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HISTORY  
OF THE  
SI REPORTING BOARD

1 December 1944

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HS/CSG-1468

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

Destroy only with consent  
of the Historical Staff

Name:   
Date: 27 JAN 1969  
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28 Feb 68

TO: CS Historical Staff

From: [redacted]

This document was unearthed in FI/INT/RC files and [redacted] gave it to me for retention. It should be made a permanent record, maybe counted as an historical paper. [redacted] knows about it and would like to see it. Two more copies remain in [redacted] files.

[redacted] thinks that he probably wrote this paper, and it would have been his ~~main~~ logical function at the time to do so. Some of it certainly reflects his style of writing. I have some recollection--- rather vague---about its compilation. I think several of us---including [redacted] and me---worked on parts of it and Lester pulled the whole thing together.

I have clipped to the last page a reconstruction of the persons who held the positions on the chart. This was checked with [redacted] who verified the names I could remember and supplied some additional ones. It was also checked with [redacted]. [redacted] is probably the best source of the missing names. She has retired (twice---most recently from a contract) but is still in town.

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## HISTORY OF THE SI REPORTING BOARD

### I

#### General Reflections

The SI Reporting Board in Washington and in the field offices performs functions which are the logical results of needs which were foreseen in some measure at the time of its founding and also of needs which developed from the expansion of SI activity. As the Reporting Board now exists its functional services to SI are two:

1. To process, to evaluate and to disseminate all intelligence procured by SI activity in the field;
2. To advise the SI operational desks of an expressed or presumptive need for the acquisition of specific intelligence.

Processing involves the editing of documents into proper form by the suppression of operational material, which might endanger the security of an agent, by the elimination of duplicate reports and of intelligence which has become outdated or is patently false.


Evaluation involves the creation of complete files on all SI intelligence received against which the reports officer can check the degree of reliability of any statement of fact and the established reliability of source. The Reporting Board has the right to request an opinion of

evaluation on statements of fact from the R&A Branch, and in cases where special information becomes necessary, the Reporting Board tries to obtain information pertinent to the final evaluation from all OSS Branches or the other Government agencies.

Dissemination involves the actual printing and distributing of intelligence in its processed form to the proper recipients and the establishment of sufficient liaison with these recipients to enable the Reporting Board to channel to them such intelligence as they may require.

Directed Intelligence involves the reception by the Reporting Board of such requests from Government agencies and departments as can be channeled to the field and to suggest to the operational SI desks the procurement of such intelligence as would fill the needs indicated by a study of intelligence records.

The performance of these Reporting Board functions necessitates the closest collaboration between its reports officers and the appropriate SI desks so that the security of SI agents and the credit due to SI documents may be maintained.



It is obvious upon reflection that this Reporting Board activity as it has developed and is at present exercised is divided into two overall types of work:

1. The actual physical reproduction of the reports for dissemination and transmittal to various agencies with all the clerical, printing and administrative work involved;
2. The more intellectual work which determines the evaluation of the intelligence or suggests the direction which future intelligence should take.

Since the early days of SI when it became clear that a separate section of SI would have to handle the reports obtained from the field, the Reporting Board has constantly had four overall objectives in the maintenance and pursuit of which recurrent difficulties have been met. The Board, however, has at all times instinctively or deliberately asserted the value of these objectives. They are:

1. Control over all disseminations of SI material in respect to form and recipient;
2. Production-line processing of these disseminations;

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3. True evaluation;
4. Directed intelligence.

In the course of its history, then, the Reporting Board has made its decisions and formed its policy with these four ideal objectives in view. Objective 2 is naturally a variable factor with reference to Objective 3, and the maintenance of the best balance possible between these two has been a constant purpose. Objectives 1 and 4 also have a common variable relationship since direction of future intelligence is impossible if intelligence, which has already been received, has not been submitted to the Board and has not in turn reached the customers who need it.

The early period of the Board extends from its founding in Washington to the time of the creation of reports offices in the field. This field activity divides the history of the Reporting Board into its two great parts. In the first period, the Reporting Board was founded, gradually adopted its policies, as the needs appeared, and expanded to meet them. At the end of this phase, however, the flow of reports became so enormous and reporting problems so intricately involved in the field that decentralization from Washington became necessary and the later and mature phase of Reporting Board activity expanded slowly in the creation of reports offices throughout the world.

## II

The Early Board, 27 March 1942 - 1 July 1943

In COI days, Mr. David Bruce gathered together a group of experienced men to establish the Special Activities Branch as SI was then called. Among them were Mr. F.L. Belin, Mr. Richard Southgate, and Mr. Hugh Wilson. They were men who had had distinguished diplomatic and business careers. In March of 1942, SI was tremendously active with numerous projects for obtaining secret intelligence both from future SI sources and from existing Allied secret services abroad. Both of these categories were eventually obtained, the Allied secret intelligence first.

