JUSTIFICATION FOR PPC TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

1. There are three principal elements in the PPC Staff -- the Office of the Chief, the Strategy and Policy Group, and the Program Coordination Group. This breakdown is actually more theoretical than real, but it meets the administrative requirements incident to the processing of T/O's. In actuality, there is a great deal of interchangeability and mutuality of interest between all three elements and there is a continual effort to utilize the background and ingenuity of any individual in the shop who has something to contribute to the solution of a problem.

Office of the Chief

2. Unless there is some argument about the functional statements as presented, the duties of the Chief seem to be fairly clear and those of the Deputy equally so. Between the Chief and the Deputy, arrangements are made for coverage of external as well as internal meetings and conferences both in and out of Washington. In addition, the Deputy spends as much of his time as necessary with the Strategy and Policy Group or the Program Coordination Group and blends the efforts of these two elements on joint problems. The Administrative Officer and the Secretary in the Office of the Chief are required not only for secretarial work, but to conduct the routine administrative tasks, in which connection the Administrative Officer is in effect an executive assistant to PPC so that the Deputy is free to concern himself with substantive rather than administrative matters.

Strategy and Policy Group

3. The principal reason for the existence of this element is to harness the efforts of the various staff elements of the covert offices to the same framework of strategy and policy so that the different staffs and areas are not running off in diverse directions. There is much risk in a situation where there is inadequate time for thorough coordination where security considerations tend to reduce the amount of staff coordination carried out and where the absence of a broad national strategy leaves excessive leeway in the selection of methods, techniques, interim objectives, programs, and projects. It has become increasingly clear that this staff element must develop the strategic planning assumptions which will serve as a basis for both cold and hot war planning of all elements within the DD/P Staff. In addition, it must give guidance as to whether certain contemplated actions are within policy. It maintains the NSC files within the DD/P Staff and from these and the results of the consultants' meetings and other high level conferences and liaison conducted in Washington, maintains on a continuing and current basis the DD/P Policy Book which is a compendium of all existing policy guidance broken down both by function and by area.

4. As to staffing requirements, three key individuals and two secretaries will be needed. Of the three people, the Chief will be

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responsible for reading and appraising all documents which have or may have strategic or policy implications. This will include NSC papers, staff studies, intelligence reports, minutes of important conferences such as the consultants' meetings, and cable material. He will deal with such members of the DD/P Staff as necessary on any important implications of this nature. He will also insure that where modifications in strategy and policy are indicated, action be taken by the necessary authorities to achieve such modification. As required by DD/P, he will engage in the review of certain 10/2 activities to insure consonance with policy and proper strategic orientation. This responsibility requires an individual of the broadest possible background and with a thorough knowledge of all matters in the government affecting the covert missions of CIA. He will be supported by two individuals -- one an individual with considerable staff and operating experience who is constantly striving to find new strategical techniques for the better achievement of the covert mission and for conducting the necessary liaison in the government toward the development of new or improved strategy. The other individual will be in charge of the NSC files and the DD/P Policy Book and it will be his continuing responsibility to maintain this Policy Book up-to-date in the light of day-to-day developments and as directed by the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group. Two secretaries will be required for this part of the organization since the task of maintaining the NSC files and keeping the Policy Book current is one which requires considerable clerical support and is sufficient to warrant the use of one full-time clerk stenographer.

Program Coordination Group

5. The establishment of the Program Coordination Group activates what is perhaps the most essential and important item in the entire 15 July 1952 reorganization -- that of a staff element whereby DD/P can coordinate and balance the planning efforts of the covert staff elements and one whereby the logistical and support preparations of the overt staff elements of CIA can be tied together therewith. The basis for this requirement is discussed in the following paragraphs.

6. Because of the relative youth of the 10/2 organizations within CIA, including the 10/2 work of the area divisions, the covert operations under 10/2 have developed more or less like topsy; i.e., each area division has done what seemed to be best looking at the picture from the standpoint of that area alone. In this way, toward the end of FY 1952, there were over ███ Opc active projects -- yet the sum total of these ███ projects was by no means a coordinated effort nor was the impact of these operations simultaneous or even necessarily mutually supporting. In many cases, serious conflicts were found to exist. In others, conflicts were found between the requirements of the 10/2 mission and the NSCID 5 mission. The reason for all this was a simple one; i.e., that there was no staff element which could devote itself to the careful fitting of the diverse requirements of these activities into a logical pattern and no procedure whereby this could be done.

