000.

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DAILY REPORTS

The second method of furnishing the Government agencies the material contained in the monitored foreign broadcasts is by mimeographed daily reports. FBIS issues two such publications -- the Morning Preview and the Daily Report. These are augmented by special reports on the occasion of outstanding war or propaganda events or developments such as the United States landings in North Africa, destruction of the French Fleet at Toulon and the invasion of Sicily, or significant speeches and statements of leading enemy officials. The supplements bring together information and comment from foreign broadcasts to which are frequently added a radio chronology and other relevant material. The speech texts in translation are sometimes accompanied by the text in the original language.

The Morning Preview provides a brief summary of war events as revealed by radio intercepts, a short factual statement of enemy propaganda themes, and one or more key broadcasts verbatim. It is produced daily except Sunday for distribution before 11 a.m. It covers the foreign broadcasts for the 24 hours up to 8 a.m. of the day it is issued. It is limited strictly to 6 pages, 1,000 to 1,500 words. Its characteristics are that it is always short and always delivered on time to officials who need a quick over-all view of the situation each day.

The Daily Report also is published daily, except Sunday. It covers foreign broadcasts intercepted up to 10 a.m. (EWT) of the day of its issue, and it is scheduled for delivery to the user agencies by 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. It is a mimeographed book averaging 85 to 100 pages. The average wordage in a day's Report is about 40,000. On Mondays, both the Daily Report and Preview cover broadcasts of the previous 48 hours rather than 24.

The main body of each Daily Report consists of significant foreign broadcasts selected from the viewpoint of the valuable intelligence they contain, in the words actually used by the broadcaster. Between 95 and 99 percent of the main body of the Report consists of verbatim text. It takes up about three-quarters of the whole Report, some 30,000 to 35,000 words. It reports the basic material received each day by FBIS.

There are various classifications of the material -- primarily according to transmitters and regions. The classifications as shown in the table of contents of the Daily Report of May 25, 1944, are:

PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE

PROPAGANDA THEMES

European Section:

Military Affairs:
Italian front.
Eastern front.
Air war and other items.
German Reich Affairs
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Balkans
Southern Europe
Articles and Speeches

Far Eastern Section:

Military Affairs:
General.
India-Burma.
China.
Japan
China; Occupied China
Southeast Asia:
Netherlands East Indies
Malay and Singapore
International Comment; United Nations
Articles and Speeches.

Personal Intelligence -- In addition to the main body of the Report, there are several special sections built up to meet the needs of the users. One is called Personal Intelligence. It covers the movements, promotions, demotions, conferences, and other activity of persons and named groups as announced in foreign broadcasts. The section is of special value to the Government intelligence departments in piecing together a whole picture of enemy organization, movement, and trend from such personal items. It is to be noted that here, as elsewhere in the Daily Report, it is not

facts but foreign broadcast statements that are listed. A typical number of a day's personal intelligence items would be 60 to 120.

Notes on Transmitters -- In another special section, information on significant behavior of the foreign radios monitored is given. The criterion of significance is suggested by two questions: (1) Does the radio or the broadcaster, aside from the content of the broadcast itself, reveal anything significant about conditions in the country or neighborhood of the transmitter? (2) Does the use of the radio with respect to beam, frequency, or other technical handling reveal pertinent information as to what is called radio warfare?

Communiques -- Military Intelligence -- Another section includes official military communiques with full text. Still another special section gathers together broadcast intercepts of specific value as information for the Army and Navy. Selection is based on instructions from the chief editor which are in turn based on guidance received from the users. The number of items in this special section varies greatly from day to day. One day's broadcasts may yield less than 10, those of another day 30 to 40.

Propaganda themes -- Different in type and origin from the rest of the Report is the section summarizing the day's propaganda directed by enemy countries to their home audiences. Continental domestic broadcasts are examined as part of their routine each day by the FBIS editors and they prepare a review or round-up of the day's output, gauging the volume and emphasis by repetition and other devices. Similarly, the FBIS editors review and summarize the day's Far East output. These are telegraphed or cabled to Washington and form the body of this special section. The propaganda

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round-ups are in addition, of course, to excerpts and texts from the home broadcasts published in the main body of the report.

