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INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COURSE

CURRENT APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF COORDINATION
IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Presented by

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Assistant for Coordination/Director of Central Intelligence
9 April 1963

BACKGROUND

We entered World War II without a national mechanism to pull together the intelligence information available to the United States. During that war, intelligence required for the military conduct of the war by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was coordinated by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This committee included representatives, not only of the military services, but also the State Department, the Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration. However, its function was solely to support JCS strategic planning, and its coordination was accomplished by committee vote (the product of a committee is usually the lowest common denominator).

About one year before the end of the war, studies were undertaken within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the concept of a permanent, centralized, national intelligence service. The resulting views were presented to the President who, by Executive Order on 22 January 1946, formally authorized the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunners of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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National Security Act of 1947

You will remember that in 1947, Congress and the White House were strongly influenced by the Pearl Harbor investigations which showed the need for an effective national intelligence system. This was stressed in House and Senate hearings on the National Security Act bill, and witness after witness testified as to the value of centralized intelligence.

There followed very little opposition in Congress to the plan for a central intelligence service and on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act became the law of the land and the Central Intelligence Agency was born.

A review of the Congressional debates indicates that when CIA was first proposed, Congress was primarily interested in a mechanism for coordinating foreign intelligence.

The National Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency, and authorized the President to appoint a Director of Central Intelligence, "who shall be the head thereof." This Act also placed the Agency under the orders of the National Security Council, and charged the Agency with the duty of making recommendations to the Council "for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security."

It is pertinent to note that Mr. McCone's title is Director of Central Intelligence. It is not accurate nor proper to refer to him

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as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is of course the head of the agency, as stated in the law, and is universally referred to as the Director.

It is not generally known that the law did not charge the CIA with the responsibility of coordinating the intelligence activities of other departments and agencies. It did, however, give the Agency responsibilities for making recommendations to the National Security Council regarding coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security.

National Security Council Intelligence Directives

Appropriate recommendations were made and the first directive received from the Council emphasized, as did Congress, the dominant importance of coordinating foreign intelligence activities of the United States. These directives are usually referred to as "non-skids."

This first NSC Intelligence Directive made the Director of Central Intelligence, not the Agency, individually responsible for over-all coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. President Kennedy strengthened the authority of the Director in a recent memorandum to Mr. McCone. I quote:

"In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence, it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total United

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States foreign intelligence effort. As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field."

The Director's major responsibility is that of coordinator of the total foreign intelligence effort of the United States upon which he expends about 90% of his efforts. He has delegated his authority for the day-to-day management of the Agency to General Carter. In performing his coordination function Mr. McCone:

(1) maintains liaison with the President, the White House and the President's Advisory Board on Foreign Intelligence Activities;

(2) works closely with the heads of agencies and departments -- State, Defense, AEC, FBI, NASA, and others;

(3) is Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board which has ten other members -- State, Defense, JCS, Army, Navy, Air Force, AEC, FBI, NSA, and CIA. General Carter now represents the CIA, but prior to 30 November 1961 CIA was not represented per se;

(4) makes extensive use of his Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Carter; the Chief of Staff of the CIA, Mr. Kirkpatrick; and the four Deputy Directors of the Agency, Dr. Cline, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Helms, and Colonel "Red" White.

(5) Assigned to the Director's office, is a Coordination Staff consisting of a full-time group of intelligence professionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence community-at-large. The Staff is currently authorized ten officers. The Assistant for Coordination and Deputy Assistant are appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence; three full-time members (one each from the DD/P, DD/I and DD/S) are detailed from the Central Intelligence Agency, and arrangements have been made for part-time membership from the DD/R. One full-time member each is detailed from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the National Security Agency. There is also a liaison officer from the FBI and the AEC. The grade structure is GS-15 or above, or Colonels or Navy Captains. The Staff average is 18 years intelligence experience per member.

CONCEPTS OF COORDINATION

The term "coordination" has many connotations in our governmental activities. To some it means command or control; to others, guidance and agreement. Frequently the word "coordination" carries with it the connotation of passive policing; as if the objective of coordination was the mere identification of duplicative activities and elimination of the duplication, either by combination of the two activities or suppression of one of them. The concept of coordination expressed by the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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of the United States Government and followed by the Director's Coordination Staff is quite different. This concept regards coordination as an active effort to marshal in orderly fashion available intelligence resources to achieve agreed ends. Its objective is to improve, in every possible respect, the intelligence activities of the Government, and much of the time and effort of the Coordination Staff is devoted to seeking out means of improvement, developing them into coherent courses of action, and recommending such action to proper authority.

The passive or policing concept of coordination also leads to conformity and uniformity. Intelligence is one Government activity that should not only tolerate, but in fact, cherish its "gad-flies" -- the dissenters, the unorthodox, the innovators, the skeptics who challenge accepted and traditional views -- provided they are true gad-flies in the Socratic sense, and not chronic complainers. The Coordination Staff door is always open to the unorthodox, and they can be sure that their ideas will be weighed fairly and impartially by a group of men who collectively understand the intelligence community, and who, more importantly, have no vested interest except in improving it. Mr. McCone's concept for coordination is "you can nudge 'em, but you can't push 'em."

