

Interior Dept. Slashes Atlantic Drilling Areas

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000300100005-1

DRILL, From C1

permission to drill as close as 23 miles from shore.

An Interior Department spokesman said yesterday that the decision to cut back on the number of tracts available for drilling had been based on environmental concerns as well as objections from the fishing industry and comments from several states and federal agencies. These included the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

Seventy-one tracts were eliminated from the drilling area after they were objected to by the Mid-Atlantic Finfish and Lobster Association of Narragansett, R.I., an Interior spokesman said.

Despite the sharp cutbacks in the available drilling area, an official of one of the oil companies involved in the preliminary exploration of the offshore site said the areas of primary concern to the companies had been retained in the list released yesterday.

"Some of the companies were pretty vague in their requests originally," said Jack Jackson, an official of the Exxon Company and head of the American Petroleum Institute's offshore committee. "The area they bid for probably covered more than they really needed but they exagger-

ated to camouflage their real needs. It would be my guess the Interior Department probably approved the acreage they (the companies) most wanted."

The Interior Department has begun to produce a draft environmental impact statement on the proposed drilling area, a spokesman for the department said. The statement is expected to be completed in October and public hearings on the sites will probably take place in December or January, he said.

Although there has been a relatively mild show of opposition to the East Coast drilling plans up to now, Interior Department officials have said they expect more vehement protests to arise at the public hearings from environmentalists and others.

If the department's tentative timetable holds, a spokesman said the tracts may be available for leasing by next May. Once a tract is sold to an oil company it usually takes three years to reach the production stage after oil is discovered.

Originally it was estimated that the offshore oilfield in the Atlantic could contain between 10 and 20 billion barrels of oil. Those estimates were drastically reduced to two to four billion barrels after preliminary exploration by private companies and the government in the last year.

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Atlantic Drilling Sites Cut

Interior Reduces Areas Sought by Two-Thirds

21 August 75
By Bill Richards

Washington Post Staff Writer

File

The Interior Department reduced by nearly three-quarters yesterday the area sought by oil and gas companies for offshore drilling in the Atlantic and said additional cuts could be made before final approval for drilling rights is made next year.

The cutback was made to meet objections of environmentalists, the fishing industry and various governmental agencies, according to the department.

A department spokesman said 154 tracts totaling 876-750 acres had been given preliminary approval for exploration for gas and oil. In June, 20 oil and gas companies had filed requests with

the Interior Department to be allowed to drill on a total of 557 tracts covering nearly 3.1 million acres.

The lease tracts included on the list released yesterday by the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management stretch offshore from Tom's River in northern New Jersey to Rehoboth Beach, Del.


The tentative drilling area ranges from 109 miles out to sea at its furthest offshore point to its closest point to shore, 54 miles off Atlantic City, N.J.

Several environmental groups and seacoast resort communities have expressed apprehension that the offshore drilling could result in leaks and oil slicks that might ruin beaches.

Frank Basile, head of the Bureau of Land Management's Environmental Assessment Team, said yesterday it is doubtful that oil leaks from even the closest offshore point could reach the shore. "If the oil did make it that far," Basile said, "it would probably be in the form of small globs of tar and a lot of those beaches already have that."

The oil and gas companies made their original request for drilling rights on the 557 undersea tracts, covering 1.370 square miles of seabed, after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in March the federal government's right to lease the continental shelf oil field. At that time, the companies had asked

See DRILL, C7, Col. 1



The black areas locate the Interior Department's tentative sites for offshore oil exploration, that firms sought

14 Aug 75

"First the blade, then the ear,  then the full grain in the ear"

The Monitor's view

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Thursday, Au

Kissinger's ocean plunge

For the first time Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has publicly plunged into the complex but crucial issue of a new law of the sea. His statement in Montreal that the United States is now prepared to share its deep-sea technology with other nations in mining of the oceans is a significant step forward. It could help break the present impasse in negotiations.

One deadlock has revolved around the demand of the developing nations that only a new international organization be given the right to exploit the seabeds. The U.S. position has been that the mining should be done by the individual nations and their enterprises.

The Kissinger proposal does not alter this position but it does offer a compromise. The Secretary proposes formation of a world agency in which there would be "weighted voting" to set rules for deep seabed mining. Nations would contribute a part of their revenues to the organization. If this approach is followed, the U.S. would be ready to explore sharing its deep-seabed technology.

While pleased by this change in American policy, sea-law experts point to a number of questions raised by the Kissinger initiative. What technology, for instance, would the U.S. share? What about the Glomar Explorer, the deep-sea vessel financed by the CIA and built by mystery-man Howard Hughes which was used to dredge up part of a Soviet submarine? Does the U.S. in fact own this ship, billed as the world's largest and most sophisticated deep-sea mining ship; and, if it does, would the seabed information gathered by it be passed on to American companies or to other nations of the world?

There is also the sensitive issue of "weighted voting," intended to counteract the "automatic majority" of the developing na-

tions, which account for 104 of the 140-odd countries participating in the law of the sea talks. These nations presumably would resist any move deemed prejudicial to their interests, so means may have to be found whereby states with special concerns, such as landlocked nations, can have some voice.

The developing nations may also take exception to Dr. Kissinger's proposal that the international agency not have the power to control prices or production rates. Since the mining of seabeds will expand the supply of minerals and hence affect the prices of the resources of landlocked countries, it seems inevitable that some sort of pricing scheme will have to be considered.

The Secretary also moved to head off congressional enactment of a 200-mile fishing limit off U.S. coasts. He was right in doing so. The participants in the Law of the Sea Conference are reaching a consensus on a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone," which the U.S. supports also, and a unilateral move in Congress would only undermine U.S. bargaining leverage when the conference resumes next year.

The important thing is that Dr. Kissinger is sounding the dangers of delay in agreeing on a new law to govern use of the seas. As he himself put it at the meeting of the American Bar Association in Canada, if the world fails to adopt a law of the oceans, there will be "unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil."

Unfortunately, this is not a dramatic issue that excites or concerns most Americans. Hence the fact that the U.S. Secretary of State himself is involved should heighten public awareness of it and show other nations of the world that he takes it seriously.



File

File

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, August 14, 1975

How U.S. Coast Guard would enforce 200-mile fisheries limit

By the Associated Press

Washington

If the United States declares a 200-mile fisheries limit, how will millions of square miles of ocean be policed?

Simple says the U.S. Coast Guard and others close to the problem: Keep an eye on the few square miles where the fish are.

"We know the fishery pattern, where the fish will be and in what season. We can pretty well predict their presence," says Coast Guard Capt. Adrian L. Lonsdale, a spokesman for the service that would enforce the limit law.

And where the fish are is where one finds the super-efficient trawler fleets of the Russian and Soviet bloc countries as well as the Japanese and West Germans.

The 200-mile limit is being given serious consideration in Congress because fishing grounds close to the continent — a historical preserve of American and Canadian fishermen — are being picked clean by foreign nets. The current U.S. limit for fishing is 12 miles, adopted in 1966 after the three-mile limit was deemed inadequate for protection of the U.S. fishing industry.

Supporters of the 200-mile limit are talking about congressional passage by Christmas. Some 30 other countries already have adopted a 200-mile fishing limit or are considering it.

In hearings on the legislation, the Coast Guard told Congress it would need \$63 million

to start up its policing program and another \$47 million annually to operate it.

Some congressmen think the Coast Guard estimate is too low, but are leaving that alone for the moment. There is some talk, too, about giving a part of the enforcement role to the Navy.


Essentially, the Coast Guard plans to search broad ocean areas with C130 Hercules transports, built by Lockheed. Cutters would patrol below, awaiting radio commands. Aboard the cutters would be helicopters for close-in supervision and transfer of personnel.

The Coast Guard says it will need 1,700 more men, 16 C130s, six medium-range Albatross aircraft and 10 more helicopters. Six cutters would be taken out of mothballs at their berths in Curtis Bay, Maryland, near Baltimore. They've been there for three to four years after having been used in the Indo-China war.


The current Coast Guard budget is about \$1 billion annually. Strength of the service is 37,000 in uniform and 6,000 civilians.

In recent years, Congress has markedly expanded the service's duties, adding pollution patrols and patrols to help combat Caribbean drug smuggling.

The fishing limit bill, as it stands in rough drafts before both houses of Congress, would promote conservation of fish stocks, with American fishermen being given first crack at the catch when the population is deemed to be at a suitable level.



Soviet tugboat tows a timber 'island' on the Amur River in Siberia



File

Washington at odds over fishing rights

By staff correspondents of
The Christian Science Monitor - 12 Aug

For the third time in recent months, Congress and the Ford administration are on a collision course on foreign policy — this time over fishing rights.

Following congressional action to undercut Ford-Kissinger policies on arms aid to Turkey, and arms aid to Jordan, many Democrats are in strong disagreement with the administration on how best to protect the rights of American fishermen off U.S. shores.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger told the American Bar Association in Montreal this week that he remained firmly opposed to action by Congress which would extend U.S. fishing rights to 200 miles offshore.

But a House subcommittee has already voted out a bill which would do just that, and the Senate is to take up the bill later in the year. The Senate passed a similar bill last year, but no action was taken in the House — so prospects for passage by both houses look better this year.

Behind the House move is a feeling that U.S. fishermen need protection now, especially in the Northeast, and that waiting for international action at the Conference on the Law of the Sea (sponsored by the United Nations) would let other nations catch too many fish.

Dr. Kissinger wants to wait for the conference to hammer out a joint position. In the meantime, he proposes working out individual agreements with other nations to protect U.S. fishing rights.

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Indian court throws wrench Mrs. Gandhi's political plans

By Geoffrey Godsell
Overseas news editor of
The Christian Science Monitor

The Indian judiciary has defied Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her ongoing efforts to remove all effective challenges to her running her country as she sees fit.

This has the effect of stalling Mrs. Gandhi's moves to clear the decks as soon as possible of all overt opposition so that she can begin implementing the program of reforms which she has promised India and which she says the country needs.

Since introducing a state of emergency on June 26, Mrs. Gandhi has managed to keep her will on two forums of critics' opposition: Parliament and the press. Critics would say she has gagged both. She remained only the courts, and she had set on her way to working her will with them. The Supreme Court's latest decision has at least delayed that.

Mrs. Gandhi's lawyers turned up in court in New Delhi Monday to present an appeal against her conviction in an Allahabad court last June on charges of irregular electoral campaign practices. The lawyers were to have based their argument on the Amendment to the Indian Constitution, passed on Mrs. Gandhi's initiative and in force since Sunday, retroactively placing the conviction of the prime minister, the speaker of

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ABC, Frost may present Nixon interview in '76

By Arthur Unger
Television critic of
The Christian Science Monitor

After firmly rejecting the chance to bid for the television memoirs of former President Nixon because of objections to "checkbook journalism," ABC-TV now is said to be deeply involved in negotiations with David Frost, who has just acquired rights to the memoirs.

According to industry sources, ABC may have provided most of the money for the "international consortium of broadcasting organizations" which Mr. Frost said at the weekend had bought the rights to four 90-minute broadcasts to be shown after the 1976 elections.

This speculation is raised here that the Frost interviews may be shown on the ABC network.

ABC president William Sheehan, who only a few days ago told this newspaper that "bidding for Mr. Nixon's memoirs in advance of

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★ Washington at odds over fishing rights

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Sources close to U.S. Rep. Gary Studds (D) of Massachusetts, a leading voice in the House, say such interim agreements would take too long.

While negotiators argue, the sources say, species such as cod, halibut, and yellowtail flounder would be vastly depleted by Japanese, Soviet, and other fleets using nets with holes too small to let smaller fish escape (and continue the species).

Some New England sources also say that neither the Japanese nor the Soviets would sign such agreements — just as they have not signed a 1968 covenant protecting whales.

The Studds position is that the congressional bill would protect U.S. fishermen right away. Written into the bill is language that would allow agreement at the international Law of the Sea Conference to take precedence, once the agreement is reached.

Sources close to Representative Studds say

such an agreement could take 10 to 15 years. The State Department believes the time will be shorter.

The next law of the sea round of talks is to be held next spring.

The overall U.S. position as set forth by Dr. Kissinger in Montreal includes:

1. The U.S. is willing to go along with the conference in extending its traditional three-mile territorial waters limit to 12 miles, as long as international transit rights in straits are guaranteed.

2. The U.S. is willing to recognize an eventual 200-mile limit for national control of fisheries.

3. The U.S. wants national mineral rights extending to the full extent of the coastal shelf. This will require careful definition of coastal shelves. Each country could freely drill for oil or seek other minerals within the defined limits.

★ ABC, Frost may present Nixon interview

Continued from Page 1

public comment by him on Watergate may be good show business but is bad for journalism," is said to be actively engaged in the negotiation which, again according to industry sources, is being justified on the basis of it being a business deal with a third party (Mr. Frost).

Mr. Frost's office reported that he was on his way to France for a vacation and would not engage in further negotiations with anybody until he returns in two weeks. In his original announcement of the Nixon deal, Mr. Frost stated that he believed "a major network would be involved" in broadcasting the interviews.

CBS News president Richard Salant and NBC News president Richard Wald both deny that their networks have even been approached by the David Frost organization.

Mr. Wald explained that NBC had withdrawn from the negotiation originally when "it was told that the other negotiators were going out to San Clemente to see whether the

president had rapport with them.

"I feel that even if we had bid more, there would still have remained the question of whether NBC is considered compatible enough."

CBS News president Salant told the Monitor that if he were approached by Mr. Frost "There are a lot of questions to be answered first . . . such as if there are rights of approval by the subject, etc. I wouldn't want to slam the door on any negotiations because by the time the memoirs get on the air in late 1976 or 1977, Nixon may have already been on newscasts telling his story, in which case it would actually be a memoir that Frost is selling."

According to Mr. Frost, who announced that he and Mr. Nixon had signed the 13-page contract on Aug. 9, "the former president does not wish to appear to intervene in the 1976 elections" and therefore insisted that the programs not be aired till after that time. "No subject, including Watergate, has been barred," Mr. Frost said.

★ Indian court throws wrench in Gandhi's plans

Continued from Page 1

Lower House, the president, and the vice-president beyond challenge in the courts. But the 39th Amendment itself became the issue.

Instead of hearing Mrs. Gandhi's appeal, the Supreme Court took up the case made by her opponents: that the 39th Amendment itself is unconstitutional. The court rejected a request by Mrs. Gandhi that the court simply overturn her Allahabad conviction.

The chain of events since June was triggered by Mrs. Gandhi's conviction in Allahabad for violation of P.O. Act. Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000300100005-1

Court justice pending hearing of her appeal by the Supreme Court when it reconvened this week. But the stay forthcoming from the single Justice at the end of June was conditional. There followed Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of a state of emergency, with the arrest of hundreds of her political foes (including critical journalists).

Mrs. Gandhi convened a short summer session of Parliament, in which — because of the silencing of the opposition — her Congress to legitimize all the Prime Minister's actions, past and future. Mrs. Gandhi's defense for all this is that she needs to remove the threat of

Mood shift in Russia

Touch of post-harvest

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Fall comes early in Moscow.

Partly it's the weather. July heat to August briskness, and already premonitions of the blanket of clouds hide the winter sky for weeks on end.


Partly it's the harvest. In the fields the wheat has already been trown the farmers' markets are not only with summer's tomatoes, cabbages, but also with squashes, egg potatoes, cauliflower, enormous red and fragrant phlox. The vegetables are coarse now and comes wrapped in speeches of Stalin.

Most dramatically of all, the announced in this northern city dwindling daylight. By 8:30 in the last vestiges of pink are fading out.

The local park reflects the mood. The trees have thinned out. And babies have been gone back to more normal behavior than a few weeks ago. Benches are empty. Checkers players and of authors manuscripts.

The park has ceased to be the sunroom for cramped city apartments.

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The grain famine goes West

The shambles of Russian agriculture is now again likely to raise the price of food all over the world. With every day that passes, more reports appear of the Soviet Union's attempts to buy grain in the West. Already, the Russians have bought about 14 million tons from the US, Australia and Canada. Now they have approached two Common Market countries, France and Germany, to discuss purchases of a further 1 million tons. Estimates of the yield of this year's Soviet harvest have been repeatedly revised downwards by the US Department of Agriculture, and last week Mr Earl Butz, the Secretary of State for Agriculture, was reported to be privately predicting that the Russians might this year buy about 20 million tons of grain from America.

It is just possible that the Russian demands can be accommodated without causing a sharp rise in grain prices. It is still too early to predict crops in most big wheat growing countries, although only ten days ago the International Wheat Council still thought that the US would have a record wheat crop this year. But the 20 million tons the Russians may want to buy from America is more than the 14 or 15 million tons which the Department of Agriculture recently estimated was the most that could be sold without disrupting domestic US supplies. And it is uncomfortably close to the 19 million tons bought from the US in the "Great Grain Robbery" of 1972.

Then, Russia and China bought grain at a time when prices were low, but before what turned out to be an internationally disappointing harvest. The food stocks which were run down at that time have still not been rebuilt. The world-wide rise in grain prices which followed Communist purchases played an important part in the subsequent burst of international inflation.

It hurt the developing countries, and major food importers like Britain and Japan, particularly badly.

A part of the reason for Russia's grain purchases this year is undoubtedly the climate. But that is not the whole story. The combination of complex and illogical food subsidies and the rigidities of the collective farming system are probably the main explanation for Russia's repeated failures to feed herself. Russia's agricultural subsidy bill comes to about 5 per cent of the country's national income—a staggering amount by Western standards. The subsidies are paid out on what looks to the outsider like an utterly irrational basis. Collective farms can make more by selling their grain to the State than by feeding it to their animals. It is more sensible to feed the livestock on cheap subsidised grain—or even loaves of bread—bought back from the State.

As for the collective farms, even Soviet newspapers have been carrying stories about the flow of instructions and questions from the central government which absorb the time of key workers even at the height of the harvest season. And experiments to break down the collective system into small teams of workers rewarded with payment by results have been repeatedly frowned on by the Soviet authorities. Until Russian agriculture can be drastically reorganised, though, there is every probability that the harvest failures of recent years will persist. As the Russians grow richer, they will want to eat more meat. As the Third World recovers from the oil price rise, its demand for grain will also increase. Unless we are in for years of recurrent food crises—crises which will put Russia and the Third World very much at the mercy of the United States—the Soviet Union will have to find a better way of organising its agriculture.

File

NEW YORK TIMES
12 August 1975

U.S. EASES STAND ON SEABED MINING

By LESLEY OELSNER
Special to The New York Times

MONTREAL, Aug. 11—Secretary of State Kissinger today offered the developing nations a compromise United States position on deep-sea mining in an effort to remove a major obstacle in negotiations over a new law of the sea.

The proposal was one of several conciliatory gestures to other nations, mostly to developing or so-called third world nations, in a speech at the meeting here of the American Bar Association.

The compromise would permit mining of the deep seabeds both by individual nations and their companies and by a new international organization that would mine primarily for the benefit of developing nations, with assistance from the more developed. The developing nations have said that only the projected new organization should be permitted to extract the mineral resources that lie beneath the seabeds; the United States, until now, has said that such mining should be done by

the individual nations and their citizens.

Mr. Kissinger said that the United States would press for final action on this and other issues when the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea resumes in New York next year. He called the conference "one of the most comprehensive and critical negotiations in history" and warned: "The breakdown of the current negotiation, a failure to reach a legal consensus, will lead to unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil."

The other conciliatory gestures in his speech—a review of United States priorities and policies in international law—included the following:

"The United States is prepared to 'make a major effort' in drawing up 'an agreed statement of basic principles' to guide the actions of multinational companies, and invites 'the participation of all interested parties.'"

"The Administration opposes unilateral action, in the form of bills pending before Congress, to establish a 200-mile fishing zone off United States coasts. It will make some 'interim' arrangements with other countries, Mr. Kissinger said, but it favors a solution worked out at the Law of the Sea Conference. Recognizing that there should be 'full consultation

among the nations directly concerned' with certain American space activities, the United States 'stands ready to engage in a cooperative search for agreed international ground rules for these activities.'"

Specifically, Secretary Kissinger mentioned "earth-sensing satellites" that are used to gather environmental information and broadcasting satellites by which nations may some day be able to relay broadcasts directly into other countries.

Speaking in the huge Place des Arts hall here before thousands of judges, lawyers and members of their families, Mr. Kissinger reiterated his call for new restraints by the United Nations to combat terrorism, such as sanctions against nations that harbor aircraft hijackers and terrorists. Earlier proposals on this subject have not had much effect because they have been viewed primarily as anti-Arab.

Mr. Kissinger also described United States goals for reform of the law of war, particularly "greater protection" for civilians and for prisoners of war, the missing in action and the wounded, and "application of international standards of humane conduct in civil wars."

Though Mr. Kissinger's proposal on deep-sea mining represented a compromise, the United States was offering a plan that still gives it what it wants: the right of its com-

panies to mine the seas.

The law of the Sea Conference, which opened in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974, and continued in Geneva this year, had its origin in a United States mandate in 1970. It involves many aspects of regulating the oceans, from ecology to questions of territorial waters. Two especially controversial aspects have been deep-sea mining and fishing rights.

"Common Heritage of Man"

The 1970 resolution specified that the resources in the deep seas were the "common heritage of mankind." According to Richard T. Scully of the State Department office dealing with the sea law negotiations, all sides contemplated the formation of some kind of international organization to assume responsibility.

However, the developing nations have contended that the phrase used in the United Nations resolution meant that such an organization should do the mining for the benefit of the various nations. The United States contended that "common heritage" referred to the benefits of the seas, that all peoples should have access to seabed mining and that the organization should be primarily an administrative organ to enforce standards and to funnel funds from companies' profits to the needy nations.

GENERALCHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 August 1975**Combating world terrorism**

The guerrilla attack on the American Consulate-General in Malaysia this week followed by the kidnapping of a U.S. businessman in Colombia points up a problem that neither individual countries nor the United Nations have been able to solve: international terrorism.

While skyjacking has abated, terrorist acts continue to occur around the world. Recent killings in Northern Ireland and the Basque area of Spain, kidnapping in Lebanon, and the murder of two United States Air Force colonels in Iran are part of a pattern of violent activity by extremist political groups.

Two aspects of terrorism in particular are cause for increased concern. First is the apparent world network of terrorists. Authorities have established connections between the Red Army group in Japan, the Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and other "liberationist" organizations. Ethnic separatist groups convened secretly in Trieste last year, and representatives of several terrorist groups have gone to the Middle East for guerrilla instruction from radical Palestinians.

Second, the Soviet Union reportedly plays a prominent role in the training and supply of terrorists around the world.

Members of the Baader-Meinhof gang have admitted to being secretly financed by the Russians, arms have been funneled through

Czechoslovakia to the provisional wing of the IRA, and there was Soviet support for Portuguese Communist terrorists before last year's coup d'etat.

With its heavy "third-world" representation, the UN seems unable to deal with the problem. The question of terrorism has been raised — and shelved — every year since the 1972 massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich.

The United States has a special Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism within the State Department, but most of its effort is spent reacting to crises. "Operation Boulder," an extensive screening program set up in the U.S. following the Munich tragedy, was scuttled this spring because it failed to weed out more than a handful of suspicious travelers to and from this country.

Cuba's decision not to harbor fugitives who commandeered aircraft played an important role in the marked decline of skyjacking, and U.S. policy is never to meet terrorist demands for ransom or release of prisoners. But as long as other countries and private companies take a less firm stand, terrorist attempts are apt to continue.

Unless nations, individually and collectively, increase their efforts to halt the rise of organized international terrorism, they will continue to find themselves its victim.

*File*WASHINGTON POST
12 August 1975**Action Urged
On Sea Law
By Kissinger**By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger cautioned yesterday that "political turmoil" is in sight over mining of ocean resources unless the deadlock is broken on a law of the seas.

"In a world, desperate for new sources of energy and minerals," Kissinger said, "the economic significance of ocean resources is becoming enormous."

The United States cannot defer its own deep seabed mining "for too much longer" as interest rises in extracting manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper and other minerals from the seabed, Kissinger said.

An international solution must be found in 1976, Kissinger told the American Bar Association convention in Montreal and he proposed creating an international agency that would establish rules for seabed mining.

At the State Department, and in Montreal, officials held briefings to focus special attention on Kissinger's speech.

In part the speech was a response to criticism in Congress and elsewhere that the dragging law-of-the-sea negotiations among more than 140 nations need heads of state, or foreign ministers, to break the impasse.

Kissinger proposed an American compromise for the deadlock caused by the underdeveloped nations' insistence that "sole right to exploit the seabeds" be given to a "new international organization."

Kissinger suggested creation of an international agency in which there would be weighted voting to "set rules for deep seabed mining."

All nations, and the agency itself, on behalf of underdeveloped nations, would be free to exploit deep seabed resources.

Although Kissinger only alluded to it, the weighted voting would be designed to overcome the "automatic majority" now held by the underdeveloped nations in the United Nations General Assembly.

Kissinger said that nations and enterprises mining the

seabeds would pay a portion of their revenues to the international agency. He said that if this cooperative approach is followed, the United States is prepared to explore sharing, deep seabed technology with other nations. The agency he proposed, however, "should not have the power to control prices or production rates."

Unless there is "a legal consensus" for law of the oceans, which cover 70 percent of the world's surface, there will be "unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil," Kissinger said.

Many of the world's backward nations have envisioned solving their economic miseries by control of the world's mineral-rich seabeds achieved through their U.N. voting power. This clash with the industrialized nations, Kissinger warned, can lead to "unbridled competition."

"The United States has nothing to fear from competition," he said, for "our technology is the most advanced, and our Navy is adequate to protect our interests." Rivalry, he said, can only "lead to tests of power" that can "invite a competition like that of the colonial powers in Africa and Asia in the last century."

The last U.N. Law of the Sea Conference ended inconclusively in Geneva last May. Another is set for March, 1976, in New York.

Demands are rising in Congress, Kissinger cautioned, for unilateral U.S. action, which he called "extremely dangerous..." except "as a last resort." He said "the current negotiations may thus be the world's last chance."

Kissinger said a consensus is near on accepting a 12-mile territorial limit on the sea, instead of the old 3-mile limit. The United States, he noted, is prepared to accept 12 miles if unimpeded navigation through international straits is permitted.

U.S. opposition to a proposed 200-mile limit was repeated by Kissinger. He reiterated American support for an alternative "200 mile offshore economic zone" in which coastal states would control fisheries and mineral resources, but freedom of navigation and other international rights would be preserved.

The principal obstacle, U.S. officials said, is agreement on

COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1975

The Bear in the China Shop

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

STOCKHOLM—The most significant commitment of the European summit participants — and the least noticed—was the pledge that “all one another’s frontiers” shall be “inviolable.” This specifically includes the Soviet-Chinese border and, since the United States signed, it cannot help but alter the diplomatic balance affecting the neighboring Communist behemoths.

I have talked with several leaders who autographed the document involved and not one of them had been aware of its Asian implications. One prime minister said: “At least the Chinese should be pleased that we also agreed there can be no territorial changes except by peaceful means.” I doubt if Peking is delighted. It certainly is more acutely aware of what was done than any other capital save Moscow.

Against this background, one must look at what now is happening in China. The Chinese aren’t concerned about Russia laying claims to areas on Peking’s side of the border. It is the other way around, with China insisting that the present frontier was unfairly imposed by “unjust” treaties and must be modified at Moscow’s expense.

For the past several years few observers have worried about earlier speculation that Russia was about to launch a preventive war on China to eliminate its nuclear capacity. Opinion has swung about to a suspicion the Kremlin instead now secretly backs forces that might make trouble during a political succession struggle after the deaths of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai—forces that could turn back to a pro-Soviet line in exchange for such help. It is useful to recall that former Defense Minister Lin Piao

(killed in 1971) and other leaders have been accused of such tendencies.

As Mao’s energies drain and Chou remains hospitalized most of the time, there are new reports of trouble inside China. Workers have been officially criticized for demanding higher wages and causing industrial “troubles.” There have also been physical clashes between militia units and gangs in provincial cities.

‘All one another’s frontiers shall be inviolable.’

In ancient Hangchow disturbances were so serious that Wang Hung-wen, a young activist and number three in the present party hierarchy, was sent to restore order. He failed. Subsequently Teng Hsiao-ping, Chief of Staff and Deputy Premier, who increasingly shoulders the burdens of Chou, went to Hangchow with a brigade of infantry from Nanking and tranquilized the situation.

The People’s Liberation Army (Teng is its senior officer) had sought to stay out of the Hangchow clashes. However, when militia factions began fighting each other with mortars and automatic rifles while Peking only implored those involved to calm things, a crisis threatened. Train-drivers refused to cross the “dangerous area” which is near Shanghai.

The Central Government was forced to act. It ordered the militia to disband

and give up its arms. This was accomplished with difficulty. An army security unit from Peking (far to the north) was sent to patrol Hangchow’s streets and safeguard trains traversing the region.

What all this seems to indicate is that competition has already begun in the struggle for the post-Maoist succession. Young Wang has lost face in an important test while Teng, with Chou’s overt support, has gained.

This interpretation would seem confirmed by the official announcement of a high-level dinner party July 31 in Peking’s Great Hall of the People. The guests of honor included the new Minister of Defense and the entire High Command, featuring Deputy Premier Teng, Wang and his sponsor, Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), were absent.

Since the Lin Piao conspiracy four years ago, the army has been staying out of the public eye. Lin had been Defense Minister when he died in a plane crash on his way to Russia. Since then many of his associates and military appointees have been purged. Lin was fleeing toward the U.S.S.R. and there is no saying how deeply Moscow may have been involved in Chinese plotting.

But China’s Army leadership seems to have been entirely “purified.” Now, through Teng, it has gained prestige by showing it could achieve results that radical party leaders like Wang were unable to accomplish.

And the army is not only a vital factor as the post-Mao political kaleidoscope pattern emerges. It is nationalist, not inclined to be pro-Russian, determined to straighten out the Soviet frontier in a more favorable sense, and in no way bound by promises made at Helsinki in the name of “European security.”

JAPAN TIMES
31 July 1975

China Accused MOSCOW (Kyodo-Reuters)

— The Soviet Union’s close ally Mongolia has accused China of using a nuclear threat to blackmail neutral Asian states into becoming Chinese satellites.

Last Friday’s edition of the twice-weekly News of Mongolia, which reached here Tuesday, quoted British and In-

dian newspaper reports that China had deployed at least 20 medium range missiles in Tibet, close to the Indian border.

“Such a range makes vulnerable the populated centers of China’s southern neighbors, which are becoming the target of the strategic forces of the Maoist expansionists,” the paper said.

the deep seabeds.
On other subjects of international law, Kissinger said recent events show that "stronger international steps must be taken—and urgently—to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safe haven and to establish sanctions against states which aid them, harbor them, or fail to prosecute or

extradite them."

He was alluding to the recent attack by Japanese Red Army guerrillas on the U.S. consulate offices in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where 52 hostages were seized and then released with the terrorists flying to Libya.

Kissinger also called for increased cooperation in space

technology. Earth sensing satellites, he said, can have dramatic results in detecting resources of underdeveloped countries.

On another area of sensitivity to underdeveloped nations, regulating multinational corporations, Kissinger acknowledged that "recent disclosures of improper financial relations

ships between these companies and government officials in several countries raise fresh concerns."

"But it remains equally true," he said, "that multinational enterprises can be powerful engines for good," by marshaling capital, initiative, research, technology and markets.

WASHINGTON POST
12 August 1975

Viking Launch Is Delayed Because of a Faulty Valve

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla., Aug. 11—The launch of a Viking spacecraft built to land on Mars and search for life there was postponed today when a faulty valve was found in the mechanism that steers the rocket during its flight away from earth.

Technicians discovered the balky valve just after 1 p.m., less than four hours before Viking was to be launched and just before liquid hydrogen and oxygen were to be pumped into the fuel tanks in the upper stage engine of the Titan-Centaur rocket.

The space agency postponed the launch for three days, saying it needed one day to remove the bad valve and replace it with a new one and two more days to test the new valve. The launch was set tentatively for Thursday at 5:08 p.m.

Oddly, the later launch gets Viking to Mars a day earlier next year than if the spacecraft had left earth today.

Thursday is the best day to launch the craft anyway but scientists had sought today's launch to get as much extra

time as possible in case something went wrong, as it did today. On Thursday the scientists will fire the Viking on a straighter trajectory than they would have today.

Viking will go into orbit around Mars June 13 instead of the 16th, but will still land on the red planet on July 4, 1976, to celebrate the nation's 200th birthday.

The faulty valve was found in the midst of the final countdown today as technicians were getting ready to fuel the Centaur upper stage with liquid hydrogen and oxygen, the most crucial part of the countdown.

The valve is one of 24 electrical valves in the steering mechanism fitted to each of the Titan-Centaur's two solid-fuel rocket motors. The valves serve as openings for liquid nitrogen tetroxide that guides the rocket on course while the two solid-fuel rocket engines provide 2.4 million pounds of thrust for liftoff.

A command was sent to the 24 valves during the countdown today, ordering them to open and then close. All but one did so. That one opened, then refused to close.

Had Viking been launched with the valve stuck open, enough nitrogen tetroxide might have leaked through the open valve so that the spacecraft would not have reached orbit. A mechanism built into the rocket can order an open valve to close, but the space agency preferred to postpone today's launch rather than run a risk that this mechanism might not work.

Technicians were due tonight to remove the nitrogen tetroxide from a tank strapped to the rocket engine, then take out the faulty valve and the electric motor that drives it. They were then to replace both parts with a fresh valve and motor.

One reason the postponement is three days is that tests must be done on the new valve with the tank empty and then full. The testing alone takes the better part of a day.

The Titan-Centaur is a 2-year-old rocket that was developed especially for Viking. It has been used twice before, once on a test flight and a second time to send a Helios spacecraft around the sun last year.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 August 1975



Is there life on Mars? Is mankind alone in the solar system or not? On Aug. 11, a silver, unmanned U.S. spacecraft called Viking will blast off in man's most ambitious effort so far to find out.

At a cost of \$1 billion, Viking (and a sister ship to take off eight days later) will fly the 186 million miles to Mars, land there in July next year, and analyze soil samples and atmosphere.

By David F. Salisbury

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Garish red sand, driven by a thin, howling wind, swirls off an eroded canyon wall. . . . The sun shines, strangely diminished, in a deep purple sky. . . .

Suddenly a point of light overhead begins to grow brighter and brighter. . . . The light becomes a silver spacecraft descending slowly on a pillar of flame. . . . The squat craft settles its three ungainly legs softly on the canyon floor. . . . The flames flicker out. . . .

This would be the view from a vantage point on the sands of Mars, if a U.S. probe lands there next July, as scheduled.

No one knows whether there will be in fact any living creatures to witness the drama; the purpose of the gleaming metal emissary from earth is to search for life on Mars.

Previous Soviet attempts to land spacecraft on the red planet have failed. In 1971 an American satellite orbited the planet and photographed its surface, and did not show evidence of cities or widespread vegetation.

But evidence that water once flowed freely there has renewed scientists' hopes that alien life may be found.

The space explorer is called Viking, one of two identical spacecraft now being readied at Kennedy Space Center for their journey to the planet which most resembles earth. The first launch is scheduled for Aug. 11. The second will follow eight days later.

The two craft have been designed to carry out the most ambitious planetary mission ever attempted. Designing, building, launching, and landing them on Mars will cost the U.S. about \$1 billion, making it the most expensive unmanned space mission America has mounted.

Landing site: land of gold

Mars is the target because for over 250 years it has been linked with alien life both in science and fantasy.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been working on the project since 1968. Generally, Congress has voted the funds requested, without significant opposition — a measure of the fascination of Mars.

The landing site for the first Viking spacecraft will be Chryse, the land of gold, one of the channels geologists believe must have been cut by running water. The second Viking will set down farther north, where there may be permafrost for organisms to feed on.

Here the two spacecraft will search for life in two ways. One is by using a stereoscopic color camera system. The other is a miniaturized biological laboratory which will try to detect microscopic traces of Martian life.

"The cameras don't make any assumptions about Martian life," Carl Sagan, director of the Laboratory for Planetary Studies at Cornell University, says, explaining why he prefers

them. "There is no reason to believe or disbelieve that there are larger organisms on Mars [which the cameras might detect]. Mars has had 4½ billion years for independent evolution. Therefore the Martian organisms, if any, are not like us. The slate is clean on that subject. We won't know until we land."

If a Martian elephant, say, should wonder by the cameras will take a picture of it — provided it isn't moving too fast. Rapidly moving objects will not show up clearly, Viking experimenters say, because the cameras slowly scan the landscape.

Many scientists are skeptical of finding large animals or plants on Mars. And even if they exist, skeptics point out, they might be unrecognizable from a still picture.

But for every pound of elephant on earth, there are a thousand pounds of bacteria. This is what the biological experiments will try to find on Mars. These experiments depend on a number of assumptions.

"We assume that if life exists there, it exists for many of the same reasons that life exists on earth," says Viking biologist Richard Young. "That is, it is the end product of chemical evolution and therefore will be at least chemically related to life on earth."

Viking's landers are equipped with long, mechanical arms which can reach out and scoop up soil samples within 10 feet of the craft. Viking then dumps the soil down a tube to its biological laboratory, which has been shrunk to one cubic foot in size.

The entire laboratory weighs 35 pounds and is crammed with 40,000 parts. Built by TRW, Inc. of Redondo Beach, California, it cost NASA \$50 million to develop. Within it are three totally separate experiments.

In one, Martian soil is drenched with water and a rich mixture of organic food. If there are living, breathing micro-organisms on Mars similar to those on earth, they should grow in this favorable environment and exhale various gases. The atmosphere in the container is periodically sampled to detect possible changes.

The second experiment also uses water, but in this case the Martian soil is barely moistened. Mixed with the water is a nutrient containing traces of radioactivity. The soil is incubated and, again assuming Martian creatures would change part of their food into gas, the air is sampled for radioactivity.

Martian sunlight duplicated

Finally, instead of water, radioactive carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide are added. A light duplicates Martian sunlight. If any plant-like organisms are present, biologists expect them to absorb some of the radioactive gases. After

JAPAN TIMES

13 May 1975

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Law of Sea Conference

The third United Nations

Law of the Sea Conference, which was held in Geneva, ended at the end of last week. The "unified draft" distributed to the delegates at the end of the conference consists of 309 articles. It proposes a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. It says that each pertinent coastal nation has a sovereign right to the natural resources located within each economic zone. Regarding fishing operations within the economic zone, the draft says that each coastal nation should endeavor to use the fishery resources to the best of their advantage, allow other nations to conduct fishing operations for the portion

in excess of the coastal nation's requirement and minimize the economic blow to those nations which have been customarily engaged in fishing in the economic zone. The draft provides for development of deep-sea resources by international agencies, passage through international straits "without damage," partial return of benefits to underdeveloped nations in the case of continental shelf development beyond 200 miles from the coast. The "unified draft" has no binding force. It has only been distributed to the participant nations. Nevertheless, it is certain that it will play an important role as a reference and source for new rules of the sea. — Asahi Shimbun

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EASTERN EDITION

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High as Talks on Law Of Sea Near Opening

Formidable Agenda Awaits UN Meeting in Caracas: Fishing, Mining, Pollution

A Plethora of Positions

By BARRY NEWMAN

Staff Reporter of The WALL STREET JOURNAL.
Over the protests of the State Department and a threatened presidential veto, Congress recently passed a law declaring once and for all that a lobster isn't a fish.

State Department emissaries argued at hearings that lobsters jump up and down when they get mad and swim a few feet, showing that they are more like fish than, say, clams are. But that didn't hold up in the face of scientific testimony that lobsters make whoopee on the sea floor, demonstrating that they don't swim much at all.

With the law on the books lobsters now are considered "creatures of the sea floor" and, unlike fish, are off limits to foreign fishermen. The whole lobster question still gives State Department diplomats heartburn. They might not actually care very much if a lobster is classified with fish or not. What really upsets them is that the new lobster law is another in a long list of pushy unilateral actions by the U.S. and other countries rustling rights to the oceans before the United Nations has a chance to decide peaceably on an international law of the sea.

That chance will come this week. On Thursday, in Caracas, Venezuela, the UN will convene a big Law of the Sea Conference for 70 days of dickering. Debate over the lobster's swimming ability will be just one niggling point of friction among thousands at what promises to be the biggest international gathering in history—and quite possibly the most confusing.

Hangers-On and Calligraphers

There will be about 100 countries attending; that's about 70 more than even existed at a previous Law of the Sea Conference in 1958. Delegates, advisory committees, interest groups and assorted hangers-on will number close to 5,000. And the UN is sending 89 translators, 35 reviewers and another 89 typists and calligraphers—plus a contingent of executives to run the show.

To house this mob, the Venezuelan government has reserved every inch of first-class hotel space in Caracas and has taken over a just-finished luxury housing project, turning a 42-story tower into delegates' quarters and converting a movie theater into a plenary meeting hall equipped for simultaneous translating into five languages. The cost to the host government was \$16.5 million.

What all these people are going to try doing in Caracas is to boil down six fat volumes of turgidly composed proposals into one neat document that would:

—Put a uniform world-wide limit on how far out to sea a coastal state can claim sovereign authority.

—Create an intermediate zone where a coastal state retains power but where other states have rights to navigate and exploit resources.

—Impose international law over the deep sea beyond national jurisdiction, especially over the mineral wealth at the bottom.

—Establish authority transcending national and international bounds to control pollution and encourage scientific research.

The complications are phenomenal. "It is fair to say," one expert asserts in all seriousness, "that mankind has probably never before attempted such a difficult task."

The Conflicting Interests

All the traditional alliances have come unstuck in a negotiation awash in conflicting interests dictated simultaneously by military, economic and geographical distinctions. Delegations are themselves divided into interest groups, and factions are warring within factions.

Coastal states want as much power as far out to sea as possible; landlocked states want to share that power. Advanced states want to exploit the sea; developing states fear exploitation. Maritime states want freedom of navigation for their vessels; straits states want to control shipping. States with concave shorelines worry about being squeezed by states with convex shorelines. States without islands are nervous about being pushed back by states with islands.

There are combinations and permutations: coastal states that are maritime powers vs. coastal states that aren't; developing states with rich seabed mineral resources vs. developing states without them. Oil interests within any one delegation may be pushing for freedom to drill while fishing interests want to prevent pollution. The oil interests may themselves be split between shippers wanting freedom to navigate and operators who don't want foreigners competing in coastal waters. And the fishing interests can be split just as often between those who want to chase the tuna anywhere on earth and others who want to protect coastal banks against poachers.

No wonder pessimism is riding high. "Most people just don't think we're going to get out of this thing with a treaty the United States Senate will ratify," a congressional observer says. "Our only hope is that everybody else will turn out to be more screwed up than we are."