Foreign Economic Administration Economic Report -- A report serving a specialized clientele is issued each day by the Foreign Economic Administration in cooperation with FBIS. This volume contains all economic items of any sort. FBIS editors, as they run across such items in their regular work, set them aside for the FEA group located at STATINTL headquarters. The FEA then processes and issues the items daily for the use of their own staff-- also for other Government departments. Because this specialized report handles economic items, the more widely distributed Daily Report is able to omit them, unless they have direct, immediate bearing on the war.

It is taken for granted in a general way that the Government agencies make full use of the material contained in the daily newspapers. With the constant necessity of keeping down the Report's size, the verbatim repetition of any fully reported newspaper statement as it appears on a broadcast would serve no purpose, and is not included. If an important speech or statement appears in the newspaper only in part or in direct discourse, however, the complete text may be carried in the Report.

It is taken for granted that much United Nations information is available to Government intelligence bureaus before it is put on the air. For this reason, greater coverage is given to enemy than to United Nations broadcasts.

The process -- The actual process of preparing the day's Report may be followed through by seeing a section proceed on its routine. The Report staff is divided into regional units: Far East, German, and so forth. Let us follow the Far East desk through a typical day, which runs

from 4 a.m. to 1 p.m. The first editor arrives at 4. About 40,000 words from Far East broadcasts have accumulated on his desk. It is the same inflow of material that furnishes the raw material for the wire services and for the Analysis Division. It includes material from the

STATINTL It includes Japanese, Japanese-organized, and Chinese broadcasts. The early morning editor puts the volume of accumulated material into preliminary regional and subject-matter classifications, eliminating items that are either nonessential or that have already been used in previous reports.

The other editors arrive by 6 a.m., while the material from the teletype machines and monitoring room continues to pour in. The Preview is first put together, and sent for stenciling to the typists who begin their day at 7:30 a.m. The editors then work at the task of selecting, sorting, eliminating duplicates, arranging items and giving them headings. Special sections, such as Personal Intelligence, are put together. By 11 a.m. the bulk of the material has gone into the typing room, the stencils have been proof-read, and the mimeographing process is well under way. Until 11:30 a.m. important news items flowing in are put into the "last minute reception" section. With the stenciled copies corrected, the head of the desk assigns advanced items from incoming material for the next day's Report, assembles the material for the FEA economic daily digest, and assembles cultural material in the broadcasts for the Far East Section of the State Department. The editors must be in close touch with the other regional desks to furnish them material in Far East broadcasts dealing with other regions and to receive Far East items from the other desks.

Each item in the Report is identified fully by a complete description of the broadcast from which it is taken. This system enables the user of

the Report to clip the various items and distribute them among the number of individuals or file them for reference without causing any item to lose its identity.

The actual item, as far as possible, arrives on the Report editor's desk in verbatim quotation. He must preserve and publish, so far as possible, just what the broadcaster said. Already the monitor's and translator's transcript has been checked by a linguistically skilled supervisor. But he must ask himself whether the monitor heard correctly, or whether a mistake in wire transmission may have occurred. The slightest slip at any stage may ruin an important intelligence item.

Qualifications of Personnel -- The personnel quota for the Report Section allows for a total of persons. Qualifications for editor positions, as recorded with the Civil Service Commission for recruitment purposes, are: newspaper experience, or its equivalent, and foreign experience, or its equivalent. The skills and working technique acquired through actual work in the editorial department of a metropolitan newspaper are almost the sine qua non for standing up under the high-speed, high-pressure work which must be done in the FBIS Report Section. It is not, however, newspaper work. Not news for the general reader but intelligence items for the trained specialist is the basis for selection. These are different tasks. And in the competition between accuracy and speed, accuracy must hold first place. In a number of cases, thoroughly grounded and experienced newspaper people have not responded to the retraining process for FBIS work and have failed to make the grade. On the other hand, a very few without newspaper experience have developed into good FBIS editors. When hundreds of "takes" of

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editorial copy are being handled, when these takes fall into a dozen or more separate categories (which, in turn, are subdivided), and the number of stencils to be made runs into 80 to 100, the problem becomes complex, and the pressures upon both editors and typists are heavy. Cool-headedness, clear organization of flow of material, and teamwork of high order are essential. The editorial time element in the Report Section is similar to that in a metropolitan newspaper office, i.e., the handling of material must begin as late as possible so as to get the latest intelligence and must end as early as possible so that the intelligence may be conveyed soonest to those whose operations depend on it.

