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SOVIET DEFECTION TO THE GERMANS IN THE WAR.

JUNE 1952

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SOVIET DEFECTION TO THE GERMANS IN THE WAR.

Introductory Note.

The following pages contain an attempt to examine the main features of Soviet defection to the Germans during the late war; and to draw from German experience the conclusions which appear of relevance to problems which confront us today. The main sources of information will be found listed in an Appendix. While we have been unable to obtain access to all the material which we should like to see (Appendix Section H) we are satisfied that we have seen enough to enable us to assess accurately the main features of Soviet defection during the late war; and that, while certain further aspects of the question still remain to be explored, the broad picture which we have presented is fully confirmed.

1. German policy.

(a) HITLER's policy.

The outstanding feature of the German campaign against Russia was that it was embarked on without any clearly formulated political plan. This was essentially consistent with HITLER's outlook, since from his point of view the campaign did not raise any political problems. He visualised it as an enterprise in which the Germans, as a superior race, would fulfil their destiny by taking over the territory and natural riches of a sub-human and inferior population. There is no evidence that he was at any time concerned with what would happen to this population in the process. What is quite certain is that the idea of co-operation between Germany and the Russian population against the Soviet Government was abhorrent to him as both derogatory to German dignity and dangerous to German security. HITLER was quite willing for any form of propaganda to be used to the Russians which was considered helpful in the campaign. Thus, the campaign against Russia was initiated in general terms as a campaign of liberation from Bolshevism. But HITLER does not at any time appear to have realised that propaganda can only be effective if it bears some relationship to the truth. GOEBBELS, in whom over-all responsibility for propaganda rested, does seem, if the diaries published in his name are authentic, to have grasped this weakness in all German propaganda to the population of Russia. But his unwavering personal loyalty to HITLER prevented him from taking any action to remedy this weakness. HITLER's outlook on the Russian campaign found practical expression in the excesses of the SS, under the direction of HIMMLER, of the civilian administrators of the type of KOCH or KUBE, and later of those responsible for the recruitment of labour, under SAUCKEL. It was these men who had the ear of HITLER and spoke the same language. Their

/views were in

-2-

views were in the last resort bound to prevail on any question affecting Russia as against the views of ROSENBERG, whom HITLER rather despised. There were many military figures whose views differed from HITLER's; but in any case he never completely trusted his generals.

(b) ROSENBERG's theories.

ROSENBERG was familiar with Russia, where he had spent his early youth. The country had fascinated him, and he was obsessed with the danger that this fascination might ultimately deflect the pure German race from its historic mission and destiny, and leave intact a Russian state which in fifty years' time would once again threaten "Aryan" culture, - and even more formidably since it would by that time have benefited from German administrative talent. Hence he evolved a policy of dismemberment of greater Russia, with separate Baltic, Ukrainian, and Caucasian states. The Russian core which remained would suffer a diminution in standards of living as a result, and a very considerable decrease in population (40 million would die in the process, according to the views of officials of ROSENBERG's ministry). Within the limitations of this "hard" decision, as he called it, ROSENBERG was anxious to win over the Russian and other populations of the Soviet Union to the German side, and to encourage the formation of anti-Communist governments - always provided that this did not threaten to revive the Great Russian menace. However, within the framework of the German system, ROSENBERG's Ministry for Eastern Affairs counted for little in the face of the policy on the spot which had the support of the SS, and hence of HITLER. The efforts, which he directed at HITLER, at the civil administration and at the SS to bring about even modest changes in the system of occupation remained without effect.

(c) The attitude of the German Army.

The third policy was to be found in the army. The army propaganda plan which was prepared in June 1941 for Operation Barbarossa clearly echoed ROSENBERG's central idea - but with a significant modification. The main line was:- the Germans come as liberators and have no enmity against the Russian people. Then followed an instruction that while local languages should be used in administration, care should be taken to prevent the population from "prematurely" drawing the inference that a deliberate dismemberment of the Soviet Union was being aimed at. Perhaps the army had realised the danger inherent in ROSENBERG's ideas that their effect on the Red Army and on the Russian population might stiffen resistance. However, the army directive of June 1941 was even more remarkable for its omissions; nothing was said about the encouragement of deserters nor about the utilization of Russian deserters or prisoners as fighters on the German side. There were no instructions about the form of local administration, nor was anything said about the promises which might or might not be made to the peasants on the future policy with regard to the collective farms.

/These omissions

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These omissions may have been due to the fact that it was never intended that the army should play any significant part in the administration of occupied territory. It is however more likely that they are to be explained by the fact that no one had given these problems serious thought. This is confirmed by the fact that, although a department for tactical propaganda in the field existed in the German army, it played virtually no part in the early stages of the campaign - i.e. in the most vital stages. It is, for example, very striking to note that Russian deserters were not counted or listed separately from those taken prisoner in combat until May 1942. In fact, it was not until the first victorious advance had been halted that any serious attention was devoted to field propaganda to the enemy as a weapon in warfare.

(d) Improvisation, unofficial propaganda, and broken promises.

The immediate consequence of the lack of any clear directives on policy towards the population was that the army authorities improvised policy on the spot. The results achieved by them were not lasting, in the sense that their effects were soon overtaken by the SS and the civil administration which followed in their wake. In the course of time, and in particular after the end of 1941 when it became evident that the German advance into Russia was not going to be the easy success which had been confidently expected, unofficial planning for propaganda and political warfare and experiments of various kinds were instituted. These efforts took place unbeknown to HITLER, often in an atmosphere of conspiracy, and in many instances of disloyalty to the HITLER regime. They were short-lived, because before long they were in turn frustrated by the SS which knew it could rely on HITLER's support. Moreover, any success which such efforts could achieve was necessarily temporary and spasmodic because none of the experiments attempted corresponded to any reality of effective national policy. To take one instance: considerable success was achieved for a time in the summer of 1943 by front line propaganda promising deserters that they would be given the opportunity to enlist to fight against the STALIN regime*. But this operation was doomed to failure when in the event deserters were not allowed to enlist, or were enlisted for labour or for service elsewhere than on the Eastern Front - a fact which soon became known on the Russian side and was interpreted as evidence of yet another broken promise. The whole of the VLASOV movement, right up to November 1944, when it was taken over by the SS, developed in just such a series of semi-conspiratorial experiments without official support. The suspicious attitude of HITLER and his entourage to the experiments with VLASOV and similar experiments in the exploitation of the considerable potential disloyalty on the Soviet side was, no doubt, not allayed by the fact that the prime movers in such experiments were nearly always persons whose loyalty to HITLER was questionable - von BRAUCHITSCH, von BOCK, von GERSDORFF, von TRUSKOV, von SCHENKENDORFF, von STAUBENBERG, von ROCQUES - some of whom were later to be implicated in the conspiracy to assassinate HITLER. Some of them, if not disloyal by usual standards,

/were known to be

* See section 3.

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were known to be critical of HITLER and even disillusioned by Nazism to an extent which in a totalitarian regime approximated to treason. Among such was Captain STRIK-STRIKFELDT. A Baltic Russian in service with the German army, he was largely responsible for the building up of the VLASOV movement, participated personally in all its stages, and was the most important German figure to combine an understanding of the Russian situation with that of the political difficulties on the German side*. Whether the German commanders in the field were as innocent of HITLER's intentions towards the Russian population as they sometimes maintain today is perhaps open to doubt. According to SCHILLERBERG the army was informed at the outset of the campaign of the proposed "mass destruction of Jews and Communists". It is perhaps the more likely answer that they often accepted HITLER's policy as a means to victory in the first, victorious stages, and grew disillusioned and critical partly from what they saw of the treatment of the Russian population, and partly because they realised that a good political opportunity was being thrown away by the blindness of their own leaders.

(.) The VLASOV movement as a source of intelligence.

The masters of German policy - HITLER, HIMMLER, and the SS - remained impervious to the need for a political plan in relation to Russia until it was much too late. They ignored the warnings of those army officers who were aware of the opportunity which was being squandered. They also disregarded the advice offered to them by the many anti-Communist senior Red Army officers who had fallen into their hands by the end of 1941. These officers, who included Lieutenant-General LUKIN, an army group commander, all urged the need from the German point of view of setting up a national Russian Committee, and of giving the land to the peasants. They also warned the Germans that the effect of the treatment of the civilian population by the SS and by the civilian occupation authorities would be to drive the population into the partisan bands and to stiffen the morale of the Red Army. These warnings were all ignored, and no concerted effort to exploit the potentialities of the tensions within the Soviet Union in the German interest was ever made. The value of the VLASOV movement and similar experiments as a source of intelligence is therefore mainly confined to the light which they can throw on the potentially disloyal elements within the Soviet state. It is from this angle that German attempts will be considered in the following sections.

2. The first impact.

(a) Reaction in the Baltic States.

Sufficient evidence is now available on the first reaction of the population of occupied Russia to the German invasion to state certain basic facts with fair certainty.

/In the three

* His recollections and some of the documentary evidence preserved by him have formed an important source of our information on this subject.

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In the three Baltic countries, which had only recently been forcibly incorporated in the USSR, the reaction was one of unqualified welcome. They regarded the war as an opportunity of regaining their lost independence, and offered the Germans every assistance to this end. There was large scale volunteering to enlist. The only partisan activity in the early stages, and that principally in Latvia, was due to efforts of communist underground organisations which had been left behind when the Soviet forces retreated, and was on a small scale. The failure of the Germans to exploit more fully the potential assistance which the Baltic countries could have offered was beyond all doubt due to their determination to exploit them to as great an extent as the Russians, and to their policy of at all costs preventing the re-emergence of these countries' national independence.

(b) The Situation in Russia proper.

Beyond the countries of the periphery, i.e. in Russia proper, the Russians had in most cases achieved some form of evacuation before the German entry, with a greater or lesser degree of chaos. The success of the evacuation varied according as the centre was more or less remote in the path of the German advance. In Kiev, for example, which was not entered until mid-September 1941, at least a third of the population had been evacuated, or had fled. The evacuation in most cases comprised the bulk of industry and of the workers engaged in it, and party (and NKVD) officials. Basically therefore in so far as it is possible to generalize a situation which was essentially fluid, and at times chaotic, the classes of the population with whom the Germans most often found themselves in contact were the peasants and the "intelligentsia". The "intelligentsia" includes, in Soviet terminology, technicians, senior administrators, members of the learned professions, teachers, writers, and army officers - in general, all with a higher than secondary school education. Since the bulk of the communist party was in 1941 (as it is now) recruited from the intelligentsia, the latter included a fair proportion of party members.

(c) The reaction of the Peasants.

The reaction of the peasants was in general one of welcome. It is now often asserted that this welcome was confined to the Ukraine, but this view does not appear to be correct. The welcome may well have been somewhat more exuberant in the Ukraine, a fact probably to be explained by the more exuberant national character of the Ukrainian. It may also have been due to the preparatory activities in the Ukraine of agents of ROSENBERG's ministry (which were suspected by H.M. Foreign Office as early as 1938). The peasants' welcome was founded on a very simple basis: they disliked collectivisation, and they wanted the land. Beyond that they were not interested in anything very much - absence of freedom for example, did not figure as a ground for their discontent with the Soviet regime. Two aspects of the reaction of the peasants to the advent of the Germans in 1941 were of particular significance. The first was their desire not only to receive land by sub-division of

/the collective farms

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the collective farms, but their desire to receive it at the hands of some recognized and established administration (the collapse of the Soviet regime was at the outset of the war taken for granted) which could give them a valid, permanent title. The second notable fact was the complete absence of any spontaneous rioting or disorganized seizure of the land. It would no doubt have been sternly put down by the Germans, who realized the economic value of the collective farms no less than the Soviet authorities. But the fact remains that there were no known instances of what had hitherto been the traditional manifestation of the Russian peasants' reaction to the breakdown of the authority which keeps him in subjection. Whether this curious fact was due to a change in the character of the Russian peasant as the result of ten years of collectivisation; or possibly to the removal, through the opportunities provided by the Soviet regime for advancement, of potential ring leaders of a revolt, or to some other reason is a question which would well repay further study.

(d) The reaction of the intelligentsia.

The reaction of the intelligentsia was more complex. The remnant of the old, pre-1917 intelligentsia showed open welcome: after all, the Germans were Europeans, and it was a relief to turn to them after all hope of ever seeing an end to Soviet rule had vanished. The case of the new Soviet intelligentsia was different, and from the point of view of lessons to be learnt far the more important. The emergence of this new class from the dark mass of the people is probably the most significant of all the changes brought about by the Soviet regime. The Germans, certainly, found much to be astonished at when they first came in contact with them, not least the level of intelligence of the upper stratum of this class. (Subsequent intelligence tests carried out by the Germans on Russian prisoners showed that while 75% were well below the West European average, 25% were well above it). It is important to consider the attitude of this class, as it appeared to the Germans. It can be fairly safely estimated at not less than twelve million of the population, while its importance in keeping the Soviet regime in being is well out of proportion to its numbers.