There is, however, one strong incentive for diplomats to find a workable treaty, and that is the thought of what might happen if they don't. There is too much of value in the oceans for the traditional "freedom" of the seas to persist. Without a treaty, the world is likely to see a wave of unilateral claims to vast ocean areas, putting map makers to work drawing boundary lines over the blue. Louis B. Sohn, a Harvard professor, sees such a free-for-all leading "to a division of the oceans among a few major powers along the lines of the division of Africa in the 19th

Please Turn to Page 33, Column 2

Maritime Muddle: Pessimism Is High for the Law of Sea Meeting

Continued From Page One

Century; and such neocolonialist competition might easily degenerate into a new era of imperialist wars."

Some nations, impatient with the lack of legal framework for exploitation, are taking the law into their own hands. Years ago several Latin American nations extended their territorial claims 200 miles out to sea, and Peru has harassed a scores of U.S. fishing boats that venture too near.

More recently, Canada declared a 100-mile "pollution zone," and Iceland extended its territorial sea to 50 miles, touching off a "cod war" with Great Britain, its ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; that conflict reached the shooting stage last year. (Britain and Iceland signed an agreement on the issue last November, but it will only be in force for two years—presumably enough time for the UN to act.)

In recent weeks, two more NATO members, Greece and Turkey, have been edging toward a military confrontation over Turkey's exploration for oil in the eastern waters of the Aegean Sea. The area is only a few miles from Turkey's coast, but it is dotted with small islands owned by Greece. Turkey claims the floor of the sea, Greek islands or no Greek islands. Greece disagrees, and the international law applying to such questions is very muddy.

There are four international treaties, adopted at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, but they have some deficiencies that are getting worse as technology for exploiting the oceans improves and the number of countries in the world increases. The treaties, for one thing, never clearly defined "territorial sea." For another, an average of only 40 nations ever bothered to ratify them.

By 1970 it was obvious that something more was needed, so the United Nations decided to throw another conference. A 91-nation committee was set up to decide what to talk about, and without a single dissent, the General Assembly declared that the guiding principle of the meeting would be the preservation of the sea as "the common heritage of mankind."

This inspirational declaration lost some of its high tones when the countries sat down to hash out the issues. "The seabed is the heritage of 'mankind,'" says Louis Henkin, a Columbia University professor, "but there has been no agreement as to who is or represents mankind or how mankind should enjoy that heritage."

A Mountain of Conflicts

The 91 countries that were supposed to spend four years arriving at a basic treaty text for 150 countries to ponder have instead dumped in Caracas a mountain of conflicting proposals. The six volumes don't include a single set of draft articles. The report of one of the three subcommittees has no fewer than 50 separate proposals, and appended to them are hundreds of anonymous "variants." Another massive section is written with alternatives that aren't accepted by one or more delegations enclosed in brackets—and there are even brackets within the brackets. The "press kit" for the conference consists of sheets of paper several square feet in area, on which the plethora of positions are separated into little boxes.

If the issues sound complicated, consider that the conference still has to decide on a system for voting on the issues. In another grand gesture, the General Assembly reached a "gentleman's agreement" that decisions would be made by "consensus." But nobody knows what consensus means, except that it definitely means more than a two-thirds vote. The assembly has ordered the conference to clarify the rules in the first week of the meeting. The conference could vote to rescind that order. But it would naturally first have to decide how many votes would be needed to decide whether to reconsider the decision that everything should be decided by consensus.

An International Authority

Absurd as this seems, parliamentary procedure becomes deadly serious to states trying to line up alliances and predict how the conference will vote on a number of crucial points of conflict. "The business of the conference involves such concrete issues and interests that nobody wants to wind up in the minority," one UN official says.

One key confrontation will involve the

creation of an unprecedented international authority to govern the exploitation of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This would have been an esoteric topic a few years ago, but now several major mining companies, mostly from the U.S., are ready to take huge tonnages of minerals from the ocean floor at depths as great as 20,000 feet.

Some developing countries, landlocked countries and countries not enamored of free enterprise want to share the wealth through an international authority that will operate the mines or at least form joint ventures. Advanced countries, namely the U.S., want an international body that will mainly grant mining licenses. Developed countries are worried about minerals shortages and expropriation threats; developing countries with rich resources don't want markets destroyed for minerals they mine on land. There isn't much room for compromise.

Just as contentious is the question of what to do about the sea under national jurisdiction. There is general agreement that coastal states will get absolute sovereignty 12 miles from their shores. But beyond that, about 200 miles to the edge of the continental shelves, there is a problem: how to retain national jurisdiction while giving the international community some rights in the area. This issue, says John Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the talks, "involves more interests of more states than any other problem in the law-of-the-sea negotiations."

Some Latin American coastal states will argue for complete control of everything 200 miles out. A few of their neighbors will support a 200-mile "patrimonial sea" where other states can navigate but can't mine or drill without permission. On the other hand, the U.S.—as well as some states with resources but without the wherewithal to get them—wants coastal states to relinquish some jurisdiction and in return to share in the revenue of investments made off their shores.

Fish and Pollution

Living resources are another kettle of fish. There are countries that hook most of their catch off their coasts; they want to keep foreigners out. Other countries have fishermen who travel long distances after their quarry; they want access to foreign waters. And still other countries, the U.S. included, have both kinds of fishermen, and they want the law to apply differently to different kinds of fish.

Even further from resolution is the pollution problem. Ideally, ocean pollution could be controlled by an international body with power in national and international waters. Because a lot of ocean pollution starts out on land, this authority might even have some influence on the kind of garbage allowed in the oceans to begin with.

But that sort of rule would infringe on coastal-state sovereignty. As a result, the language of all the pollution proposals is high-minded but purposefully vague. International standards for land-based pollution are undoubtedly out the window. Some states want pollution standards that can be relaxed if their economic situation is bad. Others want the right to impose stricter standards if they choose. Any such ideas are anathema to maritime countries worried about their ships having to meet one standard in one port and another standard in another port.

There is one area on which the U.S. and other big powers aren't likely to compromise. These nations want freedom to pass through narrow straits, regardless of how much the conference extends a nation's territorial limits. The major powers want their nuclear submarines to pass through the straits unimpeded and underwater.

Some U.S. groups are concerned that under Pentagon pressure to win on this issue, the U.S. delegation might bargain away all other points. One congressional aide says that the Pentagon "would trade every damn thing there is lying around—fish, oil and everything else—to be able to go through the straits of the world with their atomic subs under water."

The Question of Time

Various groups are also worried about how long it might take to put into effect any international law that might come out of the conference. Another conference session seems almost certain next year, but any final agreement it might produce could languish as long as a decade before wide ratification.

Congress is already considering a bill that would permit ocean miners to go ahead and mine if the conference doesn't come up with a pact by next year. Another bill, which has a good chance of being passed this summer although it would probably be vetoed by President Nixon, would extend U.S. control over foreign fishermen to 200 miles from the current 12 miles. Rep. Gary Studds of Massachusetts, a principal sponsor of the bill, says, "If we wait, the question will be academic. There won't be any fish."

Mr. Studds was also instrumental in getting the law passed that declared the lobster not a fish. He says he did it because he didn't think the lobster could wait for an international law of the sea either.

The State Department didn't agree with Mr. Studds on that, but there is in all this at least one point of almost universal agreement—clams. The State Department, Mr. Studds and almost everybody else seem to be under national jurisdiction. "Clams are sedentary," U.S. Ambassador Stevenson says. "There is no problem with clams."

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New Draft Sea Law Treaty. But What Comes After?

A second round of international negotiations which ended on 10 May fell far short of producing a treaty to bring order to ocean law. But the 8-week Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva did produce a draft treaty which U.S. officials say is "in the ball park" of what the United States had hoped to achieve.

A remaining stumbling block is the draft treaty's proposal that seabed resource development be controlled by an International Seabed Authority. This group would be controlled, in effect, by developing countries, since they vastly outnumber developed countries, and it would make decisions by a two-thirds vote. The number of countries likely to have the technology to mine the seabed is barely a handful.

The draft, released the day the meeting ended and written by the chairman of the three working committees, was not voted on by the participating nations. The diplomats term the document an "informal single negotiating text" and consider it a starting point for the third round of talks. These will take place in New York next March. U.S. officials say that the compilation of such a single document—in contrast to the previous situation in which there were multiple wordings of every proposed rule—is itself a major achievement.

Time, however, is becoming an important element in the law of the sea negotiations, as it may take both the New York meeting and a fourth one in 1977 before a final treaty emerges. With this in mind, the conference president, Hamilton S. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), issued a "fervent appeal" for all nations to refrain from actions that would jeopardize the eventual conclusion of a treaty. This was a none-too-veiled reference to the United States and the U.S. Congress, where legislation is being considered that would authorize U.S. mining companies to begin ocean ventures immediately. Congress is also considering fishing bills which, by extending national jurisdiction over fish stocks to 200 miles from shore, could provoke confrontations with Soviet and Japanese fishing fleets that would further hinder negotiations.

The draft treaty would set two international rules which were almost foregone conclusions by the end of the Geneva session. The limits of all nations' territorial waters would be extended from 3 to 12 miles offshore, and coastal states would be allowed to establish an "economic zone" of jurisdiction extending at least 200 miles offshore.

Transit rights. The draft also gives the United States in substance what it sought for military purposes, namely the right to pass through international straits. Since the 12-mile limit would close off some 116 straits which are now open to international traffic and considered strategically crucial, some ambiguity remains about what rules the nations bordering these straits can enforce on traffic passing through them.

Pollution. The draft treaty would set standards by international agreement on activities from ocean dumping to ship construction. The United States had favored this, arguing that if the job were left to coastal states, an impractical patchwork of conflicting standards would result. Enforcement out to 200 miles would be left to the coastal states. On the open ocean, it would be the job of the International Seabed Authority.

Controls on research. The draft treaty would not require research vessels to obtain coastal states' consent for "fundamental" research projects performed off their shores. But it would require consent for research that is "related to the resources of the economic zone or the continental shelf." In addition, as

offer scientists or observers from the coastal state the chance to participate in the research. Data and findings must be made available to the coastal state (*Science*, 8 June 1973).

The International Seabed Authority would have to be notified before research could be conducted in the open ocean; it would also be authorized to conduct its own research.

Technology transfer. Developing nations at the conference outnumber developed ones by over 2 to 1. Not surprisingly then, the draft treaty provides for technology transfer of marine scientific know-how from developed to less developed countries. The draft says that all nations shall "promote the development of marine scientific and technological capacity of developing states" as well as landlocked states and those with limited access to the sea. This promotion would take the form of international cooperative programs, hiring of personnel from less developed countries for the technical staff of the international authority, and regional marine science centers.

Deepsea mining. No consensus exists here and U.S. officials make no bones about their unhappiness with the deepsea mining provisions. The International Seabed Authority could conduct the deepsea mining operations, or it could contract with states to have it done. Constituted so that the developing countries have a clear majority vote in both its assembly and its council, the authority is also instructed to note the negative impact deepsea mining could have on countries that are heavy exporters of minerals.

Ironically, the revelation that the ocean mining ship *Glomar Explorer* was really a cover for U.S. intelligence activities may ease the way for eventual negotiation of a seabed authority more acceptable to the United States. The story broke during the meeting, and incensed some delegates already suspicious of U.S. spying under the guise of research. But it may have been a relief to other delegations who assumed that the *Glomar Explorer* was actively mining the ocean bottom and hence felt pressured to enact some form of controls.

Now that the Geneva meeting is over, the ocean law issue will bounce into Congress' court. There, a major piece of legislation on fishing that will extend U.S. jurisdiction over fish stocks to 200 miles offshore has a good chance of passing this session. The bill's particulars are compatible with the fishing provisions of the "economic zone" articles in the draft treaty. However, throughout the meetings, the U.S. negotiators have urged other countries not to take any unilateral actions until after a final treaty emerges. The picture will change, obviously, if the United States takes unilateral action itself.

The fishing bill would benefit a substantial segment of the country's fishing industry; on the other hand, the deepsea mining bill would aid only those three companies actively engaged in ocean mining development: the Hughes interests (who maintain they are still working on ocean mining, intelligence cover or no); Tenneco's Deepsea Ventures, Inc. (which last year announced a claim in the Pacific); and, to a lesser extent, Kennecott Copper Corp. Conceivably, the bill could pass the Senate this session, an event which would have considerable impact on the already polarized seabed negotiations when they resume in March. Says one official, "It would be like two people standing there ready to fight and one of them throws the first punch." Until March, then, on several legislative fronts, Congress will have to decide what the chances are that the new draft treaty will turn into a real one.

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—DEBORAH SHAPLEY

Geneve Chelms File

never had to work from West Virginia, to run factor.

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News Summary and Index

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1975

The Major Events of the Day

Additional

President Ford asked Congress yesterday to appropriate \$1 billion to pay for the resettlement of 100,000 refugees from South Vietnam over the next 28 months. The Administration has already committed \$98-million, and other Federal funds, for the resettlement of refugees who fled the Communist takeover in South Vietnam. [Page 1-8.]

The Defense Department disclosed that it had started removing from the inventory many of the 130 planes flown there by South Vietnamese pilots last week after the Communists took over Saigon. The former South Vietnam and the new Saigon Government demanded that the United States return the planes to South Vietnam. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger said last week that the United States will have title to the aircraft, which it will return to the former Saigon Government as part of its military aid program. [1:6-7.]

More than 100,000 Vietnamese refugees escaped from Saigon, the city was marred by what diplomats and newsmen describe as bad planning, bitter fighting between sections of the United States and often an every-man-for-himself attitude. Department officials said that they had evacuated virtually the entire non-

of New York," and the first five volumes of "Jefferson and His Time," by Dumas Malone. The prize for the best play went to Edward Albee's "Seascape," his second play to win the Pulitzer. In journalism, The Boston Globe, The Xenia (Ohio) Daily News and The Indianapolis Star were cited. [1:1-2.]

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey testified in the trial of his former campaign manager that as a candidate for re-election in 1970 he personally sought the support of the Associated Milk Producers, Inc. But he said he had no personal knowledge of the illegal contribution that Jack L. Chestnut, his former aide, is accused of taking. [1:3.]

Secretary of State Kissinger said that he and the National Security Council had had no involvement in the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic spying operations and that he had never "transmitted" to the agency any feeling of concern about domestic security on President Nixon's behalf. He made the statement to newsmen after testifying before the Rockefeller Commission, which is investigating the C.I.A.'s domestic activities. It appeared to contradict Richard Helms, a former chief of the C.I.A. [1:1-2.]

Kenneth B. Keating, Ambassador to Israel and former Republican Senator from New York, died at the age of 74. His political career in New York was associated with the "good government" Republican years. He lost his Senate seat

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USSR

(continued from page 1)

The Soviet document, called "Working Document on the basic provisions of the rules and conditions governing the evaluation and exploitation of the mineral resources of the seabed beyond the limits of the continental shelf" (A. Conf. 62/C.1/L.12), also contains some positive provisions relating to the sectors reserved for application from states, ("or groups of states").

It proposes that for each category of mineral, no one state, regardless of its size or population, shall be entitled to apply for more than a given area. The limit, whatever it is, will be the same for all states. The Soviet Union thus claims no advantage to itself from being the largest state in the world and one of the most populous. The fact that "groups of states" may apply would, presumably, leave it open, for instance, to the Group of 77 to make a collective application, if they can raise or attract the necessary capital and technology. The hundred states in the "group of 77" could eventually, under the terms of the Soviet proposal, exploit in aggregate a hundred times as large an area as that to which the Soviet Union itself was confined, or ten times as large an area as ten socialist states together could apply for.

The proposal also contained a provision for inspection and monitoring of seabed operations by the Authority—a very necessary aspect of any regime claiming to protect the "common heritage." It does not, as yet, give the Authority any right to regulate the pace of development throughout the international area, i.e., including those sectors for which states can apply.

Some such right is essential if the Authority is to be able to make timely adjustments to possible economic and ecological repercussions of exploitation. This does not mean giving it the power to strangle production and force up the price of seabed minerals. It does mean authorizing it to act so as to prevent prices from sharply falling as a result of seabed mining. Since the document expressly emphasizes that it does not represent the Soviet Union's final position on the question, there is no reason to assume that it has decided against such a provision, which would not seem to run counter to the general spirit of the proposal.

One provision of the Soviet proposal would, perhaps, unnecessarily impede the realization of the "common heritage" idea. That is the requirement that the Authority should, in the sectors open to applications, deal only with states, and not with individuals or groups of individuals. This would have full discretion to sub-contract "to natural

or juridical persons," including, presumably, private companies and consortia. This would seem to prevent the Authority from satisfying itself in advance of the competence of the entity that would do the exploiting. It would make the state responsible for the behavior of a company over which, in some cases, it might have little control. The Authority itself could, of course, inspect and monitor operations, and penalize those that fell short of its standards, but it would be better if by dealing directly with the enterprise concerned, it could establish the incompetence of an applicant before it did any damage.

Perhaps the Soviet Union is concerned that its own state enterprises should not be excluded from exploitation. Such fears seem groundless, since an Authority which dealt directly with companies could also deal on the same terms, directly with state enterprises—in both cases under the sponsorship of states.

In spite of this, the Soviet Union is to be congratulated on this proposal. It marks a step toward compromise with the Group of 77 position, a partial acceptance of a principle quite at variance with the USSR's original position.

The gap between divergent views has been narrowed. If other countries show comparable willingness to compromise, the essential constitutional framework of a regime for the "common heritage" may yet emerge from Geneva.

SCIENCE

(continued from page 7)

Antics such as the Howard Hughes-CIA venture to raise a Soviet submarine under the guise of exploring for manganese nodules will adversely affect UNCLOS discussions on marine scientific research, warned Christopher Pinto, Chairman of Committee I and delegate from Sri Lanka. Pinto felt it was likely to increase the trend toward coastal state control over scientific research which is a contentious issue in Committee III.

Research institutions feel burdened by red tape and restrictions of suspicious coastal states. They fear the trend toward coastal state control will cool the zeal for research in coastal areas where it yields most valuable results.

Developing states disagree. They suspect that industrial, military and intelligence espionage off their coastal areas may be carried out under the rubric of pure scientific research.

CANCION de la ampollita

Una va pasada y en dos muelle; mas molera si mi Dios guerra a mi Dios pidamos que bien viaje hagamos; y a la que es Madre de Dios y abogadannuestra, que nos libre de agua de bomba y tormentas.



(One glass is gone and now the second flower) more shall run down if my God will. To my God let's pray to give us a good voyage; and through His blessed Mother our advocate on high, protect us from the waterspout and send no tempest nigh)

Questions—

- What, exactly, is a joint venture?
- Arab states now own 3% of the world's tankers. How will they reconcile their support of broad coastal state powers with their growing maritime interests?
- Who is the mysterious entity so often referred to in Committee III as "the competent international organization"?
- Would regional sharing of resources be equitable or effective? How would resources shared in Africa, for example, compare with those shared in North America?
- Who will serve as agents of technology transfer?

Editorial board: Lee Kimball, editor; Dale Andrew, Jim Bridgman, John Diamante, Joyce Hamlin, Miriam Levering, Jim Orr, Barbara Weaver, Carolyn White. Thanks to Edith Ballantyne Imprimerie: Roto-Sadag, S.A.

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NEPTUNE

Number 2

INDEPENDENT NEWS AT THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE, GENEVA

April 4, 1975

NEW USSR PROPOSAL

ISRA Could Mine Seabed

by Roderick Ogley

A document which could mark a highly significant contribution to the creation of institutions embodying the idea of the "common heritage" was presented by the Soviet Union to the First Committee at its meeting on March 26. The Soviet Union has become the first developed state publicly to propose a role for a Seabed Authority going beyond the mere regulation of the activities of others; and thus to approach, in some way at least, the position of the Group of 77.

At Caracas, opinion on this question was polarized. The Group of 77 called for an Authority which, within the international area can either exploit the seabed itself, or make whatever arrangements it chooses with other entities which enable it to retain full control of all operations. The developed states, in contrast, sought to limit the discretion of the international body.

Subject only to certain minimum restrictions relating mainly to competence, work requirements, the safety of navigation and the prevention of pollution, they wanted to allow all who wished to exploit the seabed of the international area to do so as rapidly as they could so that the international body was not permitted either to regulate the rate of exploitation, or the terms of contracts with states and enterprises, or to undertake mining itself. Proposals along these lines were put before Committee I from the USA, from eight members of the European Economic Community and from Japan. There was no corresponding proposal from any of the Eastern socialist states at Caracas, but there was little sign that they envisaged a Seabed Authority with any greater discretion.

What the Soviet Union now proposes is that every exploitable part of the seabed beyond the limits of the continental shelf should be divided into two sectors. One sector would be preserved by the International Seabed Authority to exploit either directly, or through whatever indirect means it chooses; the other is to be open for states, or groups of states, to apply for. In this sector, each state would be entitled to a fair share and the Authority's discretion would be correspondingly limited. The relative size of the "international" and "national" sectors would be specified in the Convention, but the document itself does not say what it should be. (continued on page 8)



DELEGATES NARROW GAPS ON DISPUTES

Ocean policy experts and delegates are saying privately that a law of the sea convention or treaty which does not provide a mechanism to settle disputes between parties would be of relatively little value. In this view, UNCLOS III would suffer from the same drawbacks which undermined the effectiveness of the 1958 and 1960 law of the sea conventions: shortsighted perspectives on what uses the oceans might be put to in five, ten, or fifty years, and a reluctance to settle disputed issues at the time. These omissions guaranteed that UNCLOS III would become a forum for interpretation and discussion of disputes arising out of the older conventions.