DAILY REPORT

Note on Format

During the war period, the Daily Report of Foreign Radio Broadcasts, was published in a single volume, though for a time this was supplemented by the short "Morning Preview." In the Daily Report several methods of classification of intercepts were tried or considered. From the standpoint of radio reception, the logical classification is on a transmitter basis, or transmitter-group basis A good case, however, was made for classification on the basis of geographical areas of reference. A case could likewise be made for classification according to "beam" or intended audience.

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The difficulties of any classification otherwise than in accordance with transmitters of origin are fairly obvious. Nevertheless, in the Daily Report the attempt has for a long time been made to arrive at a compromise

between transmitter classification and classification by geographical areas of reference. On the whole, this method, while awkward in some cases, has been satisfactory.

From time to time, experiment was also made with the inclusion of certain special sections or features in the Daily Report, in which certain kinds of information were grouped or digested. Examples of these have been "Personal Intelligence," "Military Intelligence Items," "Daily Roundup of European broadcasts."

Since these features were presented in addition to the fundamental report on foreign broadcasts, their inclusion or abandonment was predicated on the necessities of speedy production or, more often, on the availability or lack of personnel and talent. Budgetary considerations have been the main factor governing the size and contents of the Daily Report.

The question also arose during the early history of the FBIS as to whether reports should be made in the form of summaries of intercepts or in the form of verbatim (translated) transcription. The need for verbatim transcription of significant passages of intercepts was unmistakably demonstrated, and the practice was adopted of using summaries and digests only sparingly.

Reconversion, which took place shortly after V-J Day, has resulted in breaking the Daily Report into three sections -- European, Far Eastern, and Latin American. The European Section is classified on a transmitter basis. With respect to the Far Eastern Section and the Latin American Section, there is a slight compromise with the geographical-areas-of-reference system. For example, Moscow broadcasts directed to the Far East and dealing with Far East problems is included in the Far Eastern Section of the Daily Report rather than in the European Section. Regular special

features and roundups have been eliminated with the sole exception of "Broadcast Highlights" a daily or week-end roundup of broadcasts inserted in the Far Eastern Section. The Daily Reports -- three sections -- are now (May, 1946) published five days each week. The total wordage is about 50,000 per day. Of this, 90 percent or more consists of verbatim reportage of significant passages from intercepts. The 10 percent remainder consists of summarization of broadcast content.

The Users -- The Daily Report is distributed -- about 390 copies in all -- by messenger and mail to some 300 offices in 56 different agencies of the Government. It serves not only a different purpose but also reaches a much wider group of officials than can be served directly by the FBIS teletype network. The number of officials receiving the report and number of copies received is a little misleading, however, as to its major users. Fourteen major subscribers, 10 of whom also receive the FBIS wire service, receive 330 of the 391 Daily Reports distributed, or 84 percent of the total. Of the 14, 6 major subscribers receive two-thirds of the total. These are OWI, War, OSS, FEA, Navy, and the State Department.

Circulation, February 1945.

Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service Daily Report subscribers classified from list published in hearings, Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, on H.R. 1070, February 15, 1945, pages 130-139.

major subscribers:

- 1. Office of War Information*-----70
- 2. War Department*-----46
- 3. Office of Strategic Services*-----45
- 4. Foreign Economic Administration (includes Lend-Lease and Rubber Development Corporation)-----43
- 5. Navy Department*-----30
- 6. State Department*-----25



- 10. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs*----- 9

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11.		
12.		
13.	Department of Justice-----	6
14.	War Relocation Authority-----	6
	Total-----	12

Other Federal Agency subscribers:

1.	Department of Agriculture-----	2
2.	Alien Property Custodian-----	1
3.	Civil Aeronautics Board-----	1
4.	Office of Civilian Defense-----	1
5.	Coast Guard-----	1
6.	Commerce Department-----	3
7.	Federal Reserve Bank-----	1
8.	Interior Department-----	1
9.	Inter-American Defense Board-----	1
10.	Library of Congress-----	1
11.	National Gallery of Art-----	2
12.	Office of Censorship-----	2
13.	Office of Price Administration-----	2
14.	Treasury Department-----	1
	Total-----	20

Allied Government agencies (with approval of State Department):

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Total-----23

Others -- On the Office of Information request----- 7

SUMMARY

	Copies	Percent
14 major subscribers-----	330	84
15 other Federal Agency subscribers-----	20	5
18 allied government agencies-----	23	6
10 President, 1; Congress, 8; Supreme Court 1 ----	10	3
77 others--on Office of War Information request---	7	2
Total** (56 agencies)-----	390	

*Also receives Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service wire service.
 **In addition, 17 copies were distributed internally in Federal Communications Commission.
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Circulation, May 1946.