On 27 March 1942, it became apparent to Messers. Belin, Southgate and Wilson that some provision for the systematic handling of this increasing flow of material would be necessary. With this in mind they wrote to Mr. David Bruce:

"All of us who are accustomed to State Department procedure have been troubled by the genuine danger of the present method of distribution of incoming material, and the handling thereof. Furthermore, it has appeared to us that this organization is growing with such incredible rapidity - and will doubtless continue so to grow - that method and organization become more and more important. Whereas, in its initial stages, an organization can be handled by one or two men doing everything, this task becomes impossible when an organization swells to its present, or

even greatly increased future volume .....  
It may be found advisable to set up some  
sort of supervision in the distributing  
center of outgoing material in order to  
prevent duplication, contradiction, or  
other troubles, which arise unless every-  
thing flows through one channel."

Mr. Bruce took action upon these suggestions and on  
7 April 1942, in a directive to SI pointed out that SI  
intelligence consisted or would consist:

1. Of reports procured from its own agents;
2. Of reports obtained by SI from secret  
services outside SI.

He directed that the responsibility for disseminating  
intelligence in Class 2 should rest with the Reporting Board.  
The Reporting Board as constituted on 7 April 1942 consisted  
of Mr. F.L. Belin as Chairman, Mr. Richard Southgate and  
Mr. Hugh Wilson.

The Reporting Board, however, felt, as it has always  
felt, that some element in SI should have complete control  
of all disseminations whether from SI or foreign secret  
sources. Otherwise, correlation of intelligence obtained  
from different areas or sources would be impossible, confirma-  
tion of facts would rest on no sure basis and systematized  
distribution to the proper recipients could not be  
established.



In point of fact, the need for control over the dissemination of SI source intelligence did not become apparent until such intelligence began to flow in from the field.

Continued and systematic reception of intelligence from the

[redacted] was not established until

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5 August 1942 and 1 October 1942 respectively. Intelligence

from [redacted] sources followed later.

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On 21 September 1942, Mr. Bruce, persuaded of the necessity of dissemination control, issued the following directive to all SI Geographic Desks:

"It is a function of the Reporting Board to disseminate information obtained as a result of the activities of SI. In order to assure that all interested agencies, whether other branches of OSS or other government departments, receive information, and in order to avoid duplication, all Geographic Desks are directed to supply the Chairman of the Reporting Board with any information to be disseminated, or a copy of all information disseminated directly by the Geographic Desks, with a list of those to whom it has been sent."

During the period from the founding of the Board to the directive of 21 September 1942 establishing control over SI intelligence disseminations, the Board felt its way tentatively toward methods which would create:

1. An efficient and rapid processing of intelligence;
2. A precise system of evaluation.

It should be emphasized, however, that these methods, which were the nucleus of eventual processing and evaluation, were created with a different purpose in view. In the end they developed from their initial functions into the mature systems which operated in the Board's later period.

The intelligence was of such proportion at this time that the three members of the Board were able to evaluate, disseminate, and record it themselves.

The Board, however, felt that it was necessarily a kind of repository of the intelligence obtained by SI and, as such, could in various ways be of assistance to the SI Geographic Desks. It could, for example, call to the attention of the African Desk information pertaining to Africa which had cleared from the Spanish Desk for dissemination outside the Agency. The SI Geographic Desks were so occupied with their many activities in establishing agents in the field that the Board believed they might wish to consult with men who had a detailed technical knowledge of foreign countries from their own background knowledge and from the intelligence being obtained by SI.

The Board thought that this should be a service to SI alone. It realized that the R&A Branch of OSS by directive devoted its attention and energies to research and the

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analysis of intelligence from all sources overt and secret. R&A, however, was physically removed from SI and so busy with the work required of it that it was almost impossible for its officers to foresee the needs that might develop from any of the many SI projects. The Board did not have then, and never has had, any intention of participating in the field of R&A's jurisdiction. The Board, however, realized that the SI desks often needed background advice, and that when they asked for assistance they wanted it quickly from men who were well acquainted with SI projects and SI security problems. SI's activity has always been directed to the speedy acquisition of recent intelligence and to the immediate dissemination of such intelligence in such form as to achieve the maximum of speed and the maximum of accuracy at the same time. The prevailing atmosphere of SI is more that of a newspaper office than a scholar's study and the nature of the work could not make it otherwise.

More to assist the Geographic Desks in their projects than to establish a system of editors and reports officers advising the Reporting Board itself, the Chairman of the Board, Mr. Belin, acquired the services of Mr. Harold Coolidge as Secretary to the Reporting Board and on 6 May 1942 proposed to establish an office called the Reference Room

under the jurisdiction of the Secretary to the Reporting Board, which would contain a few men with background knowledge of enemy or enemy-occupied countries.

In a memorandum of 2 July 1942 to Major Bruce, Mr. Belin summarized the activity of this new office:

"At the meeting of 6 May 1942, it was generally agreed that the Geographic Desks were so over-worked that they had not the time to study and digest the material available not only in R&A but also in other agencies of the Government such as the Library of Congress, State Department, etc.

"On the other side of the picture, R&A officers are far too busy with the work requested of them by the armed services of the Government to be able to foresee the needs of SI and furnish it material which we might desire. The need is so great from both points of view that it was decided to establish the Reference Room (so called in order to indicate to R&A that we were not infringing on their 'research' bailiwick).

"It was originally planned to go fairly slow on this Reference Room and only three men were envisaged at the beginning. However, as Coolidge indicates and as succeeding argument demonstrates, the Reference Room has already shown its usefulness.

"My concept of the Reference Room has been a double one. First, to bring into the organization men trained in the studious approach to questions in the expectation that after a certain amount of general work in the Reference Room, they would be better qualified to take positions at the Geographic Desks than any non-indoctrinated persons would be. The experience of the past few weeks has shown that this concept is already working out and that the men we bring in readily find useful niches in the geographic units.

"The second concept, however, is to induct into the Reference Room a small number of persons, men or women, who are qualified to find the answers to specific requests for information which may arise from the various desks. We would like to be in a position to send a circular to the Chiefs of the Geographic Desks saying that we are ready to answer questions involving study and research and that we are equipped to tap material from the vast reservoir of all the organizations of Washington for this purpose.

"It would not be necessary for us to discriminate between the two types of personnel above. Their personalities, abilities, and talents would quickly indicate whether they should specialize on operations or remain in the pool for the answering of specific questions.



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We find here the germ of the highly developed system that was to come a year and a half later of:

1. The reports officers and editors dependent on the Reporting Board in Washington, each organized on a geographic basis to correspond to the SI geographic operations officers, each with a staff of editors and assistants, elaborate files and maps, and facilities for the evaluation of SI intelligence;
2. The overseas reports officers with their staffs and quasi-independent offices and mechanical facilities for the printing of lateral disseminations and the transmission of intelligence;

J. J. J.

3. The training facilities for intended overseas reports personnel used both by the Reporting Board and Geographic Desks.

It was made clear at the staff meeting of 6 May 1942, that each operations desk would have liked to have a corresponding specialist in the Reporting Board's Reference Room. It seemed to the Board, however, that the greatest need then lay in the European Theater. By 1 August 1942, four men had been selected: Dr. E.M. Carroll for France, Mr. Franklin D. Scott for Scandinavia, Mr. Dena Durand for Germany, and Mr. Walter Brown for Spain.

By 1 September 1942, two other service units besides the Reference Room had been created by the Reporting Board to aid the operations desks and the Reporting Board in current background information: the Geographic Index of Persons, under Mr. G.W. Cottrell and the Press Survey under Mrs. Alice C. Clifford.

It was felt a year later that the service of the Geographic Index of Persons was of an historical nature and more properly within the jurisdiction of R&A. It was, therefore, detached from SI and became R&A's Biographical Records section.

The Reference Room undertook at this time also to circulate to the interested SI Geographic Desks abstracts

and catalogues of information procured from the researches of R&A and agencies outside of OSS.

The Reporting Board services then, as always since, have been directed toward doing any and all kinds of work which would assist SI activity in any way. Some of these services have attempted to fill a temporary gap and have then been abandoned when the work was done. Others met a lasting need and have continued. In them all, as well as in the Reference Room specialists, is the origin of the ultimate ideal of all mature reports work: directed intelligence which can supply the operations officers and the field with a specific list of intelligence requirements.

In setting up procedure for the evaluation of intelligence as to source and fact, the Board adopted from the British system its letter and number system for the grading of secret reports, and on 23 May 1942, so informed the State Department, ONI, G-2, A-2, BEW, the R&A Branch, and Colonel Donovan. The other American agencies and departments also agreed to conform to the system. Printing of the disseminations by ditto machines on stylized forms for consistency was instituted, and a printing and reproduction unit under Mrs. Ann S. Leshar and Mrs. Lilah Simmons set up by early 1943. Only one ditto machine operated by hand was needed then. In the later period of the Board, three hand machines and one electric machine were necessary to print the

steadily increasing volume of intelligence. Lists of the intelligence requirements of OSS customers began to be compiled for the proper and systematic distribution of material.

In November 1942 Mr. Hugh Wilson resigned from the Board and was succeeded by Mr. F.L. Mayer. Mr. Mayer resigned in February 1943 and was succeeded by Mr. Coolidge.

On 8 December 1942, Major Bruce reaffirmed the vital directive of 21 September 1942 and amplified it with the following remarks:

- "1. A large proportion of the material arriving in SI must be distributed according to commitments previously made and policies currently in effect.
- "2. There must be thorough and prompt distribution.
- "3. There must be simultaneous distribution through established channels in order to avoid criticism of giving preferred treatment to any individual or agency.
- "4. Grading of reports must be consistent.

"In view of the importance of these considerations, it is believed that the best interests of SI will be served by confining the dissemination of SI material to the Reporting Board as the only unit currently informed on all these points. The Geographic Desks are, therefore, directed to arrange for the dissemination of all material as promptly as possible through the Reporting Board only ..... The Reporting Board will in all cases welcome recommendations from the Desks for evaluation and dissemination."



