

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0

IPI

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



**AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF**



NORTH VIETNAM (U)

(THROUGH 18 JULY 1967)

JULY 1967

S-2408/AP4A

Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency



CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0

WARNING


This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0

**AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 18 JULY 1967)**

FOREWORD

This report is prepared on a monthly basis at the request of the Secretary of Defense for an evaluation of certain effects of the ROLLING THUNDER program. The report covers three general areas of concern: Effects on Military Targets; Leadership and Public Reactions; and Effects on the NVN Economy. The discussion of political effects is limited to those developments within North Vietnam which relate to Hanoi's attitude toward continuing the war and the effects the ROLLING THUNDER attack has on civilian morale in North Vietnam.



AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 18 JULY 1967

SUMMARY

1. (S/NFD) The sustained high intensity of air strikes that began in April continued through June and the first half of July. The preponderance of strikes were against the transportation system with emphasis on the key lines of communication (LOC's) in the northeast. Damage inflicted on vehicles and railroad rolling stock increased to one of the highest monthly totals since the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER program. Recent analysis of comprehensive photo coverage, however, indicates that the inventory of operational rolling stock is still adequate.

2. (S/NFD) Air attacks were conducted against numerous targets on all of the northern railroad lines. Extensive interdictions along the Hanoi-Dong Dang line delayed rail movement temporarily and may have caused the North Vietnamese to shift some cargoes to the less efficient highway system. Attacks against the road system increased, with the bulk of the effort concentrated south of the 20th parallel. Widespread attacks were also conducted along several important routes to the northwest. Strikes and damage inflicted against the waterborne transportation system declined from the previous period.

3. (S/NFD) North Vietnamese Air Force reactions diminished and air engagements decreased as a result of heavy aircraft losses and damage to airfields. Firing of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's)

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

declined from the high level of recent months. However, SAM coverage has been expanded westward from the Hanoi area and another attempt was made to establish a SAM defense in the DMZ.

4. (S/NFD) With the exception of restrikes on the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, electric power plants were the only significant targets struck within North Vietnam's modern industrial sector during the reporting period. Restrikes on seven power plants effectively negated extensive reconstruction efforts that had been under way for the past several months.

5. (S/NFD) Since April, there has been a major increase in the level of damage inflicted by air strikes. The stepped-up air campaign has caused major changes in the air defense system and widespread disruption of economic activities in North Vietnam. However, the North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels and force structures.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Effects on Military Targets

1. (S/NFD) The sustained high intensity of air strikes that began in April continued through June and the first half of July. Nearly 11,000 attack sorties were flown in June, and the same high rate has been maintained in July. The preponderance of strikes continued to be against the transportation system with emphasis on the key lines of communication (IOC's) in the northeast. Damage inflicted on vehicles and railroad rolling stock increased to one of the highest monthly totals since the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER program. Jet-supporting airfields, military barracks, electric power facilities, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, storage sites, and ammunition depots were also hit.
2. (S/NFD) Air attacks were conducted against numerous targets on all of the northern railroad lines. These attacks, conducted against multiple targets on each line, probably disrupted operations, undoubtedly created formidable repair problems and required a substantial increase in the expenditure of labor and materials.
3. (S/NFD) The most important rail targets struck were along the Hanoi-Dong Dang line, North Vietnam's principal rail connection with Communist China. Intensified attacks against yards, sidings, and bridges resulted in extensive interdictions that delayed rail movement.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Traffic was limited to shuttling for about 10 days during the reporting period. This may have caused the North Vietnamese to shift some cargoes to the less efficient highway system.

4. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Lao Cai line, also subjected to concentrated attacks, was operational for most of the period except for shuttling at the destroyed Viet Tri Rail and Highway Bridge. This line, which runs northwest to Yunnan Province in Southwest China, has been little used since 1965. The discovery of six new bypass bridges at vulnerable points may, however, portend a more important role for this link. There are now 10 bypass bridges on this line.

5. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Haiphong line was struck repeatedly, and shuttling operations have been required since 20 June to bypass the two interdicted railroad-highway bridges at Hai Duong. This complicates the movement of supplies from Haiphong to the Hanoi area. However, adequate vehicle and water transport is available to maintain movement of supplies out of Haiphong.