(e) The motives of the intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia had grown up in circumstances of privilege and, within the limitations of a totalitarian regime, of responsibility. Their knowledge of the west, at any rate in 1941, was virtually confined to the few party clichés on the subject. Even if they did not take those very seriously, they had nothing to put in their place. They were fully conscious of their superiority to westerners, even to a victorious invader. They boasted of their technical experience and skill, of the advantage of substantial forced labour resources which enabled Russia to disregard the ordinary economic laws of cost of production or manpower wastage, and of their own achievements. In 1941, at any rate, they showed little concern for the miseries of the masses, and of the peasants in particular. In all the plans and projects

/which they submitted

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which they submitted to the Germans their primary concern appeared to be to ensure the continuance of their own position in authority, without which they believed the country could not be governed. For example, the agronomists in authority in the collective farms opposed the abolition of collectivisation on the ground that it would decrease production. It may be that this gulf between the intellectuals and the masses should not be overstressed, and that at times of particular sufferings the latent bond between the two classes becomes more evident. (Certainly this appears to have been so during the rigours of collectivisation between 1929 and 1933). Moreover the Germans also found that as time went on and the sufferings inflicted by German occupation became widespread, this gulf between the privileged and the masses tended to disappear. The intelligentsia had no particular political ideas. They were certainly not convinced communists, even in the case of party members, whose outlook did not generally differ from that of the non-party intelligentsia. They were not particularly chauvinistic, in spite of their consciousness of superiority, and they were receptive to such ideas as that of a greater European unity. In general it would give a false impression to suggest that their motives were the purely selfish ones of preserving intact their own privileges: their main motive in fact was a form of idealism, of devotion to work for the greater advancement of their country. But this they believed could not be achieved without conditions which enabled them to give of their best.

(f) The intelligentsia throw over the Soviet regime.

Another striking feature of the outlook of the intelligentsia was the complete absence of loyalty to the Soviet system. They had felt the rigours of its oppression and detested it, though without lifting a finger to resist it. It cannot be stressed too much that the Germans discovered no traces of any underground opposition, nor any traces of secret adherents of the former Socialist parties, nor any groups associated with the executed opposition leaders of the thirties, like BUKHARIN. It was plain that the intelligentsia, whatever their opinions of it, had served the regime loyally - at any rate since the purges of the thirties had removed any whose private doubts were likely to affect their conduct. The purges clearly had done their work thoroughly. On the other hand, this loyalty did not survive the regime for long. The intelligentsia, like the peasants, were in no doubt that the Soviet regime was finished, and they were ready to throw it over without regret, and to work with the Germans. Their loyalty was not to the regime, but to their work: they would co-operate with any regime which held out hope that their work towards the advancement of the material welfare of their country would continue. Again it must be stressed that this applied equally to members and non-members of the Communist Party. (Even Soviet published sources occasionally admit that there were party members who readily co-operated with the Germans). Party membership in the case of the Russian technician intellectual is an accident or incident of his career: it does not otherwise affect his outlook, or make him different from his non-party colleague. Exception should be made for the NKVD (MVD) officers and officials, and for professional party

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functionaries, to whom different considerations may well apply. With those the Germans did not come in contact, since they for the most part escaped or went underground to organize the partisans. The few who entered German service did so in their old capacity as police, and no doubt the transition was an easy one.

(c) The Germans unprepared.

Thus the two main classes with whom the Germans first came into contact, the peasants and the intelligentsia, were both ready to co-operate, if for different motives: the peasants wanted land, the intelligentsia privileges and an opportunity to work. The questions most frequently raised by the population were: what form of government would be established? Would industry be improved? Would independent artisanry be allowed? Would the collective farms be abolished? German official policy had, for reasons already stated, no answer to any of these questions. Military commanders on the spot improvised answers as best they could. But either their answers were evasive, or their promises were necessarily made only to be broken. (STRIK-STRIKHELDT, who at the beginning of the campaign was serving on the staff of Von BOCK with Army Group Centre, even went so far as to attempt to form on his own initiative some kind of National Russian Committee at SHOLYNSK). The civilian and SS administration which followed in the wake of the army soon revealed the real nature of Germany's intentions. As is well known the results of this administration on a potentially willing and co-operative people were, from the German point of view, disastrous. But before analysing the further developments in occupied Russian territory after the first impact, it is necessary to consider the question of the Red Army.

3. The Military Picture.

(a) Defeat rather than defeatism.

The scale on which prisoners from the Red Army fell into German captivity was unprecedented in military history. The total for the first five months can be confirmed beyond doubt as at least 3,850,000, and for the whole campaign as well over 5,000,000. Thus, some two thirds of all prisoners taken were captured during the first tenth of the period of fighting. These facts have frequently been cited in support of the contention that the Red Army displayed its hostility to the Soviet regime by mass surrender at the first opportunity. The evidence does not support this view. All German official appreciations conclude that the vast number of prisoners was above all due to the military situation, i.e. to defeat and not to defeatism, and that in the majority of cases troops fought tenaciously until overwhelmed. External factors confirm this conclusion. Had there been a prevalence of mass defeatism in the Red Army one would have expected large surrenders to have taken place immediately, in the first weeks. In fact, as German claims show, although quite sizeable numbers of prisoners were taken in July and August 1941, the really astronomic claims relate to September and early October. Moreover, although surrenders of whole units did occasionally

/take place, it is

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take place, it is doubtful if they took place as frequently as has been asserted. For example, on the whole front of Army Group Centre during 1941 there was only one single instance of surrender by a whole unit, that of an artillery battery. It is notable that, as in the case of the civilian population, there is no evidence whatever that the Germans found within the Red Army any organized opposition or underground. The Russian reaction is also revealing. The re-appointment on 16th July of military commissars provided some evidence that all was not well with army morale. However, in official pronouncements signs of panic first appeared only on 18th September 1941, when Pravda admitted that the danger was grave, - significantly adding a warning that the Germans aimed to re-organize the collective farms for the purpose of exploiting them in their own interest. A month later, on 19th October, ZHUKOV was given command on the Moscow front, over the head of the "old guard" commanders who had failed, and the NKVD troops were concentrated at the disposal of Major-General SUBILOV. There is ample evidence of panic in Moscow about this time, if only in the reports of trials and executions for treason and defeatism. Had mass desertions been taking place in the first stages of the campaign, one would have expected these signs of panic to have appeared earlier than September.

(b) Motives for Desertion.

However, if the large numbers of prisoners in the early stages were mainly accounted for by military defeat, there was nevertheless a high degree of desertion. No accurate estimates are possible, since the Germans at first kept no separate count of deserters. The motives of the deserters in the early stages, so far as can be estimated on scanty information, were in the great majority of cases neither cowardice, nor desire to save themselves. In fact, the early prisoners usually came over expecting to be killed immediately, as they had been told they would be by their own propaganda. The impulse to desert came from dislike of the Soviet regime. In the case of the peasant the object of dislike was the collective farm system. The officers, whose outlook corresponded in many ways to that of the intelligentsia in the civil population, often combined a general dislike of the regime with a sense of resentment at the political system of control in the Red Army, which hampered their initiative in doing their jobs in the field. (The system of political commissars lasted for about a year after 16th July 1941. Too much significance need not be attached to the temporary reintroduction of political commissars, since even without the commissars the political system of control remains very stringent. The commissar system, used in emergencies, merely has the effect of increasingly centralising this control). Moreover every Russian soldier knew that by deserting, or indeed by allowing himself to be taken prisoner, he was not only committing a serious crime himself, but was endangering his family. There were a number of instances of bombing of prisoner camps by Soviet planes in the early stages of the war which were designed to emphasise these facts.

(c) Readiness

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-10-(c) Readiness of the deserters to fight on the German side.

The result of all these factors was that nearly all deserters and many prisoners immediately offered their services to fight on the German side and thus help to overthrow the Soviet regime. This offer, in the soldiers' eyes, both wiped out the disgrace of desertion or surrender, and presented a chance of saving his own life. This desire of the deserter to change sides and fight, which corresponded to the civilian collaborator's anxiety for the immediate setting up of some anti-Soviet Russian government to which he could give his allegiance and service, was the cardinal feature of all anti-Soviet tendencies inside the USSR throughout the war. It was ignored by the Germans, because it ran counter to the plans with which HITLER and the SS had embarked on the war. On the other hand, as events were to show, the minor successes achieved by the army authorities in spite of or unbeknown to HITLER were due solely to a correct assessment of the strength of this factor. Meanwhile, in the early stages of the war the German authorities, combining brutality with political ineptitude, allowed the reservoir of potential allies represented by their Russian prisoners literally to rot. Only 1,100,000 were alive by February 1942. Half a million died between November 1941 and January 1942 alone. The fate of the prisoners in German hands soon became known in the Russian lines. Together with the halting of the German advance before Moscow this knowledge acted as a powerful deterrent to would-be deserters.

(d) Desertion after 1941.

Nevertheless, desertion did not cease altogether. Although after 1941 it never attained proportions which threatened the fighting capacities of the Red Army (except perhaps in the Caucasus) it nonetheless remained of significance, if only as evidence of a potential element of disloyalty in the Red Army. One instance is worth recounting. In April 1942, during one of the few Russian airborne operations, a company was dropped in error in German occupied territory. It surrendered without fighting. The whole company, including the company commissar agreed to the proposal of the local German commander that it should fight on the German side. Fairly accurate figures of deserters are available after May 1942. They show the number of deserters as 10 - 15,000 a month up to the Russian victory at Stalingrad, or perhaps 10% of the total of prisoners taken. After Stalingrad the figures dropped rapidly. This is not surprising, since this Russian victory was by all accounts a turning point in Russian morale, military and civilian. It was the first point in the war at which the conviction that the Soviet regime was finished gave way to the belief that the Germans would ultimately be defeated. And it was characteristic of all Russian desertion to the Germans in the war that even if the causa causans was often hostility to the regime, the causa sine qua non was in the great majority of cases the military defeat of that regime. However, while desertion to the Germans decreased, account must also be taken of the fairly extensive desertions to the various anti-Soviet bands of guerillas which took place between 1942 and 1944. These anti-Soviet guerillas (who are dealt with later) totalled several hundred thousands, and deserters from the army formed a considerable proportion of them.

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(c) The BERGLINN Operation.

There are several lessons of interest to be learnt from the picture of desertions to the Germans from the Red Army during the period 1942 - 1945. The first was the relatively greater readiness of troops of national minorities with whom the Germans now came into contact, to desert. This was particularly so in the case of troops of Caucasian nationality, though it applied as well to troops of some of the nationalities of Central Asia. In the Caucasus, in the spring and summer of 1942, the Abwehr semi-officially maintained a detachment of some 1700 Red Army prisoners of the various nationalities of the Caucasus partly for combat duties, and partly for diversionary operations in the Caucasus in the enemy rear. The operation went by the name of BERGLINN and was commanded by OBERLANDER*. It achieved considerable successes in inducing desertions from Caucasian troops on its front, mainly by propaganda promising that deserters would be immediately recruited to fight against the Soviet regime. In the case of an Armenian division of the Red Army the BERGLINN detachment achieved such marked success with their propaganda that this division was hastily withdrawn from the front. There were no desertions from the BERGLINN detachment. OBERLANDER also claims, though it has not been possible to check this from any other sources, that his unit was in touch with communists in Tiflis and negotiating with them. The communists were to organize a revolt and open up the Georgian military roads and mountain passes to the German advance. Nothing came of these negotiations owing to the German withdrawal about this time. The greater readiness of Caucasians to desert is however fully confirmed both from some contemporary intelligence sources and from German records. Thus Army Group A, which was opposite 70 - 80 native Red Army divisions in the Caucasus until December 1942 recorded a daily average of 96 deserters from the Red Army between September and December 1942, or 15.2% of total prisoners taken; the overall proportion of deserters to prisoners for the whole front at that time was about 10%.

(f) Operation SILBERSTREIF.