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7. In addition, the lack of a programming machinery for the overall covert effort created a situation whereby the central support offices of CIA did not receive estimated requirements sufficiently in advance to provide the resources necessary to conduct operations, nor were they equipped to evaluate and assess priorities to the various requests that were submitted. Yet, it is incontrovertible that when there are not enough resources to go around, some machinery must exist for the fixing of priorities. Finally, because there was no overall program but simply a miscellany of projects, it was not clear to the central support officers what load would be imposed upon them as a result of the contemplated 10/2 operations. For this reason, at various times during the past two years, the recruiting machinery, the security clearance machinery, the training machinery, the procurement machinery, the transportation machinery, and the audit machinery has been completely swamped because these elements of CIA had not been in a position to assess the demands that were to be made upon them.

8. These deficiencies have by no means been corrected and all continue to exist in one form or another. On the other hand, no question has been raised in any of the discussions leading up to the present reorganization that what was needed was a system whereby 10/2 as well as NSCID 5 operations could be planned against the framework of a coordinated world-wide plan; whereby the planning that was done could be reviewed for consistency and timing; whereby the support requirements of all types which were generated by these plans could be reviewed and checked to insure that they were not exorbitant or excessive (and, as a result of this check, plans readjusted well in advance so that the requirements would be realistic); whereby the resulting requirements could be delivered to the procurement elements of CIA and in turn to the Department of Defense sufficiently in advance for orderly development of budgets to insure that adequate funds would be available when needed; and whereby final revision and cutback of plans could be made as budgetary developments tended to reduce available resources. These, in short, are the missing items which can only be supplied by a program coordination group. It will be noted that a group of this type can furnish as important a service to DD/A and the central administrative offices as to DD/P since it involves not only the balancing of the operational programs, but the balancing of the support requirements generated by these programs.

9. In addition to the above basis for such machinery, consideration must be given to the question of decentralization to the field. It is clearly the intent of the Director that this decentralization should proceed as rapidly as the administrative capability is developed to manage such an organization from Washington. Quite obviously, there can be no decentralization without a comprehensive, consistent, realistic, and balanced program. Once the machinery is established for the development of this program, decentralization can take place with relative ease.

10. As to staffing requirements, a minimum of three individuals will be necessary to develop this system to coordinate the development of the necessary directives, formats, etc. to review the key planning, programming, requirements estimation, and budget documents which are generated as a result of this system and to insure realism, consistency, and balance. To date, there has never existed in CIA a staff element for conducting this review. As an example of the magnitude of the task involved, all drafts of procedural directives require coordination at 35 different points within the Agency -- long and detailed discussion and negotiation being required in all cases. The Chief of the Program Coordination Group must be an individual of considerable background and experience in procedural analysis, with particular reference to governmental procedures as well as those in the civilian organizations with which the government must deal. He must have a good general background in strategic planning and the general situation as to the national cold war strategy. He must be well versed in logistical support requirements development in its broadest sense so as to assess correctly the mutual interaction of strategy and logistics. He must have the maturity and patience necessary to conduct long and detailed negotiations with many different staff elements both in the overt and covert offices. He must be supported by at least two individuals, of which at least one must have considerable military background and experience in military and operational planning and programming as well as intelligence matters in general. His other assistant should have considerable background in facilities planning. Among the three key personnel in this element, there must be considerable knowledge of governmental budget programming procedures. Since the development and coordination of the procedures necessary to effect sound and adequate programming will require a very large amount of drafting and redrafting of directives and negotiation on these directives as well as formats and drafts of plans, two secretaries will be required to support the efforts of the key staff officers in this group.

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATION	GENERAL FUNCTION (S)		DOC DATE CLASS S
			Staffing	
HQ	PPC	DDP	T/O	23 Oct 52
			Personnel	24 Oct 52
			Function	
			Organization	

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IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT

Memo from C/PPC to DDP. Subject: PPC Staffing Requirements
Memo from COPS to C/ADMIN, same subject.

ABSTRACT NOTATION REFERENCES

Detailed discussion of the staffing requirements for PPC and
C/OPS approval.

(also see: HS/CSG-743, 750, 1578, and 1668)

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