During the spring of 1943, the Board obtained the services :

1. In February, of Dr. Lester C. Houck as Italian specialist and editor. The need for capable handling of material from this area had become very pressing;
2. In March, of Mr. J.L. Lane as Middle East specialist and editor;
3. In May, of Mr. Alton Childs as French and Battle Order specialist. Mr. Childs succeeded Dr. E.M. Carroll, who had become SI Liaison Officer with the Battle Order Branch of MID.

With the acquisition of these men, the old concept of a reference room of geographic specialists changed into the present one of geographic reports officers. The Reference Room itself was gradually dissolved during the spring and summer, and separate offices were established and staffed with editors and typists each under the supervision of the reports officer.

This development was necessary because of the enormous increase of SI intelligence flowing from Italy, France, and the Middle East. A careful check on the documents was of vital importance. Topical breakdown of the material was essential for proper dissemination. Comprehensive files of this topical breakdown were imperative for proper evaluation. The reports officer in each unit assigned specific types of

reports to specific assistants as the subject matter of the reports was too different for one man to handle. Thus the reports officer, in addition to policy matters for all disseminations on France, might himself handle specifically the French military reports, and assign the French political, economic, and scientific reports to different assistants.

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SI has always followed a geographic breakdown. The Reporting Board paralleled the SI Operational Desks with geographical reports officers but gave a topical breakdown within the reports unit itself. The advantage so far as Washington is concerned is obvious. The system, however, has never been rigid. In the stress of work, a certain reports officer, because of the preponderance of military operations in his geographic area, might, ipso facto, acquire considerable knowledge of battle order in general. In that case, he was often consulted by other reports officers about military reports outside of his geographic unit.

On 1 September 1943, Dr. Lester Houck became the fourth member of the Reporting Board.

## III

The Later Board, 1 July 1943 - 1 September 1944

The emergence of the field reports offices marks the beginning of the period of the later Board. The theory for the field reports officer coincides with the development of the reports officer in Washington. The actual causes which led to the founding of the field offices, however, are two:

1. The establishment by the Army of theater headquarters and the imminence of military operations.
2. The creation of JICA and the necessity of lateral distribution in the field.

When the Army established important theater headquarters, immediate distribution of intelligence to these headquarters was necessary. To relay the intelligence from Washington caused an avoidable delay. The plans formulated in army headquarters for future operations required directed intelligence, i.e., the reception by responsible officers of requests which could be forwarded to field agents for immediate action. Records on such intelligence had to be kept. Experience has shown that unless an officer is in the field whose sole responsibility is the dissemination of documents, the intelligence may be given a faulty distribution; it may not reach all

of the proper recipients in the field and in Washington.

In the spring of 1943, JICA, the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency of G-2, ONI, and A-2, was created by order of the Chiefs of Staff. JICA was not an agency for the initial procuring of intelligence, but a unit designed to collect intelligence from the head field offices of all agencies and forward it to Washington. To submit such intelligence in raw form to JICA in the field would, however, have risked unnecessary exposure of SI agents and would have delayed transmission to SI, Washington, considerably. Therefore, control of SI intelligence which was to be submitted to JICA in the field had to be exercised by a reports officer.

At the same time, the advantages of lateral distribution of intelligence between OSS field offices became apparent. In addition to Washington, both London and Algiers, for example, needed information on France as soon as possible because of impending military operations from these bases. A reports officer was needed, therefore, in Algiers, Madrid, and London to see that the proper number of copies, or photostats, or microfilms should be sent to the various offices. He was also needed to receive and forward to agents requests for intelligence from customers in any area.

Consequently, on 18 June 1943, the Reporting Board, in

conjunction with the Registry, suggested to Mr. Shepardson in a memorandum that in the light of recent JICA objectives and procedures it was clear that Reporting Board and Registry personnel should be sent to the headquarters of theater operations in Cairo, Algiers, and London in order to assure document security, safeguard OSS sources, and prepare the documents for photostat-dissemination by the JICA system. On 9 July 1943, the JICA organization in the different theaters was discussed in a meeting of geographic desk heads and the Reporting Board.

It was agreed that hereafter all agencies of OSS should send copies of their reports to the OSS headquarters of the theaters in which their jurisdiction lay in addition to sending their reports to Washington. In other words, OSS representatives in France, Switzerland, Germany, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, etc., would send their reports to London; those in North Africa and Italy would send theirs to Algiers; those in the Near East and Balkans would send theirs to Cairo. The only lateral distribution would be from London to Algiers, London to Cairo, Algiers to Cairo, or vice versa.

*IN JULY 1943 MR. HAROLD COOLIDGE BECAME OVERSEAS PERSONNEL OFFICER FOR THE REPORTING BOARD.*

In accordance with these developments suitable men were obtained by the Reporting Board to serve as field reports officers and to set up reports offices in vital theater head-

quarters. For several months before they were sent, these men were given intensive training in reports work by the Reporting Board and were thoroughly grounded in editing, procedure, and administration before they left. The Board has always emphasized this training course for the thorough preparation of its officers in SI service abroad.