A minor political warfare success was achieved by the Germans in the spring and summer of 1943. This was the OKW propaganda operation known as SILBERSTREIF. The Germans first began to devote some interest to front line propaganda designed to induce desertion in the summer of 1942 - apparently during the period of military success they did not find the time to think much about its importance. Even after 1942 their front line propaganda was neither well co-ordinated nor, so far as one can judge from the few examples, of a kind likely to prove successful. It was crude, usually anti-Semitic, and above all based on promises of material benefit (not very convincing to any Russian soldier who had heard something of what happened in Russian prisoner camps in 1941). Several reports of interrogations of prisoners during 1942 and 1943 stress that material promises were useless as an incentive to desert in the case of soldiers used to hardship:

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what was required, say these reports, was a promise that the deserter would be allowed to enlist to fight against the Soviet regime. This is exactly what the SILBERSTERNIF operation adopted as its main keynote. Its timing, in the spring of 1943, also coincided with the peak period of the propaganda success of the semi-illicit VLASOV movement, which Army and Abwehr authorities succeeded in conducting until stopped by HITLER. SILBERSTERNIF therefore started off on favourable soil. Indeed, an OKW Order of 20th April, 1943, which immediately preceded the propaganda campaign noted that desertion was now on the increase. For the first time this Order laid down separate, and good, treatment of deserters. SILBERSTERNIF, which in essence was a widespread and intensified appeal to "come over and fight STALIN", achieved quite a measure of success - particularly if it is borne in mind that the Germans were now no longer advancing. The number of deserters rose steadily from 2,500 in May to 6,500 in July. Of 104 divisions questioned on the value of the operation, 97 reported favourably. The experiment was shortlived, as all such German experiments: the Order of 20th April was disregarded, and the SILBERSTERNIF promise was not kept.

(g) Desertion in the later stages of the war.

The third point of interest in the later history of desertions from the Red Army was a noticeable increase in numbers at the end of 1944 and in 1945 (the numbers were negligible in the first nine months of 1944). In 1945, for example, there were nearly 2,000 deserters, including about 50 who deserted to a unit of the VLASOV army in March, on German soil on the Oder. However, this slight increase in the number of deserters is probably correctly attributed by German sources to three causes: repeated Soviet attacks (in some sections of the Southern Front) which in German observation always led to increased numbers of deserters; desertions by Russians who had been in German service, had been recaptured by the Russians in their advance, and drafted into penal battalions; and desertions by Ukrainians who, as the result of the Russian advance were being victimized on account of the resistance activities of the guerrillas in Western Ukraine. The desertions in this later phase do not therefore add much to the picture given in the earlier phases.

(h) The convinced communists.

The story would not be complete without emphasising the fact that there were, and remained, among the prisoners captured by the Germans a proportion of convinced communists, whom nothing would induce to cooperate with the Germans in any way. It is difficult to estimate this proportion in 1941 - 1943, i.e. before Russian victory became certain. Some indication of the proportion may be provided by VLASOV's estimate, made at the end of 1944 in discussion with HIMMLER (as reported by an SS officer who was present), of the proportion of convinced communists* among prisoners in German hands as

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* Since this account of what VLASOV said comes from a Nazi, it is possible that VLASOV included in the 15% both convinced communists and those who, for patriotic reasons, would refuse to ally themselves with Germany, even if they were opposed to the Soviet regime. The Nazis did not draw any distinction between these two categories.

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15%. If this estimate was right and honest, the proportion in 1941 and 1942 could scarcely have been higher, and was probably lower. Again, according to VLASOV, at the end of 1944 30% would readily have enlisted to fight against the Soviet regime under his command, and under the aegis of a Russian national committee. 55% in VLASOV's estimate were undecided, but could eventually be persuaded. The estimate of 30% was in the event shown to have been an under-estimate.

(1) The lesson of Red Army desertion.

The significance of these figures of deserters and prisoners willing to enlist on the German side is however secondary. The fact of major importance was that right up to a time when a Russian victory was already probable, the Red Army contained within it a potentially large number of men who could with comparative ease be persuaded to enlist to fight against the Soviet regime. Even the rudimentary and spasmodic efforts of the Germans to win over this potential ally were sufficient to reveal, if only by the rapidity with which even these efforts won a response, the true optimum conditions for their success: the formation of some form of national Russian government; and the setting up of a Russian army under Russian command.

4. Russians in German Service.

(a) "Russia can only be conquered by Russians".

The lack of a propagandist plan and the determination of HITLER with regard to the nature of the Russian campaign led to unco-ordinated efforts by individuals to exploit what they believed to be the opportunities offered by anti-Soviet feeling both in the Red Army and in the occupied territories. In the second half of 1941 STRIK-STRIKHELDT, who seems to have been the first to conceive the idea of a clear political plan, was serving on the staff of Army Group Centre. He won some support from its commander, von BOCK, and was thus enabled to tour freely in the occupied territory, unopposed even by the SS. The Russian National Committee which he set up at Smolensk addressed an appeal to HITLER. The appeal remained unanswered, and even von BOCK was not prepared to support an idea which ran so much counter to the official view. STRIK-STRIKHELDT then, in November 1941, prepared a lengthy report, the gist of which was that the Germans should set up a Russian national provisional government, and create a Russian Army of Liberation, and at the same time put a stop to the horrifying conditions in the prisoner camps and in occupied territory which were turning even the anti-Soviet Russians into enemies. This, the first of a series of similar reports which were to be prepared in the course of the next two years by STRIK-STRIKHELDT and other experts who took a similar view, reached von BERRUCHTSCH. The latter accepted its conclusions and noted in the margin: "This can be decisive for the issue of the war. Russia can only be conquered by Russians". Shortly afterwards von BERRUCHTSCH was dismissed -

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whether or not as the result of endeavours to get the suggestions in the report implemented is not known. There is some evidence that von BRAUCHITSCH was in touch with what he believed to be an "opposition" in the Red Army, but which was in fact an NKVD invention.

(b) The Hiwis.

However, while any far-reaching political plan was thus doomed to failure at the outset, this did not prevent individual commanders on their own initiative, and often without higher authority being aware of what was happening, from attempting to exploit on the spot the readiness of Russian prisoners to serve against the Soviet regime. The employment of Russian prisoners for non-combatant duties was permitted, and tens of thousands, and later hundreds of thousands, were so employed. These Hilfswillige ("Hiwis") became an integral part of the German army and local commanders became increasingly dependent on this manpower as the war progressed. In general, there was no political idea behind their employment. They were under German command, though their conditions of service were until late in the war far inferior to those which applied to Germans; and they wore no distinctive sign to indicate that they were part of any separate Russian or volunteer unit. They never formed part of the VLASOV Army, and never came under VLASOV's command even when, in the later stages of the war, they began to be used on an increasing scale for combatant duties. For the greater part of the war these Hiwis, as well as some of the units formed of Russian minority nationals, came under the overall command of General KOESTRING, who had for many years been Military Attaché in Moscow. KOESTRING, and a number of Commanders in the field who exploited Hiwi manpower and became dependent upon it, found themselves constantly at odds with the higher authorities over the fate of these Russians. They had to struggle both for betterment of their conditions of service, and against demands such as those of SAUCKEL, who was anxious to secure the manpower for the civilian labour market, as Ostarbeiter. To a certain extent, the supporters of the Hiwis also found themselves at odds with the VLASOV Army of Liberation, which during its short period of existence provided a powerful counter-attraction to the Hiwi. The result was that, with the German's natural propensity to give a theoretical basis to an empirical practice, the generals interested in the Hiwis developed a doctrine - they were for the most part either of Baltic origin, or, like KOESTRING, experienced in Russian questions, and many, if not all, were in greater or lesser degree out of sympathy with HITLER's more extreme doctrines. They came to believe that the defeat of STALIN's regime could be achieved by the development of good human relations with an increasing number of Russians from the Red Army. In their relations with Russian officers they implied, if they did not so state, that after the overthrow of STALIN the inhuman Nazi plans for Russia would also come to an end. The enormous numbers whom they were able to enlist as Hiwis, as the war progressed, no doubt served to increase their confidence in their theory.

//(c) Statistics of Hiwis

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(c) Statistics of Hiwis.

The number of Hiwis in service in the German army was at least 220,000 in the middle of 1943. A year later there were at least half a million, and the total number of Russians in German military service was at the lowest estimate a million, i.e. a tenth of the whole German armed forces. By the end of 1943 already a Russian company was a common sight in a German battalion. The figures alone are impressive, particularly if one recalls that after the death of nearly three million Russian prisoners by the spring of 1942, the Hiwis represented a very substantial proportion of the total number of Russians in German captivity. But several factors must be set against this. In the first place, the readiness of prisoners to volunteer for Hiwi duties can easily be explained by the desire to escape from the conditions of prisoner camps, without any particular anti-Soviet impetus. That this explanation is probably correct is suggested by the fact that when the VLASOV army was formed there was a rush from all the more active anti-Soviet elements among the Hiwis to enlist in it. Secondly, KOBSTRING's claim that the increase in the numbers of deserters at the end of 1944 was the direct result of his successful efforts in mid-1944 to improve the conditions of the Hiwis is probably wrong. The abominable conditions of prisoner camps in 1941 undoubtedly acted both as a deterrent to would-be deserters and as a motive to enlist in the Hiwis; but improvement of relations with Hiwis did not materially satisfy the impetus of Russian prisoners to fight under Russian authority and flag in a Russian anti-Soviet army.

(d) Russian PW in anti-partisan units.

Apart from the official Hiwi movement, there were several unofficial or semi-official attempts by local commanders and by the Abwehr to exploit Russian prisoners more actively, and even in a political direction. These experiments were especially associated with Army Group Centre, though also with 18 Army on the Northern Front commanded by General LINDEMANN. One such experiment was the fairly widespread use of small volunteer intelligence units for anti-partisan reconnaissance, recruited mostly from captured Red Army officers and NCOs, who had never passed through prisoner camps, had had no contact with the civilian administration, and had consequently not been antagonised by its behaviour to the civilian population. Soviet partisans were also often recruited to their detachments. About three quarters of the personnel of these detachments, which were commanded by a Russian officer and were directly responsible to GSO I (Int) at Army or Corps HQ, were Great Russians. Their employment was considered a complete success, since the fact that they had to operate by surprise and deception put their loyalty to the Germans, or disloyalty to the Soviet regime, to a severe test. Thus, out of 700 in the area of 18 Army in 1943, there were only four instances of desertion to the Soviet partisans.

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RESTRICTED(c) The case of 134 Infantry Division.

An interesting instance was the employment right from the start of the campaign of a large number of Russian prisoners for general combatant duties by 134 Infantry Division - apparently in complete disregard of the official policy with regard to such employment then in force. As early as July 1941 all prisoners and deserters were offered enlistment in the division on the same footing as Germans. Many prisoners, and most deserters accepted. By November 1942 nearly half the strength of the division was made up of Russians, armed almost entirely with captured Russian weapons. The officers were both Russian and German - the commander of the anti-partisan battalion, for example, was a Red Army officer, who was given a free hand to choose his own NCOs from among prisoners. In addition to the anti-partisan battalion, there were several artillery batteries, anti-tank and engineer platoons, and a pioneer battalion. The commander of the division states that the employment of these Russians, given good treatment, was a complete success. There were only three cases of desertion.

(f) The effect of German military reverses.

The above are two instances out of many of the employment of Russians for combatant service on the "good treatment" basis of the Hivi school of German generals. In general, the success claimed by German commanders in the employment of these troops on the Eastern Front may well have been true - so long as the Germans appeared to be winning. In many instances the turn of the tide in 1943 was followed by desertions and the Germans responded by shifting most of their Russian volunteers over to the West. That the Russian Hivi should react to German reverses by cutting his losses and by deserting even to the Red Army was natural enough. (Different considerations applied in the case of the national minorities, whose morale often remained better, even in defeat). The Hivi was a mercenary pure and simple. His service with the Germans was not inspired by any political ideal, even an illusory one. Be that as it may, it is important to remember that many of the Hivis deserted not to the Red Army, but to the many anti-Soviet bands of partisans which by 1943 were operating in Soviet-occupied territories. The ideologists of the VLASSOV movement claimed that if Russians could be attracted into German service by a political ideal which held out some hope of a new future Russia, a mass army of Russians could be created. This army, by winning over a substantial proportion of the Red Army to its side, would bring about the overthrow of the Soviet regime.

(g) Operation GRUKOPF: formation of R.N.N.A.

