

02

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Yugoslavia

DATE DISTR. 20 Feb. 1952

SUBJECT Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia;
Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito
and the Present Regime

NO. OF PAGES 18

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

50X1-HUM

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.


DO NOT CIRCULATE



THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1-HUM



Stability of the Regime

1. It may be taken for granted that the Tito regime is in no danger of being overthrown by the action of the Yugoslav population, not because the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav people are not dead set against it, but because they are entirely impotent to do anything about it. The Yugoslav population has grown more anti-Tito and anti-regime than it was between 1945 and the middle of 1947. Physical power has become much more consolidated and widespread in the hands of the Security Police (UDB), whose tentacles now reach as far down as the community councils (opstinski odbor).
2. If Tito and his regime stand in any danger of being overthrown, it is by a "Palace coup" or an armed forces coup engineered by Cominform elements of the Yugoslav Communist Army. However, this, too, appears highly improbable. It was very difficult to evaluate the situation in this respect, since particularly at that time, it was very difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the strength of Yugoslav Cominformism, its dynamism and its means of pulling off such a coup. There are many people in Yugoslavia today who believe that a majority of the Yugoslav Communists, particularly the hard core, are Cominformists. When they are asked why, in that case, the Cominformists are not in control of Yugoslavia instead

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	EV	X	NAVY	X	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION												
ARMY		X	AIR	X	FBI	ORR Ev.	X											

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 2 -



50X1-HUM

of Tito, they inform you: "Simply because Tito, by keeping them in the dark about his intentions vis-a-vis the Cominform until he was ready to act, got the jump on them and made them powerless." Subsequent purges, particularly in the UDB and the armed services, incapacitated the Cominformists from organizing. 50X1-HUM

3.



4.

5.

6.

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 3 -

50X1-HUM

7.

8.

Will the Yugoslav People Support Tito to Resist Aggression?

9. It is apparent that the stability of the Tito regime rests not on the support of the Yugoslav people but entirely on force and the physical impotence of the Yugoslav people to upset it. This sort of stability cannot be permanent. It constitutes a weakness in Yugoslavia's potential of resistance to Soviet-inspired aggression [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

[redacted] While there is no doubt that the stability of the Tito regime, however maintained, has been the determining factor against Soviet-inspired aggression from within Yugoslavia, it is equally certain that, in the event of aggression from without, the factor of Yugoslav resistance will shift to the willingness of the Yugoslav people to repel the aggression.

10. It is evident that Tito cannot continue to force Communism down the throats of the Yugoslav people and at the same time expect their support to repel aggression, even Soviet aggression. [redacted] it is an error to contend that the Yugoslav people will support Tito against Soviet or Soviet-satellite aggression because, by comparison, the Tito regime is the lesser of the two evils. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the people [redacted] would recall with horror their experiences under the Russians or the satellites and would readily admit that they certainly did not want any part of the Russians, the Hungarians or the Bulgarians, not one [redacted] would rally to Tito's support against such aggression. Many would evade this question; others would reply, "But this (the Tito regime) is evil, too." Still others would say, "Would you fight for anything evil?" or "Why should I shed my blood or send my son to be killed for this (the Tito regime)?" When asked what they would do in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia, they answered they would do nothing or they would flee to the woods.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

Attitude of Peasants toward the Regime

11.

[redacted] this feeling of bitterness against the Tito regime was not the expression of transient anger, but was a genuine and deep-rooted feeling. The peasants complained bitterly about their lot, which they said was going from bad to worse, from year to year. The Yugoslav peasants looked miserable, and were as they described themselves "gol i bos" (naked and barefooted). An old Serb, lurching on black bread and green peppers, under a tree not far from Nis, after heaping abuse upon the regime (in which four or five other peasants present participated) for the multiform sufferings the

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 4 -

regime has visited upon the peasants (which in his case reached the limit when "the government authorities took all my fat pigs and three lean ones" [redacted])

50X1-HUM

12. A few miles from Zagreb, [redacted] a caravan of peasants, some on carts, others on foot, returning from a religious celebration at Maria Bistrica. Those on foot and many who jumped from the carts.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] vied with each other in condemnation of every aspect of the regime. [redacted] at least they were not prevented from making the pilgrimage to Maria Bistrica, they admitted that in this respect "things were a little easier", but, all the same, they feared that sooner or later they would in some way pay for it, for they were certain that "they (the Communists) kept track of everybody who made the journey to Maria Bistrica." An old lady of seventy-five years of age told her most recent experiences with the Communists. She said the "Communists" came to her and demanded 27,000 dinars in taxes. She protested that it was impossible for her to pay it. She had three pigs and they threatened to take them away from her. She went to every house in the village "except the Communist authorities", and tried to borrow money. She said everybody knew her to be an honest woman and she would have no trouble in raising the money if the people had it, but she was able to raise only 5,000 dinars. Frantically (sic), she sought the president of the village committee and pleaded with him for a delay "so that one of the pigs could have a litter", but her pigs were taken two days later by force when she was not at home and her daughter was too frightened to put up any resistance.