It is an encouraging sign for the law of the sea negotiations that a sizeable group of delegates in Caracas agreed to form an informal working group on the issue of settling disputes. By the end of the Caracas session, the group had met together several times and drafted Conference Document A. 62/L. 7, which embodied texts for alternative approaches to compulsory dispute settlement.


Considerable gaps remain between positions of some representatives of the dispute settlement group. But their continued meetings at a weekend retreat in nearby Montreux and in the Palais have reduced the number of differences.

An all-embracing mechanism for settling maritime disputes is difficult to find because so many different interests are at stake in the sea. Small states are all too aware of the power differentials between themselves and the large industrial nations. When disagreements occur, they hope to meet the big states in a neutral juridical setting where the odds against them are not so overwhelming. Large and powerful states fear arbitrary coastal state actions. New powers and areas of jurisdiction granted to coastal states in the ocean convention may result in the detention of vessels for minor infractions or technicalities disrupting the flow of commerce upon which their highly developed economies depend.

- 1) Modify the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to handle ocean disputes, perhaps by establishing a special chamber of ocean jurists to hear sea law disputes;
- 2) Set up a law of the sea tribunal quite separate from the ICJ, to hear disputes related to the proposed international seabed authority, or according to a variant of this view, to hear any disputes relating to all areas covered in an ocean convention;
- 3) A functional approach where disputes in different categories would be considered in different forums—an arbitration panel for fisheries disputes, a tribunal for the seabed, etc.

(Continued on page 7)

walling planet earth



Something there is that doesn't love a wall," wrote the poet Robert Frost. "That wants it down again!"

"Could it be elves?" he muses. Whatever it is, it is not in those governments who have sent talented pin-striped masses to Geneva only to spend their days walling in and walling out the sea. Many approach the superhuman in ability, trying to wall, fence, subdivide and partition something that, like the sky, cannot be walled.

focus on three women

It may be International Women's Year, but it's still a man's world at UNCLOS III. Of some 2,000 delegates, an unofficial count shows 43 women among them.

Despite their small number, several have prominent positions, including Lombe Chibesakunda of Zambia who heads her delegation, and Gertrude Skinner of Ireland who chairs the group within the European Economic Community that works on Committee I issues. Another delegate, Patricia Rodgers of the Bahamas, is working on a doctorate in international affairs and a thesis on "Archipelagos and the Developing Law of the Sea."

LOMBE CHIBESAKUNDA

Zambia is distinguished as the only delegation chaired by a woman (ironically listed as "mistress" in the provisional list of delegates). She is Lombe Chibesakunda, a Member of Parliament, a Minister of State, and Solicitor General of her nation.

A barrister who studied in Zambia and London, Miss Chibesakunda said that the legal profession is part of her family's history. "As a trial chief before independence, my father was responsible for adjudicating matters in the civil and family court system of his tribe," she related. "My brother also practices law and it was natural for me to take an interest in the field."

Until around 1965, chances for a woman entering the legal profession were "practically non-existent," said Miss Chibesakunda. "Times are changing, though slowly, and the chairwoman feels her country is doing well in regard to women's status."

"It's a great challenge to me. It is important that I discharge my duties well. I must not let the President and the people down."

But she questions the wisdom and justice of the exclusive economic zone concept and believes a regional approach is preferable.

"It's an uphill battle, I know. If only we can confine our selfish interests and shape the future equitably," she concluded. "But I have a lot of hope. I believe in the African sense of justice."

PATRICIA RODGERS

Patricia Rodgers' delegate badge is one of the few that carries the title "Ms." She is comfortable in the role of liberated woman and believes that her newly independent country, the Bahamas, is "one of the most liberated countries" for women.

At UNCLOS Ms. Rodgers serves on Committee II and expresses a deep personal commitment to the archipelago concept. "When I arrived at the conference, I was treated as a woman, not as a serious negotiator," she reflected. "But if you keep presenting your ideas on a serious level, you can break through that barrier."

Ms. Rodgers, a striking woman with long lashes who laughs easily, is completing her doctoral work in international affairs. In 1970 she joined the staff of the Ministry of External Affairs and today she is an assistant secretary.

The number of women lawyers, doctors and politicians in the Bahamas is small, but growing. Politics is considered a rough and tumble field and few women run for office. "Many women think it's too dirty to get involved," Ms. Rodgers observed. Still, there are two women senators.

The future for women in the Bahamas looks good, Ms. Rodgers feels, and she looks forward to the day when the percentage of women at international conferences will increase substantially.



DISPUTES

(continued from page 1)

An all-embracing mechanism for settling maritime disputes is difficult to find because so many different interests are at stake in the sea. Small states are all too aware of the power differentials between themselves and the large industrial nations. When disagreements occur, they hope to meet the big states in a neutral juridical setting where the odds against them are not so overwhelming. Large and powerful states fear arbitrary coastal state actions. New powers and areas of jurisdiction granted to coastal states in the ocean convention may result in the detention of vessels for minor infractions or technicalities disrupting the flow of commerce upon which their highly developed economies depend.

Most states, of course, are concerned about violations of environmental rules, navigation agreements, or contracts for marine resource exploitation.

I C J

There is not much momentum for giving the ICJ sole jurisdiction over all ocean disputes. The ICJ has heard only a few ocean disputes of any note in recent years. Norway and Britain's dispute over boundaries in 1951; Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany turned to the Court in 1965 to settle their North Sea boundary dispute, as did Iceland and the UK after gunboats joined their North Atlantic fishing fleets in 1974. Only states themselves can bring cases before the ICJ, yet the nature of ocean disputes foresees many arguments over seabed mining contracts, for example--may involve the international seabed authority in cases with private or state corporations.

Worse, less than 50 states have so far accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, and few without reservations. In 1972, after six years of French nuclear testing near the Mururoa Islands in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand registered official complaints and tried to bring France before the ICJ. France refused, excepting the incidents as a case of "national defense" not subject to the ICJ under its reservations. Soon after, in 1973, Australia succeeded in winning an injunction. While the Court debated the substance of the case, the French produced a "White Paper" which the Court more or less endorsed. The case was dismissed in December, 1974, because of the French claim that they had opted away from atmospheric testing and planned to go underground henceforth.



GERTRUDE SKINNER

Miss Gertrude Skinner is an Irish delegate. She has clear blue eyes and red highlights in her brown hair. At UNCLOS, Miss Skinner chairs the European Economic Community group working on Committee I concerns.


Chairmanship of the EEC rotates each six months and Ireland's turn came during the law of the Sea negotiations. NEPTUNE asked if Miss Skinner was accepted as a chairperson of this prestigious group. "Oh yes," she responded. "There's no problem. Delegates look on you as a good or bad chairperson. Whether you're a woman isn't important." Miss Skinner credited a French chairwoman who preceded her and other competent female delegates within the EEC as persons who paved the way. "It becomes easier," Miss Skinner smiled. "As another girl does well, the next has less to prove."

Miss Skinner's interest in law was also "inherited." "My grandfather and father were in law. I was an only child and carried on the tradition. Perhaps if I'd had several brothers I might not have gone into law," she mused.

Miss Skinner indicated that Ireland held traditional ideas about women and in many ways was "backward." "But things are changing tremendously," she said. She believes that Ireland's entrance into the EEC in 1973 has helped expose the country to broader perspectives and new attitudes.

Miss Skinner is optimistic and feels women are going to make it--not on any superficial quota system, but on their own merits. "I sympathize with the bra burners," she says. "Strong methods are necessary to get attention." But when asked about women becoming priests she seemed surprised. "Goodness! I've never really thought about that one." She laughed good naturedly. "I don't think Ireland's ready for that--not in my lifetime at least."

SEA SCIENCE



During the Caracas session on the law of the sea, the informal working group on scientific research developed four alternative texts incorporating the views of the majority of states represented in the Conference. These ranged from requiring explicit consent of the coastal state or the international authority for any research conducted within their respective areas of jurisdiction, to freedom of scientific research activities beyond the territorial sea, except for research concerned with the exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources within the coastal states' economic zone.

Discussions among the groups supporting the proposals outlined in Caracas here in Committee III in Geneva have focused on what may soon emerge as a single proposal encompassing portions of alternatives A, B, and C. This proposal will espouse strict coastal state consent for research activities in the economic zone related to resource exploration and exploitation, and a more relaxed consent regime for scientific research which clearly deals with winds, tides, currents, etc., and could be classified as pure research. In this manner coastal states will be able to ensure that their territorial and resource interests are adequately protected without unduly hindering global marine scientific research.

They will also be able to select those research institutions which they feel follow through on obligations to share results, allow participation by the coastal state, and thus enhance coastal state marine research capacities. As trust builds up between certain research organizations and coastal states, strict consent procedures could become less and less burdensome.

Responsibility lies with the scientists to alleviate coastal state fears and distrust, and they may become more wary of devious undertakings.

(continued on page 9)

Biggs Jumps Deepsea's Claim

Apprehension runs high among many UNCLOS delegates over how soon the developed countries may begin mining the deep seabed. On November 15, 1974, Deepsea Ventures Inc., filed with the United States Secretary of State an unprecedented notice of discovery and claim of "exclusive mining rights" to 60,000 square kilometers of the seabed of the Pacific Ocean.

On March 26 in Committee I, delegates from Peru and Cuba warned against any state undertaking such mining activities whether as a pressure tactic or otherwise. Australian Senator Willness referred directly to Deepsea Ventures' threat to exclusively mine a portion of the Pacific Ocean floor and denied its justification under the freedom-of-the-high-seas principle. United States Ambassador John R. Stevenson pointed out that legislation circulating within the U.S. Government has not been endorsed by the executive branch nor introduced into Congress. But Stevenson withheld comment on Deepsea's claim.

Gonalo Biggs, of the Legal Department of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, D.C. considers Deepsea's request to be a radical transformation of an abstract legal principle concerning rights to seabed resources beyond national jurisdiction into a serious international problem. In commentaries shared with NEPTUNE (to be elaborated in April issue of International Lawyer) he explained why.

---To indulge in ordinary legal analysis seems frivolous in a situation where a unilateral claim totally ignores the progress made during the last 30 years in regulating human activities in the oceans. Most incredible U.S. Biggs is Deepsea's apparent expectation that the world community would obligingly sanction the company's claim as an exercise of high seas freedoms under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

---The Truman Declaration of 1946 which claimed jurisdiction over resources of the continental shelf precipitated a revolution in world thinking. This unilateral move for oil deposits prompted similar seaward extensions of sovereignty by South American states, and led to a revised concept of the high seas freedoms governing seabed resources articulated in the 1958 Geneva Convention

on the Continental Shelf. According to this agreement, seabed resources located beyond national jurisdiction are effectively placed under the jurisdiction of coastal states. Under the 1958 Convention and the doctrines which arose from the decision of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, coastal state jurisdiction over exploitation of seabed resources was permitted. The Court based its decision on the grounds that a continental shelf is an extension of the principles of "prescription" or "occupation" of the continental shelf up to the "abyssal ocean floor."

---Biggs cites the General Assembly's Moratorium Resolution and the Declaration of Principles as evidence of emerging "customary Law" as to the acceptance of the "common heritage" doctrine and the rejection of Deepsea's claim of "res nullius." ("Res nullius" means belonging to no one.) That the U.S. signed the Declaration of Principles, and participates in current law of the sea negotiations to establish an international authority to govern seabed mining, reveals a "fundamental incompatibility in tolerating individual exploitation of the seabed resources--however transitory--with the efforts to establish international legal machinery--how are we to interpret denial of recognition (by the United States) to exclusive mining rights of the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and, at the same time, to interpret denial of recognition to Deepsea's assertion that mining of those same resources may proceed in accordance with international law?" One must ask whether it is Deepsea Ventures or the U.S. law of the sea negotiators who best reflect U.S. opinion.

In light of Biggs analysis which shows Deepsea's international legal "claim" to be somewhat questionable, the question remains of the purpose of the claim. Some experts have concluded that the sole purpose of the Deepsea request was to enter their claim on the record so that if and when plots of the seabed are allocated, Deepsea will have spoken early for a prime piece of resource rich real estate. It is difficult for these experts to conceive of anyone's taking seriously the legal justification in which they have cloaked their claim to some deep sea territory.

FATE OF THE LAND-LOCKED, SHELF-LOCKED, & ZONE-LOCKED

Friday, April 4, 1975

NEPTUNE

Zone-locked states are coastal states which would have to cross another state's economic zone to reach the high seas. If the proposed 200 mile economic zones include some type of jurisdiction over navigation, the 68 coastal states which have to traverse neighboring coastal zones to reach the high seas might have to consent to restricted access.

Five additional coastal states would lack high seas access to one side of the ocean on which they face, and six land-locked states, once they attain access to neighboring coastal state waters, would still be confronted with additional coastal state zones before they can reach the high seas. Adding 30 land-locked states brings the total of states with limited high seas access, subject to the whims and benevolence of neighboring states to 96.

Potentially Zone-locked States

Americas	6
Europe	17
Asia and Oceania	11
Middle East and Africa	27

The Question of Islands
Islands would fare very well with a 200-mile zone of economic jurisdiction. Three island states rank in the first seven nations according to the most area under a 200 mile boundary. Most of the Central Pacific west of 135° W would be taken up by the economic zones of many islands, islets, and rocks.

WHAT IS THE RESOURCE POTENTIAL WITHIN SUGGESTED LIMITS AND WHO WOULD GAIN FROM THEIR ADOPTION?

If 200 miles becomes the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone, this zone would incorporate 36% of the ocean seabed (assuming an economic zone around Antarctica). The only exploitable seabed resources in this zone in the reasonable future are likely to be found on the shelf and slope. Assuming that 200 meters will continue to be under coastal state jurisdiction, the size and quality of the continental slope that each nation acquires within 200 miles determines its potential welfare gain.

If 200 miles plus 200 meters, whichever is farther from shore, becomes the accepted outer limit of the exclusive economic zone, four of the six countries who would gain from the proposal are highly developed. These nations may propose some system of revenue sharing in these continental shelf zones beyond 200 miles to counter disagreement on their "advantage", but the international community should not place high hopes on these resources in the mere 38, 000 additional square miles, since much of this area is in inhospitable Arctic waters.

If 200 miles or 4, 000 meters (the slope), whichever is farther from shore, becomes the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone, almost all of the continental land mass would be included within coastal state jurisdiction, 90-98% of offshore petroleum lies within this proposed limit. There are approximately 20 countries which have slopes that continue outside their 200 mile zone (14 whose slopes reach beyond the 200 miles plus 200 meters criterion). A small number of them—nine—would gain 95% of the resource value from this extension of jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. Six of these are highly developed nations.

If 100 miles plus the toe of the continental rise becomes the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state would gain jurisdiction over its entire continental mass. This geomorphological criterion is justified as representing the "natural prolongation" of the continental state. However, due to the very gentle slope of the rise (less than 1 part in 1, 000), beyond the toe of the rise would be subsumed under national control, including mid-ocean ridges. Most of the Atlantic Ocean would be divided up leaving only two small isolated international zones. Petroleum beyond the edge of the slope is at most only two to eight per cent of the total offshore potential. (Some valuable manganese nodules lie at depths of 4, 000 meters as well.)


Boundaries and Manganese Nodule Potential
200 mile zones of exclusive economic jurisdiction place some important manganese nodule deposits under national jurisdiction of both continental nations and islands.

If present trends continue in Committee II and in the Evensen Group of Juridical Experts, coastal states may end up with the best of two worlds. States opposing a 200-mile exclusive economic zone to protect coastal fishing interests will be satisfied, and states with wide continental margins will receive jurisdiction over seabed resources beyond 200 miles out to the edge of the continental margin. This would double the 200 mile limit for some states. In the Caracas session, the 200 miles were still pitted against the "marginisers" who wanted to go further.

The vast majority of countries will gain little from continental margin resources which lie within their proposed 200-mile economic zones. Only 32 countries have significant oil potential beyond 200 meters depth. There are 30 land-locked, 23 shelf-locked, and 53 countries with narrow continental slopes (the continental margin beyond 200 meters). These states could benefit from some sort of revenue-sharing from petroleum resources beyond 200 meters. Of the 45 remaining states which have wide slopes, two have no oil potential and 11 have at most from zero to 250 million barrels total of potential recoverable oil resources.

Indonesia*The Strait State Extraordinary**
Indonesia will soon count within its jurisdiction 16 straits used for international transit, four of which are deemed critical to international maritime traffic. (The responsibility for two of these is shared equally with its neighbors.) According to reports picked up along the social circuit, a high-level, law of the sea official representing a state which fashions itself a champion of unimpeded transit through straits and coastal zones, was off last weekend to Jakarta to represent the interests of a maritime state in high-level deliberations with Indonesian representatives with the hope that some settlement could be worked out.

The Question of Semi-enclosed Seas
Two-thirds of offshore petroleum production now comes from the Gulf of Mexico and the Persian Gulf. One-fourth of the world's commercial fisheries catch is recovered from semi-enclosed seas. These 26 semi-enclosed seas are bordered by about half of the nations in the world. Revenue sharing beyond 200 meters in these areas could yield major resources for international community purposes.



Boundary Proposals

Boundary Proposal	Est. percentage of total seabed falling within national jurisdiction	Est. percentage of total petroleum resources in national jurisdiction	Est. Number (total) of nations making small or no gain from extending boundaries	Est. Number (increase) of nations with large recoverable resources (from above 11)
200 meters	8%	55-70%	---	---
200 miles and/or 2500 meters	35.86%	80-95%	149	32*
200 miles and/or seaward edge of the rise	39.9%	90-98%	162	39*
200 miles and/or seaward edge of the rise	40.4%	98-100%	144	7(?)

*96 countries gain some seabed in extending from 200 meters to 200 miles, but 53 of these have narrow slopes (less than 50 miles) and of the 45 wide slope states, all but 32 have very low potential recoverable resources—that is between 0 and 250 million barrels, most of them at the lower end of this range.

FISH n SHIPS

There is agreement among ocean experts that a "fish problem" exists, but most people are confused as to exactly what the problem is, why it is, and how it can be solved.

The "fish problem" is really a series of issues, interrelated because of overlapping jurisdictions. It is a case of overfishing in some areas and underfishing in others; of depletion of some major existing stocks and non-utilization of other marketable fish species. It is a confusing picture of scores of regional fishery arrangements, attempts at seeking international solutions, and the likelihood that UNCLOS III may turn over control of important coastal stocks to over 100 coastal states, each of which may decide how many fish may be harvested and by whom.

SOME STOCKS DECLINING


The statistics themselves are seemingly contradictory. By all signs available, ocean fishing has the potential to provide vast new quantities of protein for an increasingly protein-starved world. The world fishing industry "take" increased by three and one half times over the two decades from 1950 to 1970. Some fisheries experts have made the hopeful projection that the oceans could support an annual harvest of twice the 1970 level of 70 million metric tons.

Yet the total world fish catch reached a maximum in 1970 and has declined every year since. The apparent contradiction lies in the fact that there is an increasing concentration of fishing effort on already overfished species, the result of more fishermen with better equipment going after declining stocks. The reasons for the virtual decimation of higher yielding fishing stocks are clear. Fish are the only food resource that is virtually free for the taking—all one needs is a minimum of capital for the initial investment of a boat and nets, plus a relatively small amount of labor.

Until the demand for fish reached its current high level, there was no problem. Unlike farmers and herders who learned quickly that one reap what one sows, fishermen thought they could reap harvests without investment in conservation measures.

States paid lip service to the ideals of conservation and stock preservation and several dozen regional and international fisheries commissions to oversee the taking of marine fishes. Yet they were careful to give these commissions the teeth they needed to effectively enforce what restrictions they could agree upon, and everyone continued to gobble up all their nets could catch.

In some cases where quotas were placed on a particular fish stock, enterprising fishermen were able to frustrate the intent by concentrating their efforts on other vulnerable stocks, taking advantage of inevitable time lags in international regulation. Today there are even those who no longer find it in their interest to play along, and have openly announced their intention to ignore quotas. Japanese and Soviet whalers are a case in point.



Coastal state regulations for "purposes of conservation" are being given short shrift as well. In the recent cod war, British fishermen were labeled pirates by Iceland for fishing within Iceland's 50 mile zone, and now West German-Icelandic diplomatic relations are strained over the same subject. The U.S. government spends millions battling out an average of two or three tuna boats a month from imprisonment in West Coast Latin American states for fishing without the proper licenses.

Fishery experts have isolated a group of potentially productive fishing grounds which are now under-utilized: oil sardines off Oman and southern Arabia up to Iran, (potentially 1 million tons per year); coastal stocks in the Indian Ocean, (estimated at 12 to 20 million tons per year); and other areas including the South China Sea, Argentina's Patagonian Shelf, the coastal waters of Mauritania, and possibly other areas of West Africa. The biggest potential fishery, the Antarctic krill, is estimated at from 50 to 100 million tons annually. Krill could seemingly replace the anchovy as the principle source of fish meal.

An estimated one-third of world fish production goes into fish meal or oil which together with soy beans, form the major sources of protein for live stock and poultry. (Some observers claim that anchovies have been priced beyond the means of the fishermen themselves by competition from North American buyers who are willing to pay high prices to turn anchovies into pet food.)

The attempts at UNCLOS III to grapple with the fisheries problem fully reflect the complexities of the issue. The most crucial question of control over the valuable coastal stocks has largely been settled through widespread agreement in support of the establishment of a coastal state economic resource zone that will stretch from the coastal state's territorial sea to a distance of 200 miles (or possibly to the physical edge of the continental margin). Control of resources within this area will belong to the coastal state, but with certain qualifications.