Copies of the Daily Reports circulated among intelligence operatives and other U. S. Government personnel number: (May, 1946)

European Section-----	256	
Far Eastern Section-----	243	
Latin American Section-----	140	
		Total (all three) 639*

Divided as to Departments or Agencies:

	<u>Eu.</u>	<u>L.A.</u>	<u>F.E.</u>	<u>Total</u>
War Department-----	89	37	73	199
Navy Department-----	27	18	29	74
State Department-----	121	64	108	293
Other Govt.-----	39*	21*	33*	93*
Misc.-----	91	54	93	238
				<u>873</u>

*Includes Pan American, American Red Cross & UNRRA.

ANALYSIS

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(part V)

To the services provided by the wires and the Daily Reports, the Analysis Division adds two others. First, the Division prepares periodic summaries and interpretations of broadcast material. Some such summaries are prepared once a week, others at 2-week intervals. Second, the Division performs special services, it prepares special reports, and answers special queries.

On the one hand, the Daily Report and the wire service, working from day to day or minute to minute, quickly and accurately disseminate excerpts of foreign broadcasts, in as nearly verbatim form as possible. On the other hand, the Analysis Division, working over longer periods, distributes summaries and interpretations of broadcast material. Many users in many war agencies carefully follow items from the Daily Report or the wire services. Many users in the very same agencies, however, cannot read such detailed information, but must have information, nevertheless.

The Analysis Division regularly issues six publications. The first and oldest of these is the Weekly Review of Official Foreign Broadcasts. It has been published each week since December 6, 1941, the day before Pearl Harbor. It contains significant items and highlights of trends from broadcasts originating all over the world. Its content is organized into several sections which deal with the various military fronts, and with significant events affecting neutral, occupied, and enemy nations.

The number of readers of this document can be estimated with a moderate degree of accuracy by multiplying the number of copies circulated by the average number of persons who read each copy. At the last check, in April, 1944, the readership was approximately as follows: War Department, 225 persons; Navy, 60; State, 150; Office of Strategic Services, 105; Office of

War Information, over 300; Foreign Economic Administration, 105; Department of Justice, 30; other United States Agencies and Allied Governments, over 400.

When it first appeared, the Weekly Review was the only publication of the Analysis Division. Some time after its inception, it began to reach dimensions of 70 pages or more. In attempting to communicate information of value to regional specialists, the Division was producing a document which was too long for reading by busy officials who wanted an over-all point of view. To meet the needs of regional officials, a series of regional reports were originated, and the Weekly Review again shrank back to a manageable size.

The first of these regional publications to be developed was the Radio Report on the Far East. This has been published every 2 weeks since August, 1942. Its individual sections deal in some detail with Japan, China, Thailand, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, the South Sea Islands, and India. Each geographical section contains an orderly and factual account of military, economic, political, and religious events and conditions in the area, as portrayed in radio broadcasts. Individual names, for example, are given of appointees to even relatively minor positions in the Japanese and puppet governments. New laws are described; commodity prices are quoted; the location and products of enemy war plants, insofar as available, are given.

For the most part, this Radio Report is a careful and painstaking assembly of broadcast items. Some special analysis is included at points where analysis can illuminate the material. For example, after the last Japanese Diet session, the report included a statistical study of the questions which Diet representatives asked Cabinet officers as they appeared

before the Diet. The study showed that the three leading topics were war transportation, industrial production for military use, and wartime production of food. The purpose of the study was to indicate which phase of the Japanese war effort were most criticized. As it happened, some weeks later, the two Cabinet Ministers concerned with transportation and food were permitted to "resign" and the Munitions Ministry, of which Tojo himself is the head, was reorganized.

The Radio Report on the Far East, like the other Analysis publications, is compiled on the basis of carefully maintained topical files. An item of no particular significance in itself, and thus not carried in the other services, may be seen to be quite significant when the analysts compare it with previous items on the subject, and it and the previous items may be presented in a short subsection in the Radio Report on the Far East. An accumulation of items, broadcast over a long period of time, may add up to a story worth telling.