13. About half-way from Nis to Belgrade, [redacted] a young man [redacted] was plowing a field and some farmers working across the road. [redacted] the same bitterness against the regime.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the Yugoslav authorities went to his house and demanded 14½ kilos of wool from his wife. Since he has only 15 sheep, his wife protested that if she delivered this wool, the family would have to go naked since at the prevailing prices (7,000 dinars for one meter of the cheapest sort of woollen cloth) it was impossible for them to buy even one meter of material. Thereupon, they tied her hands behind her back and took her to the village committee headquarters where they kept her all day with her hands still in that position. Several days later, at a village "conference", her son, a young man in his late twenties, ventured to say that his family could not deliver the wool, since they had nothing to wear and no money, and that a cheap shirt alone cost 2,600 dinars. He soon found out, the father said, that "things in this country had not changed, for he had to spend 20 days in jail, besides having to give up the wool".

14. At the other end of Yugoslavia, in Bosnia, in August, [redacted] outside a farmhouse by the road [redacted] a man, his wife and his son, just back from the army. [redacted] the previous week the Yugoslav authorities had called on his wife and demanded delivery of one and one-half kilograms of wool "for last year". She told them that she had no wool to give them, for the winter had been severe and they had no money to buy clothes and she had used the wool to knit a sweater. Whereupon, she was warned that unless the wool was delivered in 15 days, her husband would go to jail. They still had no wool, but they would have to find some.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

15. [redacted] in Lika, Croatia, a farmer complained that out of 900 kilograms of wheat the government had taken 400 kilograms (at the recently reduced quotas of collection). "Of the 500 kilograms left me", he said, "I need 200 kilos for seed; then how long do you think the remaining 300 kilos would last my family of eight persons?"

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 5 -

50X1-HUM

Not much more than a month." He said that government pressure was still great but that at a particular village in Bosnia the pressure was greater and so was the "otkup" (government collection quota);

50X1-HUM

16. [redacted] meetings between members of the county committee and three different peasants in that area (two elderly women and one young man) at Bosiljgrad, two miles from the Bulgarian border. The committee members spoke in Serbian, [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] they spoke in Bulgarian, he and his friends were able to note the lack of docility of the peasants in reply to the demands of the county committee members. They were able to gather that one woman objected to the amount of wool she was being assessed; the other woman wanted food for her family; while the man complained that they had taken his ration card away from him and demanded to know why. The significance of these scenes lay in the defiance with which these three peasants demanded what they considered to be their rights and refused to be cowed by the concerted attacks of the three committee members who threatened the man even with arrest. The complainants obviously got no satisfaction.

Peasants Versus the Collectives

17. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the attitude of independent peasants of the so-called "private sector" (peasants who are not collectivized) toward the regime. The situation of peasants who are members of collectives, on the other hand, is even worse, if anything. Exorbitant taxes and virtual confiscation of their produce and livestock (fruit and vegetables were placed on the free list in July) have reduced the independent peasant to a state of unprecedented misery, yet he still feels that he is his "own boss" and has his self-respect, whereas the collectivized peasants have been virtually reduced to robots. Not only do they own nothing, but they have even lost their quality as men and women and have become merely "radne snage" (labor forces). The situation is, in fact, most accurately reflected by the determination of those who are out of them to remain out. No promise can induce the independent farmers to join the collectives voluntarily. On the other hand, there is a spontaneous, strong movement on the part of the collectivized peasants, albeit unorganized, to break up the collectives.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] A considerable number of peasants in Serbia, and especially in Croatia, simply "abandoned everything" and left the collectives even before the three-year period had expired. In Macedonia, which is approximately 60 percent collectivized, the peasants were in a veritable state of ferment.

18. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] almost 100 percent collectivized, where peasants had attempted to break up the collectives about a month before.

50X1-HUM

[redacted] 200 militiamen had been dispatched from Bitolj to quell the "uprising" in a particularly brutal manner and that the leaders of the "uprising" had been sentenced to terms of eight to ten years' imprisonment. Strong and bitter peasant discontent against the collectives was not confined to the village of Novaci; from Bitolj to Kriva Palanka, peasant feeling ran high. Submittal of petitions to get out of the collectives appeared to be the order of the day in Macedonia. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] all except thirteen residents of the village had signed such petitions, and [redacted] these thirteen were Communists.

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



50X1-HUM

19. In the town of Virovitica, in Slavonia, [redacted] two young men who were very enthusiastic about their collective farm, located at Brezovo Polje, not far from Virovitica [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] the two young men, [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] with Petar Stojanovic, president of the collective farm, [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] to see [redacted] The farm was not very large but the two young men were very proud of it, as well as of the fact that they had been the first to turn in their full quota of wheat to the government - two whole "wagons" or 20,000 kilograms. The hosts showed the visitors their livestock and various installations; called over some of the men working in the fields to meet them; and finally took them up into the loft of the barn. Over two-thirds of the floor space wheat had been spread neatly and evenly to dry. The men proudly stated that this wheat was over and above what they had given the government, and that after enough of it was taken out for seed, the remainder would be distributed among the collective members. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] what this quantity for distribution amounted to, and the young man replied "about two wagons", and turned to the president of the collective for confirmation. "At least three wagons", said the president. This was such a deliberate lie [redacted] 50X1-HUM

"Thirty thousand kilograms?" to which the president replied, "Yes, about that". Taking into consideration the amount of floor space and the fact that the wheat was spread comparatively thinly, [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] there could not possibly be more than 1,500 kilograms of wheat altogether. [redacted] this deliberate lie was in line with the other lie told by the two young men at Virovitica, [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] how much of their country was collectivized. They stated, "It is hard to tell, because farmers are joining the collectives all the time, but it must be at least 80 percent. Actually, not more than ten percent of the area is collectivized and the farmers, instead of joining, are getting out of the collectives, if they can. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] the home of Petar Stojanovic, the president of the collective; [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] The interior walls of the house were adorned with pictures of Tito and other celebrated partisans. 50X1-HUM

20.