6. (S/NFD) In addition to the intensive attacks against the rail system in Northern Vietnam, a high level of strikes was maintained against the Hanoi-Vinh line. This line was closed to through traffic during the entire period, but shuttling, utilizing the adjacent highway, permitted rail operations to continue, although at a reduced rate. The tramway south of Duc Tho was closed to traffic except for

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

light shuttling operations on the 45-mile section south of Xom Hoai which was extended two miles during this period.

7. (S/NFD) The high level of strikes against the rail system resulted in extensive damage to railroad rolling stock that was higher than for any reporting period during 1967 and only slightly lower than the record total achieved during late summer, 1966. Recent analysis of comprehensive photo coverage, however, indicates that the inventory of operational rolling stock is still adequate.

8. (S/NFD) New construction intended to improve the capability of the rail system continues. Conversion of the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen line to dual-gauge may be completed and two new seven-track yards have been built north of Hanoi. The Hanoi-Haiphong line is possibly being converted to dual-gauge, completion of which will significantly increase North Vietnam's capability to move supplies from the port of Haiphong. Construction continues on the railroad bypass and ferry crossings which will connect the Hanoi-Haiphong and Hanoi-Vinh lines and provide an alternate to North Vietnam's longest bridge -- the Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge over the Red River.

9. (S/NFD) Attacks against the road system increased, with the bulk of the effort concentrated south of the 20th parallel -- primarily against Routes 1A, 15, 101, and 7. Widespread attacks were conducted along several important routes in the northwest. Monthly vehicle losses have increased steadily since December 1966,

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

and the number reported destroyed and damaged in June was one of the highest monthly totals since the beginning of the ROLLING THUNDER program.

10. (S/NFD) Vehicle traffic continued at a high rate, with the majority of trucks detected at night. Large convoys in the northeast were seen moving south toward Hanoi, possibly representing the delivery of new trucks from China to North Vietnam. These trucks may have been used also to deliver some freight from Ping Hsiang, China, possibly to overcome delays imposed by interdictions on the key Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line. Traffic in the Mu Gia Pass area was not significantly affected by air operations during the month and construction and repair continued during most of the period. The principal alternate crossing into Laos, Route 137, was observed to be in relatively fair condition but only lightly used

11. (S/NFD) The over-all condition of the road network continues to be adequate to meet essential transportation requirements. Repeated interdictions, increased traffic, and heavy rains require more maintenance to keep the roads in serviceable condition. Sections of key roads in the Panhandle were closed for short periods.

12. (S/NFD) Strikes and damage inflicted against the waterborne transportation system declined from the previous period. Attacks were concentrated on the intracoastal and inland waterways in the southern portion of the Panhandle. Photographs during June showed

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

heavy concentrations of craft on the inland routes in this region. Small craft are still being sighted near mined areas, but no large, self-propelled, metal-hulled craft have been observed in waterways to which access is only possible through mined areas. The importance of waterways to the North Vietnamese is documented by reports of compulsory labor details performing dredging and maintenance operations on the intracoastal route and the hasty work noted on previously unnavigable segments.

13. (S/NFD) Attacks against watercraft have probably reduced North Vietnam's inventory, although the actual cargo-carrying capacity may have increased. Watercraft that have been destroyed were mainly small wooden types used in the southern provinces. Replacement vessels being built domestically and imported, although fewer in number, are larger and have many times the lift capability of those destroyed.

14. (S/NFD) Strikes against coastal transshipment points and naval bases decreased from the previous period. Damage was inflicted on piers, warehouse areas, cargo-handling facilities, and storage sites, and many fires were reported. No strikes were conducted against maritime port facilities during June. However, a strike on the Hon Gai rail yard may hamper port operations and further retard North Vietnam's already sagging coal exports.

15. (S/NFD) Pilots have reported a marked increase in the number

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

of secondary explosions during air strikes over North Vietnam during May and June, particularly in the Panhandle area. These explosions represent substantial losses of ammunition and material and probably indicate the more widespread use of small dispersed supply points.