The readership of the Far East Radio Report, estimated on the same basis as that of the Weekly Review, is approximately as follows: War Department, 105 persons; Navy, 28; State, 32; Office of Strategic Services, 55; Office of War Information, 120; Foreign Economic Administration, 175; others, 140.

The Central European Analysis has been published each week since January 1943. It concentrates especially on German propaganda policy and factors bearing on German morale. In addition to radio material, it also includes some European press material made available by OWI. Its estimated readership is: War Department, 52 persons; Navy, 10; State, 16; OSS, 38; OWI, 95; FEA, 46; others 119.

The Western European Analysis, covering France, the Low Countries, Spain, and Portugal, has been published weekly since May 1943. It also includes European press material. Its estimated readership is: War Department, 50; Navy, 15; State, 15; OSS, 55; OWI, 105; FEA, 60; others 140.

The Eastern European Analysis has been published once every 2 weeks since June 1943. It covers the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Baltic States. Its estimated readership is: War Department, 38; Navy, 10; State Department, 14; OSS, 42; OWI, 70; FEA, 51; others, 59.

Special services are rendered in a number of ways.

First, the Analysis Division prepares and publishes special reports on events or topics of interest. Just as regional report circulation is specialized, so is the distribution of special reports limited to agencies who will be interested.

Second, the Analysis Division functions as an organization to do special research, with the limits of its resources, for any authorized person or agency who calls on it for such work. Some requests touch topics of sufficient interest to be developed into special reports. Others must be prepared in such a way that they will not betray the source and character of confidential inquiries.

Third, the Analysis Division answers miscellaneous queries. The analyst can reply "off the cuff" to many questions which otherwise would require hours or even days to answer.

Since April 1942, the Analysis Division has published about 120 special reports. Many of these reports have originated on the initiative of the Analysis Division. Many others have originated as the result of requests from other agencies.

The special report is a detailed treatment of a subject judged to be of interest to a substantial number of officials in other agencies. Some events are so important that they obviously require special treatment. The American bombing of Tokyo was obviously such an event; so was the Teheran Conference. Sometimes an agency or group of agencies will make known to FBIS an interest in a topic which is sufficient to justify a special report on that topic.

A prime factor in the usefulness of the work of the Analysis Division is the competence of the Division's personnel. At the inception of FBIS, there were few persons in the country who had had any experience in the specific field of broadcast analysis. Nevertheless, the first nucleus of the Division, amounting to half a dozen men and women, was composed of persons with specific experience in the field or very close to it. Two were former staff members of the listening center of [redacted] STAT

another was recruited from the staff of the radio-research project of

[redacted] another had been a fellow of the [redacted] STAT

[redacted] in the social sciences; a fifth, from the [redacted] STAT

[redacted], had performed research on the effects of spoken propaganda, and

a sixth, from [redacted] was a specialist in the psychology of language.

From this beginning, the Analysis Division grew into a group which, not including clerical staff, never numbered more than [redacted] persons. Although the first emphasis was on psychology, later personnel of the Division represented several other fields; government, history, economics, foreign languages, sociology. STATINTL

Probably the most important qualification of the analysts is their knowledge of foreign countries. All analysts are American citizens, and have studied or taught in American universities. Every geographical section of the Analysis Division contains one or more analysts who know the major peoples and countries of their area at first hand.

The reports and studies of the Analysis Division are useful for three principal reasons. First, they present much material in brief and ordered fashion. Second, the topics of reports and studies are selected according to the known interests of users.

Most foreign broadcasting stations are government-operated, and therefore reflect official policies. Most of them show an inner consistency in their successive reactions to the changing course of events. Each develops a kind of propaganda personality, and no two -- even among those dominated at the top by Joseph Goebbels and Hans Fritzsche -- are quite alike. Judgment cannot be based on the mere radio statement itself, but must depend on who said it, in what context, on which program and over what station.

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FBIS analysts acquire a useful experience from many months of study of the broadcasts from given transmitters or groups of stations.