Mr. McCone uses his coordination channels to the White House and with the heads of departments and agencies to deal with the broad intelligence problem which usually requires a high-level policy decision. Such things as collection of information by overhead reconnaissance and the coordination of clandestine activities of the military services with

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similar activities of the CIA are examples of problems requiring high-level discussion with the heads of departments and agencies.

The Director is also the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which is a most important and active forum for intelligence coordination. The Board advises and assists the DCI as he may require in the discharge of his coordination responsibilities. The Board meets once a week and sometimes every day when the Government is faced with a crisis situation such as the Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.

For several days during that crisis the Board met every morning (including weekends) at eight A.M. By ten A.M. Mr. McCone, in his capacity as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, was off to a meeting with the President and his Executive Committee. Each day overhead photographic reconnaissance information was collected, and the evaluated intelligence therefrom was available to the Board for its meeting the next morning at eight A.M. This general cycle was repeated for several days, and it is one of the finest examples of community coordination of intelligence we have experienced.

Mr. McCone receives assistance from and coordinates an extensive variety of problems by use of the USIB mechanisms. At present USIB has 15 committees covering a wide field of intelligence activities which involves, in some degree, every member of the intelligence community. The Committees work in substantive fields which by their nature can not readily be assigned to one agency to perform.

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The Committee-type of coordination is employed by the USIB for such intelligence activities as: overhead reconnaissance (COMOR); interchange and maximum community utilization of intelligence (CODIB); early warning of intention to engage in aggressive action on the part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (Watch); prevention of unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods (Security); critical collection problems (CCPC); production and exchange of foreign economic intelligence (EIC); production of intelligence on atomic energy (JAEIC); production and coordination of guided missile and astronautics intelligence (GMAIC); production and coordination of scientific and technical intelligence (SIC); policy affecting defectors (IDC); priorities for clandestine collection of information by the CIA (ICC); signal intelligence activities (SIGINT); and production of the National Intelligence Survey.

The Director uses the Senior Staff officers of the CIA for specific coordination assistance within their assigned specialties of intelligence production, including National Intelligence Estimates; intelligence collection, both overt and covert; intelligence research; and world-wide support for intelligence activities.

Another category of assistance of a less direct nature, which the Director receives in his role of coordinator of the foreign intelligence effort, comprises services of common concern and intelligence of common concern. These are provided to the intelligence community, as a whole, by the agency or department assigned the responsibility. (Refer to the black dots on the second chart for the allocation of the responsibility.)

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In addition to the services shown on this chart the CIA also provides, as a service of common concern, for a National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC); a Central Reference Facility [redacted]

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The Origin and Mission of the Coordination Staff

In 1956 the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities recommended that the DCI establish a sort of Chief of Staff to run the detailed operation of the Agency so that the Director could spend more time following and coordinating the national foreign intelligence activities.

The DCI responded by appointing a fourth Deputy within the CIA having the title of Coordinator to "assist him in coordination of the intelligence activities of the Government." The management of the Agency continued as before. The new deputy with his staff of two officers worked primarily on the revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) and their implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs) but was unable to devote a major effort to day-to-day coordination in the intelligence community.

Some elements of the intelligence community looked with distrust and suspicion at the function of the CIA deputy who would look into their activities. Consequently, a pronounced conflict of interest developed. This was particularly noted in the overseas clandestine collection efforts.

Some members of the community did not believe that a major competitor and operator should be their coordinator. In simplest terms, the coordinator is then in the position of being both pitcher and umpire.

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During the last half of 1960 the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States, Chaired by Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA, developed 43 recommendations. These were then considered by the National Security Council and their actions were approved by the President on January 18, 1961.

One of the approved recommendations, No. 29, established the Coordination Staff. We are not a committee and our decisions are not always reached by unanimous agreement. The wording in the Joint Study Group Report describes its composition, purpose and allegiance. I quote a paragraph:

"To provide for including full-time professionals into the field of co-ordination and minimizing the conflict of interest problem, we propose that the DCI organize under his Assistant for Coordination, and as part of his personal staff, a full-time group of intelligence professionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence community rather than any one member agency. Membership on the staff would be drawn from the foreign intelligence community-at-large. We believe that this Coordination Staff should be charged with assisting the DCI in his community-wide responsibilities for coordination of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, including surveys of departmental intelligence activities authorized in National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 1. The Staff and its entire membership should be responsible to the DCI as a Coordinator and they should be separate from any operational responsibilities of CIA or other department or agency."

All support for the Staff, (except pay and personal administrative matters for the members from the Departments of State and

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Defense), is provided by the DCI. In some quarters the inference has been made that if our Staff members are paid by their own agency their allegiance to the national effort is not complete. I do not agree with this line of thinking. Actually, the person who controls the effectiveness reports of the officer controls the work and the results.