21.

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 7 -



50X1-HUM

22. [redacted] Slavonia (Croatia), 50 men were arrested in a village and taken to Zagreb on the charge that they had agitated to break up the village collective. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

[redacted] two of the three men were members of the collective in question, and the younger man was obviously an official and probably a Communist. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

one of the men (who was a private farmer, clearly much worse clothed and fed than the other two) was very positive that he wanted no part of the collectives, and the older of the other two (although himself a member of the collective) definitely agreed with the private farmer. They both attacked the younger man verbally for asserting that after the government collected its quotas, the peasants who belonged to the collective had enough left to eat.

23. At Osiponica, just before entering Pozarevac, [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] a group of peasants composed of an old man, a middle-aged man, two young men, three women and a baby, who were eating under the shade of a tree. The old man, a picturesque Serb,

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the old man went off into a vehement tirade against the regime, so intense and full of hatred, from deep down in his soul, that it fairly shook his frail body. [redacted] not only had they not received any food of any kind, but [redacted] the Yugoslav Government took away from them the little that they raised.

50X1-HUM

24.



SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 8 -

50X1-HUM

25. This old man was quite emotional, but so were practically all of the other persons [redacted] even if they did not possess the dramatic talent of this old Serb. The present regime has created a situation which affects every Yugoslav peasant deeply, spiritually as well as materially. It has brought a combination of privation and oppression which generates a feeling of hatred towards the regime that will be extremely difficult to eradicate, for it transcends nationalistic or patriotic pride. Any appeal to the Yugoslav population to rise in defense of such a regime would be an appeal to perpetuate its own slavery and misery. It is only when the situation is seen in this light that one can understand a Serb when he says: "I am really ashamed to admit it, but I would rather have the Nazis"; or a Croat [redacted] "old Yugoslavia" exclaims, "Would I? And how! A million times better!" There is no hesitation on the part of the Croat peasants as to whether they would prefer the old Yugoslavia to Tito. [redacted] they were not particularly keen on King Peter, they would prefer anyone to Tito. The way one Croat put it in referring to old Yugoslavia in comparison to the present regime, "those were golden times". [redacted]
- [redacted] not one of those persons, excepting the government officials, would vote for Tito if anybody formerly a part of the old regime in Yugoslavia were offered to the Yugoslav people in a really democratic, free election.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

Do the Yugoslav People Differentiate Between Tito and the Regime?

26. A widely propagandized opinion is that the dissatisfaction of the Yugoslav people, and particularly the peasants, is actually directed against local Communist Party officials and not against Tito, who is looked upon as a hero and a great Yugoslav nationalist; that the people hate the regime, but that they admire and respect, if not actually love Tito. This is definitely not true. If this propaganda is believed then it must also be believed that the Yugoslav is too stupid to understand that the low-level officials of his village, especially in a Communist regime, cannot do anything which is not sanctioned or ordained by the hierarchy. It is true, naturally, that some officials with whom the peasants come in direct contact are more brutal than others, and that the peasants realize this; however, the peasants have no illusions as to who makes the policy of which these village officials are the instruments and the peasants the victims. Frequently in conversations regarding the present Yugoslav regime, peasants would remark, "The fish rots from the head."
27. Whether Tito is regarded as a Yugoslav nationalist and a hero may still be a controversial question to the world outside Yugoslavia. [redacted] the majority of the Yugoslav people still regard Tito as a rank Communist whose primary object in fighting World War II was to establish Communism in Yugoslavia, and who, in so doing murdered, imprisoned, tortured and persecuted millions of Yugoslavs. They definitely will never forget that Tito mobilized thousands of youths, especially Serbs, immediately after the liberation of Belgrade, and sent them without training to be butchered in the front lines of the Srem front outside of Belgrade. In fact, the Serbs insist that Tito sent them purposely to be butchered as potential enemies of his regime. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive a vindictive Balkan, his hero-worshipping nature notwithstanding, looking upon his malefactor as a hero, particularly when this malefactor not only has done nothing to atone for his crimes, but even continued with his evil deeds.
28. [redacted] concerning the cooperatives, and referring to Tito's speech at Knezica, wherein Tito admitted that mistakes had been made and that these mistakes would be "amended". The responses of the peasants were always the same: "We are fed up with Communist lies"; or an impatient gesture indicating the same thing; "For years, we hear it everyday: 'It will get better', but instead it gets worse." The peasants

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 9 -

50X1-HUM

impossibility to rely on Tito's promises is pungently expressed by them in this manner: "Tito speaks of one thing, thinks of something else, does still something else, and we (the peasants) come last." With regard to Tito's theory that "Democracy is not a matter of decree, but a question of the consciousness of the citizens. The more consciousness and the fewer enemies of socialism, the more will our democracy grow", if peasants did not dismiss the matter with a shrug of the shoulder, they answered to the effect that (as one peasant put it): "One cannot create any kind of consciousness by force."

