





**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

Top Secret



25X1

25X1

National Intelligence Daily

*Wednesday
30 July 1980*

25X1

Top Secret

CO NID 80-178JX


30 July 1980

Copy **235**

25X1

Page Denied

25X1



Contents

25X1



Briefs and Comments

Bolivia: *New Regime's Prospects* 2

25X1

Cuba: *Castro's Speech* 3



USSR: *Oil Production*. 4

25X1



UNCODED



25X1



Top Secret

25X1

30 July 1980

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied


Top Secret




25X1

BRIEFS AND COMMENTS


BOLIVIA: New Regime's Prospects

Argentina's recognition on Monday of the Bolivian military government may improve the new regime's chances for international legitimacy and financial support. 


25X1

The decision could induce other nations, particularly Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, to recognize the Garcia Meza government. These nations also have military governments and are more likely to accept the Bolivian military's claim that it seized power to prevent a Communist from being elected. Bolivia's Andean Pact neighbors to the north, however, as well as most other nations, so far seem disinclined to accept Garcia Meza's claim. 

25X1

The Argentine move and its continued material support to Bolivia may also dishearten the regime's opponents. Civilian resistance now appears limited to several scattered mining districts. Hernan Siles Zuazo, who had been expected to be elected president, is in hiding and so far has not been able to unify the resistance. 


25X1



25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

30 July 1980

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

CUBA: Castro's Speech

President Castro apparently has decided on a less aggressive approach toward Washington for now. [Redacted]

25X1

The content and tone of Castro's remarks concerning the US in his annual 26 July speech were similar to his statements made the previous week in Nicaragua. By failing to repudiate recent US media reports that Havana was seeking improved ties with the US, Castro implied that he remained interested in broad-ranging talks. [Redacted]

25X1

On past occasions when Havana had no interest in normalization, Castro was quick to squelch such speculation. In the short term, therefore, Cuba probably will not carry out new schemes to increase the refugee flow or otherwise provoke the US. [Redacted]

25X1

The Castro regime is sensitive to the impact its actions may have on the US election campaign. Havana strongly believes a change of administrations would be highly unfavorable to its interests. [Redacted]

25X1

Castro presented a detailed critique of the Republican Party platform, warning that if fulfilled it would lead to war between the US and Latin America. By contrast, the Cuban leader generally avoided denunciations of President Carter's administration, virtually ignored the refugee issue, and made no reference to Cuba's conditions for negotiations with the US. [Redacted]

25X1

Commenting on his visit to Nicaragua, Castro reasserted that true revolutionary progress can only be gained through armed struggle. He pointed to the late President Allende's overthrow in Chile in 1973 and the recent coup in Bolivia as proof that the only viable formula for liberation was that used by Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. Castro's strong attacks on the Salvadoran junta and the Guatemalan Government--and on US backing for these regimes--indicate that Cuban support for insurgents in those countries will continue. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]


25X1

30 July 1980

Top Secret




25X1



USSR: Oil Production


Soviet oil production during the first half of this year averaged about 11.9 million barrels per day. Oil production from July through December will have to average almost 12.3 million barrels per day to reach the 1980 daily production goal of 12.1 million barrels. The goal could be met if 1980 production follows the pattern of the past six years, when second half output accounted for 51 percent of total annual production. Declining well productivities, sharply increased drilling requirements, transport problems resulting in shortfalls of oil-field equipment deliveries, and a serious lack of infrastructure at the new oilfields in West Siberia indicate, however, the target for 1980 will be difficult to achieve.



25X1

UNCODED

Top Secret



30 July 1980

25X1

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret