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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 3984

Date Received SA _____

To	Room No.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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1. <i>S</i> FIR	10	DEC	1957	<i>fu</i>	7 GW <u>did</u> rec.
2. <i>AC/SE</i>		12	Dec.	✓	This copy sent to Mr. Wisner @ his request. <i>Polzo</i>
3. <i>SE/CFI</i>				<i>fu</i>	
4. <i>SE/CPD</i>				<i>fu</i>	
5. <i>SE/YA</i> KT				<i>fu</i>	
6.		BS		<i>fu</i>	Contents of this document not to be revealed outside O/OT Washington.
7.		PA		<i>fu</i>	
8.		<i>fu</i>			<u>Crash</u>
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URGENT TELEGRAM

Department of State

39

SECRET

Action

Control: 3976

EUR

FROM: Belgrade

Rec'd:

December 6, 1957

Info

6:22 p.m.

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

COPY TO:

SS

NO: 934, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

DDIP
ADDP/P
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4. Referring to President's remarks on recognition of East Germany, Tito said he wished to clarify certain points. His action was not hasty or ill-considered and had been in the air for over a year. It would have been done sooner had it not been for Soviet attacks early in 1957 against Yugoslavia. It was not planned as move to make things more difficult for Adenauer nor, as had been suggested in Western press, result of deal between him and Khrushchev. It represented logical continuation of independent foreign policy based upon principles long enunciated. Until recognition was accorded Yugoslavia could not have free hand in its relations with East European states and its influence would diminish. He would ask us to realize that it was logical development given Yugoslavia's middle position and should be accepted as based upon principle that way must be found to settle great issues between blocs. I inquired if these principles implied that Yugoslav recognition could therefore be expected of other divided countries such as Korea, China and Indo-China, if his principles implied acceptance of situations of fact followed by attempts to final solution. Tito got out of that query, with some help from Foreign Secretary, by somewhat rambling reply to general effect recognition of East Germany was decided on its merits alone and represented "positive" step. Yugoslav decision was based on its own appraisal and recognition of other countries would have to be similarly decided as Yugoslavia did not want to "subordinate its foreign policy to bloc considerations" (whatever that may mean).

5. In seeking further clarification of Yugoslav position

vis-a-vis

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1-11, 13 AUG. 1957

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-2- 934, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) from Belgrade

vis-a-vis US and USSR, following emerged. When I commented upon increasingly hard line of Soviet policy (Gromyko press conference, note on N.E. to US and declarations at launching of satellite), Tito said he is convinced present Soviet declarations do not represent long-term intentions. He said West should not react so sharply to Soviet declarations and remarked some of our Generals indulged in bellicose speeches as well. We should by now be accustomed to sharp speeches and not become too alarmed. I recalled that circumstances should not be overlooked when aggressive declarations were made, attended as they were by fall of Zhukov. Tito replied he was convinced Zhukov's fall was not result of foreign policy considerations but was purely internal. I asked him how he interpreted removal of Zhukov to which he replied it was internal matter and therefore he could not properly comment. He would say, however, that West should deal "with whole complex of Soviet policies" and not worry too much about personalities. I said given type of government in USSR this was not so simple as our experience with violated agreements fully demonstrated. Tito did not deny this but said he was still convinced process of liberalization in Soviet Union will continue. Russian people expect and await such development and pressure for it will continue. It would be wrong to assume that Soviet foreign policy is purely matter of internal developments and personalities. It represents foreign policy of powerful Socialist country developed as result of many interests.

RIDDLEBERGER

VH:HC/7

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

39
Action

Control: 4052
Rec'd: December 6, 1957
9:35 p.m.

S/S

EUR FROM: Belgrade
Info TO: Secretary of State

RMR NO: 934, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

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6. I said we had possibly seen reflection of this in recent party declaration in Moscow which, however, seemed to repudiate some earlier postulates embodied in Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and Moscow Declaration of 1956 which Tito had signed. Tito said anyone who read recent Party Manifesto in Moscow could readily see why Yugoslav delegation had not signed. Too many conclusions, however, should not be drawn from speculation in Western press. Yugoslavia stuck to positions it had enunciated although it was clear from Party Manifesto that there were differences of principle between it and USSR. Perspectives for Yugoslavia are somber, Tito said, caught as it is between two blocs. He thought basic principles of Yugoslav foreign policy, seeking as it does a relaxation of tension, were right. Failure to make progress on disarmament was discouraging. Had West shown more confidence in Khrushchev earlier things might have been different. He thought present international situation was extremely dangerous and hoped West would make renewed efforts to reach agreement with USSR. Yugoslavia would continue to work for solution on basis of its independent judgment and will continue its efforts to have good relations with both blocs. CP Manifesto should not be over-dramatized and it will take time for process in Soviet Union to become manifest.