Laborers and White-Collar Workers

30. [redacted] the situation among laborers and white-collar workers to be better, although far from satisfactory. They at least were issued "guaranteed-ration" cards which enabled them to obtain a minimum of essential food supplies at the low food prices fixed by the government. However, the fantastically high prices put everything else out of reach for them. Persons entitled to ration cards also received a certain amount of coupons which entitled them to an 80-percent reduction on any merchandise purchased, but the money value of coupons was so small (1,050 dinars every three months) that it made very little difference in their living, since any item worth 1,050 dinars, after the 80 percent reduction (a pair of ordinary shoes, for instance) would "eat up" the entire coupon allowance for three months. An idea of the wages paid may be had from the following example: One individual with a university education, several years of study in Vienna, and business experience is employed in the government export bureaus at 4,000 dinars a month. His wife, an experienced pharmacist with a university degree, who formerly operated her own drugstore, is now employed as a prescription clerk in one of the nationalized drugstores in Belgrade at 4,500 dinars a month, gross salary, before deduction of income tax, social insurance fees, dues to the People's Front, et cetera. 50X1-HUM
31. Army officers constitute a favored class. Some of their privileges have been curtailed, but not all; for instance, they are still given preference in drawing their rations ahead of the rest of the population, an important advantage, considering the frequent shortage of rations. Complaints are frequent relative to the fact that, while other families are allowed only one cubic meter of wood for the entire winter, army officers are allowed one cubic meter a month, whether they need it or not, most of which they sell on the black market. Army officers, particularly those of higher ranks, receive cloth, house furnishings and a number of other commodities which, if they do not use, they sell on the black market. All of these things affect the morale and attitude of the Yugoslav people toward the regime.
32. In connection with the working class [redacted] the laborers are deeply dissatisfied. They feel that, with the exception of much cheaper rents (in itself not an unalloyed blessing inasmuch as they have no choice concerning their place of abode nor of their dwelling partners) they are much worse off than under the former Yugoslav regime, although they must work harder because of the norm system. In addition to this, they are not free agents. 50X1-HUM
33. [redacted] a wedding celebration at a house by the side of the road, a few miles out of Banja Luka, in Bosnia. Food was plentiful, and the guests drank and sang to the accompaniment of an accordion and a guitar. There was high merriment and a convivial company. Since they sang nothing but Tito songs, even to the exclusion of national folk songs, it was obvious that all of those present were politically homogeneous. The accordion player, a truck driver who sang verses satirizing drivers and their trade, [redacted] 50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 10 -

[redacted] They declared that all of the people at the wedding festivities were "partiaci" (Party members), several of them county and community officials. The bridegroom was an official of the Communist Party in Banja Luka, and, of course, the officials were happy. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

Non-Nationalized Artisans

34. One of the small classes in Yugoslavia who have no love for the Tito regime are the "private" artisans, such as shoemakers, tailors, shirt-makers, hairdressers, et cetera. The taxes levied upon them are so exorbitant that they can scarcely eke out an existence; still they refuse to become nationalized. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the shoemaker, [redacted] began to recite the woes of all small shopowners like himself under "this inhuman regime which does not hesitate to drive people into starvation in order to force them into the cooperatives". He said that he could not afford more than one helper, but the more helpers the greater the tax that had to be paid. As it is, he had been forced to sell one of his sewing machines during the previous year in order to pay his taxes, and this year, he expects to have to sell his radio. Nevertheless, he said that there were others who were even worse off than he was. He knew of one colleague who had only one sewing machine and no helper, and had a wife and four children to support. A few months before, he stated, "they descended upon him" for taxes and, as he could not possibly pay the taxes, they took away his machine, his one and only means of livelihood. "How was he going to support his family? They did not care. And now [redacted] "would you blame him if he drew his gun (provided he had one) and shot them all dead? . . . But, we will not join the cooperatives; we will not submit to daily indignities for a chunk of bread." [redacted] a hairdresser who had had a prosperous business before the war, but now both he and his business were indescribably run down. This hairdresser's mood was the same as that of the shoemaker. [redacted] Tito cannot "create a socialist state" in Yugoslavia and get the people to defend it, thus perpetuating it, any more than one can eat his cake and have it too.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

Is the Regime being Democratized?

35. Since Tito's break with the Cominform and since the Western orientation of the Yugoslav regime, efforts have been assertedly made to "democratize" the regime. To this end, a number of laws have been enacted, among which the decentralization law and the new criminal law have been given prominence, as well as a number of executive measures which have been taken. Procedure has been revised with a view to relaxing the controls and easing the pressures employed by the regime to maintain itself and impose its program upon an unwilling people. These efforts have made little impression upon the peasants except in their relations with the Church. The terror under which they have been living may have been slightly mitigated, but it is still there; they are still spied upon and fear to speak their thoughts, and go to jail if they fail to "conform" even if for shorter terms than before. They are still compelled to attend "conferences", though not as rigidly or frequently as before; they are forced to perform "voluntary" labor; they are arrested without warrant; detained without trial; sent to jail by administrative action; et cetera. Consistent with Communist "tradition", laws are still published only to be read, and important pronouncements affecting the lives of the people are still made by important persons only to be heard. The decentralization law, for example, has only made it easier for top-level bureaucrats to evade responsibility; actually it has given no power or right of initiative to the workers or to the executive boards of enterprises. Workers' Councils are still chosen from lists furnished by the Communist Party; executive boards are elected in like manner, and their members

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 11 -

still do as Party representatives direct; and Party representatives themselves still take orders from Party heads. With regard to the new Penal Code. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] In contrast to this there were numerous recent instances where people had been arrested or detained without trial or sent to jail by administrative action.