Our mission flows directly from the DCI's authorities and responsibilities for the coordination of the total United States foreign intelligence effort, which were clarified and strengthened by the President's recent memorandum to him. As examples, we are specifically charged with supporting him in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions for coordination problems by identifying and promptly recommending solutions to such problems especially through surveys of intelligence activities.

We go about our job by taking the initiative to identify situations and doing something about them before they become acute problems. Our officers travel throughout the community visiting their numerous contacts. They are welcome at staff meetings within their own agencies and gradually a greater sense of trust and confidence in this Staff is emerging throughout the community. The Staff collectively has extensive knowledge of community activities and every day brings new knowledge to our group. Thus, part of our work stimulates elements of the community to action, which in turn surfaces problems so that we can contribute to their solutions and assist in expediting action. When people become aware of the fact that we work for the DCI as the Coordinator, we find that by merely showing interest in a problem we

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have a catalytic effect in starting action and keeping it going.

Examples of Coordination Staff Action

Research and Development

Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 39 called upon Defense and CIA to seek more effective coordination of research and development activities for intelligence purposes. Several months ago the Coordination Staff took the lead, working with representatives of the two agencies, in developing proposals to achieve the desired improvements. Although for some specific fields of research, such as in communications, coordination at the technical working level is excellent; nevertheless, agreement was reached in principle that there should be in both CIA and Defense, a focal point for the coordination of their scientific and technical research and development effort.

A further problem, which requires continuous effort, is that of achieving an awareness by scientists and technicians of intelligence needs, and recognition that a development originated for another purpose can be exploited to solve an intelligence problem.

Future Plans and Programs of the Intelligence Community

Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 32 requires that the United States Intelligence Board review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle.

The Coordination Staff, acting on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence and the USIB, has action responsibility for this particular recommendation.

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The intelligence community's efforts in this field were concerned with Fiscal Year 1963 and 1964.

Examples of coordinated actions proposed by our Staff:

(1) Improved ELINT collection and processing equipment.

(2) Coordination in foreign service and attache coverage of Africa and Latin America.

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(4) Improved intelligence support for the planning of guerilla operations. (Counterinsurgency)

(5) Pointed out the limitation of the collection and production capabilities of the Department of State at the present time.

(6) Noted the numerous and uncoordinated program in the electronic intelligence field.

(7) Discussed problems engendered by the reorganization of intelligence in the Department of Defense (DOD).

(8) Encouraged centralized management control of mapping, charting, and geodesy in the DOD.

(9) Proposed a review of the original concept of the National Intelligence Survey Program.

(10) Encouraged acceleration in the development of an adequate and balanced capability in the national photographic effort.

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(11) Pointed out a need for coordination of the research effort on the impact of Sino-Soviet Bloc military and economic aid to non-Bloc countries.

(12) Noted that DIA should re-examine biographical intelligence activities in the DOD.


Scientific and Technical Intelligence

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requested an assessment of the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence on the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc, with a view to effecting improvements.

As a result of consultation with the various elements of the community concerned with collection and analysis of scientific intelligence, the Coordination Staff has reached conclusions concerning the present status of our intelligence in this field, and identified specific areas where improvements can be made. In brief, some of these areas of improvement are:

(1) Additional steps can be taken now to expand the flow of intelligence available from unclassified Soviet scientific and technical literature.

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(3) Of the highest importance is the further development and implementation of a realistic program for the clandestine collection of scientific and technical intelligence,

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concentrated on Soviet policy, planning, research and design in areas of critical scientific and technical importance.

(4) In the development of new technical collection methods and devices, certain principles should be followed to ensure effective planning, development and management of such methods and devices.

(5) Programs of intelligence support to research and development components of the Government not only significantly assist the U. S. research and development effort, but through the use of scientific talent available in the research and development community, can provide great assistance in solving problems of intelligence analysis and collection. Such programs should therefore be continued and strengthened.

USIB Structure

The Coordination Staff has completed a report on the subject of the committee structure of the USIB. In preparing this report, the Staff consulted knowledgeable individuals within the intelligence community, including the chairmen of several of the committees, and sought to develop a rationale that would provide USIB with the type of support that it requires to meet its broad responsibilities and at the same time permit desirable modifications in the committee structure. We concluded that such desirable modifications would be those that:

(1) recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the

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potential for greater coordination within the Department of Defense resulting from the establishment of the DIA;

(2) recognize that services of common concern, like assigned functions of primary responsibility, are essentially functions which can and should be charged directly to an individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the particular service or function and for its coordination throughout the community;

(3) recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis, only those committees that are clearly required to support functions specified for USIB in NSCID No. 1 or to coordinate certain important functional programs (other than services of common concern) which are carried out by several agencies to meet their own and community needs.