1. Station characteristics -- The analysts know that certain stations are likely to be used to launch "trial balloons," to provoke reactions and to plant rumors, while others are jealous of their reputations for probity. "Trial balloons" are sent into the air when enemy intelligence agencies suspect that Roosevelt and Churchill are meeting but have not discovered where they are meeting. Some alleged naval news items are only fishing expeditions. German radio propagandists "sank" the British aircraft carrier, Ark Royal, hoping to provoke a British denial and explanation of where it was. Japanese radio propagandists "sank" the American cruiser

Marblehead at least three times for much the same reason. Radio "trial balloons" are common when the enemy wants to sound out prospects for negotiations without actually making diplomatic approaches.

Such false reports, while of some value, are perilous, since they may be exposed and their source discredited. They are likely, therefore, to be disseminated by anonymous speakers or satellite stations. Berlin has developed regular outlets for this kind of material. This makes it important to compare the version of a story given by the official German radio with those versions put out by radios such as Oslo, Budapest, Lahti, Vichy, or Madrid, which are under German influence, but can easily be disowned.

2. Wave length, beam, language, hour -- Analysts interpret each report in the light of the wave length, language, beam, and program hour. Cases of sharp contrast between beams are not uncommon. Berlin's broadcasts toward Russia called the Moscow conference agreement a triumph by Anglo-Saxons over the outwitted Stalin; at the same time, from the same station, programs beamed westward called the same pact a shameful sell-out of Europe to Bolshevism.

Even the hour of broadcast may need to be taken into account. There are two or three news periods each day which are widely listened to by the men and women of the home population; other programs may be intended for special audiences: farmers, women, children, or troops overseas.

Within any one program, on the same station, beam, and language, there may be differences which invite analysis. One of the most interesting of these appeared during the North African campaign. German news programs began with the High Command communique and continued with other news and often added a commentary. An analyst noted that while Rommel's tactical

genius was a major theme in the comments, his name was rarely mentioned in the communique -- less, in fact, than the names of other lesser generals. Further study supported the conclusion that Rommel was favored whenever possible in those announcements coming from Nazi party headquarters, but was in disfavor with the top military leaders.

Analysis can be carried out, in the strict and full meaning of the word, without any resort to speculation or interpretation. Nevertheless, it is obvious that after the analyst has divided up and examined his materials, he is in a position to interpret their meaning. So the analyses do contain interpretations -- which always are clearly indicated as such, and which are not presented at the expense of facts which may enable the reader to draw a different conclusion. Any interpretations made by FBIS can be checked against other evidence in the hands of user agencies.

Foreign broadcasts can be interpreted from experience. If a transmitter is studied carefully over a period of time, it can be learned how it behaves in certain major types of situation -- a defeat situation, for example. When transmitter behavior has been learned, it then becomes possible, on occasion, to read through the lines of broadcasts from that transmitter, and to perceive at least generally the situation the transmitter is attempting to conceal or exaggerate.

What is needed for this process of interpretation is first a sound knowledge of transmitter behavior, and second of the cultures of the countries involved as broadcasters or as recipients of broadcast material. News of heavy casualties is likely to depress the Germans, but is less likely to depress the Japanese, who are thoroughly inculcated with the idea of fighting to the last man. An admission of heavy casualties by the German radio would mean one thing; on the Japanese radio, it would mean something else.

Propaganda lines and patterns -- Analysts learn to interpret each item in relation to the general propaganda directives of that station. Knowing the past and present propaganda line, analysts are able to predict, within reasonable limits, how any event or speech will be treated. Analysts who have acquired this high degree of familiarity with the propaganda of a foreign country, quickly recognize slight changes of policy. Even minor changes in propaganda emphasis may presage important changes in the domestic situation or in international plans.

Analysts become familiar not only with the usual propaganda line but with the patterns used by each transmitter in dealing with previous surprises, defeats, and victories. "Disengagement according to plan" became a familiar alibi of the Germans during Rommel's retreat in North Africa and its significance was clear when the same sort of phrase reappeared in German reports of their Eastern Front during the Summer of 1943. Analysts reported a year earlier that the propaganda pattern during the Stalingrad campaign reminded them less of the confident reports during the successful struggle for Sevastopol and more of Berlin's "caution wrapped in noise" which betrayed uncertainty.

A variety of techniques of evasion have been spotted. Sometimes the propagandist retreats into the past or the future. He talks about the gains of last year to cover embarrassment this year. He looks ahead to brighter days to help his listeners forget immediate worries. He talks of spiritual gains -- which are difficult to measure -- when the hard facts go against him. Even within the area of military reporting analysts have noticed that claims of larger numbers of planes downed in the uncertain battles of the air are used to cheer a home public who might be discouraged over territorial losses not so easily concealed or distorted. Discussion of bad weather is another give-away pattern.