16. (S/NFD) The intensified attacks in the northeast have caused some deterioration of the air defense system. North Vietnamese Air Force reactions have diminished and air engagements decreased as a result of heavy aircraft losses and damage to airfields. The North Vietnamese fighter force lost almost 50 per cent of its in-country MIG-17's during the April-June period and in the past month had seemingly all but retired from the scene of combat. While no long-term abatement of SAM firings has been discerned, there are increasing reports of the effectiveness of CBU munitions in silencing antiaircraft batteries.

17. (S/NFD) Firing of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) declined from the high level of recent months -- 178 were fired from 20 June to 12 July. There were 11 SAM's fired in the eastern area of the DMZ on 6 July, the first noted since 13 May. The three attempts to establish a SAM defense system in the DMZ area since September 1966 demonstrate Hanoi's continuing concern with defending its military assets in the southern Panhandle and its desire to preclude unrestricted B-52 operations over the area. SAM coverage has also been expanded westward from the Hanoi area. Photographs of 18 June revealed an occupied SAM site 65 miles west of Hanoi. The site was

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

heavily camouflaged and located in a barracks area which had been previously bombed. Occupancy of this site extends the SAM envelope 32 miles to the northwest, which includes a portion of Laos. An unoccupied site was later discovered five miles west of the one mentioned above.

18. (S/NFD) The sustained high intensity of air strikes against significant North Vietnamese military and economic targets since April, together with increased emphasis on attacking key LOC's and transportation facilities in the northeast, has resulted in a major increase in the level of damage inflicted. The intensity of the air campaign has caused major changes in the air defense system and widespread disruption of economic activities in North Vietnam. In addition, the Communist countries are being forced to assume an increased burden of providing military and economic aid. The cumulative effects of the air strikes have degraded North Vietnam's capability for sustained large scale conventional military operations against South Vietnam. However, the North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels and force structures.

Leadership and Public Reactions

19. (S/NFD) In the past several weeks, the North Vietnamese leadership in a series of authoritative statements has underscored its determination to continue the war until a settlement on its terms

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

can be achieved. In two separate interviews, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh restated Hanoi's demand that the bombing of the North be stopped unconditionally before there can be any talk with the US regarding the settlement of the war. Other North Vietnamese spokesmen in recent public and private statements have adopted an equally unyielding tone. There have been some reports, however, indicating that the ability of the US to escalate the air offensive -- including the ability to counter increased aid shipments -- has convinced some Soviet and Eastern European representatives in Hanoi that the North Vietnamese cannot win. Presumably this attitude applies to both the air offensive in North Vietnam and the ground war in South Vietnam.

20. (S/NFD) Despite the difficulties incurred by the population in both Hanoi and the countryside, there continue to be no signs of open disaffection with the regime, nor has there been any indication that the regime is modifying its policies in response to any popular unrest. The little hostility and anger that has been observed in the population is chiefly directed against the US.

Effects on the Economy

21. (S/NFD) With the exception of restrikes on the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine, electric power plants were the only significant targets struck within North Vietnam's modern industrial sector during the reporting period. Approximately 80 per cent -- about 150,000 kw -- of the national capacity currently is out of service. Except for the Hanoi power plant, which is believed to be operating at about one-half of its installed capacity of 32,500 kw, all of the central

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

generating plants in the main Hanoi-Haiphong power network are out of service.

22. (S/NFD) Activity during the period consisted of restrikes on seven power plants which effectively negated extensive reconstruction efforts that had been under way for the past several months. The most significant strikes were against the Uong Bi Plant which, having been restored to operating conditions, sustained heavy damage. The Thai Nguyen and Thanh Hoa plants, also under repair, received additional damage. At Nam Dinh the severity of damage was particularly extensive. Each of the other plants will require a minimum of three months to be restored to partial operation. Damage from attacks on the Hanoi and Bac Giang plants was negligible. Aerial photography of a restrike on the Ben Thuy plant is not yet available. Although the plant was being repaired, it was not in operation at the time of the strike. Much of modern industry continues to be seriously hampered by the power shortage. Both the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine and the Haiphong Cement Plant are inoperable as a result of bomb damage and loss of power.