An opportunity to make some attempt to put this idea into practice, behind the backs of HITLER and the SS, came early in 1942. This was the operation known to the Germans as GRUKOPF, which took place at Osintorf (a village in the Orsha neighbourhood) in the area of Army Group Centre. The operation originated officially as an Abwehr plan to create a small detachment of Russians for special mission duties, and was suggested by two emigre officers, IVANOV and SIKHAROV. In fact the official plan was camouflage for a more ambitious

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schome. Recruiting in the prisoner camps began in February 1942 and evoked rapid response. By the end of 1942, in spite of the original limit of a thousand, the unit was between five and six thousand strong, and a force of fifty thousand or even eighty thousand was being actively planned. The unit was planned on lines which were later to form the basis of the VLASOV Army: it was known to the Russians as the Russian National Peoples' Army (RNNA). Russian uniforms were worn, and all the officers were former Red Army officers, with the exception of three emigré officers. The Germans were represented merely by a detachment of two Abwehr officers and a few ORs. Training and weapons were Russian. The oath of allegiance was taken not to HITLER, but to the Commander, Colonel BOYARSKY. Political training was in the hands of General ZHILANKOV, (a figure of great importance in the VLASOV movement), a former communist party secretary in a Moscow urban district. The political doctrine current at Osintorf was that STALIN was Enemy No. 1, and could only be destroyed with German aid; but that thereafter a strong Russian army with full support of the Russian civil population would defeat HITLER. The main aim, therefore, was to spread defection in the Red Army in order to win adherents. The fact that such openly seditious ideas, from the Nazi point of view, were possible anywhere on German-occupied soil becomes more intelligible when some of the principal figures on the German side are considered: Colonel von GERSDORFF, GSO I (Int) of the Army Group and Commander of the Abwehr Kommando concerned, was later one of the most active figures in the STAUFFENBERG conspiracy; General von TROCKOW, who made an attempt on HITLER's life some time before von STAUFFENBERG, was also on the staff of the Army Group; STRIK-STRIKOWITZ, who without ever being implicated in any conspiracy against HITLER had lost his early Nazi illusions by 1942, was on the staff of the Abwehr officer attached to von GERSDORFF. That in such circumstances the experiment was doomed to failure goes without saying: before long (late 1942) an SS inspection resulted in the whole organization being disbanded. The Red Army and emigré officers were dismissed, and the troops put under German Command on normal Hiwi lines. A large number of them, nearly the whole battalion according to some accounts, deserted to the Red Army, and further German reprisals followed. (The fact that the German officers concerned apparently suffered no repressive action suggests that the seditious doctrines preached within the unit were not discovered by the SS). In terms of military action the "RNNA" achieved little more than some successes against partisans. Its main employment had been in anti-partisan warfare. The chief importance of "RNNA" consisted in the fact that it laid the future of the VLASOV movement; and consequently that the germ of this movement grew in an atmosphere of disloyalty to HITLER, almost of conspiracy. This factor is of some assistance in assessing the motives which, at about the time when the "RNNA" was coming to its inevitable end, induced VLASOV to become the head of a wider movement.

5. The VLASOV Movement: First Phase.

(a) A change in German policy.

Towards the latter part of 1942 signs of change became observable in the German official attitude on political warfare against Russia. Pressure by the army generals who in greater or lesser degree opposed HITLER's Russian policy,

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combined with the halting of the German advance, had led to this chance. Even HITLER was among those in favour of a new line. The opposition of ROSENBERG was sufficiently overcome to secure his agreement first to the creation of a school for training Russian prisoners as propagandists, and later to the ostensible setting up of a Russian Army of Liberation, and of a Russian National Liberation Movement, headed by a Russian National Committee. HITLER's consent to these moves, which on the face of it were a radical departure from all his avowed policy hitherto, was also secured. A good deal of light on HITLER's attitude to the whole matter is thrown by the records of a meeting held by HITLER with his Chiefs of Staff in June 1943 on the whole question of political warfare against Russia. HITLER's attitude was quite clear. The Russian Liberation Army and Movement were permitted so long as they remained nothing but a facade. For the strictly limited purpose of propaganda to the Red Army, in order to encourage desertion, the existence of the Army and the Movement could be publicised. So far as practice was concerned, it was to make no difference of any kind. There was to be no Russian Liberation Army. Russian prisoners were to be employed as heretofore on labour or in the limited capacities officially permitted to Hiwig. Above all, no propaganda of any kind was to be permitted behind the front line, among prisoners or in occupied territory, and the very existence of the movement was not to be disclosed in Germany. HIMMLER's attitude (as appears from a report made by him in the Spring of 1943) was essentially the same. In his view the propagation among Germans of the doctrine that Russia can be conquered only by Russians, or the like, would be devastating to German morale; and he was also in full agreement with HITLER that the existence on German or German-occupied soil of Russian troops with any kind of independent command was a serious menace to German security.

(b) The Military Psychological Laboratory.

The movement which is associated with the name of General VLASOV was therefore launched as a sham. It was moreover in its ambit strictly limited to Great Russians: other arrangements were afoot for the political and military exploitation of the prisoners of the minority nationalities*. However, for a period of some months, from late 1942 until the summer of 1943, the German enthusiasts connected with the movement, notably STRIK-STRIKFELDT, succeeded by a process of intrigue, at times almost of conspiracy, in manoeuvring for more significant results than HITLER's strictly limited sanction could have secured, or tolerated. The ideology of the movement originated in the so-called Military Psychological Laboratory in Berlin, which was attached to the Ostpropaganda-Abteilung of the War Ministry. Until the end of 1942 it was directed by von GROTE (also a Baltic German and a former officer in the Imperial Russian Army) and thereafter by STRIK-STRIKFELDT. The Laboratory, which was an institute for the study of questions of political warfare, normally housed a small number of Russian prisoners considered to be of special interest and who were allowed certain privileges in return for their assistance in

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* See Section 7.

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the work. A new impetus was given to this small institute by the arrival of ZHILLENKOV, who had been dismissed from Osintorf after the SS had become aware of the GRAUKOPF experiment; and about the same time by the arrival of ZYKOV. The latter, who was the one man mainly responsible for the formulation of the ideas of the VLASOV movement, was a somewhat mysterious figure, of outstanding ability in propaganda. He was a Jew, - though this fact was naturally concealed from the German authorities - and is said to have been at one time assistant to BUKHATIN, and himself a prominent oppositionist. Since the name he adopted was certainly a pseudonym there is no way of checking this. Though violently anti-Stalinist, he was very left wing, almost communist, in his views, and incidentally very anti-British. He offered his services as a propagandist immediately on surrender. These two factors, combined with his hitherto unexplained disappearance in 1944, have led to rumours that he was an NKVD agent. But in view of his signal services to the movement it is difficult to see what his mission as an agent could have been. It seems much more probable that he was killed by the Germans. Other figures, later of prominence in the VLASOV movement, such as TRUKHIN, were also at the Laboratory in the late summer of 1942. The idea of launching a Russian Liberation Movement, which originated in this Laboratory, required for its implementation a military figure to head it. There were already several Lieutenant Generals to choose from in German captivity. ZHILLENKOV was a political general and was clearly unsuited for that reason. Another refused outright to have anything to do with the project. A third, LUKIN, though strongly anti-Soviet, refused (according to KOESTRING) on the grounds that he would not be a party to any movement launched by the Germans so long as dismemberment of Russia remained the German policy. VLASOV, who accepted after considerable persuasion, was in many respects an admirable choice: he enjoyed an enormous reputation in the Red Army as the much decorated and publicised hero of the stand before Moscow; and his honesty and qualities of leadership inspired the confidence of all who came into contact with him. He arrived in August or September 1942 in the Laboratory, together with General MLYSHKIN, to join ZYKOV and ZHILLENKOV and the others who were already there.

(c) VLASOV's Motives.

VLASOV's motives are not easy to assess. They were not motives of personal aggrandizement - all who knew him testify to that. Nor, on the other hand, was he impelled to join the German side by any long-standing antagonism to the Soviet regime. He had not himself been implicated in any opposition (MLYSHKIN, for example, had been through the hands of the NKVD during the purges connected with the name of TUKHACHEVSKY), had had a successful career in the army, and was a member of the communist party. He was, it is true, the son of a peasant, and his father had been victimized during the collectivization. But this remote event can hardly by itself have engendered bitter enmity to the Soviet regime only after ten years of faithful and successful service. Certainly VLASOV showed considerable resentment at the system of police and political control in the Red Army, which, like so many Red Army officers he regarded as inconsistent with the dignity of an officer. After his victory at Moscow VLASOV himself had been summoned to the Politbureau and kept standing, like

/a schoolboy, in the

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a schoolboy, in the august presence. Perhaps this latent resentment, combined with the shattering defeat and appalling carnage inflicted on his troops before his capture both contributed to his decision in the autumn of 1942 to turn against STALIN. STRIK-STRIKHELDT, who was responsible for all the negotiations with VLASOV, says that the factor which finally persuaded VLASOV was the belief that by his action he would be able to alleviate the sufferings of the Russian prisoners in German hands.

(d) No possibility of internal revolt.

Certainly, neither VLASOV nor any of the leaders of his movement, had any illusions about HITLER or Nazism. Indeed, as has often been observed, the striking feature of all Vlasovite utterances was the almost total absence of references to HITLER or any of the fetishes of Nazi ideology, - all the more remarkable in the case of prisoners of war with little or no status. The relatively few anti-semitic utterances, for example, which can be found in speeches and propaganda are not in the circumstances a matter for wonder. What is more remarkable is that anti-semitism never figured officially in the programme. The references to Germany, in programmes, and in propaganda, were always in the form of "alliance of the Russian and German peoples". In numerous public utterances VLASOV and others got very near to hinting that HITLER would not last forever. HIMMLER, in his report on the VLASOV movement already referred to, quotes in extenso a speech made by VLASOV to German officers in the spring of 1943 in Mogilev. In this speech VLASOV freely criticized the German policy of occupation, the humiliating treatment of the Russian workers in German industry, and the flood of Nazi propaganda which depicted the Russian as an Untermensch. So long as this continued, he maintained, there was no prospect of success for any movement which aimed at conquering Russia with the aid of the Russians. HIMMLER noted with dismay that many of the German officers present appeared to agree with VLASOV's views. The atmosphere in which VLASOV began his service with the Germans was one in which hostility to HITLER was scarcely concealed by the German officers with whom he mostly came into contact, and therefore one in which he could easily persuade himself that the overthrow of STALIN would be rapidly succeeded by the overthrow of HITLER. On the other hand, it was also true that in the eyes of his Russian followers alliance with the Germans was something for which a convincing form of justification had to be devised. VLASOV repeatedly expressed his conviction that there was no possibility of any internal revolt against STALIN*. But he believed that a decisive defeat inflicted on the Red Army by the German army with the aid of a national Volunteer Russian army would rally the bulk of the Russian population to the side of the Russian volunteers and thereby bring about STALIN's overthrow.

(e) The Smolensk Programme.

The VLASOV movement, as planned in the Military Psychological Laboratory, was much more ambitious than HITLER had any intention of allowing. It comprised the setting up of a

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* This view was also shared by General LUKIN.

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National Committee headed by VLASOV with certain administrative responsibilities in occupied Russia; the formation of a Liberation Army planned to grow to the size of a million; and the open and public inauguration of the movement at a meeting at Smolensk. According to some accounts HITLER was persuaded to agree to this, but changed his mind at the last moment. It seems much more probable that the plan as outlined never got beyond the stage of a private conspiracy to hoodwink HITLER and his entourage, and that it did not come off. At any rate, all that happened was a broadcast to Russia at the end of 1942, from Berlin of an inauguration supposed to be taking place at Smolensk and the Programme of the movement. The Army of Liberation, of which the Red Army were informed, did not come into existence. The shoulder flash "ROA" was issued to Hiwis to lend some substance to the propaganda story, but otherwise their status remained as before. The Programme, which was the work of ZYKOV, contained thirteen points. Apart from guarantees of the personal freedoms and provisions for securing social justice and private initiative in a Russia freed of "Bolsheviks and Capitalists", it guaranteed abolition of the collective farms. The Programme did not deal with questions of the national minorities, beyond vaguely guaranteeing "freedom of nationalities". ROSENBERG's dismemberment policy therefore remained unaffected by it.

(f) Dabendorf.

That the movement was not entirely still-born was due to the energies of the enthusiasts at the Laboratory who strove hard to make it a good deal more effective than HITLER intended. They achieved some measure of success in two ways. The first was the transformation of the small laboratory into a larger school for training Russian prisoners as propagandists, which in 1943 was transferred from Berlin to Dabendorf. At the same time publication of two newspapers each printed in large issues was started. Ostensibly the papers were for dropping across the lines to Red Army soldiers. In practice they circulated in large numbers in the prisoner camps and among the Hiwis, achieving the result which HITLER had been anxious to prevent, the publication of the existence of the movement inside Germany. The Dabendorf school, in which several thousand prisoners were trained as propagandists, soon became the real centre of the movement. On the one hand, it provided an opportunity for developing an ideology in the minds of Russian prisoners and for teaching them the facts about Soviet history which were perverted in communist teaching. On the other, the propagandists when trained usually returned to their Hiwis units or industrial occupations they helped to spread the ideas which they had imbibed, and thus to keep alive faith in a movement which had little objective existence. The influence of Dabendorf has generally been exaggerated in retrospect by its participants. But it appears to be true that, at any rate for the best part of 1943, the Germans left the Russians a fairly free hand both in running their newspapers and in the teaching. We possess a good deal of material relating to the instruction at Dabendorf, and more could probably be obtained. It provides a most valuable guide to the lines upon which the retraining of the communist-dominated mind can be effectively achieved, and much of it is

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of current interest. Files of the two newspapers, arya and Dobrovolets, for 1943 are not available in England, but there are said to be such files in existence in private hands in Germany.