Propaganda offices usually have plans on hand for dealing with all the events they can foresee. Occasionally, however, a military or diplomatic action may catch them quite by surprise. It is important to know when this happens; for one thing, it sheds light on the efficiency of enemy intelligence services. In two notable air raids, FBIS analysts reported that the enemy had been taken unaware. The first Tokyo raid from "Shangri-La," and the first thousand-plane raid on Cologne were followed by unmistakable indications of consternation in the Axis broadcasting offices. Radio reaction was late; it was inadequate for some time after it began; contradictory reports were broadcast; "lines" were started but abruptly dropped. After a day or two the directives had come through and everything was again smoothly coordinated with the official emphasis and slogans all in place.

Weighing Emphasis -- The obvious way in which foreign radios emphasized their main propaganda points is by volume of attention. Analysts tabulate the frequency with which each standard theme appears. Volume of attention often appears disproportionate to news interest, revealing the desire of the propagandists to play up or play down a given event. But volume is not the only indicator to be taken into account.

Almost hidden behind more striking and prominent accounts are insignificant items which would be overlooked by observers in search of big news. Some of these appear again and again: A bakery window smashed in India; arrest of several rioters in Ireland; plans of an American corporation for expansion in Bolivia, and so forth. Analysts discovered that these persistent items, like a chronic low-grade fever, need attention. Enemy propagandists are trying to build up a picture of British and American imperialism, using the psychological device of slipping the items in when the critical sense of listeners is off guard. Not infrequently news

programs are built up by the Nazis to carry several such items in succession: Food shortage in Iraq; anti-British speech in South Africa; two policemen slain in India. Although the superficial impression is one of a round-up of scattered news, the underlying purpose, of course, is to reinforce the idea of vicious British control.

Emphasis appears also in the choice of speakers to make an announcement. Goebbels' weekly article in Das Reich has been found to set directives for the ensuing days. A new theme in his program means much more than it would, for example, in the irresponsible meanderings of Robert Best or a "Bill" program. The American press and some American officials were temporarily misled on one occasion when these second-string men treated a peace feeler in one of their trivial, half-humorous programs broadcast only by short wave in English to North America, as though it had been a pronouncement over the German radio by Goebbels or Schmidt or Fritzsche. Some speakers have access to discussion and decisions of the highest councils; others are journalistic hacks who know little beyond what they have been told to say.

Comparing Versions -- Broadcasts are not printed documents. The same story is often told and retold over the air, but the versions are not always identical. After an important speech or proclamation, resumes and selected passages are used on later programs. From a news point of view, they are usually passed over since they do not introduce new material, but closer analysis of such reverberations is revealing. What is stressed, and why? What parts are omitted, and why?

At the time when the decision in the battle of Salerno apparently hung in the balance, headlines and comments appeared in the American press to the effect that the Nazis were predicting that the Allies soon would be

thrown back into the sea. Comparisons with Dunkirk were made, and the whole picture was rather a gloomy one. Much of this was based on German news agency dispatches in Morse code for American and overseas consumption.

Analysts, aware of the fact that Nazi propaganda often puts out different versions to different audiences, studies these different versions and were able to point out that, in fact, the Germans apparently had little expectation of winning the battle of Salerno. German comment to Germans at home was very restrained. This was correctly evaluated as being much closer to the truth. German home propaganda had come perilously near being bankrupted by the collapse of all German predictions during the previous Fall and Winter that the Russian campaign would soon meet with a victorious conclusion, and it was especially necessary, for months after, for the Propaganda Ministry to tell Germans, at any rate, the truth.

Transmitter Expertness -- Interpretation is not a mysterious or pretentious process. Transmitter expertness is not an affectation of a black art. Analysts become expert by painstaking study of the organization and control of radios in one country; the characteristics of beams, languages, and programs; the basic propaganda lines and recurring patterns; the speakers and sources most relied upon; the various versions broadcast. If used without benefit of such background knowledge, isolated items of radio news are very likely to be misleading. If Government offices were supplied only with raw materials of broadcasts, each agency would be forced to build up its own staff of radio experts to perform the services now performed by the Analysis Department of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service.