As the pressure of distant water fishing states, principally the USSR, US, Japan, Norway, Canada, Spain, Romania, Portugal, East Germany, West Germany, Bulgaria and Italy, the conference is considering the principle of "full utilization." Under this regime, coastal states would be obligated to license foreign fishermen to harvest that portion of the annual harvest of fisheries under their management jurisdiction which the coastal state is unable to recover by itself.

Undermining OIL OOZES ON

The U.S. Congress has been considering legislation for three years to "authorize" U.S. companies to mine the deep seabed—commonly referred to as the Metcalf Bill. In its current form, and apparently as a concession to the negotiations at UNCLOS, the mining could not take place until January, 1976. Newspaper reports from the U.S. indicate that there is another version of this bill prepared by the U.S. Department of the Interior which is circulating within the Administration. According to the new measure, if no international treaty were submitted to the Senate by January 31, 1976, the Interior Department would be free to unilaterally issue sea-bed mining licenses by the summer of 1976. Some Congressional and Administration spokesmen have freely admitted they hope the threat of unilateral U.S. action might prompt delegates at UNCLOS to reach a quick agreement in Committee I. This does not appear to represent a majority view, however.

BARGAINING FOR TECHNOLOGY

The proverbial problem of technology transfer from the developed to the developing countries arises in the fisheries issues as well. Some developing coastal states are unenthusiastic about accepting the capital intensive technology and the expensive final products produced by developed-country distant-water fishermen. They would prefer some form of sharing arrangement such as joint ventures which could increase the take of both local and distant-water fishermen in effective fisheries management, supply palatable fish protein for local inhabitants at lower costs, and give a large boost to domestic fishing industry development.

There is little agreement as to the manner in which non-coastal species of fish should be dealt with. While existing arrangements to protect the species interest of coastal spawning areas of anadromous species seem to be adequate for the moment, the highly migratory fishes such as tuna require special regulatory measures by instituting or yet-to-be created international organizations.

Effective international organization seems to be necessary to coordinate and enforce provisions of the convention that will apply to fisheries. Some organization must take responsibility for coordinating the work of a large collection of fisheries commissions with their less than brilliant record in management and conservation techniques.

To this group, add over 100 coastal states, each of whom have their own ideas of how many fish should be harvested and by whom, to say nothing of the threats posed to the health of fish stocks and those who eat fish by pollution.



ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCY?

While it is too early to predict what sort of international coordinating agency will be chosen, three options are being considered. 1) The FAO has been suggested as the assessment and monitoring body because it currently possesses the only good data on fisheries, has developed experience in organizing technical assistance projects in fishery development, and has recently undertaken the task of monitoring food security.

2) A second proposal would have FAO continue its fact-finding and assistance functions, while the new International Seabed Resources Authority would undertake management responsibility for international fisheries such as the Antarctic krill which do not fall under national jurisdiction, in coordination with an International Tuna Commission and the International Whaling Commission.

3) The third approach would grant to the International Authority all the functions mentioned above, now managed (or mis-managed) by existing agencies. Whatever arrangements are finally considered, they must blend interrelated objectives of ecological interrelationships, conservation, utilization, optimal use of capital investments, workable dispute settlement procedures, and world food and economic development needs.

Mining and Undermining

The U.S. Congress has been considering legislation for three years to "authorize" U.S. companies to mine the deep seabed—commonly referred to as the Metcalf Bill. In its current form, and apparently as a concession to the negotiations at UNCLOS, the mining could not take place until January, 1976. Newspaper reports from the U.S. indicate that there is another version of this bill prepared by the U.S. Department of the Interior which is circulating within the Administration. According to the new measure, if no international treaty were submitted to the Senate by January 31, 1976, the Interior Department would be free to unilaterally issue sea-bed mining licenses by the summer of 1976. Some Congressional and Administration spokesmen have freely admitted they hope the threat of unilateral U.S. action might prompt delegates at UNCLOS to reach a quick agreement in Committee I. This does not appear to represent a majority view, however.

The U.S. companies which hope to begin mining the seabed while they still possess a technological lead over other countries, have put considerable pressure on both the Congress and the Administration. They have supported their cause by pointing to huge projected deficits in the U.S. balance of payments, potential mineral shortages—both real and contrived, and the need to develop new sources of minerals.

Three major U.S. companies are known to be actively exploring the possibilities of seabed mining. Deepsea Ventures Inc. of the Tenneco Company has recently announced joint ventures with three Japanese firms; Nichimen Company Ltd., G. Itoh Company Ltd., and Kanematsu Goshu Ltd., to develop ocean mining technology. Deepsea's claim is a stretch of ocean floor in the Pacific near Hawaii is discussed elsewhere in this issue. The second venture centers around the Kennecott Copper Company which has formed a partnership with four other companies including Rio Tinto-Zinc (London), Consolidated Gold Fields, (London), Mitsubishi, (Tokyo) and Noranda Mines, (Toronto). The Summa Corporation, elevated by the CIA to instant infamy last week, is the third potential seabed miner, but whether their efforts will continue to be centered on sunken naval vessels or whether they may actually begin nodule mining remains to be seen.

NGO Notes

Informative seminars open to all interested persons are held at the Quaker International Center, 13 Av. du Merveil (take 33 bus to Le Bouche), 20:30.

On Wednesday, April 2, Ambassador Alexander Yankov, Chairman of Committee III, spoke on the major issues before that group.


Next Wednesday, April 9, Professor Willem Ripham, legal advisor and the vice-chairman of the Netherlands Delegation will speak on the topic of his choice, Whose Common Heritage, by Roderick Ogley, an invaluable analysis of the Caracas Conference and current UNCLOS issues, is available in Geneva at the Naville Bookshop, Palais des Nations, or from the publisher: Francis Pinter, 161 West End Lane, London NW 62 LG. It has 48 pages and costs \$5 postage.

John McConnell, originator of the Earth Day observance, arrived from New York Tuesday to promote his campaign to enroll "Sea Citizens."

While damages from oil slicks cause high interest in an agreement on vessel-source pollution regulations, differences between maritime nations and coastal states are making this one of the toughest issues before UNCLOS. These concerns are being worked over in the Evensen Group where some compromise may be forthcoming. In another arena, the United Kingdom has developed a set of draft articles on the prevention, reduction and control of pollution—and has been blasted by India for its lack of protection of developing country's coastlines.

MARITIME NATIONS' VIEWS

States with extensive maritime interests are wary of vessel-source pollution regulations which would empower coastal states to set or enforce these codes. They fear profits will be hurt, or oil supplies for crucial industries could be curtailed. Potential restriction of transit for military purposes also view, however.



evokes strong resistance to any regulatory impediments to vessel transit. Land-locked states share the concerns of maritime states on this issue because they are often dependent on ship-borne trade and resist any limitation of access through neighboring coastal state waters.

COASTAL POLLUTION FEARED

Coastal states, on the other hand, are interested in protecting their shores from pollution damages. As larger and larger oil tankers put to sea without adequate safety construction and procedures, their threat to the ocean environment grows increasingly serious. Major damage from oil spills in recent years illustrates the crucial need for adequate prevention measures.

General agreement has been reached, however, that LOS nations will accept and apply internationally imposed standards for vessel-source pollution and that states of registry may apply higher standards to vessels bearing their flag.

States are not agreed, however, on two questions:

- 1) whether coastal states should be permitted to apply more stringent standards than those internationally agreed upon, to vessels transiting their waters and under what conditions; and
- 2) whether states other than the state of registry will be allowed to enforce these standards.

Since Caracas, many more states also seem to be willing to recognize the rights of coastal states to set higher standards for vessel-source pollution in certain vulnerable areas such as shallow straits or arctic waters where oil takes a long time to biodegrade. The standards may be subject to review by an international body in order to avoid arbitrary measures. Reports from the Evensen Group indicate possible compromises supporting the right of the coastal state to enforce standards out to, say, 50 miles, but not out to the outermost limits of the proposed economic zone.

OPPOSING DOCUMENT OFFERED

While a great deal of progress in seeking compromise positions has been achieved within the areas of the Evensen Group, other nations are dissatisfied—notably Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom, and introduced a document on March 21. This set of draft articles deals with the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution. They are more representative of maritime state interests, acknowledging coastal state concerns for particular areas where adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of vessel-source pollution may be required for reasons deriving from oceanographical or ecological conditions.


The draft provides that an area may apply to the competent international organization for recognition as a special area. International standards could then be established pursuant to the application.

On enforcement, the document provides for a system of inspection and enforcement by port and flag states, but limits the port state's ability to take proceedings in the event of any violation. It also proposes that coastal states may request information from vessels suspected of violating international regulations, but, as favored by many maritime states, it scrupulously avoids any provision for coastal state enforcement of international standards.

BLASTED BY INDIA

India responded to the document by blasting it as a one-sided proposal which reflected attitudes of shipping powers. The Indians claim it does not take into account the need for protecting the coastlines of developing countries. Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Canada also expressed reservations about the document's omission of enforcement powers for the coastal state.

On March 26, the USSR tabled its own additional draft articles on the prevention of marine pollution. They felt that the UK articles neglected the problem of whether a coastal state could set standards higher than international standards for design, construction, equipment, operation, or manning of foreign ships in their territorial seas or in international straits. The Soviets oppose, this strongly and wish to avoid any arbitrary restrictions on global transit, but their articles did propose that in cases of imminent pollution damage, coastal states could take certain measures to protect their coastlines.



U.S. Ocean Policy Objectives

For ~~Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000300100005-1~~
years the United States Government has attempted to secure certain ocean-related economic and security objectives through international negotiations which, it was hoped, would lead to a timely, comprehensive, and widely accepted international agreement on a variety of important law of the sea matters. It was clear to most observers following last summer's session of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas that this approach was failing. That fact is even clearer now that the recent Geneva session has ended (May 10).

The situation is grave not only because the U.S. has been unable to achieve adoption of the desired treaty, but also because the trends of agreement (where they exist) have almost been in directions inimical to U.S. interests. Even if an agreement were reached along the lines of the "single

negotiating text" which emanated from Geneva, one hopes the Senate would not give its advice and consent to ratification because of the text's anti-American bias.

The time has now come—and it should have come earlier—when this nation must pursue alternative methods of achieving its major ocean policy objectives—access to deep seabed minerals, access to high seas fisheries, protection of coastal fisheries, and maintenance of free navigation on the high seas and through straits. It is imperative that alternatives to a law of the sea treaty be identified, assessed, and pursued. Among approaches the government might consider are:

(1) Bilateral agreements could be used (and are now to a limited extent) to secure fishing rights for United States nationals off the coasts of other nations; they could also be used to ensure continued free navigation through straits.

(2) Limited multilateral agreements could be used to facilitate deep seabed mining by limiting the parties to those states possessing the requisite technology; such treaties could also provide for regional marine resource management (e.g., in the Gulf of Mexico).

(3) Domestic legislation can and should be enacted now to protect coastal fisheries, to authorize U.S. citizens to mine deep seabed minerals, and to protect the offshore environment.

(4) The threat of use of force should be considered in certain situations, and the Department of Defense should develop contingency plans to protect existing ocean rights, including the right to mine deep seabed minerals, the right to fish up to 12 miles from the coasts of other nations, and the right to navigate freely outside the territorial sea and through straits used for international navigation.

If the government should default on its obligation to U.S. citizens to protect such interests by opting only for continued negotiation in the Law of the Sea Conference, national ocean interests will, in my view, be irreparably damaged. We must act now, we must act unilaterally if necessary, and we must be prepared to defend our existing legal rights on the ocean with force if required.

H. Gary Knight
Carnegie-Rochester Professor of
State University Law Center
Member, Advisory Committee on the
Law of the Sea, National Security
Council Inter-Agency Law of the
Sea Task Force.

The Washington Star

JOEL L. ALLBRITTON, Publisher

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THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1975

Search for a Sea Law

Everyone should know by now that the world's seas are in deep trouble. Their life-giving resources of food are threatened by unprecedented plunder and spreading pollution, and their vast mineral treasures soon will be exploited through deep-water mining techniques. Nor is any international issue more complicated and resistant to solution than this one — how to regulate and, more importantly, protect the seas. This difficulty is reflected again in the latest actions at the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva.

In fact, a distinct impression flows from these proceedings that no such law will be enacted for quite a while. The developing nations are locked in rhetorical conflict with the industrial countries, demanding a much larger share of oceanic profits and territorial prerogatives than the latter are likely to give away. But some modestly hopeful signs did emerge from this Geneva round of the conference, in contrast to the discouraging results of its sessions last year in Caracas.

The conferees, representing some 150 nations, finally drew up a draft charter for the oceans. But this document is a long way from being approved by the world community, reflecting as it does the hotly conflicting views of the conferees themselves. It is a working paper, which must undergo numerous alterations if any agreement ever is to be reached. The less controversial aspect (though not lacking controversy by any means) is a 12-mile territorial limit with full sovereignty for coastal countries, coupled with a 200-mile economic zone in which they would control all maritime resources. Going far beyond this, however, is a proposal for an international authority to engage in exploitation of the ocean floor, jointly with countries or companies.

The extent of power which the developing countries want to invest in this body is likely to be the big sticking point. Governing outside the national economic zones, with authority over two-thirds of the international waters, it would issue licenses for projects such as seabed mining, collect royalties and fix prices on whatever is produced. Underdeveloped nations (which lack the technology for seabed operations) would partake of the profits nonetheless, even from activities beyond their reach. Furthermore, sharing the governing authority. Furthermore,

some of them indicate they may attempt to enforce full territorial authority 200 miles out from their coasts. Extension from the present three miles up to 12 doesn't suit them at all.

Plainly visible, then, are the seeds of a conflict that could go on and on. The seas have become a big grab-bag, and some industrial nations will not gladly share the rewards of costly seabed projects with countries that aren't even in the general vicinity. Much less will they agree to fixing of prices by an international group that conceivably might take on the characteristics of a cartel. This price-setting scheme largely represents the fear of developing countries that abundant minerals from the sea floor might drive down the prices of minerals they now mine on their own soil, such as copper, manganese and cobalt. One can appreciate their apprehension about the march of oceanic technology, but how long would the world tolerate artificially high prices?

The realistic point is that only a few nations have the capability of going after those valuable raw materials in the depths, and that some — notably the United States and Russia — probably will be doing it before any law of the sea is devised. If the developing countries demand too much beyond their own territorial spheres, and the richer ones aren't willing to give enough, as may be the case at present, the whole affair could bog down permanently. And that could mean an uncontrolled and perhaps chaotic stampede to reap the ocean riches, in which the rich would get richer. In any case, our own Congress undoubtedly would balk at the charter drafted in Geneva, with its heavy tilt against the industrial nations.

But the draft does provide a basis for negotiation when the Law of the Sea Conference resumes next March in New York, and perhaps a mood of compromise will develop. Some of the developing countries may modify their large demands, and the more affluent ones that actually can exploit the oceans may agree to more generous sharing, and sensible controls. What's needed is more accent on preservation of the seas, rather than obsession with national prerogatives. Otherwise, the death of their living resources, from pollution and over-harvesting, will be a far greater loss than any gains from the rush for minerals.

Handwritten initials

GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST
20 May 1975

Prospects for a Law of the Sea

REPORTS OF THE DEATH of the Law of the Sea Conference, the United Nations' long-running effort to limit national disputes on, in and under the oceans, are decidedly premature. It may yet turn out that no treaty will be written on national territorial and economic jurisdiction, navigation and the transit of ships, fisheries, deep seabed mining, pollution, research and like issues. At the eight-week conference session just concluded at Geneva, however, at least some progress was made in every area except seabed mining. An "informal single negotiating text," something like a bill, was drafted, and negotiations on it are to resume in New York next March. One cannot be sanguine. But it is unfair to conclude the lack of solid international agreement makes it legitimate or necessary for each nation to go off on its own. This is the only chance the world will have to apply the rule of law to its oceans. As last week's costly chase over the Mayaguez all too amply demonstrated, the alternative is chaos and conflict.

The one area where the United States probably will act unilaterally concerns fisheries. The Law of the Sea Conference had long been on notice that, without an agreement on extending coastal nations' fisheries jurisdiction, the Congress would itself write legislation to extend American fisheries jurisdiction from the existing three miles to 200 miles. The chief offenders here are Russia and Japan, whose large modern fleets have endangered a dozen or more coastal species. The Conference will probably denounce the United States for legislating an extension. But one can expect the denunciation, and the damage of the example, to be limited. For one reason, extension would be consistent with the Conference's developing consensus on a 200-mile economic zone for coastal nations. For another reason, Russia and Japan are widely perceived to be inadequately concerned with proper management and conservation of fisheries resources. There is reason to believe that if the Executive shows a live concern for the very real economic and resource problem of coastal fisheries, the Congress will respond in a way that will do minimal

damage to the diplomatic objective of international agreement on a Law of the Sea treaty. In any event, that should be the goal.

That the conference split on deep seabed mining is no less troubling for being expected. The problem is that the United States, the only country with seabed mining technology, wishes to establish a system that will both attract private capital and assure access to the minerals to be extracted, while the poor and land-locked countries, calling the deep seabed the "common heritage" of mankind, want a system ensuring their own control and profit. In the absence of international agreement on this intensely ideological issue, pressure is mounting for another unilateral American move. Deepsea Ventures and Kennecott, the two leading corporations in the business, would have the United States license and protect their proposed operations; this course is favored by their friends in the Interior Department and in Congress and by others fearing a future resource squeeze. But while delay in the matter of fisheries will allow further ravaging of fish stocks, those manganese nodules are in no similar peril. Commercial mining isn't due to begin for more than five years, and plenty of other problems must be straightened out first. In brief, there is both time and diplomatic need to see if the seabed mining gap cannot be narrowed next year.

The United States has the largest and most diverse oceans interests of any nation. Thus we have the greatest need to impose an agreed pattern of law on the seas. At the Conference, a broad consensus has already been achieved on extension of the national territorial sea to 12 miles, on freedom of navigation beyond 12 miles, and on unimpeded transit through the more than 100 straits that would be overlapped by national waters under a 12-mile rule. If a Law of the Sea treaty were already in universal effect, there would have been no incident such as the one that occurred in the Gulf of Siam last week. The gains so far made and those still within reach are too important to be put at risk by unilateral national acts that can be safely deferred.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 May 1975

MOSCOW STALLED IN FOREIGN POLICY

**Gromyko Looks to U.S. Help
to Resolve Europe, Arms
and Mideast Issues**

By **CHRISTOPHER S. WREN**
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 19 — The Kremlin's efforts to promote Soviet prestige through a succession of forums abroad appear to have been stalled despite some advantages offered by recent American

The situation, in which Moscow is being frustrated by a timetable of its own optimistic making, figures in Soviet concern at a time when Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko is believed to be raising some of the more pressing problems with Secretary of State Kissinger at their two-day meeting in Vienna.

The Soviet Union has apparently learned that it cannot surmount some of these deadlocks alone. Perhaps most timely is the breakthrough needed for an accord limiting strategic arms that will justify a visit by the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, to the United States this fall. Beyond this are two other events sought by Moscow—the convening of the Middle East peace conference by Geneva and the wind-up of the European security

Moscow's hope of presiding over a meeting of European Communist parties later this year hardly depends on American cooperation. But Moscow seems to feel that such a meeting can be inhibited unless the other problems are resolved.

Judging by recent speeches, articles and private comments, the Kremlin is already feeling the pinch of time as it looks ahead to the 25th party congress set for Feb. 24. This is a good nine months away, but the Russians are counting on the series of international meetings to enhance Mr. Brezhnev's image in preparation for the congress, which will promulgate Soviet policy for the next five years.

Mr. Brezhnev's pending visit to Mr. Ford, now mentioned in terms of next fall, leaves scant time for the European security

which hinges on the issue of verification of the ceiling on multiple warhead systems.

According to one Western diplomat, Mr. Brezhnev has privately told visitors that he expects to see President Ford. Such a meeting was characterized by Mr. Gromyko last week as "an exceptionally important and major undertaking." Yet there are no signs of preparations for the visit.

In theory Mr. Brezhnev's trip does not hinge on a successful arms accord, but American diplomats concede that without it a meeting with Mr. Ford would look empty.

European Issues Remain

The 35-nation European security talks that Moscow wants to see wound up by the respective heads of state in Helsinki, still snagged on such lingering East-West differ-

COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

BALTIMORE SUN
20 May 1975

In Russia, forward steps go backward

By MICHAEL PARKS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow — Soviet censors have vetoed the principal East German entry to the Moscow Film Festival this summer and East German sources now fear that the rebuke may lead to restrictions curbing similar films in the future.

The controversial East German film, "Jacob the Liar," is set in a Nazi-occupied Jewish ghetto in Eastern Europe as it waits for liberation.

The film is deeply moving and East German sources report that it has been received enthusiastically by audiences in Berlin and other East German cities.

But Moscow's censors, mindful that it would have to be shown to Soviet audiences after the summer film festival, apparently feared that it would stir what Moscow considers "Jewish nationalism" here.

Moscow has also told East Berlin that it considers the subject and style of the film to be "serious deviations from the norms of Socialist realism," according to East German and Soviet sources.

"It's a great pity. This film was good and it marked a modest advance," one East German said. "It is hardly avant-garde, but 'Jacob the Liar' was another step forward in a careful policy of cultural liberalization. Now, it may turn out to be a step backward."

But East German authorities have decided, sources here said, to enter "Jacob the Liar" in the West Berlin Film Festival in June, about a month before the Moscow film festival, and are hope-

ful that it will receive Western recognition.