(g) VLASOV's tour of occupied Russia.

The other achievement, again without HITLER's knowledge, was the organization of a propaganda tour by VLASOV in the early spring of 1943 in occupied Russia. Judging from such contemporary accounts as are available and from the recollections of participants, the tour was a considerable success with all sections of the population. According to a report by the Chief of the Security Police and Secret Service the news of the formation of a National Russian Committee was "universally welcomed" by the population, with the exception of the "pro-Bolshevik circles". However, the knowledge that VLASOV had been touring the occupied territory reached HITLER in April 1943, with the result that the tour was immediately stopped. VLASOV remained thereafter in Berlin under a form of house arrest. By the end of the summer of 1943, after HITLER's conference with his chiefs of staff, to which reference has been made, the movement was moribund, and remained so until its sudden revival at the end of 1944. HITLER had not succeeded in preventing knowledge of its existence from reaching Russian prisoners in German camps. But the failure to implement any of the promises upon which the movement was based naturally led to demoralization among them.

(h) Potentialities of the VLASOV movement.

The abortive efforts to out-manoeuvre HITLER were, however, sufficient to demonstrate that potentially, even in 1943 after the SMOLINGRAD victory, a Russian Liberation movement could still hope to gather a good deal of support. There are four facts which bear out this view. First, the immediate and enthusiastic response to recruitment for the Liberation Army - until it began to be realized that it did not exist. Secondly, the response of the civilian population in the occupied territory to VLASOV's tour - again at a time when both the nature of the Germans was widely known, and the conviction that the Red Army would after all beat the Germans was gaining ground. Thirdly, the effect on the Red Army. It will be recalled that the SILBESTRIEF front propaganda operation was inaugurated soon after the VLASOV movement, in May 1943. Even before the operation, desertions had substantially increased - the number of deserters had doubled from 1,000 in February to 2,000 in March. In July, after two months of SILBESTRIEF, which drew largely on VLASOV propaganda material, there were 6,500 deserters. Moreover there appear to be no other reasons to account for these increases. In fact, German evidence based on captured Russian field posts shows that by the end of 1942 there was in general a marked rise in morale in the Red Army and that Soviet patriotic propaganda was beginning to show its effect. The increased trend towards desertion must therefore be accounted for by response to an offer of an opportunity to fight for the overthrow of STALIN under the aegis of a Russian National Committee. The most important evidence, however, is provided

/by the Soviet reaction

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by the Soviet reaction to the VLASOV movement. But consideration of this reaction must be postponed until the next section, so that the developments inside Russia, both German and Soviet occupied, can first be examined.

6. The Russian Civil Population.

(a) Change of opinion after Stalingrad.

The hopes which the civil population of occupied Russia placed on the Germans as liberators were rapidly shattered. The German administration either could not or did not trouble to conceal its barbarity. Prisoners died openly in tens of thousands in the camps. Jewish populations were rounded up and massacred. Savage reprisals on villagers for partisan activity soon followed. The disillusionment of the population was the more bitter in the early phase of the war when it was universally believed that the Red Army had no chance of victory. The new master was proving worse than the old. After the Stalingrad victory the situation changed. All accounts agree that this point represented the turn of the tide in public opinion. The ultimate victory of the Red Army was now accepted. In February 1943 the Chief of the Security Police and Secret Service reported from the Ukraine that "the belief that the Red Army would sooner or later collapse which was widespread until now, has been shattered". In addition to Stalingrad, the effect of Soviet propaganda began to tell, both in Soviet occupied Russia, and in the new territories which were being re-conquered by the Red Army. The intense patriotic propaganda began to have its effect. Again, the Germans had made little headway with the rebuilding and re-opening of churches. By the time the Red Army returned, official Soviet policy towards the Church had changed, and the Soviet authorities therefore garnered the popularity on this account which the Germans had squandered.

(b) Effectiveness of Soviet rumour propaganda.

Above all, the Soviet authorities made very skilful use of rumour propaganda among the population (German sources are emphatic that rumour is the most effective of all methods of propaganda in Russia). Everything would be different after the war. The collective farms would be abolished, the Church would come into its own, and there would be relaxation of the dictatorship. The omnipresent partisan movement made it easy to spread such rumours not only in Soviet occupied Russia, but in German occupied territory as well. They were readily believed by a population which had now nothing much else to hope for. The effect was particularly evident in the case of the peasants. In June 1943 ROSENBERG belatedly issued legislation abolishing the collective farms. To his astonishment the peasants refused to accept the land. No one with any understanding of the Russian peasant need have been astonished. Anxious to acquire his land in 1941, when he expected the Germans to win, he was now equally anxious not to stick his neck out when he believed that the Red Army would win, by accepting anything from the Germans. Had he been given his

/land in 1941,

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land in 1941, there is little doubt that the returning communists would have found a bitter enemy ready to fight on every plot - just as did the White Armies in the Civil War.

(c) Strength of anti-Soviet feelings.

Yet, although the tide of anti-Soviet feeling had begun to turn in 1943, there was enough evilence to show that anti-Soviet elements were still strong. The immediate response won by VLASOV's propaganda tour in the spring of 1943 demonstrated that the appeal of a Russian national government and of a liberation army (for it was as such that VLASOV portrayed his movement) was still strong. In part the response came from those, particularly from among the intelligentsia, who had burnt their boats by co-operating with the Germans. They had nothing but the worst to fear from the returning Soviet power, and therefore naturally clutched at any straw which offered some escape from the dilemma of the Nazi anvil or the Soviet hammer. A report by the Chief of the Security Police and Secret Service on public feeling in Belorussia, dated 16th April 1943, was probably typical of all occupied Russia at that date. This report divides the population into three groups. First, a relatively small openly pro-Soviet group in contact with the partisans, and forming the main vehicle for Soviet rumour propaganda. Next, "by far the largest section of the population", which had originally shown sympathy with the Germans, but was now in a state of hesitation, in part as the result of the military situation, and in part as the result of German occupation. The third group which was "quite small", and which was openly pro-German, consisted mainly of a few intellectuals and of some of the peasants. It had no contact with the population. The author of the report concludes that, if past mistakes in German policy were rectified, if the land were given to the peasants and an independent Russian administration were set up, the great bulk of the population could still be won over to the German side. But the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in 1943, actual or potential, also appears from an examination of some of the lesser known aspects of the partisan movement in German occupied Russia.

(d) The origin of the Partisan Movement.

The Soviet claim that the partisan movement originated with the networks of underground communist cells which were left behind on the withdrawal of the Red Army appears for the most part to be false. That the Soviet authorities realize that it is false is also evident from the attention which they have been devoting in recent years to the re-writing of memoirs and books dealing with partisan exploits, and published immediately after the war, which gave a different, and presumably more truthful, picture. In some cases it was true that the communist organisation was able to get the partisan movement going almost from the start of the occupation. This was so, for example, in the Leningrad area, - according to detailed evidence obtained in 1941 by the SS. But for the most part the communist organisation in the early stages broke down, or disappeared, or collaborated, or was faced with threatening hostility by the population. It was only by the summer of

/1942 that a strong

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1942 that a strong central organization succeeded in reconstructing the network of communist control which should have functioned from the start. The first partisan activity, which was already quite considerable in 1941 and early 1942, was mainly the work of two classes: deserters or stragglers from the Red Army who were afraid to surrender to the Germans, or to make their way back to their units; and small bands of townspeople and villagers who took to the woods. These numerous bands in 1941 and 1942 were of a very mixed political outlook. Some were anti-German from the start. Moreover, the number of the anti-Germans increased rapidly as German reprisals against villagers, and other action, such as the rounding up of the population for export as slave labour, drove a growing number into the woods and into the bands. But some of the bands were "neutral", i.e., anxious above all to be left alone to live as best they could in the woods and marshes. Others were actively anti-Soviet.

(c) The anti-Soviet partisans.

As time went on, certainly by the end of 1942, the Red Army, the communist party, and the NKVD (the latter was mainly responsible for the immediate control of partisan operations) had succeeded in welding the scattered bands into a more disciplined and co-ordinated movement - though not without a great deal of difficulty. A special underground communist party network was in existence by then as a branch of the All Russia Communist Party. It had its own statute, hierarchy and party discipline. Even so, throughout 1943 and 1944 quite extensive anti-Soviet partisan operations were engaging the attention of the NKVD troops in wide areas of both Soviet occupied Russia and of territories recaptured from the Germans. Much of this activity related to areas of the national minorities - particularly in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Ukraine*. But in Russia, in such areas as the Bryansk Forests, and Smolensk, Moscow, Voronezh, and Tambov provinces, the returning Red Army was met by quite considerable bands of partisans. They were a mixed bag of deserters, local inhabitants, and plain robbers. Their numbers were reinforced, as the Red Army approached, both by deserters from the Red Army and by deserters from the Hitler. The total strength of this movement (including the very substantial bands in the minority republics) was estimated by the German Security Service in the spring of 1944 at three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. It was unco-ordinated, and without any clear political aim, and never presented much more than a nuisance to the Red Army and the NKVD. The attitude of the local population was one of "friendly but passive neutrality". Its importance, if anything, lay in the potential danger that the regular partisan bands, which had been brought to heel only with difficulty, might become infected, and might desert to reinforce the anti-communists, or to join the bandits in escaping from the shackles of authority. There is good evidence, (based on the interrogations both by Germans and by officers of the VLASOV movement of high ranking partisans) that the NKVD was well aware of this danger. This appeared in its strenuous efforts to secure the maximum of centralized control over the movement. It was also evident from the policy which it adopted of as far as possible avoiding the reinforcement of partisan bands from the local population

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* See next section.

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(there are instances of bands where as many as four fifths did not consist of local inhabitants). Moreover, the apprehensions of the Soviet authorities with regard to the loyalty of the partisans were clear from the fact that upon the reconquest of territory by the Red Army, all partisan bands were, as an almost general rule, not incorporated in the army, but disarmed, disbanded, and sent off to the rear, either for dispersal or for re-embodiment in the Red Army as individuals, distributed over many different units.

(f) German failure to exploit the partisan movement.

This aspect of the partisan movement must be seen in conjunction with the opinion of the German security authorities that the Germans missed the opportunity of exploiting the anti-Soviet elements in the partisan movement. There are indications that there was some truth in this view, and that in the early stages of the free and unco-ordinated partisan activity there were many partisans who were ready to be won over into one camp or the other, depending on the opportunities or treatment which they were offered. As a captured partisan commander told the Germans in February 1943: "We in the woods believe that communism - which 70 - 80 per cent of us hate - will at least give us a chance to live". There were a number of instances at the outset of the war in which armed groups sprang up under local leaders for the purpose of protecting and administering their home territories. These groups declared themselves anti-Soviet and friendly to the Germans: above all, they wanted to be left alone. There were cases where they distributed the collectivized land and set up primitive elected administrations. The German policy of disarming these groups and retaking their land soon turned them into active anti-German partisans. In some cases they fell victims to the Red Army or the NKVD, who were quick to discover the existence of these patches of liberty and to destroy them whenever they could. In one instance one such local anti-Soviet commander, who raised a band of three thousand, successfully resisted the repeated attempts both of the SS to disarm his forces and of Soviet paratroops to destroy them. He was eventually contacted by Soviet emissaries with an offer of a free pardon, and ended by winning a decoration for his band for its action on the Soviet side. There is no reason to doubt that if these bands had been encouraged they would have left the Germans unmolested, and would also probably have fought the Red Army on its return in defence of their newly recovered land. The emergence of the VLASSOV movement gave the Germans fresh opportunities of winning over a good number of the partisans which they likewise failed to exploit. Even in 1942 and 1943, with the whole record of German administration in occupied Russia in their minds, many of these men retained sufficient resentment against the Soviet regime and fear of the return of the Red Army to respond to any offer which held out the hope of giving them the support of an anti-Soviet administration. In the summer of 1942 General von SCHENKENDORF (one of the group of generals who were active in urging a revision of German occupation policy in Russia) attempted to create an area in the Smolensk-Vitovsk-Orsha triangle in which administration would be left to the Russians. In return the Russian administration would guarantee to keep the area free from partisans. Some steps were taken to put this plan into operation: it met with immediate response,

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but within a short time von SCHENKENDORF was forced to abandon it, and withdraw his offer, no doubt under pressure from higher authority*.

(g) Soviet Reaction to the VLASOV Movement.