With this in mind the Board published on 30 August 1943, its comprehensive Manual on Reports Practice and Procedure, copies of which are in all field offices. All its personnel abroad have been thoroughly indoctrinated in this Manual and in actual work before leaving Washington.

The Board has felt that no one is ready for reports work in the field who has not actually worked on documents and been responsible for them. Without this training essential uniformity of procedure would be impossible and the ties between the Washington Board and its field representatives would be broken.

Reports officers should also have experience in office administration. They should also have sound business sense. The selection must, therefore, be made by the Board after careful observation of, and reflection upon, personality and abilities. In practice, in addition to its normal work, a reports office bears the burden of many projects actually

irrelevant to its primary functions. Its reports officer and his personnel must have such esprit de corps in their service to SI that they will give any assistance within the widest scope of their abilities. They must give that assistance unstintingly and willingly.

During the period of the later Board two important practices developed both in Washington and in the field:

1. The necessity of thorough and close liaison between reports officer and those to whom the intelligence is sent became more and more apparent. Every effort was made to further this liaison since only when such a relationship exists can the current needs for intelligence be accurately assessed.
2. If this liaison work is properly performed by, or accessible to, the reports officer, directed intelligence becomes practicable. Requests for urgent intelligence are received, checked with available reports, forwarded to the field and to the suitable agent with every expectation of a reply within as short a period of time as possible.

Within a year, therefore, the Reporting Board, had established or dispatched the following men as its chief reports officers:

Mr. T.S. Ryan on 10 May 1943 to Algiers

Mr. Philip Horton on 18 September 1943 to London

Lt. Alfred Ulmer, USNR, on 27 October 1943 to Istanbul

Mr. Walter Brown on 5 December 1943 to Madrid

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Lt. Frank Wisner; USNR, on 15 December 1943 to Cairo

Lt. Harry Harper; USMCR, on 27 February 1944 to Cairo

Mr. Don Garden on 1 March 1944 to Kandy

Mr. Lloyd George on 6 July 1944 to Kandy

Mr. Brown had been Spanish reports officer in Washington. He was succeeded in Washington by Mr. Donald Greer.

The Algiers reports office from its origin had a career of great accomplishment under Mr. T.S. Ryan. The office processed, disseminated locally to AFHQ, and forwarded to London and Washington the reports of the French chains operating from Algiers and of the Italian chains clearing through Naples. Extracts from this material had to be made for daily cables to Washington and London. The Algiers office was also one of the three recipients of microfilms of the original reports of the great French chains operating from Spain and the office processed them for local and immediate dissemination to AFHQ, not, however forwarding them to Washington or London, since the material did not originate through the Algiers office. By May 1944, the office contained approximately 27 editors, typists and clerks, and processed during that month 642 original reports containing, of course, many times that number of intelligence items. Mr. Ryan's services in liaison and the briefing of agents were of great value. In October 1944 he dissolved the Algiers reports



office and left Algiers with his staff to head the Caserta reports office and to act as Chief Reports Officer MEDTO.

The Cairo reports office had as its subsidiary the Istanbul office. Lieutenant Frank Wisner, USNR, after organizing the office, proceeded to Istanbul on 25 May 1944, and became Chief SI there. He was followed on 27 May 1944 by Lieutenant Harry Harper, USMCR, who became head of the Istanbul reports office. Lieutenant Alfred Ulmer, USNR, returned from Istanbul to head the Cairo reports office until 25 July 1944, when he proceeded to Algiers intending to head a reports office in southern France, but with the rapidity of military advances this latter plan was dropped and Lieutenant Ulmer was ultimately assigned to the Chief of SI for central Europe. Lieutenant Ulmer was succeeded in Cairo by Lieutenant (jg) Stephen Bailey, USNR. In May 1944, the Cairo office had approximate personnel of 14 and processed 621 reports in that month.

Lieutenants Wisner, Ulmer, and Bailey were all singularly successful in the liaison work so essential to the functions of a reports office. The later important services of Lieutenants Wisner and Harper to SI are wellknown and treated elsewhere.

Madrid never has had more than the single reports officer,

Mr. Walter Brown. No editing or dissemination in the literal sense took place except for the typing or micro-filming in triplicate of the original reports of the Franco-Spanish chains and the briefing of agents with requests from Washington, Algiers and London. In May 1944, 661 original reports on France and 44 on Spain were forwarded to those head offices.

The London reports office became necessarily second in size and importance only to the head office in Washington. Mr. Philip Horton was extremely successful in maintaining contacts with the British, as well as with other agencies, and in organizing the office according to business standards. He faced capably all the urgent requirements for dissemination techniques that arose during the invasion of France from such reports as the W/T messages of the Sussex agents. The office worked long and well in assisting the briefing of agents and in compiling answers to SHAEF requests. The office processed 2,319 reports in May 1944, and during the spring and early summer had an approximate personnel of 60.