Applying those principles, the Staff concluded:

(1) that the following USIB committees should be disestablished and their general functions reassigned to an individual agency:

(a) Committee on International Communism

() (State)

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(c) Committee on Exploitation of Foreign
Language Publications (CIA)

(d) Committee on Procurement of Foreign
Publications (CIA)

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(g) Emergency Planning Steering Committee (DCI)

(h) Space Surveillance Intelligence Support
Committee (DOD)

Requirements

Joint Study Group Recommendations 21 and 22 are concerned with the problem of requirements, specifically the establishment of a central requirements registry. The Coordination Staff initially took the lead in exploring various possible means whereby the general intent of these recommendations could be met by the intelligence community, particularly through the initiation of specific remedial actions relating to requirements procedures in the community. As a result of the examination, CIA is now developing procedures for machine processing and recording of all requirements originating in and levied upon CIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency is also developing procedures for machine processing of its requirements. The Coordination Staff has encouraged and assisted the two agencies in working together to ensure that their machine systems are compatible and, insofar as possible, interchangeable.

As a result of consultation and discussion with elements of the intelligence community, the Coordination Staff has concluded that Recommendations 21 and 22, as stated by the Joint Study Group, do not, in fact, meet a present need of the intelligence community and that implementation would pose severe administrative and operational difficulties. This conclusion was further strengthened by an analysis

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of all existing community requirements concerning Indonesia which the Staff undertook on its own initiative. Consequently, the Staff recommendations to USIB would suspend further efforts to implement Recommendations 21 and 22. The Staff believes that many, if not most of the problems which hitherto have been associated with the requirements process, are, in fact, parts of the broader problem of managing and directing available collection assets. We have addressed this broader problem and plan to identify and recommend additional steps which may lead to more efficient and effective use of collection facilities.

The Coordination Staff is presently examining the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Program. You may be interested in our summary of preliminary findings and the broad principles we have recommended for revising it.

Summary of Preliminary Findings

1. The NIS is a valid and highly essential program due, in large part, to the fact that it is an authoritative, coordinated, interdepartmental publication which is extensively used at both national and lower governmental levels.
2. The NIS Program has unquestionably stimulated and supported the collection and analysis of essential basic intelligence on most world areas.
3. The NIS Program, however, has reached unmanageable proportions since there is not available in being or in prospect increased production capability required for timely revision and updating as well as for continued initial production of new NIS.
4. A great amount of detailed and transitory material has been introduced into the NIS Program by agencies and individual analysts in an effort to use it as the vehicle for many forms of intelligence for many differing needs. The result has been delays in production scheduling in early coverage of new areas and in maintenance of a reasonably stable, accurate and timely product.

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5. Among the other principal factors which have adversely affected NIS production are uncertainty as to the identity of the users of the NIS product, changed and expanded requirements, the turnover and shift of analytical personnel, problems of performing editorial and substantive review in a consistent and timely fashion, and the impact of crisis situations.

6. The utility of the NIS Program is also affected adversely by the physical bulk of the individual NISs, classification, academic stylization, and problems relating to the assignment of priorities.

7. Deficiencies in the arrangements for, and conduct of, managerial responsibilities have also been factors leading to the Program's present complexity.

8. A revised NIS should be directed primarily toward meeting governmental needs for the basic intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high-level operational planning and for the development of foreign policy.

Its composition should reflect emphasis on well-rounded, up-to-date, basic and relatively static intelligence accompanied by only such detail as may be desirable to meet the needs of such users regarding the particular area covered by each NIS.

Recommendations

1. Approve revision of the NIS Program in accordance with the following broad principles:

a. The NIS Program should be redesigned primarily toward meeting governmental needs for the basic-type intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high-level operational planning and for the development of foreign policy. It should not also attempt, as at present, to meet the needs of lower-level planning and operational elements in the Armed Forces and Department of State and of all other Government agencies which require basic intelligence for the accomplishment of their missions.

b. The NIS should contain only that essential, relatively static basic intelligence determined to be specifically required for each area covered.

c. Reliance should be placed primarily upon other departmental and interdepartmental intelligence production to meet needs for more detailed and specialized types of basic

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intelligence, including those required for lower-level operational planning.

War Planning

The Staff has a continuing sort of "Watch Dog" task in planning for war or emergencies. In this we limit our efforts to seeing to it that the interests of the Director, in his capacity as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer and national coordinator of the Government's foreign intelligence effort, are protected and recognized in war plans.

This is particularly pertinent at this time in relation to the national level emergency planning and the war planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are looking forward to the time when CIA Headquarters also has adequate war and emergency plans, but this is not a responsibility of the Director's Coordination Staff. When the DOD and CIA plans are in being, we hope that the intelligence community will then undertake to establish specific arrangements for anticipating its problems and planning its activities for general war and emergencies short of war.

Questions?