The main evidence for the potential strength of a Russian liberation movement as an attraction to the partisans and to the civil population in 1943 can be derived from the Soviet reaction to the inauguration of the VLASOV movement. It is quite clear that the Soviet authorities treated it seriously. They presumably know little or nothing of the disunity among the German authorities, and of the difficulties under which the sponsors of the VLASOV movement were labouring in an endeavour to outwit HITLER. They certainly appear to have regarded the change in policy as a political move fraught with some danger from their point of view. A flood of Soviet propaganda was released, in leaflets and newspapers, directed mainly at the partisans. The choice of the partisans as the main target for this propaganda was in part due to the fact that the partisans had the best opportunity of passing it on to the civil population under German occupation. But in part it must have been due to the fear of the effect of the new German move on the partisans themselves. We possess a fair selection of this propaganda material from German sources. In one sense of course anti-VLASOV propaganda was on an easy wicket. The past German record in Russia provided ample material with which to denigrate anyone in any form of alliance with the Germans. Many of the anti-Soviet bands lived by brigandage. It was easy to saddle the VLASOV movement with much of the unpopularity which this brigandage evoked. On the one hand it is true that this propaganda was in large degree successful: among Red Army defectors in the later stages of the war for example, nearly all had heard of the Vlasovites as brigands, while only an isolated few were aware of the political movement. But on the other hand it is also true that the half-hearted, semi-conspiratorial and short lived nature of the German political effort in the first half of 1943 never gave the political side of the movement a proper chance to become widely known. Its abrupt cessation merely added a further item to the list of broken German promises and added to disillusionment, thus strengthening the chances of Soviet appeals to patriotism.

(h) Attempts to penetrate the VLASOV movement.

Even more instructive, as revealing Soviet apprehension, is the Gestapo material containing intercepted conversations between Soviet security detachments, instructions to the partisans to kill VLASOV, and the like. The Soviet authorities also made a number of attempts to penetrate the VLASOV movement, though not, apparently, with very great success. A communist cell was formed at Dabendorf in 1943, which staged a revolt. It was promptly suppressed, and there is no evidence that it was an NKVD inspired, as distinct from a local and spontaneous action. Several NKVD agents were uncovered (often owing to the efforts of the NTS) with missions to

/assassinate VLASOV.

* This account was given by KROMLADI, later VLASOV's Chief of Cabinet, who made the proposal to von SCHENKENDORF.

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assassinate VLASOV. One agent, who was discovered in the course of 1943, was of particular interest. He was charged with a comprehensive mission of organizing extensive penetration of the organization and of disrupting it with propaganda. The gist of this propaganda was to be that the communist party would be dissolved after the war, that the collective farms would be abolished, and past mistakes put right without the help of foreign invaders; and that Vlasovite defectors to the Red Army would be well received. Attempts were also apparently made by the NKVD to enlist the help of right-wing emigrés in Germany in disrupting the VLASOV movement: the story put out to them was that the "opposition" inside the Red Army (contact throughout most of the war seems to have been maintained by the NKVD with some emigré circles in Germany, ostensibly in the name of a Red Army "opposition", headed by ROKOSSOVSKY) was strongly opposed to the overthrow of Stalinism until Germany had been defeated. There is also said to have been, though this is at present quite unconfirmed, some attempt made through the Japanese to dissuade the Germans from continuing with the VLASOV movement.

(i) Lesson of the VLASOV Movement.

There is little doubt therefore that the Soviet authorities considered that the Russian Liberation Movement (which they were not to know was little more than a sham) had to be taken seriously. Its importance in terms of its effect on the civil population, at any rate in occupied Russia, lay not in what it achieved, - which was little enough. It lay in the fact that the hesitant and incompetent effort which was made was sufficient to reveal that a genuine all out political effort, had it been made even comparatively as late as 1943, might have created a serious situation for the Soviet authorities.

7. The National Minorities.

(a) German failure to exploit national minorities.

The German handling of the problem of the national minorities during the war with Russia followed a pattern of ineptitude which closely paralleled their handling of the problem of Russia as a whole. The somewhat fanciful theories of ROSENBERG on the sub-division of Russia did at any rate contain some allowance for national independence which, if implemented, might in some parts of occupied Russia have given an impetus to nationalist feelings. But in the early victorious stages of the campaign the Germans were solely intent on exploitation, indifferent to the political handling of the conquered populations, and above all hostile to any form of administration which bore even a semblance of national independence. In the Baltic countries, which were the first to be invaded, the enormous fund of goodwill which greeted the Germans as liberators from the Russians was thrown away. Immediate offers to form volunteer legions to fight for the liberation of their countries were rejected. In the course of time the Germans realised the value of prisoners of the national minorities in their hands, at any rate as cannon fodder, and permitted the formation of national units from

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the few surviving prisoners as integral parts either of the German army or of the SS. They were recruited to fight "against Bolshevism" and nationalist propaganda was not permitted. Officers of these nationalities were in general not trusted and until nearly the end of the war not placed on an equal footing with German officers. The result was that the recruiting drives were treated with suspicion. The reports of the Chief of the Security Police and Secret Service relating to the Baltic countries for the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 show, for example, that by that date the Germans had long lost the confidence of the anti-Soviet inhabitants. Partisans, at once anti-German and anti-Soviet, were already in operation.

(b) The Cossacks.

In the case of the Cossacks (who are a social caste and not a national minority) the Germans allowed more independence from the first. The Cossacks were permitted their own officers and ideological propaganda. The result was apparent in the higher quality of troops which this policy produced. Although used mostly on the eastern front there were no desertions to the Red Army from the sixty thousand Cossacks fighting on the German side. In contrast, the other minority troops, which were mostly used in the West, showed varying degrees of breakdown in morale. At a later stage, in 1943 and 1944 the formation of national committees, usually headed by members of the old emigration (i.e. not by Red Army prisoners) was at last sanctioned. But this move in any case came much too late to make any difference. At the crucial periods, when the latent national feelings of the more separatist elements within the USSR could have been rallied under a banner of fighting for their independence, German policy failed to provide any focal point for such aspirations.

(c) German failure to distinguish separatism from Chauvinism.

Apart from this general failure which characterized German handling of this question, a study of the policy pursued towards individual national groups provides abundant evidence of the doctrinaire ignorance with which minorities were often handled. This was in part due to the pre-received theories which prevailed in ROSENBERG's entourage and in part to an almost exclusive reliance for political leadership on old emigrés, rather than on the new Red Army prisoners, more familiar with contemporary conditions in their part of the USSR. The emigré leaders, encouraged by the support shown for their theories, became even more extreme, and more divorced from reality. One form of this encouragement of an extremist separatist unreality was the promotion of nationalist movements which had virtually no existence outside the imaginations of their emigré sponsors. Belorussian nationalism is one instance of this. When in March 1944 a Central White Ruthenian (Belorussian) Council, or Rada, was formed, headed by nationalists from former Polish Belorussia, its advocacy of separatism for Belorussia found no response whatever among the Belorussians from the Soviet side. Their anti-communism was based not on opposition to Russia, as such, but on opposition to the Soviet regime. The same is to a large extent true when one contrasts Western Ukraine

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and Eastern Ukraine. In the former, which had never been under Russian domination, nationalist separatism became the leading force. In the Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, it was at most a half-hearted force, if that. Again, the reason was that the main impetus to resistance came from the anti-Soviet rather than anti-Russian feelings of the population. Another bizarre instance from the catalogue of German ineptitudes was the sponsoring of an Idel-Ural Volga Tatar separatist movement after 1943. This group was united neither in race, language, nor religion. Its main reason for opposition to the Soviet regime was based not on nationalist feeling, but on hatred of collectivization.

(d) The German failure summarized.

In general, the German failure lay in the fact that they did not, when they had the opportunity, cement the nationalist feelings of those territories where nationalism really does exist with a military formation of that nationality and a genuine separatist movement to correspond to it. Thus, national armies could have been recruited in the Baltic States to fight under the orders of provisional national committees; or Georgian or Azerbaidzhani committees could have been formed at the outset, to which troops of those nationalities formed of prisoners of war could have been subordinated, to fight in the Caucasus, and to co-ordinate and support national risings in their own territories still under Soviet occupation. The miniature BERGLINN operation alone showed what good results could be obtained by pursuing this policy. As a result of their failure to pursue such a policy the Germans received little or no help from the potential dissident forces within the minority territories of the USSR. At the same time, by the encouragement of extremist separatist passions in the field of emigre politics, where they could serve no useful purpose, they only served to weaken the force and cohesion of the all-Russian VLASTOV Committee when it was belatedly formed at the end of 1944.

(e) Operation Zeppelin.

Some time in 1944 a large scale intelligence operation "Zeppelin" was carried out in the USSR. Details, or indeed the purpose, of the operation are not known, but there exists a long report by the (German) Chief of Security Police and Secret Service on the resistance movements in the USSR in 1943 and 1944. The information which it contains was based on the interrogation of prisoners and deserters, and the comprehensive picture which it gives throws a certain amount of light on the relative strength of nationalist centres of resistance. In general, the report noted a considerable increase of opposition in the Soviet interior since the beginning of 1942. It had "manifested itself in greatest strength in the national resistance movements of the Eastern Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus, which derived their support from broad groups of the population". In the Russian area the anti-Soviet partisans (erroneously described as "VLASOV bands") and deserter-bandits (to whom reference has already been made) were active. In all, the report lists a hundred odd bands or centres, with a total strength estimated at three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. In the

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absence of any co-ordinated plan or support from outside, not merely by material reinforcements, but by a policy which would give individuals the feeling that they were fighting for something worth while, in both of which the report notes somewhat grimly "there had been so far only very feeble progress", the NKVD and the Red Army were able to suppress all revolts, if not completely, at any rate sufficiently to localize the disturbances. The report then proceeds to list and classify in detail the location, nature and extent of each centre of resistance. These may be summarised as follows, so far as relates to the minority territories:-

(i) Ukraine

In Western Ukraine, the nationalist Ukrainian Revolutionary Army (UPA) - anti-German, anti-Russian, and anti-Polish. "In contrast...the groups of partisanseast of the Dniopr are not so radically nationalist" and "have many features in common with the VLASOV bands of the Western RSEBR".

(ii) Far East and Central Asia.

In Siberia, and the Far Eastern Provinces strong and active anti-Soviet bands were reported, some thirty thousand strong in the Irkutsk area. Their activities against the Siberian railway were said to be supported by the Japanese. In the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR the guerrilla movement was said to be nationalistic in character. The numerous and strong bands of Central Asia were in general anti-Soviet rather than strongly nationalistic. This was the case, for example, with the bands in Kazakhstan. In Turkmenistan however, where the resistance movement was strongest, there was a strong nationalistic movement, - which the author of the report attributed to British support from Afghanistan. In Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan the numerous bands, formed preponderantly from deserters from the Red Army, enjoyed full support of the local population. In some instances, at any rate, nationalist feelings appeared to predominate among these bands too.

(iii) The Caucasus.

Both the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia were active centres of resistance. In the latter, strongly nationalist movements were reported in Georgia and in Azerbaidzhan; in Armenia there were "no traces of any nationally conscious" resistance movements. In the North Caucasus the principal centres of nationalist resistance was among the Chechens and Ingushi (who were later liquidated by wholesale deportations). Their resistance lasted until September 1943.

(f) The significance of the nationalist revolts.

In the details of activity enumerated there are listed not only raids, but fairly large scale battles lasting sometimes for several days. The importance of this activity, however, does not lie mainly in its scale. In the absence of co-ordination and support it was inevitably bound to fall before the onslaught of the NKVD and the Red Army, as it had on a number of occasions in the past. The significance of

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these revolts lay rather in the fact that, in contrast to the guerrilla activity in occupied western Russia, they started for the most part as a spontaneous anti-Soviet, or anti-Russian revolt, far behind the line, without so far as is known any contact with the German forces, and with little hope of success.

8. The VLASOV Movement: The Second Phase.

(a) The Dabendorf period.

After the abortive effort in 1943 to launch the Russian Liberation movement, of which VLASOV's propaganda tour and the SILBERSTEINIF operation were the only concrete results, German political warfare against Russia once more fell into abeyance. There was no Liberation Army in existence - the national minority units and formations and the Hiwig all remained as heretofore. Early in 1944 the bulk of Russian troops in German service were transferred to the Western front. VLASOV was powerless to prevent this and was forced to write a letter approving the transfer. The only concrete result gained between the autumn of 1943 and the second half of 1944 was the development of a more complete political ideology at Dabendorf, mainly under the dynamic influence of ZYKOV. The Dabendorf "graduates" worked to spread this ideology among Hiwis and the many Russians employed in industry (the Ostarbeiter). Even in the face of German defeats, they appear to have succeeded in keeping alive some hope that the Germans would at last come round to the view that "Russia can be conquered only by Russians", would at last permit the formation of an army of liberation, and that then the tide would turn. The importance of the ideology developed in Dabendorf, which found expression in the Manifesto of the Liberation Movement when it was revived in November 1944, is twofold. In the first place it has entered into the political creed of a large section of the Soviet emigration and therefore forms the political basis upon which exploitation of this part of the emigration will depend. Secondly, it was largely inspired and developed by a man who in outlook fully represented the new Soviet intelligentsia, in fact in most respects a communist, save in his opposition to STALIN. ZYKOV was also - if internal evidence is any guide, - rightly credited with the propagation of the ideas of BUKHLIN's opposition. This was the most important opposition movement in Soviet history, and the only one which was able to command support in the leadership of the Red Army. The Dabendorf ideology is therefore still worth study as a basis for propaganda to the USSR.