36. In his speech at Knezica, Tito made reference to the much-advertized admission of Aleksandar Rankovic in his report to the fourth "plenum" of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to the effect that many people had been unjustly prosecuted and jailed or given unjustifiedly severe sentences. Then Tito added, "This demonstrates our tendency and progress toward democratization in our country." Rankovic pointed out, indeed, the indignities perpetrated by the Security Police, according to the people; however, the latter maintain that, since none of those in jail were released, this affirmation on the part of Rankovic can hardly be said to point out any "tendency toward democratization". As further proof that legislation passed by the Communists or premises made by them are of no value, an individual in Belgrade showed [redacted] a new form of summons, recently issued by the UDB "to fool the foreigners". This summons provides for the name and address of the individual summoned, the reason for the summons (whether as a witness or as defendant), the nature of the charge or charges, and also provides a place for the signature of the chief of the UDB station concerned. Altogether, this would be a document showing a "tendency toward democratization" and respect of the rights of individuals, if it were complied with. The summons [redacted] had actually been served on an individual, but it contained nothing more than this person's name and address, the time and the place of his appearance, and several unintelligible curves purporting to be initials in the space provided for the signature, without any title or any other sign to identify the authority issuing the summons. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

[redacted] this was common practice, which showed a tendency not toward democratization in Yugoslavia, but rather away from it. The UDB is still a law unto itself in Yugoslavia.

50X1-HUM

Tito's "Reforms"

37. The foregoing is not to deny that Tito's new attitude toward the West and the subsequent relaxation of the regime's oppressive attitude towards the people have ameliorated the difficult and tense situation in which the great majority of the Yugoslavs have been living since the liberation. It is to emphasize the fact that this amelioration is simply sugar over the pill and that fundamentally, no change has taken place. The Yugoslav people are aware of the situation, although they welcome the relief afforded them by the comparative "de-brutalizing" of the controls and pressures employed by the regime to force its "socialist state" on the people. Certainly, there is nothing in this change to justify the optimism of certain Western [redacted] observers that slowly, but gradually, Tito is moving toward [redacted] socialism or a western-type democracy, and that the Yugoslav people's view of the regime has definitely become at least tolerant, if not quite benevolent.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

Effect of Tito's "Reforms" on the Countryside

38. As indicated earlier, this air of "reform", quite strongly manifest in the cities, is only slightly perceptible in the countryside, except insofar as it affects the Church. [redacted]

[redacted] there was a marked difference in the attitude of the Communists toward the Church; they have not become supporters of the Church, but by comparison to their former attitude, they have become more tolerant. No longer do they resort to terroristic tactics, petty administrative devices, and frequent persecution, to keep the people from going to church or attending to other religious obligations. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 12 -

50X1-HUM

[redacted] the Yugoslav people were certainly pleased relative to the apparent tolerant attitude of Tito and the Communist regime toward the Church, but if there was any such change in the feelings of the people, it was not a perceptible one. In the first place [redacted] the Yugoslav people do not feel any gratitude toward Tito for giving them back something which he had taken away from them by force, and to which they believe they have a right. In the second place the people are convinced Tito was forced [redacted] to be more liberal with them in regard to the Church question.

50X1-HUM

Effect of Tito's "Reforms" in the Cities

39. In Belgrade (and the same was true of Zagreb and Ljubljana) the atmosphere was different. In Belgrade there was a sense of freedom in the air, which according to Belgrade citizens [redacted] contrasted strikingly with the depression which had prevailed up to the middle of 1947. The citizens declared that formerly garish Communist slogans were plastered all over the walls and walks of Belgrade, and strung high over the main streets in the city, displayed in shop windows and all public places. [redacted] pictures of Stalin formerly adorned the entire city, and after the Tito-Cominform break, pictures of Tito were flaunted brazenly and provokingly everywhere. Soldiers used to march in the streets at all hours of the day and night, listlessly singing Tito songs or shouting "democratic" slogans; children would parade through the streets of Belgrade yelling "We are Tito's; Tito is ours!" [redacted] The streets were crowded in the late afternoon and evening, and so were the cafes; the people did not walk along the streets silently, as the Belgrade citizens maintained they had almost from the day of the liberation until about the middle of 1947. The shops were filled with displays and there were crowds in front of every window. [redacted] outwardly this resembled the prewar situation in Belgrade, but that actually prices were so fantastically high that no one could possibly afford to buy anything. [redacted] there was nothing in the outward appearance of things that suggested anything abnormal. Ostensibly, tourists were not followed, and they were free to go wherever they wished and to talk with whomever they pleased.