COORDINATION STAFF BRIEFING

Monday, 19 February - 3:00

Mr. John A. McCone
Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

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[Redacted]

Staff Members:

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[Redacted]

Tab A

Col. Donald W. Bernier, USA

B

(DD/S)

C

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[Redacted]

CIA (DD/I)

D

E

F

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Capt. Raymond A. Kotrla, USN

G

Col. Edwin A. Loberg, USAF

H

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[Redacted]

NSA

I

CIA (DD/P)

J

THE COORDINATION STAFF OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI)
BRIEFING OF THE DIRECTOR

19 February 1962

INTRODUCTION

This briefing will cover four topics (1) origin and mission of the Staff; (2) how we go about our job; (3) what the staff has done, is doing and problems programmed; and (4) some indication of acceptance of the staff in its community role.

I will conclude by presenting charts showing the structure of the intelligence community for coordination and command followed by the national allocations of responsibility for the production of foreign intelligence, and concluding with the mechanisms for Coordination in the Collection, Production and Support fields.

First, The Origin and Mission of the Staff

In 1956 the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities recommended that the DCI establish a sort of Chief of Staff to run the detailed operation of the Agency so that the Director could spend more time following and coordinating the national foreign intelligence activities.

The DCI responded by appointing a fourth Deputy within the CIA having the title of Coordinator to "assist him in coordination of the intelligence activities of the Government." The management of the Agency continued as before. The new deputy with his staff of two officers worked primarily on the revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) and their implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's) but was unable to devote any major effort to day-to-day coordination in the intelligence community.

Some elements of the intelligence community looked with distrust and suspicion at the function of the CIA deputy who would look into their activities. Consequently, a pronounced conflict of interest developed. This was particularly noted in the overseas clandestine collection efforts.

Some members of the community did not believe that a major competitor and operator should be their coordinator. In simplest terms, the coordinator is then in the position of being both pitcher and umpire.

Coordination Staff
Briefing of DCI

25X1A Upon the retirement of [redacted] the position of a CIA
Deputy for Coordination was abolished and a new position was created
on the personal staff of the Director of Central Intelligence with
25X1A title of Assistant for Coordination. I took over this duty on 1 July
1960 and was told by Mr. Dulles to assist Mr. Kirkpatrick with his Joint
Study Group activities. [redacted] Deputy Assistant for Coordination, was
a member of the Joint Study Group and the background thus acquired by
both of us has been invaluable in shaping and guiding the Coordination
Staff.

During the last half of 1960 this Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the United States developed 43 recommendations.
These were then considered by the National Security Council and their
actions were approved by the President on January 18, 1961.

One of the approved recommendations, No. 29, established your
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always reached by unanimous agreement. The wording in the Joint Study
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a paragraph, "To provide for including full-time professionals into the
field of coordination and minimizing the conflict of interest problem, we
propose that the DCI organize under his Assistant for Coordination, and
as part of his personal staff, a full-time group of intelligence pro-
fessionals owing primary allegiance to the intelligence community rather
than any one member agency. Membership on the staff would be drawn from
the foreign intelligence community-at-large. We believe that this
Coordination Staff should be charged with assisting the DCI in his
community-wide responsibilities for coordination of U. S. foreign intelli-
gence activities, including surveys of departmental intelligence activities
authorized in National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 1.
The Staff and its entire membership should be responsible to the DCI as
a Coordinator and they should be separate from any operational responsi-
bilities of CIA or other department or Agency." End Quote.

25X1 The members of the Staff with the exception of [redacted] and myself
were selected by the DCI after nominations had been received from the
departments or agencies. The intelligence experience level is high.
Four of the officers have more than 20 years intelligence experience.
Five have from 10 to 20 years and one has less than ten years. The Staff
average is 16 years per member covering the entire spectrum of intelli-
gence activities. As to knowledge about the Central Intelligence Agency,
six of us know a great deal about the DD/P area, five have a good working
knowledge about the DD/I area and two know the DD/S area. We have been
together as a full staff for six months. A liaison officer has been
designated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Mr. William O. Cregar)
and the Atomic Energy Commission (Dr. Charles H. Reichardt).

All support for the staff, except pay and personal administrative matters, is provided by the DCI. In some quarters the inference has been made that if our Staff members are paid by their own agency their allegiance to the national effort is not complete. I do not agree with this line of thinking. Actually, the person who controls the effectiveness reports of the officer controls the work and the results. In the case of this Staff, you sign our effectiveness reports.

Our mission flows directly from your authorities and responsibilities for the coordination of the total United States foreign intelligence effort, which was clarified and strengthened by the President's recent memorandum to you. As examples, we are specifically charged with supporting you in taking leadership and initiative to develop solutions for coordination problems by identifying and promptly recommending solutions to such problems especially through surveys of intelligence activities. We are also responsible to you as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) to review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each budget cycle.