(b) Delayed official sponsorship of the VLASOV Movement.

In the summer of 1944 HIMMLER, hitherto an inveterate opponent both of the VLASOV movement and of VLASOV, changed his mind, and was persuaded by the Head of the SS Propaganda Department, d'ALQUEM, to enter into discussions with VLASOV for the resuscitation of the Liberation Movement. As Supreme

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Commander of all home forces since the summer of 1944, HITLER had now in theory acquired command over all Russians and Russian minority nationals in Germany. Of HITLER's attitude at this date nothing is known. Presumably he left HIMMLER a free hand. ROSENBERG's prestige on Russian questions had fallen considerably. His recent policy and that of his ministry, in encouraging the setting up of national committees, still made him hostile to any suggestion of a national Russian movement. On the other hand VLASOV and his following had been much antagonised by the developments of ROSENBERG's nationalities policy, a fact which made VLASOV all the readier to treat even with HIMMLER and the SS. The deal between HIMMLER and VLASOV was essentially a marriage of convenience, with little confidence on either side. From HIMMLER's point of view it was a question of trying anything that might help in a desperate situation. VLASOV and his followers knew that Germany was beaten and that it was much too late to "conquer Russia with the aid of Russians". But they had burnt their boats. They stood a better chance of survival united in a SOLID movement than as individuals known to have collaborated with the Nazis. Some of them hoped that after the defeat of Germany the Western Allies would take some steps to stem the advance of the Red Army, and therefore believed that a deal with them would be possible. (VLASOV himself apparently had little confidence in this chance). There are several accounts which suggest that contact was established with the Americans early in 1945, if not before, and it is the case that some approach was made to the British, in an attempt to reach an agreement about the future of the VLASOV Army after the collapse of Germany.

(c) The HIMMLER - VLASOV Agreement.

HIMMLER and VLASOV met in September 1944*. HIMMLER was prepared to agree to all demands. VLASOV was to have command of all Russian troops, including Hiwis, the formations and units composed of minority nationals, and of the Cossacks. A Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia was to be set up. Although provisional, in the sense that the ultimate future of the minority nationalities would be decided after victory, it was to be representative of all the peoples of the USSR. The ROSENBERG policy was thus ostensibly completely abandoned. For his part VLASOV claimed that he could ultimately form an army of a million. (Events showed that he was probably right - had he been allowed a free hand.) No specific limit was agreed on for the Liberation Army, but the immediate plan accepted was that five divisions should be formed by 1st February 1945, and a further twenty by the end of March. It was also agreed that the conditions of the Russian forced labourers in Germany (the Ostarbeiter) should be improved.

Whether the fact was that HIMMLER never intended to implement this agreement in full, or whether it was that he had not reckoned with the opposition from various interested quarters - the Ostministerium and ROSENBERG and its national committees, the local commanders in charge of Hiwis, or the labour authorities in charge of the Ostarbeiter - little of this programme was realised. The national minority and
/Cossack troops

* We have an eye witness account of this meeting from an SS officer who was present.

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Cossack troops never came under VLASOV's command, except on paper. Of the twenty five divisions projected only two were in fact ever formed, and the formation of a third attempted, by the end of the war. It was not for lack of volunteers. The SS could not, or would not, find the necessary equipment and the rival authorities who disapproved of HIMMLER's arrangements obstructed the transfer of the necessary manpower. Military defeat added to the chaos of divided authority and rivalry of command which throughout characterized the Nazi dictatorship. The total number of troops which at any time came under VLASOV's actual command did not exceed ninety thousand.

(d) The formation of KONR.

On the political side of the Programme, the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia was inaugurated at a solemn meeting in Prague on 14th November 1944. Unlike its shadowy predecessor, the Smolensk Committee, the new Committee (abbreviated to KONR) was widely publicised among the Russians in German hands. It was headed by VLASOV, and consisted of seven members, and one candidate member who was a Ukrainian. One of the seven members was an SS appointed white emigre, an obedient Nazi to-1 and spy. The inauguration included the publication of a Manifesto embodying a new programme, to which a long list of signatures (including those of Ukrainians, Caucasians, Turks and others of non-Russian nationality) was appended. The response was immediate - sixty-two thousand volunteered the day after the Prague meeting. According to numerous accounts one million two hundred thousand in all volunteered between the date of the meeting and the end of the war. To some extent this response was no doubt due to the same motives as those which may have inspired VLASOV himself: the Hiwis, or Ostarbeiter may have felt that they had burnt their boats, and that at any rate there was better chance of safety from the Red Army in an organisation than individually. But in part, at any rate, this response was due to the appeal which the KONR programme held out to the opponents of the Soviet regime who had spent years in German prison camps.

(e) The Prague Manifesto.

The Prague Manifesto reiterated the points of the Smolensk programme - and to the peasants, the guarantees of freedom and social security. Like the Smolensk programme, it was characterised by the absence of Nazi ideology - anti-semitism, or any reference to HITLER. According to numerous accounts VLASOV and other leaders, such as MALYSHKIN, had no hesitation in their public speeches after November 1944 in criticising Nazi barbarism in Russia in the past; or in ridiculing any suggestion that the Germans could ever hope to subjugate the Russians. But there were three innovations which reflected the developments which had been taking place in Dabendorf in the past two years. In the first place, KONR was no longer a Russian national committee, but a committee claiming to represent all the peoples of Russia. The first aim of the new programme was accordingly stated to be equality of all the peoples of Russia, and their right to self determination and independence. In his inaugural and subsequent speeches

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VLASOV stressed the need for unity until victory had been won, with a right for each of the peoples to determine its own future after victory. Secondly, a new idea was embodied which had been evolved by ZYKOV: the liberation from STALIN's regime was stated to be undertaken with the object of fulfilling the February Revolution. In that revolution the Russian people had won its freedom from Tsarist oppression. Thereafter the Bolsheviks had by deceit and force deprived it of the fruits of that victory. The overthrow of STALIN would thus not turn the clock back, but on the contrary give the people the chance to enjoy the achievements of their own revolution of which they had been deprived. The importance of this formulation, particularly for the Russian intelligentsia, which while dissatisfied with the new order is not prepared to see a return to the old, is obvious. (It is worth noting, incidentally, that the VLASOV ideology never included any demand for the return of the Constituent Assembly, which the Bolsheviks dispersed in 1918, let alone any claim for the rights of legitimate succession of the overthrown Provisional Government of 1917). Thirdly, the Manifesto stressed that there would be no vengeance against anyone who rejected Stalinism, regardless of whether he had supported it formerly through conviction or coercion. This is again a point of especial appeal to the Soviet intelligentsia: experience in occupied Russia during the early part of the war, and subsequently in the VLASOV movement, had fully demonstrated that willingness of the intelligentsia to turn against the Soviet regime was as likely to appear in the case of a member of the Communist Party as in the case of a non-member.

(r) The Programme of KONR.

The new programme reflected the influence of the NTS, or Solidarist party. This, the strongest and best organised émigré party at the time had participated in the work of Dabendorf and the VLASOV movement; at the same time it had pursued its own conspiratorial activities in occupied Russia, which had by 1944 got its members into trouble with the Nazi authorities. Its authoritarian doctrine and conspiratorial habits made it at times a disturbing element in the VLASOV movement. However, the two directors of the ideological section on KONR were now both of the NTS, and Point 2 of the KONR Programme embodied literally the NTS demand for the establishment of a "national order for those who work". The ideology of the new Committee also reflected, though not in the Manifesto, an intention to link the new, liberated Russia to world international organisations. VLASOV later made an unsuccessful attempt to broadcast from Prague radio a message to the United Nations preparatory session at San Francisco. Again, the importance of this idea lies in its potential appeal to the intelligentsia: those who are likely to be repelled by a promise of self-determination of the peoples of Russia (and particularly of the Ukraine, the loss of which would deprive Russia of the bulk of her food production) may be induced to accept the principle within the framework of a supra-national order. STRIK-STRIKELDT in his long discussions with the Russian intelligentsia in occupied Russia in 1941 also found among them a ready response to the idea of a federal Russia which would ultimately form part of a greater European organisation.

/(g) KONR and the

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(g) KONR and the question of nationalist separatism.

Since the whole KONR movement came too late to have any chance of success, its significance lies mainly in the realm of ideas; and in particular in its attempt to solve the conflict between Russian nationalist and anti-separatist feeling and the separatist aspirations of the minorities. It did not in the end achieve great success. But it did achieve a formulation of a basis for compromise which evoked some response. Moreover much of the difficulty in winning over the national minorities to a policy of unity of effort was directly attributable to the background of German disunity and intrigue. National committees were set up by KONR in an endeavour to attract the minorities into the fold. There were some successes - a notable instance was the acceptance of VLASOV's leadership by General NAUMENKO, the Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks. There were also many offers from Caucasians and Ukrainians, serving under German Command in the separate national units, to transfer to the Russian Army of Liberation. Permission to transfer was refused by the ROSENBERG National Committees. The latter, and in some cases the troops themselves, refused to have anything to do with what they regarded as a Great Russian manoeuvre to keep the non-Russian minorities in subjection to Russia. In part, at any rate, this reaction was the result of the policy of encouraging extremist nationalism which ROSENBERG had latterly been pursuing. To the very last, members of his Ostministerium such as Von MEHDE, were engaged in trying to maintain a rival organisation of minorities to that of KONR and working to prevent unification under VLASOV. HIMMLER's promise, if he ever intended to fulfil it, proved of little value in the face of German political rivalries, and the hostility of nationalist extremists.

(h) The last days of the VLASOV Army.

The two divisions of the Liberation Army which actually came into existence saw little military action. The Germans were anxious to commit them in action at the Oder to stem the Russian advance. VLASOV refused: he had either already decided that his best plan lay in surrender as a complete force to the Western Allies, or possibly did not wish to commit his troops to action until he had been given his promised 25 divisions, - i.e., what was in his view a large enough force to exercise political influence when facing the Red Army. The story of the VLASOV forces in the last few months is so confused that it will probably never be known in detail. One regime, under Colonel SAKHAROV, went into action on the Oder against the Red Army. It conducted intensive front line propaganda: there were some fifty deserters to it from the Red Army. The number is not large, but the fact of Red Army soldiers deserting to VLASOV on German soil a few weeks before the final defeat of Germany is remarkable enough in itself. The two divisions made their way into Czechoslovakia. In the last days of the German occupation of Prague the First Division under General BUNYACHEVSKO turned against the Germans and helped the Czech resistance in their fight against the SS. Both divisions surrendered to the Americans.

/(i) Influence of

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(i) Influence of the VLASOV movement on the Russian Emigration

Perhaps the most lasting effect of HIMMLER's belated attempt to revive the VLASOV movement has been its influence on the post-war Russian emigration. One of the large political parties, SBONR, has grown entirely out of the VLASOV adherents and ideology; while even the NTS has in the end been forced by the appeal which the VLASOV movement holds for the Russian emigration to support it in retrospect as a patriotic movement. This fact cannot be ignored in any dealings with these two parties. It has two unfortunate consequences. One is that while in the eyes of NTS or SBONR adherents the VLASOV movement was a patriotic Russian movement of liberation, only opportunistically allied to the Germans (which is true enough) there are many inside the Soviet Union to whom as the result of Soviet propaganda the name of VLASOV is associated with little more than treason or banditry. The second is that the handing over after the war of VLASOV and other leaders and adherents to the Soviet authorities by the Allied authorities has covered the latter with odium which it will be difficult ever to eradicate. The ex-Vlasovites may work with us or with the Americans. But in their eyes the alliance will be regarded as little less opportunistic than that which they concluded with the Germans. On the other hand, the tradition of KOFER may perhaps some day still provide a basis for bringing about unity between Russians and national minorities in the emigration, even though the first experiment on these lines has not proved a success.