40. There was nothing in this atmosphere of Belgrade (taking Belgrade as an example of the situation prevailing in all of the larger Yugoslav cities) that suggested a terror-ridden Communist country, and many unobserving tourists, who were content with what they saw or did not bother to "scratch beneath the surface", have been deceived by this atmosphere. In contrast to the actual situation of the permanent residents of Belgrade (not the thousands of Yugoslavs who moved there since the liberation), [redacted]

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 13 -

50X1-HUM

[redacted] To the people of Belgrade (overwhelmingly pro-West in sympathy and political orientation, a sympathy for which they have heretofore been relentlessly persecuted), this change of attitude has correspondingly brought a definite relief reflected in the outward manifestations of normalcy and calm of everyday life. However, it has not radically changed the attitude of the people toward the regime, for it has not essentially changed either the concepts or the aims of the regime's philosophy of a Communist state, nor its methods in trying to achieve such a state. The Tito regime has not ceased to regard and treat the overwhelming majority of the people of Belgrade as "enemies of the regime".

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

41.

42.

[redacted] the city appeared to have changed during the last three or four years, but [redacted] the change was all superficial.

[redacted] there are today 60,000 out-of-towners from Bosnia and the Lika, in Belgrade? They get what they want; they fill the cafes and the streets; they are the representatives of Tito's 'better life'. You do not see many real Belgrade citizens in any of those cafes; they cannot afford it."

50X1-HUM

Student Indoctrination a Failure

43. It was apparent that the regime has made no headway among students in Yugoslavia, particularly among the students in the universities and high schools. Practically all of the university students are obliged to join the Student Front Organization if they wish to continue their studies, and many students simulate belief in Communism, especially those students who must depend on financial aid from the government or government-sponsored organizations to enable them to carry on their studies. However, the vast majority of the students hold steadfastly to their anti-Communist and anti-regime principles.

50X1-HUM

Macedonian Problems

44. The high echelon Macedonian official, already referred to, probably a disillusioned Communist, not only condemned the collectivization policy, but also stressed that even the industrial working population, the supposed "elite" under the Communist system, lived under conditions considerably below the level of prewar industrial workers. Opposition to the regime on the part of the Macedonian population in general is of the same character and intensity as in the rest of Yugoslavia. Macedonia, however, presents other characteristics not to be found elsewhere in Yugoslavia, except perhaps, in a much milder form among the Albanian population of the Kosmet, and which, in case of the Soviet-inspired aggression against Yugoslavia, would undoubtedly add to Tito's weaknesses

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 14 -

to resistance. These are: (1) the latent pro-Bulgarian sentiment and (2) the intensively and apparently studiously cultivated ethnic chauvinism in Macedonia.

50X1-HUM

45.

[redacted] this pro-Bulgarian sentiment, drawing its strength from a cultural and linguistic affinity to Bulgaria, and always strong in Macedonia, was almost extinguished during the last war as a result of the brutality of the Bulgarian occupation. However, since the war, it has been considerably revived, passively but pointedly manifested in the popularity of Bulgarian folklore and folk songs, as a form of reaction against the present regime which is looked upon as worse than the Bulgarian occupation.

46.

The cultivation of Macedonian nationalism is apparent at all levels of Macedonian officialdom and constitutes the principal effort of Macedonian propaganda. It is not the usual "national" recognition (Serb, Croat, Slovene, Montenegrin, et cetera) within the framework of Yugoslav nationalism, sanctioned by Communist philosophy and given expression in Yugoslavia by the policy of "brotherhood and unity". The latter policy is not entirely forgotten in Macedonia, but the laconism with which it is referred to serves only to emphasize the seriousness and intensity with which Macedonian nationalism is propagated. During the annual town festival of Galicnik, [redacted] a gala evening performance at a new movie theater. [redacted] in former days there was no movie theater in the town, and that festivities were held in the town church square, in the streets of the town or in the homes of the various villagers. They would also hold mass weddings on that day, in former times, and the wedding celebrations which were open to everybody went on for a week. On the same day a wedding took place in the town. The church ceremony was followed by an eating and drinking ritual in the churchyard. Various people grumbled that, in former days, the father of a bride in that town would have killed at least a dozen sheep on his daughter's wedding day and the festivities would have continued for an entire week, but that now people had no sheep of their own. The cinema presentation was an exhibition of Communist culture in songs and recitations by selected groups of young people; but was especially significant for the highly Macedonian nationalistic speeches delivered by local officials and guest speakers from Skoplje. In his closing speech, the master of ceremonies made reference to "brotherhood and unity", but it was a transparent effort to eliminate the sting from the chauvinistic harangues of the evening.

50X1-HUM

47.

Perhaps by bestowing its blessing on this "promotion" of Macedonian nationalism, Belgrade takes cognizance of the seriousness of the pro-Bulgarian sentiment and employs this means to counteract it, since, obviously, it is powerless to suppress it. However, this indulgence on the part of the regime toward a nationally minded people is likely to prove a boomerang. It would probably serve as an antidote to pro-Bulgarian sentiment if the regime itself, within which Macedonian nationalism is obliged to exist, offered a benevolent and humane contrast to pro-Bulgarian sentiments. As it is, however, it appears doubtful that the Macedonians will look upon the regime as anything but an inhuman oppressor, and Macedonian nationalism will tend to be identified with pro-Bulgarian sentiment to the detriment of Yugoslav "brotherhood and unity". It is certain that it loosens dangerously the bonds of Yugoslav nationalism, and that it might prove destructive to Yugoslav resistance to aggression from the East, especially if the oppressor should hold out promises of a united and independent Macedonia to a people with an already aroused nationalistic conscience.