The reports offices established in Italy serviced Italian reports with the exception of the Bari reports office which until June 1944 serviced Balkan reports and was

dependent organizationally on Cairo. It was set up in early December 1943 under Lieutenant Michael G. Mitchell, USNR. In June of 1944 the office processed 260 original reports and had an approximate personnel of 6. By 1 September 1944 it had expanded to a personnel of 15.

Reports on Italy proper cleared through the Algiers reports office as long as part of AFHQ was still in Algiers, i.e., August 1944. However, with the invasion of Sicily and Italy in the summer and early fall of 1943, small reports offices had to be established to follow the advanced echelon of AFHQ for the purpose of local dissemination. In the earlier days of the invasion the reports were given an initial handling by small reports units within SI at Palermo and Naples before they were forwarded to the Algiers reports office.

In February 1944 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Torielli, FA, was sent by the Reporting Board and General Magruder to establish a small reports office near military headquarters, then at Caserta. He was succeeded by Lieutenant James R. Barnes, USNR, at this Caserta office in July 1944.

The jurisdiction of the Bari reports office was extended to the local processing of battle order reports from north-eastern Italy in June 1944 because of the strategic W/T facilities in Bari. The dependency of Bari on the Cairo reports

office was transferred to the Algiers reports office and all Bari material cleared finally through the Algiers office.

Mr. James R. Franklin set up a reports office in Rome on 3 July 1944.

On 31 August 1944 Lieutenant Barnes left Caserta and established a reports office in Siena.

Eventually in the early autumn of 1944 with the final arrival of AFHQ in Italy, a merger took place. The Algiers reports office was abolished and Caserta was constituted on 16 October under Mr. Ryan as head reports officer, with Rome and Siena as dependent offices, Siena to process order of battle reports, Rome to process political and economic reports. On 4 November Rome assumed an independent reports office status. The Bari reports office was abolished. Much of Bari's personnel was thereby transferred to Caserta and the Bari office became again mainly an SI operational headquarters and its Balkan and northeastern Italian reports cleared through the Caserta reports office. In October 1944 296 reports were processed through the Siena office, 139 through the Rome office and 497 through Caserta, which now represented the old Bari office as well.

The Kandy reports office under Mr. Lloyd George, who succeeded Mr. Don Garden, was still in the organizational

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stage during the summer of 1944 and had a personnel of 9. During the summer and early autumn it processed 91 original reports.

By the autumn of 1944 plans for a reports office in Kunming in China and in New Delhi in India were well advanced and reports officers for these posts were being trained in Washington.

In the autumn of 1944 the Reporting Board had a total overseas personnel of 123.

Although sound reasons have developed for the separation of jurisdiction in Washington of Reporting Board and Registry, their work is closely connected and the juxtaposition of the two sections remains imperative. In the field, however, the completely separate jurisdiction of registry and reports personnel has never developed in practice because the field offices process a smaller number of reports which represent a consistent type of intelligence and because the registry personnel in the remoter field offices have been women whose quarters, offices and routine work have had to be provided upon their arrival by the reports officer in situ.

An interesting but nevertheless natural feature of the field reports offices is that the characteristics of each

office and of each office's reports vary slightly from the others. The continued efforts of the Reporting Board have succeeded in creating uniformity of overall practice and procedure in Washington and the field, but each field office necessarily places emphasis on operational objectives, liaison contacts and briefing according to the necessities of the headquarters and the natural abilities of the reports officer. The reports office in this respect will reflect the character of the reports officer and the local needs. Thus the London reports office has been especially skillful in liaison work with the British, the Cairo office in liaison and in briefing, the Algiers and Madrid offices in briefing, Istanbul and Bari in briefing and actual operations.

During this period of the development of the field offices, the Reporting Board in Washington itself changed. On 7 March 1944, Mr. Gardiner S. Platt succeeded Captain Harold Coolidge as the fourth member of the Board and administrative officer. Captain Coolidge left the Board on a special *WASHINGTON REPORTING* *REPORTS* assignment *IN EUROPE* to ~~London~~. On 9 May 1944, Mr. Alton Childs became the fifth member of the Board, remaining, however, French reports officer which he had been since the inception of reports from France.

The geographic reports units in Washington were themselves increased to handle the great and vital flow of intelligence

from Europe before and after the invasions. Two new units were created for Germany and the Far East. To head these units as reports officers, the services of Mr. C.L.L. Williams were obtained on 1 April 1944 for the Far East, and of Dr. Walter Langsam on 22 May 1944 for Germany. Dr. Langsam fulfilled the dual capacity of the SI German operations desk, as well as German reports officer.

The Reporting Board in Washington during the later period was primarily concerned with perfecting the last two of its four overall objectives mentioned at the beginning of this survey: true evaluation and directed intelligence, and a steady advance was made toward both objectives.