We go about our job by taking the initiative to identify situations and doing something about them before they become problems. Our officers travel throughout the community visiting their numerous contacts. They are welcome at staff meetings within their own agencies and gradually a greater sense of trust and confidence in this Staff is emerging throughout the community. The Staff collectively has extensive knowledge of community activities and every day brings new knowledge to our group. Thus, part of our work stimulates elements of the community to action, which in turn surfaces problems so that we can contribute to their solutions and assist in expediting action. When people become aware of the fact that we work for you as the Coordinator, we find that by merely showing interest in a problem we have a catalytic effect in starting action and keeping it going. We, of course, have other well defined jobs such as following up on the implementation of Study Group recommendations; following the activities of the USIB and its committees; and the like.

Once when you were speaking about coordination at an early meeting with your deputies you said that your experience had been, "you can nudge 'em but you can't push 'em." We have a similar expression in the Staff, "you can lead horses to water but you can't make them drink." Our problem is to find ways of getting them to drink.

The Joint Study Group gave five principles for achieving coordination.

1. Leadership in developing and adapting new intelligence programs;

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2. Initiative in identifying problem areas and instances of duplicate effort or missing effort;
3. Investigation of these problem areas, if necessary through use of the right to survey intelligence activities;
4. Solution of these problems to the extent possible by agreed cooperative action of relevant parties under leadership of the coordinator;
5. Recommendation of solutions to higher authority when common agreement is not promptly forthcoming, with indication of the position of the various parties.

The Joint Study Group was confident that if all members of the intelligence community were to become convinced that the coordinative authority envisaged in the basic laws of the community were of this nature much of the reluctance and apprehension that now remain would disappear. We find these principles effective.

Here are some of the things the Staff has done, what it is doing and items to be looked into:

Research and Development

Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 39 called upon Defense and CIA to seek more effective coordination of research and development activities for intelligence purposes. Several months ago the Coordination Staff took the lead, working with representatives of the two agencies, in developing proposals to achieve the desired improvements. Although for some specific fields of research, such as in communications, coordination at the technical working level is excellent, nevertheless, agreement was reached in principle that there should be in both CIA and Defense, a focal point for the coordination of their scientific and technical research and development effort. Similarly, agreement has been reached that, in the case of research and development projects intended to meet national intelligence needs, the views of the community, USIB, as to the intelligence usefulness or value of the proposed project should be obtained before a decision is made to proceed or not to proceed with the project.

A further problem, which requires continuous effort, is that of achieving an awareness by scientists and technicians of intelligence needs, and recognition that a development originated for another purpose can be exploited to solve an intelligence problem.

Final decisions have not yet been reached in the Department of Defense as to the relative functions and responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Director of Defense Research and

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Engineering in this area. When this decision has been made it should be possible to establish regular procedures which will ensure effective coordination.

This Staff indorses your recent decision for a Deputy Director for Research in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Future Plans and Programs of the Intelligence Community

Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 32 requires that the United States Intelligence Board review the future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence community for consistency and proper allocation of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle.

The Coordination Staff, acting on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence and the USIB, has action responsibility for this particular recommendation.

The intelligence community's initial effort in this field was concerned with Fiscal Year 1963. The Coordination Staff, in concert with representatives of the USIB member agencies developed instructions for reporting and analyzing FY 1963 plans and programs. This effort resulted in four recommendations being submitted to and approved by the USIB five months ago. These recommendations consisted of USIB endorsements as follows:

- a. Improved ELINT collection and processing equipment.
- b. Coordination in foreign service and attache coverage of Africa and Latin America.

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- d. Improved intelligence support for the planning of guerilla operations.

Proposed FY 1964 instructions, based upon the lessons learned last year, have been prepared by this Staff and turned over to the USIB Secretariat for processing.

- a. They were developed in closer concert with those in the various agencies who will be preparing the reports.
- b. Rigid reporting categories have been avoided by permitting some freedom on the part of each agency in deciding what is to be reported. This is to be agreed upon in advance between individual agency and Coordination Staff representatives.

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c. Reports submitted will be prepared largely from existing programming systems. This will not only facilitate reporting, but it will also facilitate actions by the agencies when considering USIB-approved recommendations.

We believe that the results of this review will be of considerable assistance to you in the event that you are called upon to comment on the intelligence plans and programs of other agencies during the annual review by the Bureau of the Budget.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

Recommendation No. 15 of the 4 October meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requested an assessment of the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence on the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc, with a view to effecting improvements. The Acting DCI assigned to the Coordination Staff responsibility for undertaking the necessary examination and preparation of the draft report.

As a result of consultation with the various elements of the community concerned with collection and analysis of scientific intelligence, the Coordination Staff has reached conclusions concerning the present status of our intelligence in this field, and identified specific areas where improvements can be made. In brief, some of these areas of improvement are:

a. Additional steps can be taken now to expand the flow of intelligence available from unclassified Soviet scientific and technical literature.

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d. Steps should be taken to clarify the responsibilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the other departments and agencies for telemetry analysis.

e. In the development of new technical collection methods and devices, certain principles should be followed to ensure effective planning, development and management of such methods and devices.

