

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1 REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

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
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
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25X1 **HUNGARY**

25X1 1. As long as the Hungarian Government was not entirely under Communist control, the Czech Communist Party favored and put into effect a policy prescribing that all Hungarians would be evacuated from Slovak territory either into the interior of Bohemia-Moravia or into Hungary in a population exchange against Slovaks residing in Hungary. The excellent soil of the region was to be given to Slovaks and territorial transfers would not be considered as a matter of principle. In the course of this program, approximately 30,000 Hungarians were transferred to Bohemia and many thousands of others sent to Hungary. Early in 1947, upon protest from the Hungarian Communist Party, the transfers into the interior were stopped, although those already evacuated were not allowed to return to their former homes. As a pressure argument, the Hungarians used the threat that the population exchange of Hungarians vs. Slovaks would be stopped if deportations to the interior continued.

2. After the Communist Party took over full control in Hungary, RAKOSI, in the late summer of 1947, paid GOTTWALD a secret visit, which was arranged through CP channels. RAKOSI reopened the territorial problem, using especially the argument that the Hungarian Communist Party, being weaker than the Czech Communist Party, was more in need of a national-type success than the Czechs. Areas inhabited by a majority of Hungarians should, therefore, be returned to Hungary. At the same time, autonomy should be granted to Hungarians remaining in Slovakia. The whole arrangement should be embodied in a Hungarian-Czechoslovak friendship treaty.

3. After RAKOSI's departure, the Hungarian problem was discussed by the inner circle of the Communist Party. The definite result of these discussions was that the principle of Czech territorial integrity was given up and that territorial concessions to Hungary were envisaged. At the same time, the plan to transfer all Hungarians out of the border regions was also given up. In an unmentioned reason for these concessions [redacted] is that RAKOSI's influence in Moscow is greater than GOTTWALD'S.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 2 -

25X1 4. [redacted] At the end of
25X1 February [redacted] a friendship treaty with Hungary,
25X1 based on the above points, was definitely coming, now that the Communists
had exclusive power. [redacted] this event will still take place
during 1948.

5. Incidentally, the Czech Communist Party wanted IIIAa to monitor RAKOSI's
hotel room during his visit to Prague. The equipment of the Technical
Section, however, was found to be insufficient.

POLAND

25X1 6. The Polish-Czech friendship treaty provides that the territorial problem is
to be solved within a two-year period. [redacted] no concrete information
on Czech-Polish negotiations concerning the Tesin problem but believes, from
analogy with the Communist Party's stand on the Hungarian territorial problem,
that territorial adjustments in Poland's favor are likely to be made before
the two-year period expires. The Polish argument in favor of these adjustments
again is that the Polish Communist Party is more in need of a foreign political
success than the better entrenched Czech Communist Party.

LUZICE (LAUSITZ)

7. The movement to detach the Lausitz area from Germany and incorporate it into
Czechoslovakia was taken seriously only to a limited extent by the Czech
Government in 1946. Its chief promoter was Josef DAVID, Chairman of the Czech
Parliament. Motivated by a desire to escape Russian administration, the
Lausitz-German leaders of the annexation movement approached the Foreign Min-
istry in Prague for material assistance, such as food and textiles, in 1946;
some of their requests were granted.

8. Early in 1947 the Lausitz movement had anti-Russian leaflets printed in
Liberec, Czechoslovakia, which were distributed in Germany. Thereupon, the
Russians drew the attention of General DASTICH of the Czech Military Mission
in Berlin to the fact that they were not interested in having the Lausitz
movement continue.

25X1 9. After this, the Czechs lost interest in the annexation of the Lausitz area,
and discontinued the material assistance to the movement's leaders. The move-
ment continued to play a small political role, as the Czechs used it to dis-
courage the Poles from asking for more than a minimum of the Tesin area by
appearing, in turn, to renounce their claims on the Lausitz area. A small
club and information office of the movement still existed in February 1948,
[redacted] These activities were tolerated but not supported
by the Ministry of the Interior.

25X1 10. The movement to annex the Lausitz area was essentially promoted by Germans
who disliked living under Russian rule. [redacted] the desire to unite 25X1
their area with Czechoslovakia ceased when that country was taken over by the 25X1
Communist Party.

CARPATHO-UKRAINE

11. [redacted]

12. Throughout the war the Carpatho-Ukraine was represented in the Czechoslovak
State Council in London by Ivan PETRUSAK of Uzhorod. There was no hint until
the area was liberated by Russian troops that the Soviet Union planned to in-
corporate the Carpatho-Ukraine into its territory.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 3 -

13. When the Germans were driven out of part of the Carpatho-Ukraine, a Czechoslovak delegation, headed by Minister of Social Welfare Frantisek NEMEC, went to Chust in the Carpatho-Ukraine to take over the administration of the liberated area. NEMEC was accompanied by the Communist Member of Parliament, Josef VALO, and by Ervin POLAK of the Ministry of the Interior. At the end of 1944 they were joined there by PETRUSCAK.
14. This delegation, including its Communist members, was greatly surprised to find that Ivan TURJANICA, a prewar Communist Party secretary in Mukacevo, Carpatho-Ukraine, and a member of the Czechoslovak Brigade in Russia, had instructions differing from theirs. He told the Czech delegation that the people of the Carpatho-Ukraine were united in their wish to join the Soviet Union. When the NEMEC delegation refused to yield to his pressure, they found themselves under arrest for several hours.
15. After heated discussions with TURJANICA, the whole NEMEC delegation at about the turn of 1944/45 traveled to Moscow to see MOLOTOV. The interview was a brief one; MOLOTOV told the delegation that the will of the people had to be respected. The delegates then found that Klement GOTTWALD had only just been informed of the cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Soviet Russia, and had had no opportunity to instruct VALO and POLAK accordingly.
16. The London Government was considerably upset by these developments but had no alternative but to give in. The treaty was negotiated and signed by MOLOTOV, Prime Minister FIERLINGER, and possibly other Czech officials. [redacted] there existed no prior agreement on the cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine, either within the Communist Party or with members of the Czech Government.
17. The treaty of cession stipulated that Czechs and Slovaks and those Ukrainians who had fought with the Czech Army during the war would have the right to opt for Czech citizenship. Other Ukrainians and the Hungarians had no such right. Those who opted for Czech citizenship, after their option had been approved by the Russians, would be entitled to move to Czechoslovakia.
18. [redacted] Negotiations for the Russians were carried on by officials of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic into which the territory was incorporated. At one point during the negotiations, the Ukrainians asked the Czechs to evacuate [redacted] Jews [redacted] along with the Czechs and Slovaks. [redacted] approximately 15,000 Czechs and Slovaks opted for Czech citizenship and should have been allowed to leave for Czechoslovakia proper. However, only about 4,500 were given permission to go.
19. When the territory was turned over to Soviet Russia, the borders were immediately sealed; approximately 150 Czechoslovak nationals residing elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and equipped with valid Czech travel documents, found themselves trapped in the Carpatho-Ukraine. Steps were undertaken through the CP to allow them to return to Czechoslovakia, but [redacted] they never succeeded. The Russians argued that anyone who desired to leave Russian territory was a priori an enemy of the Soviet Union; and that the only place for enemies of the Soviet Union was inside the Soviet Union.

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