Morale of the Yugoslav Army

48.

It is difficult to learn much about the morale of the Yugoslav armed forces. As a matter of fact, since the main elements of army morale are intangible, and since manifestation of these intangibles is rigidly and ruthlessly controlled in the Yugoslav army, it is extremely difficult even among soldiers themselves to gauge accurately each other's morale.

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 15 -

50X1-HUM

If one were to judge by the army's manifest discipline and its outward appearance, one would consider the army morale to be excellent, inasmuch as all of the soldiers seen or met [redacted] looked well clothed and well fed. Yet, many reputedly well-informed Yugoslavs, who were considered "reactionaries", predicted that in the event of attack, the army would not last as long as the Royal Yugoslav Army lasted in 1941. [redacted] while the Yugoslav army leaders are brave and fantastic, they are professionally incompetent. These well-informed Yugoslav "reactionaries" laugh at Koca Popovic as Chief of Staff, and point out that the man who created and led Tito's partisan army during World War II was Arsa Jovanovic, a regular Yugoslav staff officer, who was shot on the Rumanian border soon after the Tito-Cominform break while he was "attempting to escape into Rumania", according to official Yugoslav reports. As an example of the incompetence in the army, these Yugoslavs point to the army's administrative services which they claim are in a state of confusion, aggravated by the quiet but persistent "clever sabotage" of the Cominformists. [redacted]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

49. In Zagreb there is a group of leading citizens, most of them former high-ranking army officers headed by a general, who, out of professional interest, make it their business to follow the development and evolution of the Yugoslav army. They are not an official organization; however, occasionally the members get together and exchange points of view.

[redacted] the present Yugoslav army (with the exception of certain special units) is completely lacking in common motive or moral cohesion, and is kept together only by the force of ruthless discipline. Since the break with the Cominform, an ever-growing state of suspicion has been raising havoc among the officer corps, according to this group. This tendency has been manifested by frequent arrests, and transfers and assignments of officers, who hitherto were considered "leaders", to innocuous instructor jobs.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50. [redacted] some soldiers and young men who completed their terms of compulsory military service [redacted] 50X1-HUM

These persons never volunteered any remarks about army morale or conditions in the service, and when asked how they liked army life, they replied, "I do not know." It was common knowledge that the relentless discipline of the political commissars and the constant surveillance of the UDB officers, made it dangerous for any soldier to try to find out what other soldiers thought about the army. The general feeling appears to be "work and keep quiet". [redacted]

50X1-HUM

[redacted] The soldiers know what is going on back home so how can they be satisfied? [redacted] this statement expressed the feelings of most of the soldiers. 50X1-HUM

United States Prestige

51. The Yugoslav people's attitude toward the United States, always very favorable, is not less so today. They maintain that they do not like the present United States' policy of helping Tito; nevertheless, they understand it and they hope that it may serve to gradually force Tito to grant them a democracy of the western type. The Yugoslav people believe deeply that any "reforms" Tito may have enacted have been imposed upon him by the United States, and no amount of Tito or United States pronouncements to the contrary will make them believe otherwise. A professor at one of the Yugoslav universities is said to have made the remark that the more Tito gets from the United States, the more concessions he will be forced to make and as a result, that will accelerate the end of

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 16 -

50X1-HUM

of Communism in Yugoslavia. Naturally, this is the feeling and attitude of the anti-Communist Population in Yugoslavia.

52. The attitude of the Communists toward the United States, on the other hand, although it appeared to be by far more tolerant and even more accommodating than ever before, is hardly a friendly attitude; it might be described as a correct but cautious attitude. In Prizen, an American tourist was arrested on a market day for taking pictures of peasants but was later released. In many places in Yugoslavia, although not in the cities,

50X1-HUM

Albanian Refugee - Yugoslav Relations

53. The Yugoslav authorities are in close contact with the Albanian refugees in the Kosmet through the Albanian Refugee Committee, which is sponsored and financed by the Yugoslavs and functions under their indirect supervision. This committee is engaged in welfare activities among the estimated five or six thousand Albanian refugees in the Kosmet. It is not conducting military training of refugees, nor is it apparently involved in any military activities or clandestine operations, except for running couriers into Albania for the "ex-filtration" of local leaders of similar political orientation.

ConclusionStability of the Tito Regime

54. The stability of Tito and his regime does not seem to be in danger; nevertheless, since this stability is not the product of popular support, but is dependent entirely upon force, it cannot be regarded as of permanent duration. Its continuity depends upon the continuity of Tito's control of the Yugoslav armed forces, which actually means, control of the officer corps of those forces. Contrary opinions notwithstanding, the person of Tito is paramount to this control; hence, any jeopardy to Tito's life places in jeopardy the stability of the regime.

Yugoslav Cominformism: Its Strength and Effect

55. Yugoslav pro-Cominform Communists, while of much greater strength than commonly believed, are apparently well under control and of no danger to the stability of the regime. However, they are a disorganizing influence in all branches of administration, and furthermore, they constitute a threat to Tito's life. In the event of military emergency, they definitely have the potential to become a serious menace to the unity and effectiveness of the Yugoslav armed forces.