7. Returning to question of US-Yugoslav relations Tito said he hoped economic relations could continue as before. He recalled hope he expressed last year that eventually he could get away from grants and more toward credit and loan basis. He said Yugoslav Government intends to do everything it

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-2- 934, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE) from Belgrade

can to intensify agricultural production so that it will not perpetually ask for grant aid. He was hopeful that within several years our economic relations would be on an expanded but altered basis which would make it easier for both.

8. Comment and recommendations will follow shortly.

RIDDLEBERGER

VH:OES/10

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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EURControl: 4554
Rec'd: December 8, 1957
10:35 a.m.Info
RMRFROM: Belgrade
TO: Secretary of StateSS
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NO: 938, December 8, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

1. It seems clear from Tito interview that faced with possible loss all aid from United States as result alignment Yugoslav policy with Soviet, Yugoslav Government prefers to jettison military aid in probable hope of salvaging economic assistance. As I reported when in Washington, Yugoslav interest in military aid has obviously been declining since their refusal to discuss further military aid following our offer last year. Also, there can be no doubt that termination of this military relationship fits in with Yugoslav present policy and attitude toward blocs. While I should not be inclined to jump to conclusion that Tito's decision implies an imminent military relationship with USSR, I should anticipate that in future Yugoslav Government will try to make purchases of equipment from both sides of the curtain and probably seek patent rights to manufacture. As so much of heavy equipment is American, I foresee real maintenance problems eventually for Yugoslav military. Another element Tito decision was most likely declining importance of aircraft in age of missiles. I imagine Tito rightly regarded his chances of acquiring either guided missiles or atomic weapons from US more than remote. It was evident from our interview that Tito is not now prepared to recede on any foreign policy points to which we take exception, whatever may be his personal disquiet at course of events following Zhukov visit and recognition of East Germany. This is not type of regime that cares admit mistakes.

2. By giving up military aid Tito simultaneously improves his relationship with Soviets who no doubt have been charging him with inconsistency in maintaining this relationship while proclaiming his distaste for bloc. If he were convinced that military aid has at best short expectation of life, he may as well give it up and take political credit. It also saves his

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-2-938, December 8, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Belgrade

saves his vanity from a possible cut off by US and helps him maintain his middle position between east and west. Yugoslav refusal to sign party declaration in Moscow is now balanced by breaking off military relationship with United States.

3. Course of events here yesterday gives every indication recent moves were carefully planned and contained some elements of outright deceit. At conclusion of interview at Brioni Foreign Secretary took me aside and emphasized again proposal for discontinuance of military aid should be kept secret until two governments had opportunity to work out procedures (paragraph 3, EMBTEL 934). By late yesterday every correspondent in Belgrade had story and three of them told me it had come from Yugoslav sources. Story in LE MONDE was telephoned from Belgrade to Paris by Yugoslav correspondent. By late last night story had expanded to include renunciation all aid with no denial from Yugoslav Government. Believe it abundantly clear there was planned leak to offset issuance Central Committee communique on Moscow declaration (reported separately). In these circumstances suggest we may want to make some statement to general effect that various aid relationships with Yugoslavia are now being examined by both governments with view to termination. This will leave question economic aid wide open and as we are under no pressure to negotiate new public law 480 agreement it will give time to assess real meaning of December 7 events and speeches at Brioni.

RIDDLEBERGER

SW:JAK-4

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Rec'd: December 8, 1957
12:49 p.m.

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FROM: Belgrade
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 938, December 8, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

4. In view Tito's statements and surrounding circumstances I believe Yugoslav decision on military aid is definitive and final and this phase of our relationship is concluded. Decision will in some respects ease congressional problems re Yugoslavia if future aid relationships are confined effectively to public law 480 agreements which must be negotiated annually. As there are usually no commitments extending beyond six or seven months, we can then determine if Yugoslav policy retains sufficient measure of independence for us to accord support. There may still be some political value for west in giving limited economic support sufficient to enable Tito to avoid complete dependence on Moscow. Differences between Belgrade and Kremlin are in my opinion still sufficiently important to justify hope of profitable exploitation through carefully controlled and short-term economic aid arrangements provided such assistance does not jeopardize most important requests to Congress. Furthermore, some economic aid may serve to prevent development of any extensive military relationship between Belgrade and Moscow.

5. Termination military assistance will give rise to number of problems, particularly given some provisions of bilateral agreement and our rights thereunder. We are studying them now with view to recommendations. Assuming there are certain advantages for us in maintaining western orientation Yugoslav military establishment and supply (insofar* we should prefer Yugoslavs to be dependent on US rather than Soviets for spare parts, etc.) I purposely injected "technical questions" involved in termination in case we decided upon continuation some form of assistance for spare parts. I believe however that Yugoslav will insist upon fairly rapid withdrawal of AMAS and believe we should plan accordingly. I assume all military shipments will shortly be suspended.

6. It

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PAGE TWO OF TWO

It would be helpful if I could have prompt indication how Department will deal with publicity to assist me with press and colleagues here. I am naturally besieged with inquiries and in view publicity given by Yugoslav Government see little point in continuing non-committal attitude.

RIDDLEBERGER

SW/HSO/6

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