On 23 October 1943 a committee headed by Colonel Forgan was created to consider evaluation procedure. On 11 November 1943 the Reporting Board published a study called "The Problem of the Evaluation of Intelligence Reports", which concluded with a suggestion

1. "That the Reporting Board should refer to other branches of OSS for recommendation as to evaluation, reports of an economic and political nature on which these branches of OSS are in possession of background material or records which would be of immediate value and immediate use in the evaluation of the report in question;

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2. "That the Reporting Board should give any recommendations received the fullest consideration but should retain responsibility for the final evaluation."

Colonel Forgan's Committee adopted the recommendation and as a result the Reporting Board acquired the right to ask R&A for the submission of its opinion within definite time limits on the content evaluation of political and economic reports. Dr. S.A. Callisen was appointed Evaluation Procedures Officer to accomplish the smooth working of the transmission of political and economic reports between SI and R&A.

The attempt to reach an accurate and thorough evaluation did not stop here. The reports officers tried constantly, when the need appeared, to check information against authoritative records within OSS and in other agencies, especially MID and ONI. This had to be done with a proper regard for the time element. The Board has always insisted that speed is the primary consideration in the dissemination of intelligence and it has realized that intelligence recipients prefer information in its raw form with a minimum of learned comment and elaborate rewriting. Those who use SI intelligence, however, do appreciate an evaluation of source and context which will be an indicative guide to their own judgment. Intelligence work being of the nature that it is,



a disseminated SI report often represents the most recent intelligence available on the subject in Washington and the correct evaluation consequently must often depend upon the reports officer's records of the most recent SI reports on the subject.

To further thorough evaluation a compilation of the SI agent files of the Desk heads, reports officers and Registry was made and sent to the various related field reports offices in accordance with a directive from Mr. Shepardson on 24 December 1943, which stated that "the Reporting Board in Washington and the reports officers in the field must be supplied with sufficient information about the sources known to them by code name, number or other designation, to enable them properly to evaluate the reports."

Close coordination between the reports officers in the field and Washington aided the development of the principles of directed intelligence. Bimonthly progress reports were instituted between the field reports offices and Washington. Evaluation of the agents based on the agents' reports were adjusted regularly and both unfavorable and favorable comment from the recipients of SI intelligence on certain reports was forwarded to the field so that suitable action could be taken with reference to the procuring agent. Requests for

intelligence were immediately cabled or pouched to the field so that an agent might know that he had discovered a useful source of intelligence and which particulars were especially needed.

For example, during the year before the French invasion the relations between the Reporting Board and the Battle Order Branch of MID were very close and fruitful as a result, in great part, of the services of Dr. E.M. Carroll, the Battle Order Liaison. Consequently, the Reporting Board not only knew the receivers in the Pentagon personally but were also able to obtain from them daily requests for battle order information and cable these requests to the field after checking them against the reports officer's information of the day. Such requests had been based on the SI reports of the preceding 24 hours. For the instruction of the agent the cables also contained the conclusions of MID as to troop dispositions based on his own report. The Washington reports officer was often able to indicate to a Franco-Spanish agent, for example, recent information from an Algiers or Swiss agent related to his own report.

In reports on military installations reports officers had long observed the early and faulty method of reporting, for example, an ammunition dump as "3 miles down the Bordeaux-Toulouse road behind the white farmhouse". The Reporting Board,

therefore, instituted a project for reporting enemy installations in France by map coordinates and overlays from the field on 1 January 1944. It had been preceded in 1943 by a similar system in Spain. The project necessitated the use of 1/50000 scale maps numbered to a master key with a complete set of copies in the reports offices in London, Algiers, Madrid and Washington for simultaneous reference.

Sections of these maps were given to the appropriate agents in France who customarily submitted overlay sketches of enemy installations on transparent paper.

About 1 April 1944 the Reporting Board adopted the technique of disseminating installation intelligence by coordinates rather than by reproducing the overlays. This technique had the virtue of being the most accurate and cheap system possible and of coinciding with military and naval practice. In April 1944 an index filing system of these coordinates was established by the reports officers, which provided a rapid and precise method for the processing and evaluation of all installation intelligence. Unnecessary duplication of intelligence was thereby immediately apparent and eliminated. By D-Day in France, for example, every recent artillery, minefield and anti-aircraft installation on the southern coast and on the Atlantic coast from Hendaye to the Pointe de Grave had been reported and the Reporting Board files

contain thousands of installations pin-pointed by coordinates to 1/50000 scale maps.