The Yugoslav People would not Support Tito to Fight Aggression

50X1-HUM

56. The overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav people are not disposed to support Tito to resist aggression.

attitude of the people in general is confirmed by leaders of the opposition in Yugoslavia: August Kosutic; Milan Grol; Ivan Subasic; Juarj Sutej; Kosta Kostic (Serb Agrarian Party of Dr. Milan Gavrilovic); Milorad Belic (Socialist Party of Dr. Zivko Topatovic), and a number of other lesser luminaries.

this 50X1-HUM

these leaders are assured that the Yugoslav people are not going to get killed to support Tito; if they fight at all, they will fight Communism wherever they find it. Some of the stated leaders of

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 17 -

50X1-HUM

the opposition have been known to be very emphatic on this subject. Remarks were made on several occasions to the effect that if the American people think the Yugoslav people are going to fight for Tito, they are tragically mistaken.

Yugoslav Resistance Potential

57. Assuming that under no circumstances will Tito abandon Communism in order to obtain the willing support of the Yugoslav people, the potential of Yugoslav resistance to Soviet-inspired aggression must be viewed in the light of two contingencies: (a) Tito's ability to maintain an organized and cohesive front without being compelled to give up the greater part of Yugoslav territory; and (b) his reduction to guerrilla warfare.
58. In the first instance he would be in a position to control the movements of the people as well as of the soldiers, and his resistance potential would be proportionate to his ability to commandeer their support. It is apparent that this would not be an easy task; infinitely more difficult than during World War II. In any case, it would be a support imposed by coercion, and the resultant potential would have to be evaluated on that basis. In the second instance, Tito would be forced to depend to a very great extent on the willing support of the Yugoslav people; this would be practically nil, and as a consequence, his resistance potential would also be practically nil.
59. However, there is a third contingency: one in which the United States would actively support Tito to resist aggression. This would have a decisive impact on the reaction of the Yugoslav people. They would fight resolutely with Tito if the United States action carried with it the promise that preservation of Yugoslav independence would also bring liberation from Communist tyranny and the establishment of western democracy in Yugoslavia. If, on the other hand, the United States' action failed to carry any such promise, it would result in the alienation of United States' prestige in Yugoslavia and the further stiffening of the Yugoslav people's attitude against Tito. Indeed, this would make Tito a heavy liability instead of an asset to the United States.

United States Prestige in Yugoslavia

60. Except in the circumstance of alienation of United States' prestige in Yugoslavia as described in the preceding paragraph, the United States can count upon the loyalty of the anti-Communist element of the Yugoslav people. However, the attitude of the Communist elements of the Yugoslav people toward the United States, if not completely hostile as in the case of the pro-Cominform Communists, is to say the least, extremely doubtful. This situation, in addition to a number of other indications already mentioned, is particularly borne out by the fact that political indoctrination in the Yugoslav Army, as well as throughout the country, where it is accomplished through various "conferences", although violently anti-Soviet and anti-Satellite, is pointedly reserved toward the United States, if not latently hostile.

Special Macedonian Dangers

61. In Macedonia, a rampant ethnical chauvinism, apparently sanctioned by Belgrade, loosens dangerously the bonds of Yugoslav nationalism; and, coupled with a considerable underground pro-Bulgarian sentiment, would constitute an additional danger to Yugoslav resistance efforts of a Soviet-inspired aggression, particularly if the aggressor should hold out promises of an independent Macedonia to a people already worked up to a high pitch of Macedonian nationalism.

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

50X1-HUM

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 18 -

Albanian Problem in the Kosmet

62. The situation among the Albanian population of the Kosmet has elements of similarity to the situation in Macedonia, although in a form not nearly as acute. The main difference lies in the fact that the Albanians could not be given promises of independence but only union with the Albania of Enver Hoxha, which for them would be jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. The Kosmet situation, would on the other hand, become very serious for Tito's defense efforts if, in the meantime, Albania were liberated from the Communist yoke.

Yugoslav Exploitation of Albanian Refugees

63. Yugoslav close connection with and financial support given to Albanian refugees, although apparently innocuous and of no political or military significance at the moment, is a clear sign of Yugoslav interest in Albania, and preparatory to such action as may promote Yugoslav designs in Albania when appropriate circumstances are created or an opportunity presents itself.

Yugoslav Army Morale

64. With respect to the morale of the present Yugoslav army, if the officers are able to show good leadership and loyalty to Tito, the army will be able to give a good account of itself, though it will not fight with enthusiasm. Judging from the reaction of the soldiers to the regime (a reaction which is aggravated by the tyrannical discipline imposed upon them and by the brutal treatment received by their families at home), the morale of the soldiers cannot be good; and unless their officers are sufficiently competent and able to hold their men together, the consequences may be disastrous for Tito and the present regime as well as for Yugoslavia.
65. The hatred of the anti-Communist Yugoslav population toward Tito and the regime is apparently extremely profound, and their attitude toward Tito and the regime will not be changed by any superficial or even substantial administrative changes, least of all by force. The only thing that would change the attitude of the people and revive their morale is a complete change from the present Communist dictatorship.

SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY