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
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PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY Austria/USSR 25X1X6 25X1A2g

SUBJECT ~~Austrian~~ Attitudes ^{of Austrian} toward Soviet Policies
25X1X6

DATE DISTRIBUTED Apr 55
NO. OF PAGES 3
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #



1. Observing Communism at close range, as it is possible in Austria, leads, I believe, to a somewhat different appraisal of the most important factors and policies of Communism than is generally made in countries remote from the Soviet orbit....
2. There is a significant difference of attitude towards the Soviet problem between people in the US and Europeans. The uncertainties and dangers emanating from the vast areas and countries that today bear the name of Soviet Union have been with the Europeans intermittently since the dawn of their history. To the new world, on the other hand, the collision with the political phenomenon of the USSR was a sudden and recent experience, an "agonizing re-appraisal". From this difference of experience, quite naturally, comes a difference of approach that often eludes definition and creates misunderstandings.
3. Anti-Communism is a very real force on both sides of the Atlantic but even the same words that are being used in journalism and the cold war carry sometimes different implications and connotations here and there. Whenever a person in the US speaks of Communism, he is likely to mean just that: an ideology, a creed. The European, on the other hand, is probably really more concerned about the Soviet people, even though he may also use the word Communism within the same context. There can be no doubt that the Communist ideology is a serious matter, but to those who live over here [in Europe] aside, with or in spite of the Soviets, Communism as an ideology is just one facet of a still more formidable and more concrete problem: the Soviets and their ways.
4. Since the Middle Ages the Europeans have gradually and perhaps tragically unlearned to think in creeds and crusades. Instead, they tend to think in terms of nations, culture patterns, empires. Thus, the USSR today [as of March 1955] is, like its former neighbors, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire, a multinational and multicultural empire. Nationalism, which has destroyed these empires, now also threatens to destroy the Moscow empire. The primary

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function of Communism, in the eyes of the Kremlin today, is to save the USSR from the fate of its former competitors and provide a common denominator, a binding force for all the conquered peoples and lands.

5. It is hardly by accident that Stalin was a specialist in nationality problems, a renovator of tsarist traditions and a supporter of Communism in one country first, as against Trotsky's conception of world revolution. To be sure, Soviet Russian imperialism and Communist world revolution are wedded together. It is a marriage of two complementary phenomena that cannot dissolve itself; but it is a contradictory and uneasy marriage all the same. It can maintain itself as a going concern only because imperialism is the practical proposition, whereas world revolution is a matter of the clouds, a part of Communist eschatology. If the gigantic objective of world revolution in the Communist sense of the word were put on the level of an immediate and practical target, it would mean the abandonment or collapse of Soviet Russian imperialism. Consequently, in Moscow politics today [March 1955]--as seen from Europe--world revolution is a means, a promise, not an actual policy or aim. As a promise, however, a worldly heaven, it is an essential part of the Communist pseudo-religion and can never be abandoned because the "heresy" of Communism is as unthinkable without world revolution as is the Christian religion without a heaven, or an emperor without a throne and crown. To abandon the dogma of world revolution would be to abandon the throne, to dissolve the empire, to abdicate by renouncing the symbol. Again it is the character of the Soviet people and the imperial and orthodox traditions which make symbols and dogmas all-important as a means of holding the Soviet Union together.
6. The unifying function of Communism on the home front, however, is changed into its opposite abroad. This miracle of oriental magic is of course the meaning of the Iron Curtain. While Communism serves as a common denominator and as a means to suppress nationalism inside the Soviet orbit, it becomes a disruptive force in support of nationalism outside of it. Thus, instinctively, it is not the ideology of Communism and the world revolution which the peoples on the rim of the Soviet empire fear, but the dangers that come from the fact that the Soviets are the powerful and accomplished covert instigators or open advocates or sometimes even champions of nationalism everywhere in the world. In this scheme they are successful in Germany, France, Italy, the Middle East, India, Indo-China and--from a Central European vantage point of observation--sometimes even in the US, the head and heart of the grand alliance against Moscow Communism.
7. Of course, it is not the patriotism of self-sacrifice for the common good which the Communists try to provoke, but the kind of nationalism that will bear heavily down on international relations, that will cause mutual distrust and rivalry among allies and will increase the inevitable strain of alliance by fanning the feelings of impatience, frustration and deception. Thus, Communist strategy on the global, atomic age is plotting incessantly to drive its enemies up the blind alley of ill-advised, excessive self-reliance. In this sense, "Communist activities" and "world revolution" have been only too often a dummy setup of the crafty Muscovites to detract from their real and immediate objective: the triumph of nationalism and blind emotionalism that will prevent the consolidation of the Western Alliance--otherwise a natural consequence of the expanding industrial and technological civilization under US leadership--and that will at the same time insure a further deepening of prejudices prevailing between the white peoples and the colored races and nations.

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8. In this manner, indiscriminating emotionalism in general and the dupes of nationalism in particular become the chief allies of Soviet imperialism. Of all the devices of Soviet strategy the most fatal one is to turn the traditional patriotic virtues of the free nations into the deadly vice of uncooperative, uncompromising nationalism. Communism itself is an emotional policy only in the sense that it uses emotions of others to its advantage, but not in the sense that the leaders of Communism themselves are moved by emotions similar to those which might grip and direct a popular movement. The emotional structure and character of a Communist leader can never be a simple one. Whatever makes such a man "tick," it will never be the same motive or emotion which he is causing others, outside the inner initiated circle, to have. Though it is known, it is certainly not heeded that Communist devices and methods are never direct, spontaneous or naive. They are always the result of calculation and planning within the framework of an elaborate tradition and method of operation.

9. Communists do not attack the bastions but rather the weak links of the enemy defenses. Barring an exceptional situation, a modern government of even a small state represents a bastion and a firmly entrenched position which is extremely difficult or impossible to overthrow from within. Communists rarely waste their time with impossible jobs, even if they appear to do so. The Slavs have always been master spies and Communism has perfected a natural talent, but actual subversion of a government is a different matter altogether. If military intervention is not advisable, subversion from within is not a practical proposition or a serious danger to the free world. Instead Communism concentrates all its resourcefulness, its endless array of scheming devices and screen provocations to the time-honored objective of weakening or disrupting the enemy alliance. Not subversion, infiltration and espionage are the gravest dangers of Communism; they can be dealt with by an effectively operating branch of government; the real danger comes from the fact that the Soviet Communist leaders, operating behind a screen of confusion, false issues and side shows, are themselves fully and soberly aware of the lesson of imperial history: that all vital politics concern international relations rather than home politics and of necessity center around the problem of alliance, which inevitably defies simplification. It is this very lesson which causes them again and again to make a supreme political effort towards drawing the attention of every free nation and government away from this decisive issue of alliance by creating other worries without end on a world scale. There can be little doubt that among all such worries and devices the various forms of provoking the wrong kind of nationalism are the most effective and the most applied. They are serving a double purpose: they throw continually sand into the machinery of the alliance and imperil the common cause of all nations who wish to be free; and they detract from the decisive issue of improving and stabilizing the existing alliances against a dictatorship that is irrevocably set on further conquest because it can suffer no retreat or setback which peaceful competition would inevitably bring to the Soviet slave state.

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