At the end of the second period of the Board's development, the typical procedure and treatment governing a piece of intelligence was in accordance with the following hypothetical case:

The Battle Order Branch of MID has had independent information on 2 June that the 9th Panzer Division has started to move on 1 June from Nimes, France. This information is then submitted during the afternoon to the French reports officer in Washington by the Liaison. The reports officer checks it against the reports received from Madrid, Algiers and Bern on 2 June as recorded in his files which contain a card for each unit of the German Army ever reported by SI in France and of all recent train movements in southern France. He observes that the information is so far unreported to SI, and that it is a likely move of the division since it has been carried as reforming at Nimes for many months. Reports of the division at Nimes have been carried as A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, information, the source being variable, the information confirmed. A cable requesting information is then sent to the reports officer in Madrid, Algiers and to Bern, who in turn suggests to the operations officer that the appropriate agents be briefed or radioed or written. Replies begin to flow in to the various field offices on 3 June. The first report is

received from Algiers by the reports officer in Washington. The source is an Algiers agent who is carried as "A" according to the agents file. The report states that the agent has observed elements of 9 Panzer Division moving by motor on the back roads north of Nimes on the night of 2 June. The reports officer draws up the statement in concise form and evaluates it as A-0. This evaluation indicates that SI has no basis for an opinion on the truth of the report, that the report is a reversal of the established position of 9 Panzer Division so far as SI reports are concerned.

A cable is received from a second Algiers agent rated as "B", which reports that he has seen elements of 25 Panzer Regiment at a town north of Nimes on 3 June. The reports officer checks 25 Panzer Regiment in his cross-index file, finds that it is one regiment of 9 Panzer Division and evaluates the report B-3 indicating that the report is possible and has previous confirmation. A report from a Swiss agent is received. He is a "D" agent, being a German whose reports have occasionally shown traces of being intentional or unintentional German plants. His report, however, states that the commissariat of 9 Panzer Division is at Montelimar at the Hotel St. Jacques. The reports officer knows that the commissariat of a division always moves first. He checks the existence of the Hotel St. Jacques and disseminates the informa-

tion as D-2, indicating that the information is not only possible but probable. Many reports begin to flow from the great Franco-Spanish chains. The best Franco-Spanish military agent observes a great train movement of 70 trains through Montelimar on 6 June. That information is A-2 since it is still not quite enough confirmed. However, a second report derived through a "B" agent from a Gestapo official in Montelimar reports the same troop movement. A Gestapo official is necessarily "E". The report is E-1 and the whole movement up the Rhone of 9 Panzer will continue to be disseminated by the reports officer as confirmed. A report from an agent placing 9 Panzer Division at Nimes on 19 June is evaluated A-5 or false. A report that the movement is only a partial movement is evaluated A-4 or doubtful since the reports officer knows that 70 trains have been reported and that 70 trains carry a full armored division. The evaluation 5 is used only for special cases since such reports would ordinarily be eliminated from formal dissemination.

The work of the reports officer has only begun with the dissemination of intelligence, however. All these reports have to be entered in the individual agent's log for a periodic review of each agent's letter rating: a "C" agent who for weeks has sent in timely reports that are evaluated as 2 or 3 will be eventually raised to "B" as a result of his reports.

An "A" agent whose reports have had several 4's will be lowered to "B".

In any dissemination, the reports officer has to apply definite time limits. These have been established by the Board after consultation with those who use SI intelligence. Certain order of battle reports over a month old, for example, are of no value. Repeated dissemination of intelligence reporting an enemy 150mm. gun installed in concrete is a waste of taxpayers' money since it is confirmed in its concrete and is not likely to move.

The reports officer must recognize "double sale" of intelligence. An excellent agent may feel that he fulfils all the qualifications of patriotism if he sells his information after an interval of three weeks to a British or French agent. Exchange of British and French intelligence brings the same report to the reports officer's desk for distribution in Washington by photostat as Allied intelligence. Although it has been said that duplication is unavoidable in intelligence work the dangers of false confirmation require that such reports should be eliminated whenever possible.

In due course, the pouch reports containing the original intelligence from which the cabled intelligence has been abstracted by the field reports officer are received in Washington. The same procedure of dissemination, checking of

agent, and evaluation must apply to the pouch since 90 percent has never been coded. Reports on politics and economics must be carefully compared with recent reports and trends. Military coordinates have to be checked on maps, technical translations of blueprints must be made, and the proper disposition made of a multitude of such strange objects as a piece of German copper wire, sand from a Normandy landing beach, a piece of soap from Cologne, a German soldier's passport, photographs of the victims of German atrocity.

During this encyclopedic flood of intelligence, the necessary liaison with the recipients of SI intelligence and current lists of their needs must be maintained by the reports officers.

During 1943, 32,499 reports were disseminated by the Reporting Board, each report averaging five intelligence items.

On 4 January 1944, Mr. Shepardson established the policy which should govern SI disseminated intelligence: that emphasis should increasingly be placed on quality of intelligence and less on quantity. However, the activity in 1944 was so great that, despite the strictest elimination of every piece of duplication and of all antiquated and inconsequential reports, the Reporting Board by 24 November 1944 had processed



54,862 reports representing approximately one half million intelligence items suitably evaluated, appropriately disseminated and completely recorded.

As the second period drew to its close the Reporting Board suffered a grievous loss in the resignation of Mr. Belin and Mr. Southgate who throughout the Board's career had established its policy and maintained its efficiency. To both of them the Board, and indeed SI in general, is deeply grateful and greatly indebted.