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f. Programs of intelligence support to research and development components of the government not only significantly assist the U. S. research and development effort, but through the use of scientific talent available in the research and development community, can provide great assistance in solving problems of intelligence analysis and collection. Such programs should therefore be continued and strengthened, under staff supervision. FTD

g. A qualified scientist should be assigned to the Board of National Estimates, to facilitate the use of outside scientific talents in the consideration of national estimates involving science and technology.

Further examination is now under way concerning (a) the possible further use which may be made by the intelligence community of such organizations as etc., and (b) the organization and functioning of a national reconnaissance organization.

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USIB Structure

The Coordination Staff has recently completed a draft memorandum, which will be sent to you as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, on the subject of the committee structure of the USIB. In preparing this memorandum, the Staff consulted knowledgeable individuals within the intelligence community, including the chairmen of several of the committees, and sought to develop a rationale that would provide USIB with the type of support that it requires to meet its broad responsibilities and at the same time permit desirable modifications in the present USIB committee structure. In our draft we concluded that such desirable modifications would be those that:

- a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the potential for greater coordination within the Department of Defense resulting from the establishment of the DIA;
- b. recognize that services of common concern, like assigned functions of primary responsibility, are essentially functions which can and should be charged directly to an individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the particular service or function and for its coordination throughout the community;
- c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis, only those committees that are clearly required to support functions specified

for USIB in NSCID No. 1 or to coordinate certain important functional programs (other than services of common concern) which are carried out by several agencies to meet their own and community needs.

Applying those principles, the Staff concluded:

a. that the following USIB committees should be disestablished and their general functions reassigned to an individual agency:

(1) Committee on International Communism (State)

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[REDACTED]

(3) Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications (CIA)

(4) Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (CIA)

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[REDACTED]

(6) National Intelligence Survey Committee (CIA)

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[REDACTED]

(8) Emergency Planning Steering Committee (DCI)

(9) Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee (DOD)


Note: Recent USIB action assigned responsibility for coordinating space surveillance requirements to the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee.

Requirements

Joint Study Group Recommendations 21 and 22 are concerned with the problem of requirements. The Coordination Staff initially took the lead in exploring various possible means whereby the general intent of these recommendations could be met by the intelligence community, particularly through the initiation of specific remedial actions relating to requirements procedures in the community. The Staff recommended, and the DCI approved, exploration of six possible projects in this field. The Coordination Staff, working with the agencies concerned, is completing an examination of these projects. As a result of the examination to date, CIA is now developing procedures for machine processing and recording of all requirements originating in and levied upon CIA.

The Defense Intelligence Agency is also developing procedures for machine processing of its requirements. The Coordination Staff has encouraged and assisted the two agencies in working together to ensure that their machine systems are compatible and, in so far as possible, interchangeable.

As a result of consultation and discussion with elements of the intelligence community, the Coordination Staff has concluded that Recommendations 21 and 22, as stated by the Joint Study Group, do not, in fact, meet a present need of the intelligence community and that implementation would pose severe administrative and operational difficulties.



We have addressed this broader problem, in part, in our recommendations concerning strengthening of the USIB Critical Collection Problems Committee, and plan to identify and recommend additional steps which may lead to more efficient and effective use of collection facilities.

USIB Activities

In addition to its review of the USIB committee structure, the Coordination Staff follows most of the USIB activities in order to advise and assist the DCI as Chairman of USIB relating to coordination problems. The Staff submits to the DCI its comments and recommendations whenever requested or deemed appropriate regarding any interagency coordination problems being considered by USIB. The Staff has also from time to time been requested by USIB to study certain problems such as the need for an ad hoc committee to coordinate requirements in Southeast Asia. The USIB has also approved a procedure whereby the Coordination Staff is responsible for reviewing all new plans for periodic intelligence publications in Washington to prevent duplication.

Reports for the DCI

The Coordination Staff has assembled information and prepared certain reports for the DCI to submit to the White House relating to the implementation of recommendations by the Joint Study Group and by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Reports regarding the status of all JSG recommendations have been prepared as of 1 May and 21 August 1961, and another semiannual report due 1 March 1962 is in preparation by the Staff. The Staff has also contributed portions of

reports and briefings by the DCI to the President's Board relative to recommendations concerning the coordination of the foreign intelligence effort and the status of preparations and tests of plans for CIA war-time operations in overseas commands.

Revisions of NSCIDs and DCIDs

The Coordination Staff advises and assists the DCI regarding revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives and Director of Central Intelligence Directives designed to achieve improved coordination within the intelligence community. For example, the Staff has prepared draft amendments to NSCID No. 1 relating to the proposed changes in the USIB membership. The Staff has also participated with a USIB committee in drafting revisions of the DCID on Biographic Intelligence.