23. (S/NFD) Additional reports on evacuation from Hanoi indicate that the program, which the regime has been promoting for well over a year, has been more rigidly enforced lately. A report in mid-June stated that about one-half of Hanoi's population, mostly children and old people, has been evacuated to areas between 10

and 60 kilometers from the city. Only able-bodied people between the ages of 20 and 40 are said to remain in the city, presumably to carry on essential economic activities. The evacuation program, however, does not appear to be operating any more smoothly now than a year ago. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the people remaining in the city are burdened with the responsibility of supplying and visiting their families in the countryside. Evacuees have, for the most part, found it difficult to obtain proper food, employment, shelter, and other necessities and have not been assisted in any great measure by the regime. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] While less is known about actual conditions in Haiphong, the evacuation program is believed to be creating similar problems and dislocation of the population as is being experienced in Hanoi. Haiphong is reported to be 75 per cent evacuated.

24. (S/NFD) ALL of the North Vietnamese government ministries except Foreign Affairs and National Defense have evacuated the city, leaving only skeleton staffs in the city proper. Foreign embassies and legations have been told they are welcome to evacuate to an area about 60 kilometers northwest of Hanoi, though none have accepted the invitation.

25. (S/NFD) Preliminary analysis of information on the spring

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

crop indicates that the harvest -- normally about one-third of the annual harvest -- was mediocre to poor. Although the recently harvested crop will undoubtedly give some temporary respite to the tight food situation, the long-run outlook for any substantial improvement in the domestic food supply remains bleak. The emphasis of the North Vietnamese on planting subsidiary crops, particularly sweet potatoes, at the expense of the spring rice crop does not appear to have been particularly successful. Increased imports of bulk foods in the first half of 1967 (about 238,000 metric tons or about three times the amount imported in all of 1966) testify to short-falls in domestic food production. Relatively large imports of foodstuffs will continue to be needed to prevent serious food shortages from developing. Recent information suggests that the rice ration was being met with 60 per cent rice and 40 per cent substitutes such as wheat.

26. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne imports amounted to 140,500 metric tons in June, only slightly less than the record volumes of April and May. Imports of foodstuffs and miscellaneous and general cargoes, 59,900 metric tons and 63,600 metric tons respectively, were second only to the record volumes established during May. Although the closure of the Suez Canal has increased transit time from Black Sea ports to North Vietnam from an average of 21 to 36 days, the shipments during June were not affected. The continuing

~~SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

high level of seaborne imports has substantially increased off-loading problems in Haiphong. Dry cargo ships calling at Haiphong were in port an average of 22 days during June, compared with 17 days in May. For larger dry cargo ships (over 7,000 metric tons), the average time in port was 43 days.

27. (S/NFD) The estimated petroleum imports for June were only 11,000 metric tons but an additional 11,000 metric tons arrived in Haiphong on 1 July. Although import levels have fluctuated greatly in recent months, the average monthly volume of nearly 24,000 metric tons, recorded during the first six months of 1967, exceeds estimated current consumption levels. Increased transport activity and the greater use of diesel driven generators have raised the rate of consumption of petroleum to an estimated 18,000 to 20,000 metric tons a month. Stocks of petroleum on hand as of 30 June are estimated to have been equivalent to about 100 days of supply at current rates of consumption.

28. (S/NFD) Seaborne exports from North Vietnam continued at greatly reduced levels during June. Coal shipments from Cam Pha and Hon Gai totaled 30,300 metric tons. In 1965, monthly shipments averaged 95,800 metric tons and in 1966, 78,200 tons. There were no seaborne exports of apatite or pig iron noted during June. There were no exports of cement and imports were reported for the first time arriving aboard a freighter from China on 18 July.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

29. (S/NFD) A re-evaluation of North Vietnam's unfulfilled 1965 and 1966 export commitments to the other Communist countries has been taking place since the beginning of 1967. The latest report -- negotiations with the USSR to stop shipment of veneer, plywood, and bamboo -- is a further indication of how the North Vietnamese export program has been reduced. In addition, North Vietnam is beginning to plan for its 1968 import needs. Reports of several contracts for vehicle spare parts valued at about \$11 million have been received during the current reporting period.

30. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage attributable to the ROLLING THUNDER program through June is estimated to be \$291 million. (See Tab B.) Of this total, \$24 million resulted from air strikes during June. In addition to the measurable losses, there continue to be many other losses to the economy and to the military establishment which cannot be assigned meaningful values.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS ^{a/} THRU 15 JULY 67 TABLE 360

Fixed Targets	Total Targets ^{c/}		Targets Struck		e/ No. of Attacks	b/ Strike Sorties	% of National Capacity Destroyed or inactive because of air strikes
	National Capacity (X 1000)	JCS ^{d/} Targeted	d/				
	No.	%	No.	%			
Barracks	443 men	65 41.08	54 32.3	361	2928	25.52	
Ammo Depots	112.6 MT	18 100	18 100	98	1362	76.5	
POL Storage *	133.5 MT	13 100	13 100	87	714	86.5	
Supply Depots	10550 SqFt	29 42.48	23 44.4	81	832	17.84	
Power Plants	187 KW	20 94.5	14 76.1	77	650	77.3	
Maritime Ports	7.8 ST/Dy	8 95	6 44	27	235	12.1	
RR Yards	33.7 ST/Dy	4 78	3 54	68	424	35.9	
RR Shops		3 88	2 68	4	33	21.6	
Industrial:							
Explosive Plt	1 MT	1 100	1 100	10	47	100	
Iron & Steel	300 MT (PIG)	1 100	1 100	23	273	100	
Cement Plant	600 MT	1 100	1 100	1	57	90	
Airfields	32	12**	7** 36	53	748	23	
Naval Bases	9	5	3 42	26	232	19.5	
Bridges	1,517	61	52	428	3389	55.8 (of those tgtd)	
Commo Install	50	5	2	2	15	20	
Radar Sites	210	5	5	74	434	37.5	
SAM Sites	164		58	112	388		
Locks & Dams	94	8	2 10.6	2	10	5.3	
Ferries	160		11	7	44		

* JCS targets only; does not include dispersed storage. Total Sorties: 13,227
 Armed Recce Sorties 143,595 Results ^{f/}
 Destroyed 7,456 Damaged 13,462
 ** Includes non-JCS numbered Vessels 4,131 Vehicles 4,031
 Hoa Lac Airfield. RR Stock 1,443 2,126

- a/ Assessments are based on best information received; will be refined as more accurate information becomes available.
- b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this summary assigned to principal target.
- c/ These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets (i.e., barracks, supply and ammo depots).
- d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
- e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
- f/ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc., attacked and road and rail cuts made.

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Value of Economic and Military Damage
 Attributed to the ROLLING THUNDER Program
 1965 Through June 1967

<u>Economic</u>		<u>Military</u>	
<u>Direct Losses</u>	<u>Million US\$</u>	<u>Direct Losses</u>	<u>Million US\$</u>
Railroad/Highway Bridges	27.1 <u>a/ b/</u>	Barracks	28.1 <u>a/</u>
Transportation Equipment	53.9	Ammunition Depots	5.2 <u>a/</u>
Electric Power Plants	26.4	Supply Depots	6.0 <u>a/</u>
Petroleum	7.4 <u>a/</u>	Radar and Communications Sites	2.8
Manufacturing Facilities	17.4	Airfields	0.9 <u>a/</u>
Railroad Yards	5.7 <u>a/</u>	SAM Sites	4.4 <u>a/</u>
Maritime Ports	1.4 <u>a/</u>	Naval Bases	1.6 <u>a/</u>
Miscellaneous Armed Reconnaissance	1.7	Aircraft	30.2
		Naval Craft	3.8
SUBTOTAL, Direct Losses	141.0	Miscellaneous Armed Reconnaissance	8.9
		TOTAL, Direct Losses	91.9
		<u>TOTAL</u>	
		<u>Million US\$</u>	
<u>Indirect Losses</u>		Economic	199
Exports	23.7	Military	<u>92</u>
Agriculture <u>c/</u>	25.5	TOTAL	291 <u>d/</u>
Fishing	8.3		
SUBTOTAL, Indirect Losses	57.5		
TOTAL, Direct and Indirect	198.5		

- a/ Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
- b/ Of the total, \$4.8 million is estimated to have been expended to date on the repair of damaged and destroyed bridges and \$22.3 million is estimated for complete restoration in the future of bridges damaged or destroyed. In addition, \$1.3 million would be required to make temporary repairs to presently unrepaired bridges.
- c/ It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are arbitrarily attributed entirely to the indirect effects of the bombing. An unknown part of these losses is in fact due to weather and other natural causes.
- d/ Excluding the cost of trucks destroyed and damaged in Laos and economic and military facilities and equipment destroyed and damaged by US naval operations along the coast of southern North Vietnam.