East Germany has been cautiously liberalizing its cultural policy, once the most strait-laced and conformist in the Soviet bloc, over the last two years. It started with a play, "The New Sorrows of Young W," which dealt with the alienation of youth in Socialist Germany and was hugely successful, moving since through the publication of novels and poetry previously unacceptable because of their unorthodox views and style.

"You cannot call the cultural scene a latter-day version of the Prague Spring," an East German said, referring to Czechoslovakia's short-lived liberalization in the spring of 1968, "but there has been real progress. What the effect of this film festival affair will be is uncertain — Moscow may have chosen this film to bring the liberalization to a halt."

The film's story is a simple one. An elderly Jew, Jacob Heym, in an unidentified East European ghetto in late 1944, is ordered to report to the German guard station, where he accidentally learns that the Germans have lost an important battle against the advancing Red Army.

The ghetto's liberation is near, Heym realizes, and he must tell others, many of whom are losing all hope. But he fears no one will believe him or the circumstances in which he heard the news.

So he tells his friends that he heard on a hidden radio of his own. The whole ghetto quickly hears he has a radio and he spends the rest of the play answering questions as everyone asks him for fresh news from the battlefield.

Heym also finds an appropriate answer, often posing a humorous counter-question in the classical Yiddish style.

Jurek Becker, 37-year-old author of the film's scenario, wrote the script nine years ago, but the film could not be made then because the director he wanted, Frank Beyer, was temporarily in disgrace.

But Mr. Becker persisted in his efforts to get the film made with Mr. Beyer as the director, according to East German sources, and finally won important support in the state-run film company, DEFA, and the East German television network, which joined to produce it.

File

WASHINGTON STAR
13 May 1975

Algeria Protests EEC-Israel Pact

From News Services

CAIRO — Algeria has demanded a postponement of Arab-European talks planned for next month to protest a trade agreement signed between the Common Market and Israel. Algeria, according to Arab League sources here, yesterday called on the 20-member league to "act immediately" in response to the agreement, which it said represented a "clear evidence of the EC's (Economic Community's) continuing support of Israeli occupation of Arab lands." The pact lowers tariff barriers for Israel and may blunt the Arab economic boycott of Israel. But the Common Market,

which took a pro-Arab stance during the Yom Kippur war of 1973, defended itself yesterday against Arab denunciations. "We did not ask the Arabs, can we sign?" Common Market Commissioner Claude Cheysson told a news conference. "When you look at the context of this agreement, Arab indignation is hardly appropriate." Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, who signed the agreement Sunday, told newsmen that the signing "is an encouraging sign that the nine (Common Market nations) are not read to be pushed around. I hope none of the nine will bow to pressure or blackmail."

NEW YORK TIMES
11 May 1975

Sea-Law Nations Now Have a Plan To Argue About

The 2,000 delegates to the second negotiating session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are leaving Geneva with a draft charter to govern the world's use of the oceans and their resources.

The draft reflects only an effort to reconcile the many conflicting positions of the 140 nations which participating. Real negotiations will begin when the delegates reassemble next March.

The package deal on which agreement will be sought calls for a 12-mile territorial sea, and an "economic zone" extending 200 miles out. In that zone, the coastal state would have sovereignty over the fishing, oil and mineral resources. It is these rights, especially fishing, that remain a major item of contention.

Another obstacle to agreement is the matter of unimpeded navigation rights through straits that are now international waters under the existing three-mile limit, but would become territorial waters under a 12-mile limit. Maritime powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union want continued free passage.

The desire of developing countries to vest all rights for exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdictions in an international authority is also in dispute. Developed countries such as the United States are reluctant to give up what may be very lucrative resources.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 May 1975

To Halt Nuclear Spread

The threat of nuclear energy to mankind, recognized for three decades but still too little controlled, lies in its dual nature. Like fire, it can be used beneficially or destructively. No task confronting the United States, the Soviet Union and other advanced nations—which supply reactors, fissionable materials and other peaceful nuclear equipment to the rest of the world—is more important than heading off an accompanying spread of atomic weapons.

The energy crisis is stimulating interest in nuclear power the world around. In addition to 221 nuclear power plants operational or on order in the United States, there are now 274 power reactors operating or planned in 26 other countries. By 1980, they are expected to produce annually as a by-product more than 40,000 pounds of plutonium that, extracted from spent fuel rods, could provide enough weapons-grade fissionable material for more than 2,000 Hiroshima-size bombs.

The first line of defense against this horror is the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which is now getting its first scheduled review at a month-long United Nations meeting in Geneva attended by most of its 91 parties, including the five Euratom countries which have just ratified—West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg.

Efforts will be made to urge ratification by 17 other signatory countries, including Japan and Switzerland. But it is increasingly doubtful that some, such as Egypt and Turkey, any longer have that intention. And the nations which have refrained from signing include such potential weapons-states as India, Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa.

Some treaty adherents are also suspected of nuclear weapons intentions. Iran is said to be seeking an American or French license to build a chemical reprocessing plant capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods. So too, reportedly, is South Korea, feeling more insecure than ever in the wake of the United States withdrawal from and the subsequent collapse of South Vietnam.

This trend can be slowed and possibly halted only through concerted action by the supplier nations to withhold such critical equipment as reprocessing plants and to tighten safeguards over the sales of other nuclear materials to parties to the non-proliferation treaty and, even more so, to non-treaty countries.

GENERAL

NEW YORK TIMES
14 May 1975

*U.S.-Soviet Space Mission Simulation
Runs Into a Communications Problem*

HOUSTON, May 13 (UPI)—Two Soviet astronauts simulated today their launching into orbit for this summer's joint mission with an American crew, but a technical problem prevented observers in the Mission Control Center here from hearing them.

The difficulty prevented newsmen and public affairs officers from monitoring air-to-ground communication between the astronauts and the Russian control center at Kaliningrad.

A spokesman for the National Aeronautics and Space Administrator John Donnelly, said the communication problems should not occur during a real flight and might have been the result of a misunderstanding.

"They confirmed they had provided the air-to-ground and P.I.O. [Public Information Office] commentary, and there is the possibility there was confusion on this end on which line to receive it," Mr. Donnelly said.

The astronauts, Alexei Leonov and Valeri Kubasov, were in their computer-operated spaceship simulator. They followed their practice mission through computer readouts and reported no major problems.

The American team, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Donald K. Slayton and Vance D. Brand, climbed into their Apollo simulator for the simulated blastoff at 3:50 P.M.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 MAY 1975

**The Kremlin
eyes Europe**

By Eric Bourne

Vienna

The Warsaw Pact — Russia's answer to NATO — completes its 20-year term this week and will be renewed automatically for a further 10 years.

Within a few months its seven members will meet with the NATO powers (the United States and Canada included) and the European neutrals in an East-West, all-European conference on security and cooperation.

A Soviet proposal for such a conference, tied originally to the "neutralization" of Germany, is older than the Warsaw treaty itself and has been the present Kremlin leadership's principal political goal in Europe since the mid-1960s. It might have come earlier but for Russia's use of force through the pact to crush the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968. As it was, the West made the Kremlin wait another four years before agreeing to begin its preparation.

Now, in the new atmosphere of detente, it looks to be "in the bag" and this, together with the fact that the Russians are not prolonging their "NATO," prompts questions of what line Soviet policy for Europe may adopt after such a conference.

The Russians created their Warsaw Pact in May, 1955, as a response to Western European Union and NATO's enlargement by the admission of a rearmed West Germany. Like the North Atlantic treaty, it stipulated that an attack on one member would be an attack upon all and it was described as a defensive alliance of nations facing "the common danger" of a possible "rebirth of militarism" in West Germany.

This was the constant target over the years, until it was silenced first by the Soviet-West German nonaggression treaty and later by general European detente (though, in their

current negotiations with NATO on force reductions in Central Europe, the Russians still harp most on West Germany's military potential).

The Warsaw Pact, however, provided also a very convenient new basis for keeping Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, over 10 years after the war had ended. And, although these were withdrawn in 1958 from Romania, the only East-bloc state without a border "open" to noncommunist Europe, they were retained elsewhere in the area as a sure means of control in an uncertain period when national self-interest had begun to make itself felt, as in Poland and Hungary.

Both the "domestic" *raison d'être* for keeping the pact going and its value as an instrument of foreign policy opposed to NATO remain. But a new European situation will apply after the security conference is an accomplished fact, and the Warsaw treaty itself gives one clue to what may become the bloc's new political thrust for the future.

One of its concluding articles says that if and when a system of collective security comes about on the basis of a general European treaty, the Warsaw Pact "shall cease to be operative" the day that treaty enters into force. (The simultaneous dismantling of NATO, of course, is implicit.)

The 35-nation European conference is not concerned with such a treaty. But the declaration expected to emerge from the final "summit" will undoubtedly be interpreted and exploited by the Russians as a kind of "peace and security treaty by proxy," confirming *inter alia* the status quo for Germany and Europe.

It has taken the Russians 20 years to get the security conference. They doubtless reckon that now a treaty on collective security might not take so long. In any event, it will probably be much heard of in the next ten years of the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Bourne is the Monitor's special correspondent in Eastern Europe.

WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1975

Nuclear Tests

NEW DELHI — India, which last May 18 became the world's sixth nuclear power, is planning new nuclear experiments, according to government officials. "The first test definitely was not our last, and we never said it was," said one official. The government has said that the experiments are for peaceful uses.

File

Conference on sea law: a beginning

By Tony Loftas
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Although there has been a tendency to discredit any claims of progress, the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea has taken some significant steps at its just concluded Geneva session.

Proposals that once seemed little more than wild ideas are becoming generally accepted. For example, a consensus seems to exist on the concept of a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ), a 12-mile territorial sea, and an international seabed authority that, through some form of joint venture, will take an active part in the development of resources in the international seabed area.

The problem is to ink in the detail of the broad general picture that now has emerged. This demands active negotiation and compromises between nations some of which find themselves wielding political power for the first time in such an assembly.

'Passport' for next year

The more than 140 delegations took home with them what could well be their passport to the next meeting, now agreed for New York between March 29 and May 21 next year. This consists of three unified negotiating texts prepared by the chairmen of the substantive committees of the conference.


In closing the final plenary session here May 9, the conference's president, H. Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, made a special plea for patience on the part of those countries that might be contemplating unilateral action over marine resources.

This plea, prompted by the Group of 77 (a group of developing countries first formed at a UN trade conference), was followed by a message from land-locked and other geographically disadvantaged countries asking that no nation or group of nations should seek to extend their territorial limits beyond 12 miles.

Until the end, the meeting maintained the order shown throughout the eight weeks of discussions. Some observers had feared that the negotiating texts, prepared solely at the discretion of the committee chairmen, might become a disruptive issue. But the delegations, including some known to be unhappy about the proposal, allowed Mr. Amerasinghe to swing his chairman's gavel with the alacrity of a livestock auctioneer.

Break with tradition

The texts are intended as a "procedural device" to assist future negotiations. They represent yet another break with tradition in what is becoming not only the biggest single attempt at writing international law, but also a revolutionary way of achieving it.



By a staff photographer

Who shall rule the waves?

According to Bernardo Zuleta, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, "previous conferences attempted to codify an existing international consensus, but this one is creating new law for the first time."

Mr. Amerasinghe admits to "a little disappointment" in the sense that he had expected much more negotiation. On the other hand, he can take solace that no states have tried to force votes. Even apparently intractable states recognize that a viable law of the sea will not emerge from paper victories.

Year to resolve views

The delegations now have nearly a year in which to try to attempt to resolve opposing views. They and the various regional and interest groups have been exhorted to hold intersessional meetings, not discussions among themselves, but with those holding opposing views.

These meetings, more than anything else, can help to make the New York session one in which positive negotiations will be possible. Even so, the conference has already recognized that a second session will be needed next year, if a treaty is to stand any prospect of being ready for formal signing before 1978.

Tony Loftas is marine consultant for the British scientific magazine, the New Scientist.

East, West Com meet to repair

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

East and West European Communist Parties are meeting in East Berlin Monday in a major effort to save their projected international conference from virtual breakdown before it is ready to start.

A deep split has occurred over the draft of a main document. It is opposed by at least six liberal parties, two of which are ruling parties and one a member of the Soviet bloc. According to a top West European communist source, the six will withdraw from further preparatory work unless the draft is withdrawn. They would not then take part in the final conference.

The dissenting parties are the Yugoslav, Romanian (the bloc member), Italian, Spanish, Swedish, and British, with the Belgian party apparently also expected to fall in line with them.

The offending draft was produced during a series of preparatory meetings since late last year to thrash out the agreed terms of reference for the final summit conference of party chiefs. It was largely the work of the East German party, one of the ideologically most rigidly conformist members of the bloc.

Open objection to it came from the executive secretary of the independent, nonbloc Yugoslav party, Stane Dolanc, who implied in an interview two weeks ago that the draft was unacceptable because it included a program for obligatory joint actions and tasks.

Any attempt to coordinate Communist Party activities, he said, was impossible under contemporary conditions because all parties are operating under different national circumstances.

The Romanian and Italian parties also have consistently objected to any conference resolution or other steps tending to establish one party — i.e., the Soviet — as a leading center for the movement as a whole.

The Western party source disclosed that the preparatory stages reached deadlock at a meeting a month ago, when the liberals indicated a blank refusal to proceed further as the draft document then stood.

The outcome was the appointment of a commission comprising four of the dissenters — the Yugoslavs, Romanians, Italians, and the Spaniards — and three of the unequivocally pro-Soviet, orthodox parties — the French, Danes, and East Germans — together with the Russians. Its task was to find a compromise approach in order to allow the preparatory work to proceed.

More on MacArthur

"The Years of MacArthur: Volume II, 1941-1945" will be published in May by Houghton Mifflin Company of Boston. Three volumes are planned in this biography of Douglas MacArthur, General of the United States Army during World War II. D.

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smuggling operations in July 1973 but he was subsequently captured by Thai border troops and handed back to the Burmese authorities.

The "Golden Triangle" is the

area where the borders of Thailand, Burma and Laos meet.

Lo has pleaded not guilty to the charges.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 MAY 1975

Soviets have more to gain from joint orbital venture

By George Moneyhun
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science
Monitor

New York

The Soviet Union gains more than the United States from Soviet-American scientific ventures, says Soviet physicist Alexander Voronel, who emigrated to Israel in December.

In an interview, Dr. Voronel said, "It is difficult to say in which particular areas the Russians are gaining most [from the cooperative programs] because of the great secrecy that surrounds all Soviet research." He says

U.S. technology is definitely more advanced than his country's, adding that Soviet scientific achievements have been "more erratic" than those of the U.S.

As an example of how the Soviets use American know-how, he cited an incident in which he was asked if he could develop a device to measure the temperature in a rocket. "I said, 'no, it would be too complicated,' and I was told not to worry. It would be easy. We'll give you the material from the United States, and you just re-edit it as your own." Dr. Voronel said he refused to partici-

pate.

In this light, the Soviet-American space project this summer is seen by U.S. scientists as primarily a political and public-relations maneuver, with minimal technological gains for the U.S.

Adding fuel to such criticism is a recent "progress report" on U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative programs in science and technology by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). The agency reports "to date the exchange of information has been limited and of little technical benefit to the United States"

— although, the GAO found the cooperative efforts "established rapport and fostered public visibility."

Concerned U.S. scientists say they support detente between the two major powers, but they "seriously question the present balance of reciprocity" in the cooperative science and technology programs. Pointing out that scientific exchange is no longer "one of the few bonds linking East and West," some scientists are calling for a complete reassessment of the scientific and technical exchange program.

WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1975

U.S., Soviets Recess SALT for Instructions

GENEVA, May 7 (UPI) — The United States and Soviet Union recessed the new round of strategic arms limitation talks today for one month so negotiators could return to their capitals for fresh instructions.

The break was agreed to after negotiations on a new treaty to limit nuclear weapons ran into snags involving the definition of strategic delivery systems and verification issues.

American spokesmen said that "Given the complexity of the issues being dealt with, the U.S. delegation feels reasonably satisfied with the progress that has been achieved."

A joint communique after an 80-minute meeting said: "The delegations agreed to a brief working recess in the talks from May 8 to June 1, 1975, to permit members of the delegations to return to their capitals for consultations. The talks will resume in Geneva on Monday, June 2."

[Diplomatic sources in Washington said that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko are expected to meet during the recess period to discuss SALT and other issues between the two countries.]

Informed sources said problems arising in the talks were the main reason for a postponement in the summit visit to the United States by Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Brezhnev and President Ford had hoped to sign the projected treaty this summer but Brezhnev is now scheduled to go to America in autumn.

At their summit in Vladivostok last November, the two leaders directed the SALT negotiators to conclude a pact by the end of this year limiting each side to 2,400 strategic weapon delivery vehicles—missiles and bombers—1,320 of which may be missiles capped with multiple nuclear warheads.

But in trying to translate this basic directive into treaty language, chief U.S. negotiator U. Alexis Johnson and Vladimir S. Semenov of the Soviet Union were forced to take the recess.

One of the problems apparently concerns the new Soviet Bomber "Backfire-B."

The U.S. Defense Department said in a study that the bomber, if combined with a new aerial tanker aircraft, could reach targets throughout the United States.

Whether it is intended for

LONDON TIMES
5 May 1975

Sea law conference likely to end in deadlock

By Marcel Berlins

The Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva enters its final week with no hope of agreement, and with the prospect of another eight-week session early next year.

Despite intensive private negotiations and bargaining in the corridors over the past seven weeks, the differences of views on most of the main issues have not been resolved.

The most that can come out of this session is agreement on three "negotiating texts" which would form the basis for the discussions next year.

The chairman of each of the conference's three committees (on the international seabed regime; territorial jurisdiction and general aspects of sea law; and marine pollution and scientific research) has been charged with preparing a single text reflecting as far as possible the principal shades of opinion within the committee.

It is by no means certain that there will be general acceptance even of these texts. Some countries are bound to protest that they reflect a bias

towards one point of view or another. Even if the negotiating texts are accepted, however, they will represent at best a papering over of the cracks.

The only firm decision is likely to concern the site and the date of the next session. Even that decision has been beset by difficulties. Hopes that an African or Asian country could play host seemed to have been dashed when Nairobi and Delhi were, for various reasons, ruled out. Either New York or Geneva are now likely to be chosen.

The fear is that, if a significant number of countries take unilateral action this year, as some have threatened, the session next spring will find itself in a position of even greater weakness in its attempt to draw up an international law of the sea convention.

For that reason, some delegations in Geneva are considering putting forward a resolution to the plenary session this week urging all countries to refrain from taking any unilateral action which might prejudice future talks.

such missions, however, depends on training patterns and tanker development, the study said.

conclusion of the Backfire B in the Soviet quota of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, while the United States is understood to be demanding the in-



May 3, 1975

A price from Russia

With Vietnam gone and after all the apparent blows to American and western strategy in recent weeks, the hope of a stable Europe and a pacified Middle East, resting upon the basis of a new western relationship with Russia, may seem almost dreamlike. Even Mr Kissinger's relationship with China now looks less certain (see the next article). Yet one modest consolation prize is still available for the United States and its friends in Europe if they choose to take it; and it has been made available by, of all people, the Russians themselves.

Mr Leonid Brezhnev wants to crown his 11 years as Russia's leader at the Communist party congress he has now summoned for next February. To do this, he needs to be able to tell his obedient party congress that the west has accepted Russia's claim to be not only the co-equal of the United States in the world at large but also the undisputed master of the east European empire it created for itself after 1945. And to do that he needs, by the autumn if he can arrange it, a grand finale of heads of government in Helsinki to wind up that epic of diplomats' largely wasted time known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the CSCE. If he is to get Helsinki, he should be made to pay a price for it—a gambit which Mr Henry Kissinger of America and Mr James Callaghan of Britain, who are both far too keen to see this conference over and done with, seem feebly unready to try.

The price for the Helsinki summit should be a substantial one, for the grand finale will be almost entirely to Mr Brezhnev's, and Russia's, benefit. The price might, for instance, include an understanding to keep Russian hands off Portugal. And it might include something on the Middle East: for instance, the Russians should be pressed to instil more moderation into their hotter-headed Arab friends, and so help create the conditions where a return to Arab-Israeli peacemaking in Geneva would be justified. This might in turn justify America spelling out its support for the eventual bargain (of an Israel returned to its 1967 borders except for two or three small areas, in return for recognition of Israel and a settling of the Palestinian issue) that many Israelis now admit they will have to make before time turns against them. The Russians should be told that they cannot have their precious European summit until they have made the trip worthwhile in other ways—and that probably means some real sign of movement, and more than just promises, in the Middle East before the UN peacekeeping mandate next comes up for renewal on July 24th.

The concession that wasn't

Without such concessions, Russia will have to pay for its summit in Europe itself. Ever since the end of the second world war, the Russians have wanted to formalise their east European empire. In 1972, after years of Russian urging, the western countries at last sat down at the European security conference the Russians wanted. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that Russia would look on any agreement at the conference as the equivalent of a peace treaty winding up the second world war, which would set its European sphere of influence in diplomatic

concrete. But the west hoped that in exchange for its own recognition of the present territorial boundaries of Europe it could get some relaxation by Russia and its client east European states of the restrictions they impose on the free movement of people and ideas, and Soviet acceptance of the argument that the boundaries of Europe should be able to be changed by mutual agreement, though not by force.

The west extracted one concession from the Russians at the start. In return for agreeing to the so-called security conference, it insisted that Russia should come to a parallel conference in Vienna to talk about cutting the size of the two opposing armies in Europe. It got that parallel conference, but that is about all it did get. In Vienna the Russians have stood pat on a demand that their existing military superiority in Europe be ratified.