9. Summary & Conclusions.

The Germans never attempted to develop a policy towards Russia during the war which had any chance of attracting the support of the majority of the population. Basically this was because any such policy would have been quite inconsistent with German intentions of subjugating and in part destroying the population of the country, and exploiting its resources. The Russian reaction to the German invasion showed that there was probably no spontaneous mass defeatism. Nor was there any organized internal opposition movement in existence waiting for its opportunity to overthrow the regime. But there were widespread sections of the civil population, notably among the intelligentsia, i.e., the technicians and bureaucrats, who were quite ready to jettison their regime when its ultimate military defeat appeared a probability - but only provided that some alternative was offered to them which would give them an opportunity to work in the interests of their country, and in conditions which preserved their privileged position. The latter they regarded as their natural right. Again, there were wide sections which were ready to be won over by an approach appropriate to their aspirations; the peasants by the promise of land, some of the minority nationalities by a promise of independence. Above all, in the Red Army, although the first reaction to the invasion of a foreign army was in the main stubborn fighting, there was a large element which was ready to desert. The motives which induced the Red Army soldier to desert on a large scale were in part military defeat; and in part the hope that by deserting to the Germans he would be given an opportunity to fight against the Soviet regime. Which of the two motives predominated is impossible to say. But, while

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military defeat certainly strengthened any existing will to desert, hostility to the Soviet regime just as certainly played a part in giving rise to it. This was evident from the fact that the will to desert continued even when a Soviet military victory seemed assured. The paradox that those Red Army soldiers who had particularly distinguished themselves in fighting on the Russian side often proved the best fighters on the German side showed that, whatever the motive for desertion, it was not primarily cowardice. Probably the Soviet deserter required the opportunity to take up arms against his own government both as moral justification for desertion, and to assure himself some hope of personal survival against Soviet vengeance. But of the fact that the offer of a chance to "fight against STALIN" was the best incentive to would-be deserters there is no possibility of doubt. These conclusions emerge from a study of Russian reactions to the abortive and semi-conspiratorial efforts at political warfare conducted mainly by German elements not fully loyal to the Nazi regime: and from the reaction to the belated and half-hearted efforts of the SS to revive the VLASOV movement in the last stages of the war.

Conclusions relevant to conditions today can be drawn only with caution. Circumstances seldom repeat themselves in an identical manner. It is important to remember that it is very probable that the full odium for the German occupation of Russia will fall on any US or British troops which should ever find themselves in occupation of Russian soil. For one thing, Soviet propaganda will make every effort to identify us with the Germans (as it does largely now in its propaganda about NATO and the Bonn Agreement). For another, the Russian population has little experience upon which to rely to distinguish between different Western nations. The Germans started with a welcome, and earned odium through their actions. We shall almost certainly start with odium, and have to earn welcome through our actions. Moreover, the Soviet authorities have made substantial changes in their system of control and in their political propaganda, presumably in the light of the experience of the war. These have as yet not been fully studied. However, in the event of war which brings Allied troops into conflict with the Red Army, certain inferences appear justified on what Allied policy should be. As in 1941, there is no reason to expect spontaneous mass desertion, or indeed any immediate large scale defection except as the result of military defeats on a corresponding scale to the defeats inflicted on the Germans in 1941. Nevertheless, a correct political campaign will once again provide an opportunity, (such as the Germans throw away) to increase desertions to a scale where it begins to affect enemy military resistance.

The first requirements will be the creation from the start of a Russian Liberation Army under Russian command, and under a Russian flag, as well as the setting up of a Russian National Committee; intensive front line propaganda (it is worth recalling that the Germans found leaflets dropped in quantities of twenty and even forty million at a time inadequate); and a declaration of war aims of a kind to attract both the peasants and the intelligentsia. In the event of the entry of Allied troops onto Russian soil the setting up of a local Russian administration should be the first aim; if the land cannot for technical reasons be distributed immediately, concrete promises must be given of the conditions on which the peasants will acquire land; since the aim must be primarily

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to win over the intelligentsia, many of whom are communist party members, any "decommunization" policy which does not recognize that membership of the communist party does not in appropriate circumstances preclude disloyalty to the Soviet regime will be very unwise. In the case of the minority republics, an immediate promise of independence and the enrollment of national formations would be essential in the case of the Baltic States, and possibly in the case of some of the nationalities of the Caucasus, such as Georgia. In the case of the Ukraine such a policy would undoubtedly be interpreted as a policy of crippling Russia, and would in all probability powerfully strengthen resistance in Russia as a whole. In general, military and intelligence exploitation of minority nationalism should as far as possible avoid overt commitment to a policy of granting independence. Moreover the advantages gained by such exploitation must always be weighed against the disadvantage that encouragement of separatist movements on a wide scale may have the effect of uniting the heart of Russia against what it will fear is a repetition of KOS'NBURG's policy of dismemberment.

Conclusions relating to peace time conditions are necessarily more conjectural. There are however certain important respects in which German experience in the war affords a guide to our policy towards Russia in present day conditions. The impetus to internal revolt in the USSR can only come, if at all, from the realization that there is massed against the Soviet Union an overwhelming outside military strength and potential, and the certain conviction that in a war the USSR would be defeated. In other words, the intelligentsia and the higher strata of the army will only change over, if at all, to an obviously winning side; and there can be no prospect of revolt from anywhere except from the lower strata. The peasants cannot achieve it; the national minorities may, but all experience shows that the Red Army and the KVD can easily cope with local national explosions however violent. Unless, therefore, a simultaneous co-ordinated revolt of minorities and satellites along the whole periphery can be achieved, the concrete results will be of little more than nuisance value, as in 1942 and 1943. On the other hand, the highly centralised nature of the whole Soviet system, i.e., not only of Russia but of the whole constellation, makes the intelligentsia, including the army and party intelligentsia, a particularly attractive target. If opportunities should present themselves for intelligence operations against this target, - whether they arise in conditions of peace, or in conditions of war - it is obvious that the prospect of success will depend to a considerable extent on the propaganda preparation which has been made beforehand. The fact that we shall in all probability be heavily tarred in Russian eyes with the German brush, makes the need for such preparatory propaganda even more vital. So far as overt propaganda is concerned, which is mainly that of the BBC, it should have the fundamental twofold aim of building up the picture of invincible Western strength, solidarity, and potential; and of conveying the belief that not only have we no hostile aims against the population of Russia, or any section of it, but that we are not prepared to compromise at its expense with the present regime - (as opponents of the regime inside Russia believe we have so often done in the past). Only in this way can a sense of solidarity between the outside world and any opposition which may ever form in the USSR be achieved. It must be admitted that at present the BBC Russian

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service is singularly unsuccessful in those aims. Moreover, it is doubtful whether with its present composition it can ever be expected to achieve them, - at any rate, without fixed political warfare directives of a kind which were used for the German Service during the war. The importance of broadcasting to Russia is cardinal, not because of its effect on the masses (though there is some basis for the view that propaganda can prove more effective in influencing potential defectors than actual operations designed to induce individuals to defect). It is important because some of those whom we should particularly seek to win over, i.e. the members of the intelligentsia, have greater opportunity of listening, and are in many instances bound to listen to or read monitored reports for the purpose of their duties. However, since there are a number of things which cannot be said in overt propaganda, the assault on the intelligentsia cannot be made effectively without some medium of covert propaganda, or at any rate some medium, such as a controlled emigré group, which can if necessary be officially disavowed. The theme of such covert propaganda should complement the overt propaganda: that Western military strength is defensive and not aggressive, and has therefore no quarrel with the Russian people or Russian interests; that nonetheless dictators such as STALIN are, like HITLER, always liable to start wars in order to preserve their own unpopular regimes; that in such an event the first aim inside Russia must be the overthrow of the regime; and that in any case they can prevent war from arising by overthrowing their regime before it starts. The violent reaction of VYSHINSKY, much publicised in Russia, to the recent US appropriations for aid to Eastern refugees reveals that the rulers of the USSR are still as sensitive to any political warfare move against their regime as they proved in 1943 when the VLASOV movement seemed to them to be gathering force. To the argument that they will react to political warfare by military action it may with truth be rejoined that they are more likely to interpret absence of effective political warfare by the West as a sign of weakness, inviting a "Blitzkrieg".

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Appendix.S O U R C E S.A. Our own studies and records.

1. A number of papers prepared by DRS at the request of JIC on "The Use by the Germans of Soviet Nationals against the Soviet Union in the Late War".
2. JIC(Germany)(49)100: "The Scale of Russian Desertion in the Late War".
3. Four papers, circulated in 1950, which contain the results of special investigations in Germany undertaken by us:-
 - (a) "The VLASOV Movement 1940 - 1945"
 - (b) "The Motives behind the Formation of the VLASOV Movement.
 - (c) "VLASOVTSI and other anti-Communist Russians in the period of the German collapse, and the subsequent deliveries to the Soviet Union".
 - (d) "War or Revolution?"
4. Miscellaneous interrogation reports of Germans and of Russian defectors.
5. Contemporary intelligence reports on disloyalty in the Red Army, and on the VLASOV movement.

B. US Studies (unpublished and/or restricted).

1. "The VLASSOV Movement" - by CHAVCHILVADZE, June 1950.
2. "Experiences with Russian Volunteers in the fight against Bolshevism" - by General KOBSTRING, with a commentary by an anonymous member of the Central Administration for occupied territories (undated).
3. "German Psychological Warfare against Russia" - based on materials from the files of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Abteilung - by Genevieve C. Collins, prepared for the Operations Research office at John Hopkins University, Washington. 6th February 1950.
4. "Planning for the Effective Use of Soviet Prisoners of War" - (State Department: undated).
- /5. "Russian

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5. "Russian anti-communist forces in the German war" - 2nd February 1949 (Based entirely on captured German documents).
6. George FISCHER: "Russian Defection", November 1950.
7. "Psychology of the Russian People during the time of the War" - undated, by an anonymous émigré.

C. German Documents.

1. Weekly reports of Chief of Security Police on occupied USSR from 3rd July 1942 to 21st May 1943.
2. ROSENBERG correspondence regarding administration of Russia: 1st April 1941 to 31st May 1941.
3. Report by HIMMLER on the VLASOV Movement of 22nd May 1943, with several annexes.
4. Report by Chief of Security Police on Guerrilla Bands and Resistance Movements in the Soviet Union 1943 - 1944 (dated 12th May 1944).
5. Report by Friedrich Heere Ost on desertions from the Red Army (undated, but apparently late 1944 or early 1945).
6. Miscellaneous materials containing security services' information on penetration of the VLASOV movement.
7. Miscellaneous material on resistance and guerrilla movements in occupied Russia.
8. Interrogation reports of captured senior Red Army officers (end of 1940 and early 1941) including Lieut-General LUKIN.
9. Miscellaneous materials on policy towards and experience with the national minorities.

D. Russian Documents.

1. Interrogation of a captured Russian partisan leader by an officer of the VLASOV movement in 1943.
2. Miscellaneous reports, programmes, articles, and memoirs relating to the work of the Dabendorf Propaganda Centre in 1943 - 1944.

/3. MS personal

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3. MS personal diary of a Russian (non-party) intellectual covering the whole period of the German occupation of Kiev.
4. Collection of miscellaneous documents on Soviet propaganda directed against the VLASOV movement during 1943.

E. Oral materials.

Reports of extensive discussions with and questioning of Germans connected with the VLASOV movement (especially STRIK-STRIKFELDT) and of various Russians now in exile formerly connected with the VLASOV movement.

(Note:- This material, together with items listed under A.3., has been of the most value in throwing new light on certain aspects).

F. Published Materials.

1. Two articles by the Menshevik B. NIKOLAEVSKY, published in 1948 in New York.
2. The report of a meeting between HITLER and his Chiefs of Staff on 8th June 1943, published in the Journal of Modern History for March 1951.
3. B. DVINOV, "The VLASOV Movement", 1949. (in Russian, - very prejudiced and inaccurate).
4. E.B. DWINGER, General WLABSOW, 1954. (largely fictional).
5. P. KLEIST, Zwischen STALIN und HITLER, 1950.
6. The full report and collection of documents used in evidence at the Nuremberg Trial (The Blue Series).
7. Numerous articles published in the emigré press since 1946.
8. Press and wireless reports of 1941 - 1945, Russian and German.
9. A number of post-war Soviet publications, especially partisan memoirs.

/G. Forthcoming

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G. Forthcoming publications.

1. A larger work than the one listed under B.6. on Soviet defection by George FISCHER, which is due for publication shortly.
2. A work on the VLASOV movement by the German military journalist THORWALD is expected to be published in the summer and is believed to be based on German documents which have escaped the net and remained in Germany.
3. The memoirs of HILGER covering the period of the war are shortly due for publication in USA and may be valuable on the official German attitude to the VLASOV movement.

H. Materials known to exist which have not been explored by us.

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1. Extensive holdings of captured German documents in the USA. These include the voluminous records of the departments, civil and military, responsible for the occupation of Russia; numerous interrogation reports of deserters; records of the propaganda departments; and other miscellaneous records which have a direct bearing on the question of Soviet morale during the war.
 2. Some materials in private possession in Germany mainly on the propaganda and re-indoctrination work at Dabendorf. These are believed to include files of the two main newspapers produced by the VLASOV propaganda department.