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMDISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

THE WHITE HOUSE:	
Vice President	1 Cy
Gen Maxwell Taylor	1 Cy
Mr. Bromley Smith	5 Cys
DEFENSE:	
SECDEF	2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA)	2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis)	2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (PA)	1 Cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET	1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary)	1 Cy
USIA	1 Cy
AID	1 Cy
NASA	1 Cy
NSA	5 Cys
STATE	20 Cys
AEC	1 Cy
FBI	1 Cy
NIC	1 Cy
ACDA	1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS	1 Cy
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF	1 Cy
J-1	1 Cy
J-3	2 Cys
J-4	1 Cy
J-5	1 Cy
J-6	1 Cy
SACSA	1 Cy
NMCC	3 Cys
ARMY:	
CHIEF OF STAFF	2 Cys
DCSOPS	1 Cy
ACSFOR	1 Cy
ACSI	1 Cy
ACSI-CI	1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern	1 Cy
STAG	1 Cy

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NAVY:	
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS	2 Cys
DNI	1 Cy
OP-921E	1 Cy
OP-922Y1	1 Cy
OP-922Y2	1 Cy
OP-92B1	1 Cy
AIR FORCE:	
CHIEF OF STAFF	2 Cys
ACS, I/USAF	1 Cy
AFNINDE	6 Cys
AFNIEBB	1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation)	1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library)	1 Cy
MARINE CORPS:	
COMMANDANT	1 Cy
G-2	1 Cy
CINCPAC	2 Cys
CINCPACAF	1 Cy
CINCUSARPAC	1 Cy
CINCPACFLT	1 Cy
COMUSMACV	2 Cys
7AF	2 Cys
COMSEVENTHFLT	1 Cy
COMA1KCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT (CTF 77)	1 Cy
CINCLANT	1 Cy
CINCSTRIKE	1 Cy
CINCSAC	1 Cy
SAC 544	1 Cy
CINCTAC	1 Cy
AFSTRIKE	1 Cy
CONTIC	1 Cy
CINCALCOM	1 Cy
CINCEUR	1 Cy
CINCUSAREUR	1 Cy
CINCUSAFE	1 Cy
CINCNAVEUR	1 Cy
CINCCONAD	1 Cy
CIA	125 Cys

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DIA:

DIADR	1 Cy
DIADD	1 Cy
DIASC-1	1 Cy
JS	1 Cy
CO-2C	1 Cy
AP	1 Cy
AP-2	1 Cy
AP-2C2	2 Cys
AP-2D1	1 Cy
AP-2D2	1 Cy
AP-3	1 Cy
AP-4	1 Cy
AP-4A	1 Cy
AP-4A2 (Pent)	6 Cys
AP-4A2 (AHS)	4 Cys
AP-4B4	2 Cys
AP-4C	3 Cys
AP-7	2 Cys
AP-8	2 Cys
XX	1 Cy
JT	1 Cy

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0

INFORMATION REPORT CLEARANCE REQUEST				DATE RECEIVED
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY		<input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE		20 July 67
NAME OF REQUESTER		OFFICE		EXTENSION
[REDACTED]		OER/St/P/C		red 1110
REPORT NO.	FIELD REPORT NO.	CLASS. AND CONTROL	PORTION DESIRED	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	S/NFD/NDA/CD/BUO	see below	
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
<p>PROPOSED USE Would like to use the following statement, "There have been some reports, however, indicating that the increased intensity of the US air offensive have convinced some Soviet and Eastern European representatives in Hanoi--at lease among themselves-- that the North Vietnamese cannot win."</p> <p>To be used in CIA/DIA Monthly Report, <u>An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam</u> published by DIA as S/NFD/CD.</p>				
RECORD OF PROCESSING				
NO.	NAME	DIV.	EXT.	CLEARANCE
REMARKS				
Could we please have a reply to cob 20 Jul 67? A phone reply would suffice.				
<p><i>Approved!</i></p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>20 July 1967</p>				
NOTIFIED REQUESTER: Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060008-0 (Initials)				
BY MEMO	BY PHONE			

25X1A
25X1A

25X1A