The CSCE itself is now at a curious crossroads. It is approaching the end of the long-drawn-out negotiations in Geneva that are supposed to produce the final agreement, but there is no agreement in sight. If it were to finish in Geneva in time for the signing summit in Helsinki in June or July that Mr Brezhnev is asking for, it would have to get a move on. But there is no sign of this. The delegates are still haggling endlessly over disputed texts, even over single sentences, and there is no indication that the communists are ready to make any of the concessions the west must have—and the communists know it must have—in order to reach an agreement. The Russians have already just about nailed down the thing they want most: the assertion of the inviolability of frontiers. But they know that the final agreement is indivisible, and that they don't really have anything until the whole thing is signed and sealed.

They want to go home

The main reason why no one in the west can quite steel himself to do battle with Russia over this cursed conference is that everyone in the west is weary of death of the CSCE, its 10 principles, its four baskets and its endless talking. The big wish is to get it over and done with. Many of the smaller countries are almost overwhelmed by the effort they have put into the conference: all those committees to attend; these mountains of paper to read and answer; above all, the expense of keeping so many diplomats in Geneva for so long. Even among the larger countries there is a tendency to want to wind up the whole infuriating business in return for a few minor concessions on items of individual interest.

If Mr Brezhnev started to trot out compromises there would still be time—just—to make a summer rendezvous in Helsinki. If it all broke loose tomorrow, it would take about five weeks to finish at Geneva and another four to get the papers ready for signing. Nobody really thinks it will go that fast, but it could be done at any rate by July 31st. Much later than that and some of the smaller countries will insist on a summer recess, and Mr Brezhnev won't meet his schedule.

If an agreement is to meet western requirements; any statement such as Russia wants about the inviolability of borders ought to be accompanied by 'clear' and

political and social impact this will have on the rest of the world.
As the nations of Asia grope for a new

concern and sadness; they should not be the trigger for despair and panic.

Sea law in a needy world

None of the more graphic events of the day means more to mankind's future than the prosaic process of deciding how to use, rather than abuse, the seas. For a world demanding more and more food and minerals the rich storehouse of the seas, vast as it is, has to be husbanded wisely and justly. It would be devastating if a heedless oceanic resource race were to develop because of the slowness with which the UN Law of the Sea Conference has been working toward agreement.

The session just ended in Geneva was not a "failure," as headlined. The leader of the United States delegation saw some substantial progress such as the "important procedural result" of draft treaty texts as a basis for debate when the conference resumes next March in New York. There has been a welcome spirit of moving forward rather than obstructing what is, after all, an enormously ambitious and complicated task of creating world law.

Nevertheless, the longer disagreement lasts the more the temptation for the U.S., Soviet Union, and other industrialized countries to begin the exploitation of the seabed which the UN has designated the common heritage of mankind. Such unilateral action would defy a General Assembly resolution of 1959 against laying claim to such resources in the absence of an international law-of-the-sea authority.

One of the sticking points now is whether such a body should have all the rights and control sought by the developing countries or the limitations sought by developed countries. There is an emerging consensus on such other matters as establishing national sovereignty to 12 miles offshore and economic jurisdiction to 200 miles.

It is vital to broaden the area of consensus, through such means as interim regional meetings, by the time of the next session. Without definite progress, some fears expressed in Geneva may sadly be fulfilled —

that there will be a return to national adventuring, the formation of blocs and cartels, and other setbacks to the international good.

Cuba, si

The turn toward ending the 11-year-old trade embargo of Cuba is welcome.

Secretary of State Kissinger is apparently making good on his promise of moving in "a new direction" in Latin-American affairs. For procedural reasons, the Cuban embargo is not on the agenda of the session of the Organization of American States now meeting in Washington. But the Cuban issue is the pivotal one for improving U.S.-OAS relations, and a "general understanding" on Cuba is fast being reached behind the scenes.

Dr. Kissinger's tack is to let the OAS apparatus take the legal steps of revising the two-thirds majority vote rule down to a simple majority. This would provide enough of a margin to sustain the OAS vote of last November in Quito, Ecuador, when 12 OAS members voted for ending the embargo, and the U.S. abstained.

Supporting the majority vote change implies U.S. backing for resumed OAS trade with Cuba. But leaving the initiative so visibly in the hands of the OAS reinforces U.S. regard for the organization.

There need be no rush about ending the embargo itself. The United States has made its point that Cuba will not be allowed to become a springboard for meddling in the political affairs of the American nations. But when trade and cultural lines are being opened to the communist superpowers, not even geographical closeness seems a strong enough excuse for continued quarantining of Cuba, basically a weak agrarian country and no great U.S. security threat.



Mirror of opinion

Not in public interest

Members of the New England delegation in Congress scored high on the Herald American's current "Report Card" for their unanimous support of a \$347 million plan to aid bankrupt railroads in the area.

The plan, devised by the U.S. Railway Association involves the elimination of some unprofitable, little-used lines and the incorporation of the survivors in a single system.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, is highly critical of the idea and has recommended an alternative \$12 billion rebuilding of the nation's rail network subsidized by taxes on gasoline and other petroleum products.

It goes without saying that the Railway Ass'n plan is not perfect and certainly ought to be subject to amendment — as, in fact, it is. But, as we have pointed out before, much of the difficulty railroads, airlines and other interstate industries find themselves in can be traced, in part at least, to the ICC's bureaucratic and monopoly-encouraging regulations. It's time they were freed from its clammy grip.

Besides, what the ICC is really recommending, in effect, is that the trucking and airlines industries be required to subsidize their own competition in violation of the most basic principle of our free enterprise system. And it certainly is not in the interest of the consumer public, who would have to pay the cost of higher fare, rates and tariffs, in the end. — Boston Herald American

Partial ban won't work

The move toward gun control legislation is gaining strength to the point where it's not so much a question of whether it should be passed as it is when and in what form. What's needed is a nationwide ban on handguns.

Handguns are the main target for control, and rightly so. Realistically speaking, no one buys a revolver to hunt rabbits; concealable handguns are bought to be used against people, or for protection against others who might use them.

A partial ban on handguns would still allow the criminal element access to them — nullifying the benefits of control and multiplying enforcement problems.

A bill has been introduced — by Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D) of New York, in the House and by Sen. Philip A. Hart (D) of Michigan, in the Senate — to ban manufacture, transport, sale, receipt and possession of all handguns, except for members of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, for licensed importers, manufacturers, dealers, antique collectors, and pistol clubs.

It's true that the Bingham-Hart approach, if passed, could still take years to dry up the supply of handguns. But with an estimated 40 million handguns now in the U.S., and more than 2.5 million added to the total each year, the time for effective national controls has come. — Rochester (New York) Democrat and Chronicle

Christian Science Monitor, 12 May 75

Jack Anderson

'The Sharks of Geneva'

Washington Post

11/14/75

Ten weeks ago, the representatives of 144 nations gathered in Geneva with high hopes of settling coastal boundaries, saving vanishing sea animals and sharing fairly the seabed's \$3 trillion worth of minerals.

The Law of the Sea conference has now ended in shambles. Some delegates spent more time in the cocktail lounges and on the ski slopes than at the negotiating sessions. Others engaged in angry recriminations and petty squabbles. There were whispers of "black box" spy sensors off coastlines. At one point, a Soviet interpreter was replaced by a KGB agent who ostentatiously leafed through a black notebook full of clippings about the U.S. recovery of a sunken Soviet submarine. Another time, the senior American official dozed off in the middle of an important discussion.

From a confidential report by House Oceanographic Chairman John Murphy, (D-N.Y.), and from interviews with other participants, we can now assess the debacle and how its failure affects the American taxpayers.

"The sharks of Geneva, whose interest appears to be to delay the treaty in order to force increasingly greater concessions from the U.S. (have) loomed our efforts," summed up Murphy in his report.

What the congressman meant, and what other sources agree, is that the State Department was hellbent on a treaty virtually at any cost. This led the U.S. to offer to give up much of its seabed mining potential to a world authority dominated by small, increasingly greedy nations.

So outraged were some Treasury officials over the State Department's cave-in that they described it as "disastrous . . . an atrocity . . . a debacle." The secret position papers of the various U.S. departments show that not only Treasury experts but also De-

"What the congressman meant is that the State Department was hellbent on a treaty virtually at any cost."

fense, Interior and White House budget officials sharply disagreed with the State Department.

Murphy, whose report called the giveaway plan "a national disaster of tragic proportions," fought against it at Geneva. He pressed his arguments vigorously at a backroom meeting with State Department representatives.

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6-1975 United Feature Synd.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, May 10, 1975 A 13

Around the World

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NY Times 11 May 1975
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The desire of developing countries to vest all rights for exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdictions in an international authority is also in dispute. Developed countries such as the United States are reluctant to give up what may be very lucrative resources.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Prospects for a Law of the Sea

REPORTS OF THE DEATH of the Law of the Sea Conference, the United Nations' long-running effort to limit national disputes on, in and under the oceans, are decidedly premature. It may yet turn out that no treaty will be written on national territorial and economic jurisdiction, navigation and the transit of ships, fisheries, deep seabed mining, pollution, research and like issues. At the eight-week conference session just concluded at Geneva, however, at least some progress was made in every area except seabed mining. An "informal single negotiating text," something like a bill, was drafted, and negotiations on it are to resume in New York next March. One cannot be sanguine. But it is unfair to conclude the lack of solid international agreement makes it legitimate or necessary for each nation to go off on its own. This is the only chance the world will have to apply the rule of law to its oceans. As last week's costly chase over the Mayaguez all too amply demonstrated, the alternative is chaos and conflict.

The one area where the United States probably will act unilaterally concerns fisheries. The Law of the Sea Conference had long been on notice that, without an agreement on extending coastal nations' fisheries jurisdiction, the Congress would itself write legislation to extend American fisheries jurisdiction from the existing three miles to 200 miles. The chief offenders here are Russia and Japan, whose large modern fleets have endangered a dozen or more coastal species. The Conference will probably denounce the United States for legislating an extension. But one can expect the denunciation, and the damage of the example, to be limited. For one reason, extension would be consistent with the Conference's developing consensus on a 200-mile economic zone for coastal nations. For another reason, Russia and Japan are widely perceived to be inadequately concerned with proper management and conservation of fisheries resources. There is reason to believe that if the Executive shows a live concern for the very real economic and resource problem of coastal fisheries, the Congress will respond in a way that will do minimal

damage to the diplomatic objective of international agreement on a Law of the Sea treaty. In any event, that should be the goal.

That the conference split on deep seabed mining is no less troubling for being expected. The problem is that the United States, the only country with seabed mining technology, wishes to establish a system that will both attract private capital and assure access to the minerals to be extracted, while the poor and land-locked countries, calling the deep seabed the "common heritage" of mankind, want a system ensuring their own control and profit. In the absence of international agreement on this intensely ideological issue, pressure is mounting for another unilateral American move. Deepsea Ventures and Kenecott, the two leading corporations in the business, would have the United States license and protect their proposed operations; this course is favored by their friends in the Interior Department and in Congress and by others fearing a future resource squeeze. But while delay in the matter of fisheries will allow further ravaging of fish stocks, those manganese nodules are in no similar peril. Commercial mining isn't due to begin for more than five years, and plenty of other problems must be straightened out first. In brief, there is both time and diplomatic need to see if the seabed mining gap cannot be narrowed next year.

The United States has the largest and most diverse oceans interests of any nation. Thus we have the greatest need to impose an agreed pattern of law on the seas. At the Conference, a broad consensus has already been achieved on extension of the national territorial sea to 12 miles, on freedom of navigation beyond 12 miles, and on unimpeded transit through the more than 100 straits that would be overlapped by national waters under a 12-mile rule. If a Law of the Sea treaty were already in universal effect, there would have been no incident such as the one that occurred in the Gulf of Siam last week. The gains so far made and those still within reach are too important to be put at risk by unilateral national acts that can be safely deferred.

The Washington Star

JOEL L. ALLBRITTON, *Publisher*

JAMES G. BELLOWS, *Editor*

SIDNEY EPSTEIN, *Managing Editor*

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1975

Search for a Sea Law

Everyone should know by now that the world's seas are in deep trouble. Their life-giving resources of food are threatened by unprecedented plunder and spreading pollution, and their vast mineral treasures soon will be exploited through deep-water mining techniques. Nor is any international issue more complicated and resistant to solution than this one — how to regulate and, more importantly, protect the seas. This difficulty is reflected again in the latest actions at the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva.

In fact, a distinct impression flows from these proceedings that no such law will be enacted for quite a while. The developing nations are locked in rhetorical conflict with the industrial countries, demanding a much larger share of oceanic profits and territorial prerogatives than the latter are likely to give away. But some modestly hopeful signs did emerge from this Geneva round of the conference, in contrast to the discouraging results of its sessions last year in Caracas.

The conferees, representing some 150 nations, finally drew up a draft charter for the oceans. But this document is a long way from being approved by the world community, reflecting as it does the hotly conflicting views of the conferees themselves. It is a working paper, which must undergo numerous alterations if any agreement ever is to be reached. The less controversial aspect (though not lacking controversy by any means) is a 12-mile territorial limit with full sovereignty for coastal countries, coupled with a 200-mile economic zone in which they would control all maritime resources. Going far beyond this, however, is a proposal for an international authority to engage in exploitation of the ocean floor, jointly with countries or companies.

The extent of power which the developing countries want to invest in this body is likely to be the big sticking point. Governing outside the national economic zones, with authority over two-thirds of the international waters, it would issue licenses for projects such as seabed mining, collect royalties and fix prices on whatever is produced. Underdeveloped nations (which lack the technology for seabed operations) would partake of the profits nonetheless, even from activities beyond their own zones, while sharing the

some of them indicate they may attempt to enforce full territorial authority 200 miles out from their coasts. Extension from the present three miles up to 12 doesn't suit them at all.

Plainly visible, then, are the seeds of a conflict that could go on and on. The seas have become a big grab-bag, and some industrial nations will not gladly share the rewards of costly seabed projects with countries that aren't even in the general vicinity. Much less will they agree to fixing of prices by an international group that conceivably might take on the characteristics of a cartel. This price-setting scheme largely represents the fear of developing countries that abundant minerals from the sea floor might drive down the prices of minerals they now mine on their own soil, such as copper, manganese and cobalt. One can appreciate their apprehension about the march of oceanic technology, but how long would the world tolerate artificially high prices?

The realistic point is that only a few nations have the capability of going after those valuable raw materials in the depths, and that some — notably the United States and Russia — probably will be doing it before any law of the sea is devised. If the developing countries demand too much beyond their own territorial spheres, and the richer ones aren't willing to give enough, as may be the case at present, the whole affair could bog down permanently. And that could mean an uncontrolled and perhaps chaotic stampede to reap the ocean riches, in which the rich would get richer. In any case, our own Congress undoubtedly would balk at the charter drafted in Geneva, with its heavy tilt against the industrial nations.

But the draft does provide a basis for negotiation when the Law of the Sea Conference resumes next March in New York, and perhaps a mood of compromise will develop. Some of the developing countries may modify their large demands, and the more affluent ones that actually can exploit the oceans may agree to more generous sharing, and sensible controls. What's needed is more accent on preservation of the seas, rather than obsession with national prerogatives. Otherwise, the death of their living resources, from pollution and over-harvesting, may outweigh by far any gains from the rush for

THE WASHINGTON POST
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Around the World

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All Times *11 May 1975*
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Jack Anderson

'The Sharks of Geneva'

Washington Post

11 May 1975

Ten weeks ago, the representatives of 144 nations gathered in Geneva with high hopes of settling coastal boundaries, saving vanishing sea animals and sharing fairly the seabed's \$3 trillion worth of minerals.

The Law of the Sea conference has now ended in shambles. Some delegates spent more time in the cocktail lounges and on the ski slopes than at the negotiating sessions. Others engaged in angry recriminations and petty squabbles. There were whispers of "black box" spy sensors off coastlines.

At one point, a Soviet interpreter was replaced by a KGB agent who ostentatiously leafed through a black notebook full of clippings about the U.S. recovery of a sunken Soviet submarine. Another time, the senior American official dozed off in the middle of an important discussion.

From a confidential report by House Oceanographic Chairman John Murphy, (D-N.Y.), and from interviews with other participants, we can now assess the debacle and how its failure affects the American taxpayers.

"The sharks of Geneva, whose interest appears to be to delay the treaty in order to force increasingly greater concessions from the U.S. (have) loomed our efforts," summed up Murphy in his report.

What the congressman meant, and what other sources agree, is that the State Department was hellbent on a treaty virtually at any cost. This led the U.S. to offer to give up much of its seabed mining potential to a world authority dominated by small, increasingly greedy nations.

So outraged were some Treasury officials over the State Department's caveat that they described it as "disastrous . . . an atrocity . . . a debacle." The secret position papers of the various U.S. departments show that not only Treasury experts but also De-

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from take-off to touch-down. He was not, of course, speaking in the context that produced the unfortunate press release in Montreal, but it seems clear that his concern for the comfort and con-

that we have all known for some time that the airport snow removal men were sitting around praying for snow (get up early on a Toronto in March) a much better performance could have been expected.

Whelan. The larva of the noctuid moth, we understand, can compensate for its total vulnerability by huffing, puffing and blowing. The moth is, sadly, familiar to most of us, as is the spineless, soft-shelled turtle of central and south-

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The Globe & Mail (Toronto) 11 Mar 75
Law of the Sea (I)

By GEOFFREY STEVENS

OTTAWA
The proposition could scarcely have been stated more starkly than it was in a letter written to President Gerald Ford in January by 22 members of the United States Senate. "Seldom in history," wrote the senators, "has the potential for future conflict on a world-wide scale been so clearly identifiable while there was still an opportunity to head off that conflict... We believe the door is rapidly closing on the opportunity to reach an international agreement in this area. It is imperative that the negotiations reach an agreement by the end of 1975."

Future conflict on a world-wide scale? The door rapidly closing? Imperative that agreement be reached by the end of the year? The 22 senators are responsible men, not alarmists, including among their number Warren Magnuson, Edmund Muskie, Clifford Case, George McGovern, Henry Jackson, Edward Kennedy. What are they so worried about? Arab oil? The Middle East? Southeast Asia?

No, they are talking about the Law of the Sea. About the urgent necessity of concluding an international treaty to govern the future of the two-thirds of the earth's surface that is covered by salt water. About the potential for world strife, even war, if treaty is not agreed, and agreed quickly. They wrote the letter to focus President Ford's attention on the importance of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which resumes in Geneva on Monday.

The 137 nations which met last summer in Caracas will reassemble (possibly with a few additions) in Geneva for eight weeks, from March 17 to May 10, to continue the work begun in the Venezuelan capital.

The situation—and this is based on first-hand experience in Caracas, plus recent interviews in Ottawa and Washington and at the United Nations—can be set out as follows. Although it was not meant to be so, the 10-week 1974 conference in Caracas proved to be a preliminary session. The 60-odd nations that had not previously been involved in Law of the Sea negotiation were initiated into its mysteries. The background was explored. Issues were defined and clarified. Areas of conflict envisaged by the American senators may be unavoidable.

The main progress came on two related questions: territorial seas and the concept of the "economic zone". There was a broad consensus at Caracas that the territorial waters of coastal states should extend 12 miles offshore—and that the economic zone (in which the coastal state would exercise limited sovereignty) would stretch at least a further 188 miles, for a total distance of 200 miles offshore. Three of the great maritime powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, had not accepted the 12 plus 188 formula before Caracas, so the consensus represented a significant step forward.

There was no agreement, however, on many vital details—the passage of foreign ships through territorial waters; the powers of coastal states in their economic zones; whether economic zones would stop at 200 miles or would (as Canada and other broad-shelf countries want) stretch out to the edge of the continental margin. Nor was there much discernible progress at Caracas on other key issues, including the structure and powers of the proposed new world authority to control the exploitation of the minerals in the international deep sea bed.

Because every issue involves the rights of sovereign states, none is easy to resolve—and it can be argued that it would be unrealistic to expect Geneva to resolve very many of them. But resolve them it must, because an increasing number of nations (Canada included) are losing patience with negotiations that began with the first Law of the Sea Conference back in 1958. Several are moving toward unilateral actions to assert or protect their national self-interests.

This does not mean Geneva must produce a treaty with every "i" dotted and every "t" crossed. No one dares hope for that much. But—and this point was made repeatedly in interviews in the last few weeks—substantial progress must be made and the progress must be demonstrable. If the diplomats can go home from Geneva with a piece of paper showing agreement on Points A, B and C and a good prospect for early agreement on Points D and E, the negotiating process will continue. If there is no agreement, the process will be abandoned by the American senators may be unavoidable.

If Quebec had the oil . . .

Re Geoffrey Stevens' Trying Not to Laugh (Feb. 18):

"If Mr. Lougheed were Premier of Quebec, there would be screams of outrage across English Canada."

What does Mr. Stevens suppose would happen if Quebec had the oil, and the federal Government dared to impose an export tax to help pay for Alberta's lack of same, as they are now doing to subsidize Quebec and the Maritimes?

Also why does the federal Government not tax the export of electrical energy by Quebec and Ontario Hydro, the same as they are doing on Western oil?

James A. Johnston
Orillia

Book dumping

Secretary of State Hugh Faulkner is to be congratulated for his decision (Book Dumping by U.S. Firms to be Stopped—March 4) to stop the dumping of remaindered American editions of books by Canadian writers on the domestic market. This practice has damaged both writers and publishers in this country, and I am certain that all of us will welcome this decision. It is to be hoped that ultimately (and the sooner the better) legislation will be worked out to prohibit the importation of all American editions of Canadian books in cases where the Canadian edition is available.