Staff Briefings

We are frequently requested to give briefings on the subject of the DCI's coordination of the foreign intelligence effort, and the related activities of the Coordination Staff. These briefings are normally arranged by the CIA Office of Training, either in special cases for key officials or as part of the regular training or orientation courses.

Staff Initiated Projects

Based upon its knowledge or observation, the Coordination Staff has examined problems of interagency coordination with a view to determining whether recommendations for action by the DCI may be warranted. Problems of this type which the Staff is currently planning to examine are:

- a. The adequacy of support by the intelligence community to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- b. Production of basic intelligence studies or reports by various agencies in support of operations, in addition to basic intelligence contributions to the National Intelligence Surveys.
- c. Effectiveness of the coordination and use by the intelligence community of external research facilities outside government.
- d. Arrangements for production within the community of research on international Communism, especially the activities of international organizations and interrelations between Communist parties.

Examples of Requests to the Coordination Staff for Assistance:

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


3. A request from two members of the Committee on International Communism that the Coordination Staff look into the problem of community capability for the production of intelligence on international Communism, in the light of recent reductions in staff and budget of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State, and the recent abolition of the senior staff on international Communism in CIA. ✓


4. A request for guidance from members of the War Plans Staff of DD/P concerning the handling of hot war intelligence requirements originated by the overseas commands and transmitted to the Agency by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Incidentally, CIA does not have a headquarters level war plan. Many field plans are however in being. ✓

5. A query from Mr. Sherman Kent and General Cabell as to what the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) should do about emergency planning. The Coordination Staff's survey led to incorporation of its findings regarding emergency planning in the Staff's report on the USIB committee structure which will be submitted to you about 12 March.

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9. Mr. [redacted] of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, former member of the Central Intelligence Agency Board of National Estimates, discussed with [redacted] at the request of Mr. William C. Foster, means of ensuring adequate intelligence support for that agency from the community. After exploring various possibilities, [redacted] undertook to prepare a definite statement of that agency's needs and desires for further discussion with the Coordination Staff.

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11. Requirement Registry. As a result of a request from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Staff was able to bring DIA and CIA together and ensure their effective collaboration in developing compatible requirements registries.



13. Translation of Soviet Electronic Journals. At the request of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of CIA, the Staff initiated and supported actions by the Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications to ensure the continuation of the translation of these important Soviet journals.

14. Electric Power Facility Project. At the request of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) of CIA, the Staff examined an apparent case of uncoordinated duplication in the mapping of electric power lines in the USSR, and determined that the duplication was inadvertent, and that there was, in fact, a well coordinated project under way in Defense.

Charts

In conclusion I will show five charts which were prepared specifically for briefing you. The exercise turned out to be an effective educational device for ourselves and useful in briefing others.

COLLECTION

MECHANISMS FOR COORDINATION AT WASHINGTON LEVEL

SECRET

Subject	Mechanism	Authority or Directive
CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS	CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE (CCPC)	DCID 2/2 ^{25X1C}
• PROCUREMENT <i>of</i> FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS	CIA, ASSISTED <i>by</i> COMMITTEE <i>on</i> PROCUREMENT <i>of</i> FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (PROCIB)	DCID 2/5 ^{25X1}
OBJECTIVES & REQUIREMENTS <i>for</i> OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE	COMMITTEE <i>on</i> OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE (COMOR)	DCID 2/7 ^{25X1}
ESPIONAGE & COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD	DCI (DD/P)	DCID 5/1
REQUIREMENTS <i>for</i> CLANDESTINE COLLECTION	INTER-AGENCY CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PRIORITIES COMMITTEE (IPC)	DCID 5/5
COMINT & ELINT	COMINT-ELINT COMMITTEE	DCID 6/1 & 6/2

PRODUCTION

**MECHANISMS FOR
COORDINATION AT WASHINGTON LEVEL**

SECRET

Subject	Mechanism	Authority or Directive
NATIONAL ESTIMATES	CIA BOARD of NATIONAL ESTIMATES	DCID 1/1
INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE	WATCH COMMITTEE	DCID 1/5
• NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY (NIS)	CIA OFFICE of BASIC INTELLIGENCE	NSCID-3
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE	ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (EIC)	DCID 3/125X1A
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div>		
ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE	JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (JAEIC)	DCID 3/3
GUIDED MISSILES & ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE	GUIDED MISSILE & ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (GMAIC)	DCID 3/4
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE	SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (SIC)	DCID 3/5

SUPPORT

MECHANISMS FOR
COORDINATION AT WASHINGTON LEVEL

SECRET

Subject	Mechanism	Authority or Directive
REFERENCE SERVICES	COMMITTEE <i>on</i> DOCUMENTATION	DCID 1/4
SECURITY	SECURITY COMMITTEE	DCID 1/11
• EXPLOITATION <i>of</i> FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS	CIA, ASSISTED <i>by</i> COMMITTEE <i>for</i> EXPLOITATION <i>of</i> FOREIGN LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS (CEFLP)	DCID 2/4

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