Margaret Laurence
Lakefield

Canned music

In the past two weeks I have had occasion to utilize the Finch subway station many times at all hours of the day. I could not help but notice the piped-in music which the TTC is now oozing through the air in the bus-boarding area.

Please note:

(1) I am forced, by circumstance, to use the TTC subways. I refuse to passively succumb to that drivel as well.

(2) The law, according to notices posted everywhere on TTC property, forbids me to carry any sound-emitting device on TTC property (which may annoy others with that sound). I consider that law to be equally applicable to the TTC itself.

(3) With the imminent threat of a \$56-million deficit for the TTC and/or a substantial fare increase for riders, it hardly seems the appropriate time to be wasting money on such aggravating superfluities.

Grant Chorley
Agincourt

Connaught Laboratories

It is with amazed admiration that I am following the dedicated and unselfish campaign waged by some of your journalists aimed at purifying the Canadian public and scientific life for the benefit of our whole community. Their previous revelations of police brutality affecting almost exclusively the law-abiding, taxpaying, innocent citizens already has brought a great measure of feeling of safety for those walking the streets.

into scientific matters will also prove to be helpful to those who will be able to follow their brand of dialectics, which in a sense equates making

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The Globe + Mail (Toronto) 12 Mar 75
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000300100005-1
Law of the Sea (II)

By GEOFFREY STEVENS

OTTAWA

There are reasons for being both optimistic and pessimistic about the outcome of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference which resumes in Geneva on Monday. There are two main reasons for optimism, the first being that there was, at the conference's first session in Caracas last summer, a very real determination on the part of virtually all of the 137 nations to come up with a comprehensive international treaty. Perhaps some of them were preoccupied with tactics rather than with negotiating. But no one wanted to do anything that would destroy the possibility of eventually reaching an agreement that his government could ratify.

The second reason for optimism is the sense of urgency which, as noted yesterday, surrounds the conference. "We've got to have good results, even if they are only partial results, to show from the conference," says Paul Lapointe, of External Affairs, who will be deputy leader of the Canadian delegation in Geneva. Ambassador John Stevenson, the leader of the United States delegation, emphasized the same point in an interview in New York: "It is very critical that Geneva does produce not only progress but something people can see as progress."

Everyone involved in Law of the Sea discussions knows the negotiations are in imminent danger of being overtaken by events. If Geneva does not produce real and tangible progress, countries like the United States, Norway, Iceland, Japan and, yes, Canada, to mention only a few, will give up on a comprehensive treaty.

Then, one of two things would happen. Either every country would lay claim to as much of the sea as it could, or negotiations would turn to a series of piecemeal treaties covering specific issues. The trouble with a piecemeal approach is that the sum of its parts would not be as great as one comprehensive treaty. Each country would be free to ratify the treaties that benefited it and reject those that benefited someone else.

The awareness of the undesirability of the alternatives—unilateral action or piecemeal treaties—can only spur delegates at Geneva to move quickly to a draft treaty. And that's good.

What's not so good and what gives rise to a certain pessimism is that not very much seems to have happened since the Caracas session adjourned at the end of August. The idea then was the months leading up to Geneva would be devoted to intensive discussions with other countries to narrow existing differences and to set the stage for hard bargaining to begin without delay in Geneva. Instead, a weariness—a sort of diplomatic fatigue—seemed to set in after the 10 hard weeks in Caracas.

As far as Canada is concerned, there have been some bilateral talks with the United States and Japan; representatives from Guinea and Peru have passed through Ottawa; Mr. Lapointe led a delegation to Senegal, Tunisia and Algeria in January; another External Affairs official went to Tehran; the leader of the Canadian Law of the Sea delegation, Alan Beesley, who doubles as Ambassador to Vienna, flew to New York for meetings at the United Nations. But this rather diffuse activity does not seem to add up to concentrated pre-conference negotiating and there is no indication that any of it has really advanced Canada's position.

Another cause for concern, if not pessimism, is that no one is quite sure what will happen when everyone gets to Geneva. The assumption is that the conference will go straight into working sessions, skipping the formal plenary sessions and political speeches that wasted so much time in Caracas. But the conference could go off the rails before it has a chance to get down to work if—as rumors in diplomatic circles suggest—a group of African nations move to have the Palestine Liberation Organization (which had observer status in Caracas) seated as a full delegation and to have Israel and South Africa unseated. If that happens, Algeria will probably try to have the Viet Cong seated and China can be expected to challenge the delegation from Cambodia.

A final cause for concern is talk that is already making the rounds about yet another Law of the Sea Conference in early 1976. This sort of talk is self-defeating. The more likely the delegates think a future conference is, the less they will feel compelled to accomplish in Geneva. The postponing of hard decisions is part of the nature of the diplomatic beast.

TWO LINDAS
Your article re Linda Epstein's H Krishna experience completely disma...
How Father Took Linda From S...
—March 7).

In a society where Linda Lovelace (star of Deep Throat) is laughingly pict in your entertainment section of the s issue autographing a tattooed arm, I Krishna must represent a grave th Imagine some of our young people follow the notion that purity of mind and bod the path to spiritual awakening. Imagir licit sex is not allowed. Imagine fantas and violence are not allowed. Oh Lord, the Ted Patricks and Linda Lovelace this world be safe from such frightenin nocents?
Julie Lyons
Islington

In the act of deprogramming...
Father Took Linda From Sect—Marc...
Ted Patrick confined a 19-year-old inu al in a room for several days agains wishes. He also showed disrespect an indignity to the deities of other relig wonder what would our reaction be if Krishna followers had used similar te A wrong is a wrong, no matter who do The whole affair smacks of our ir ance of other religions and sickening gious bigotry of the few. It is as much to tear apart Shrimad Bhagwad Geet would be to tear apart a copy of the S. K. Kumra
Etobicoke

I was outraged to read your front story about how a girl was deprogra from the Hare Krishna movement...
Father Took Linda From Sect—Marc...
do not know how the Hare Krishna ment operates or what methods they attract devotees, but the reported r of deprogramming are a disgrace to r city which has any respect for ind liberties and religious freedom.
V. A. Sreedhar
Toronto

The recent abduction and forcibl sure to "deprogramming" (How Took Linda From Sect—March 7) o Epstein (Rudrani Dasi) are alarm several respects. First, though least is the grossly false image of th Krishna movement being fostered brain-washer for hire. Second, a tremely urgent, is the flagrant viol the rights of a young woman (with suggestions that there are more ab yet to come). Third, and to me the rious of all, is the assumption be this that the private sensibilities, identity, and religious faith of a woman of college age are no more ble in this society than the progr read into and out of a computer. W are only nine years short of 1984, it:

I hope this incident will spur th and conscientious response that t especially from persons most c with human rights and religious t It may well be that somewhere an numerous new and old religio (Hindu, Christian, Satanist, or v attracting young persons today t some—surely not the Hare Krishn ment—that are clearly destructiv man beings. If there are such, tl

The Globe & Mail (Toronto)

B.A. 1/25

Law of the Sea (III)

By GEOFFREY STEVENS

OTTAWA

Two issues will stand out from the dozens of others when the Law of the Sea negotiations reopen in Geneva next week. They are passage through international straits and exploitation of the international seabed.

They stand out because they are exceptionally difficult to resolve, because they intimately affect the interests of the United States and because the U.S. Congress cannot be counted on to ratify any treaty which fails to satisfy U.S. interest. Without American acceptance, a treaty would be next to worthless.

On the straits issue, the United States (along with the Soviet Union and certain other maritime powers) is clinging to the doctrine of freedom of the high seas at a point in time when most of the coastal states are eagerly dismantling the doctrine by bringing as much of the seas as they can under national jurisdiction. The United States supports the consensus at Caracas last summer that the territorial waters of coastal states should extend 12 miles offshore. The problem is that 112 international straits that are less than 24 miles wide (including Gibraltar and Malacca) would become the territorial waters of the bordering nations.

This means these nations could impose their own rules, ban certain types of traffic (say, oil supertankers or nuclear submarines) or close the straits entirely to unfriendly nations. This is totally unacceptable to the United States which insists on "unimpeded transit" through straits.

The straits issue can only be resolved through compromise. Vessels planning to pass through could be required to notify the straits states involved. There could be special navigational standards imposed on the transiting countries—traffic separation, vessel construction, emission of pollutants, and so on. It might be possible to restrict the types of armaments that could be taken through straits. So far, however, the United States has shown no inclination to compromise.

On the seabed issue, it is generally agreed there should be a bicameral international seabed authority on the pattern of the United Nations itself. That's where agreement begins and ends.

The United States wants an authority that would be little more than a traffic policeman—issuing mining and drilling licences to countries and corporations that have the technology to do the job and collecting royalties from them. The developing nations, fearing a rip off, want an authority that would do the exploitation itself.

Again, it's a matter of compromise. Canada and some others propose a mixture of contracting out and direct exploitation. Some African countries suggest starting with a licencing or contracting arrangement and gradually phasing it out in favor of direct exploitation.

An even more difficult problem concerns the structure of the bicameral seabed authority. The United States wants no repetition of the one nation-one vote problems of the UN General Assembly. It would assign to the larger body (on which every nation would be represented) only the power to recommend to the smaller executive body. The smaller nations naturally want the real power to reside in the larger body. The compromise could be to give most of the power to the executive body and structure its membership in such a way as to guarantee that every interest bloc is represented. But this could prove so awkward as to be impossible.

To sum up, keep one eye peeled for signs of compromise at Geneva on the straits and seabed issues. Keep the other eye (if physically possible) on Washington. If the Congress concludes Geneva is not making progress on issues vital to American interests, it can be expected to take unilateral action; there might be enough votes to over-ride a presidential veto.

Senator Warren Magnuson's bill to declare an exclusive 200-mile fishing zone off the coasts of the United States, which passed the Senate by 68 votes to 27 in the dying days of the previous Congress, will be before the Senate again. Similar legislation is planned in the House of Representatives. "If the fisheries bill goes through," predicts a Senate aide who specializes in the Law of the Sea, "it will be followed very shortly by bills dealing with mineral resources, environmental pollution and unimpeded transit."

If that happens in Washington, the debate in Geneva will be rendered largely irrelevant.

Flora MacDonald

I am becoming a little weary with all the fuss about the possibility of Flora MacDonald being the next leader of the Progressive Conservative Party and even Prime Minister. During the past few weeks, she has appeared on nearly every radio and TV interview show in Toronto and has been the subject of numerous newspaper columns.

Now, before the women libbers begin to scream, my concern about all this attention being paid to Miss MacDonald has nothing to do with the fact that she is a woman. As everyone knows, a woman can be bright and stupid just like a man.

What I want to know is Miss MacDonald's beliefs about man and society, what she stands for, what solutions she has for such pressing problems as growing unemployment, economic recession, the energy problem, food shortages, growing racism in Canada, and peace, to mention a few. She says she is concerned about the fabric of society and about the growing number of people who are losing faith in government. There is obviously some connection between the attitude of the voter to government and the performance and quality of leadership of our elected officials of all political parties.

I am convinced that the man on the street is prepared to do what is necessary and will respond to honest and forthright leadership and example. So, please let Miss MacDonald stop being coy about this leadership business and stand up and be counted.

Albert G. Watson
Toronto

Statists

Your columnist, Geoffrey Stevens, must be wearing blinkers if he honestly believes the allegations of Tory MPs Heward Grafftey and Sinclair Stevens describing the Trudeau Liberals as statists to be "so ludicrous as to be hilarious" (Three Mid Surprises—Feb. 26). True, the new Grits haven't done their sharp left turn dramatically, as, say, by nationalization. But neither have most democratic socialists around the world lately. Today, Western socialists seek more to control the economy and people's lives through interventionism and massive government spending.

Federal Government intervention in the Canadian economy has been increasing rapidly in the last eight years. Federal expenditures have tripled during the period and federal policies have been partly responsible for the increase in provincial government spending. Government spending in Canada (including transfer payments) has grown so fast with relation to gross national product during the period that at this rate by the mid-1980s it will equal the total GNP. If this isn't "leading the country down the slippery slope to socialism and state control" I'd like to know what columnist Stevens would consider it to be.

Grant Shaver
Gormley

A sad reminder

Recently I read I'm Still Living by Chiva Kwinta. It is the testimony of a Polish Jew who, as a child, survived the atrocities of the Nazi regime.

Yet, she does not denounce the Nazis but

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Law of the Sea (IV)

By GEOFFREY STEVENS

OTTAWA
If you accept the basic thrust of the Canadian policy, you'd have to agree that things are going pretty darned well for Canada in the Law of the Sea negotiations. We have reason—thank you very much—to be pleased with both the performance of our diplomats and the substance of the negotiations.

We are, of course, delighted with the consensus that emerged at Caracas last summer in support of the proposition that coastal states (of which Canada is one of the largest) should have 12-mile territorial waters and an "economic zone" extending 200 miles offshore. Why shouldn't we be delighted? Acceptance of the 12-mile territorial limit would give international sanction to something we have already established unilaterally. And the 200-mile zone would give us control over 85 to 90 per cent of the fish taken off our coasts and the lion's share of the oil, gas and minerals of the continental shelf.

So what does Canada want when the negotiations resume in Geneva next week? In a word, we want MORE. We think the 200-mile idea is very nice, but we'd really like to push the economic zone all the way out to the edge of the continental margin (a distance of 640 miles at one point off the east coast); that way, we'd pick up an extra 400,000 square miles to preside over, not to mention all the fish and all the non-living resources of the shelf.

In the case of what are known as the anadromous species (such as the salmon), which spawn in fresh water and grow to maturity in the sea, we would like to push our jurisdiction even further. We'd like to make it illegal for anyone, other than the coastal country in whose waters the salmon spawn, to fish for salmon at all. Our argument (and it has virtue) is that our best efforts to protect and preserve the species are wasted if countries such as Japan and Denmark continue to harvest salmon before they have a chance to get back to Canada to spawn. The Danish reply to this (and it has virtue, too) is that east coast salmon are as much Danish as they are Canadian because they feed and grow in the coastal waters of Greenland.

eral claim to the waters of the Arctic will be recognized and that we will get most of what we want on pollution control in economic zones. However, it looks very much as though we will have to abandon the continental margin. Despite the fact that Canada and some other broad-shelf countries are agreeable to sharing with the rest of the world some of the revenues from the area between 200 miles and the margin, they are not winning much support. Only about 40 of the 137 nations involved in the negotiations support the margin position and votes at Geneva will require a two-thirds majority.

There's less outright opposition to the salmon, but there's also less outright support. Only perhaps a dozen nations are vitally interested in safeguarding the species. Most of the rest are not interested in the question. Some of the African countries take the view that, although they have never fished for salmon, they are not prepared to sign away the right to do so in the future.

Canada's only hope on the salmon and the margin is to try to work some trade-offs with countries with peculiar problems of their own. For example, the Algerians are concerned about the special difficulties of semi-enclosed seas (the Mediterranean being one) and about the Balearic Islands, which belong to Spain but which would interfere with Algeria's economic zone. Similarly, the Turks are worried about the Greek islands that screen much of their Aegean coastline and the Tunisians are worried about islands belonging to Italy. Archipelagic states like Indonesia, Fiji and the Philippines are shopping for support for a special legal status that would enable them to draw their territorial limits around the outermost points of their outermost islands. Canada may find negotiating room with some of these countries.

Of course, we would be overjoyed if, by some brilliant diplomatic coup, we were to win everything we want at Geneva. But should we be overjoyed? Should we even be asking for more than we already have? Tomorrow's column, the last in this series, will look at the question of whether, in fact, Canada is pursuing

Cavalier

Geoffrey Stevens is to be credited this column, History and (March 6), for revealing the wrong-headed attitude toward the East Houses of Parliament. The program of Sir John A. Macdonald's of block to the public is as scant as the bastardization of this history suit the doubtful tastes of pacifists. And the arrogance of a Canada which apparently doesn't give a damn about the doubtful tastes and comfort of its citizens dated passes all understanding.

I hope that as many of you as possible will protest personally to the Minister about this cavalier attitude to our history. We should prevent, if possible, any further view of this historic office and we should have that it be reopened immediately on Sunday tours.

Pierre Berton
Toronto

Cosmetic surge

I am writing to comment on the decision to stop including ear operations in OHIP insurance. I think this is a bad mistake.

I am 14 years old. Until last year I had very protruding ears. It was for as long back as I can remember my hair long and straight down. I never would wear tails or braids. I love to swim and swim with my friends because my hair got wet it would part and would show.

Last August I had my ears corrected (OHIP coverage) and the operation made a big difference to me. My first year of high school without being barraged about my ears. I don't wear pony-tails now and I go out feeling comfortable. I think the operation has made my life better.

There must be many boys whose ears still to be fixed, who feel did. It is cruel of the Government of this type of operation as it is a luxury. Many children who are not able to afford the expense of the operation will be forced to leave their ears uncorrected. Perhaps the Government should think of the future where children could easily be exempt from people in need of very expensive treatment.

Hilary Thomas
Port Hope

Who's literate?

Relative to Ian Morrison's "Who's Literate?"—March 11):

I would like to remind Mr. Morrison that there is no conclusive evidence of his contention that an Englishman with more than eight years of education possesses a higher intelligence than a person with less.

R. S. Craggs
West Hill

William French put his finger on the neglected point about the book "Who's Literate?"—March 11: Are we a nation of readers?

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Law of the Sea (N)

By GEOFFREY STEVENS

OTTAWA

"We must aim for nothing less than an acceptable distribution of the world's wealth. In doing so, the inequities resulting from the accidental location of valuable geological formations should no more be overlooked than should the present unequal acquisition of technological and managerial skills." — Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.

"A 200-mile limit does not fully cover the Canadian case. We must obtain recognition of our rights and needs beyond that limit if we want to protect adequately our natural resources." — External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen.

These two statements, both made this week—the one by Mr. Trudeau in an excellent speech in London, England, the other by Mr. MacEachen in a clear presentation to a parliamentary committee in Ottawa—set out with striking clarity the schizoid character of Canadian foreign policy.

The Prime Minister, in the best traditions of Pearsonian diplomacy, is touring Europe, preaching internationalism and calling for an equitable sharing of the world's wealth and resources. In Ottawa, his External Affairs Minister is spelling out a blatantly nationalist policy designed to guarantee that Canada will not have to share anything with anyone.

It sort of takes the breath away.

Nowhere is this schizophrenia more apparent than it is in Canada's approach to the Law of the Sea negotiations. No country adopted a more nationalist stance than we did at the Law of the Sea Conference last summer in Caracas. No one will be more nationalist than we will be when the conference resumes on Monday in Geneva. At the same time, however, a good many less favored nations will in Geneva, as they did in Caracas, accept at face value our sincere assurance that our most earnest desire is to protect the small and the poor from being ripped off by the big and the rich.

Canada, of course, is not alone in preaching internationalism while promoting national self-interest; we're just more efficient at it than most—we've been remarkably successful in internationalizing nationalism. Now, obviously even an imperfect Law of the Sea treaty, as long as it discourages every nation

from setting its own rules, is much better than no treaty at all. But the original dream of a treaty that would truly treat the riches of the seas as the common heritage of all mankind is dead.

Some of the figures are startling. If every coastal nation establishes an exclusive economic zone for 200 miles off its shores, 30 per cent of the world's ocean space will be brought under national jurisdiction. The figure will be even higher if Canada and other broad-shelf countries are permitted to push their economic zones to the edge of the continental margin.

One estimate is that the coastal states will have the exclusive enjoyment of \$20-trillion worth of oil, gas and minerals in the seabed of their 200-mile economic zones. This suggests that by the time it is necessary or economically practicable to develop the international deep seabed (whose revenues all nations would share), it may be a case of too little too late.

Some questions should be asked. Does Canada really need an economic zone that would stretch to the continental margin? If the Prime Minister's words this week mean anything, should we not turn our thinking around and contemplate sharing with the rest of the world even those resources that lie within 200 miles of our coasts?

A proposal to this effect was presented to a private breakfast of two dozen MPs in Ottawa this week by an American Law of the Sea expert, John J. Logue, director of the World Order Research Institute at Villanova University. Professor Logue proposed that up to 20 per cent of the revenue from each coastal state's 200-mile economic zone be contributed to a "world common heritage fund". The amount each nation would receive from the fund would be in inverse proportion to its per capita income. This way, at least a portion of the oil riches of such areas as the North Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Mexico and the Canadian continental shelf would be spread among the poorer nations.

The fact that the MPs did not rush to embrace Mr. Logue's approach does not mean it does not have some merit. At the very least, we should take a critical look at our present Canada-first policy.

Last of a series

Georg

On the 19th of troops under the Pitcairn opened Lexington, Mass.

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NY TIMES 4/16/75
**SEA-LAW SESSIONS
SPLIT ON NEXT STEP**

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, April 15—Although more than mid-way through its eight-week session, the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was divided today on how to plot its course for drafting a charter to govern man's use of the oceans.

A suggestion by Hamilton S. Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, the conference president, that the time had come for the 138-nation conference to assemble the many conflicting proposals ran into heavy going.

Despite general agreement that basic negotiating texts would be necessary, a number of countries said more discussion was required before drafts could be prepared.

The issues still causing problems include navigation through international straits that would fall entirely within the territorial seas of bordering coastal states.

Another key issue involves the rights and obligations of coastal states over the resources to which they would be given title in an economic zone extending 200 miles off their shores.