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GUIDED MISSILES AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (GMAIC)

GMAIC responsibilities include the production of intelligence, recommendations for missile and astronautics intelligence objectives pursuant to the PNIOs, and the identification of deficiencies in related intelligence production and collection. The Committee's charter does not, however, state that its activities should be directed in accordance with PNIOs, although its field of concern is clearly related to several.

The Committee's analytic and production workload is largely concerned with current problems, rather than from a studied endeavor to fulfill PNIOs. Questions and indications of special interests are received through the membership from the highest intelligence levels, and inspiration is obtained from USIB's considerations of substantive problems. Guidance to Committee endeavor is also obtained from the Board of National Estimates.

GMAIC produces missile and astronautics Priority National Intelligence Objectives based on DCID 1/3 and provides recommendations for the establishment of the PNIOs during the annual review cycle. The Committee also refers specifically to PNIOs when considering collection requirements or when asked to establish priorities for a collection problem or system.

The Committee has no collection resources, nor does it have the responsibility to program or allocate the resources belonging to other components of the Community. In addition, GMAIC feels that it does not have real influence on its primary collectors (NSA, FTD, AMC, etc.). GMAIC believes that it would benefit greatly from central direction and allocation of production and collection resources toward national rather than departmental interests.

NSA review(s) completed.

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INTERAGENCY CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PRIORITIES COMMITTEE: (IPC)

The PNIOs are used directly for both substantive and priority considerations in the preparation of clandestine collection guidance by the IPC. The IPC requirements listings are in fact broken down into sections which correspond directly to the priority categories of PNIOs set forth in DCID 1/3. The actual listing of intelligence collection requirements within the IPC sections are prepared by individual member agencies and coordinated with other IPC representatives. Conflict of agency interests occurs, but is usually resolved without need for arbitration by higher authority.

The IPC in and of itself does not plan collection but it is heavily involved in long term guidance and planning, often on a time scale comparable to that of the PNIOs. The guidance the Committee prepares is provided to DD/P/CIA for use in operational, long-range planning by the Clandestine Services. The IPC does not participate in the allocation of clandestine resources to collect against priority requirements, nor does it attempt to influence operations, or to determine the extent to which collection is satisfying requirements.

The Committee has received little guidance or direction from USIB (only PNIOs) or from the DCI other than that contained in DCID 5/5.

DDP considers that "central control" of the IPC would threaten the security of Clandestine Services operations, but feels that it would be desirable to have a central mechanism to ensure that the production offices prepare adequate requirements for IPC use.

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SIGINT COMMITTEE:

The SIGINT Committee's efforts to provide guidance to the Director, NSA, in the collection and production of SIGINT (as called for in its charter - DCID 6/1) have in recent years been based directly upon the PNIOs. Except for the 1960 effort, USIB COMINT Requirements lists prepared over the past 8 years have, in fact, stemmed specifically from both the substance and the priorities contained in DCID 1/3. At this time, the Committee is considering establishing both long-term (5 year) and short-term (1 year) guidance to SIGINT production.

To a large extent guidance provided by the Committee has been used by DIRNSA as a means of managing the headquarters processing effort (the selection and publication of messages), rather than for across-the-board allocation of collection resources.

The SIGINT Committee participates in the allocation of SIGINT collection resources to a limited extent and on a special-problem basis. For example, the Committee may make judgments as to the need for urgent coverage of a critical situation which could involve the withdrawal of resources from other targets. It does not, as a Committee, participate in the over-all programming of intercept assets and resources. This is done by DIRNSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies and without reference to PNIOs.

In 1962 the Department of Defense introduced an annual review of the entire SIGINT program (Combined Cryptologic Program) which involved a detailed examination of all SIGINT assets, their substantive productivity and the relative value of the productivity of the various elements involved. The PNIOs have not been used in this review. CIA provides an observer in the review, and the Committee has performed supporting tasks, but the Committee is not yet officially involved in the program.

From time to time the DCI has advised DIRNSA of intelligence problems requiring extraordinary attention. Neither the DCI nor USIB has provided continuing substantive guidance or direction to the SIGINT Committee.

In view of the many conflicting demands on SIGINT resources, the Committee would benefit from a centrally managed PNIO system, but would not be enthusiastic about a central mechanism overseeing its decisions and recommendations.

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JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (JAEIC)

In a fashion similar to GMAIC, this Committee uses PNIOs in the establishment of collection requirements and their priorities, but does not normally follow them in intelligence analysis and production work.

Substantive guidance to the Committee is received from the Board of National Estimates, from USIB in specific cases and, through its representatives, from participating agencies. In addition, the Chairman (CIA) receives spot guidance from the O/DD/I which stems from the White House and other high-level sources.

JAEIC engages in long-range planning only to the extent that it prepares specialized National Intelligence Objectives in pursuance of the PNIOs in DCID 1/3; notes particular deficiencies in collection against Soviet tests; and recommends on the technical development of collection apparatus.

The Committee does not have the authority for the allocation of either production or collection resources.

The Chairman does not feel that additional or central direction is required on substantive or technical matters. However, it is felt that central direction of clandestine collection would be worthwhile.

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WATCH COMMITTEE:

The subjects and interests of the Watch Committee are specifically and directly related to the highest priority PNIOs - those concerned with Communist armed action against the US, its Allies or other Free World Nations. The direction of this interest stems from the Committee's mission for the analysis and production of early warning intelligence, rather than a substantive or administrative attention to the terms of PNIOs.

Substantive guidance for the Committee is derived on a current and continuing basis from the USIB and from individual Committee members as representatives of their respective agencies. Long-range planning is conducted as part of the regular warning survey and in response to specific situations or charges as they arise.

The allocation of collection and production resources in support of Committee programs is determined and implemented under the authority and guidance of respective Committee members and their staffs.

The Committee considers that the guidance it receives and the manner in which it is received is adequate and effective and that there is no need for further centralization or for a central mechanism for the provision of guidance and coordination.

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SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (SIC)

The SIC's principal activity is the preparation of contributions to NIEs and NISs and is subject to the production schedules in these fields. Otherwise, the Committee itself determines its program and receives no direction or guidance from the outside, although it has direct contact with the Board of National Estimates.

In the past the SIC has issued Science and Technology PNIOs based upon DCID 1/3 and is considering such a publication this year. The Committee's attention to priority areas appears to stem more from a general awareness of consumer interest, rather than from guidance stemming from PNIOs or other outside stimulus.

PNIOs are cited as a justification for collection requirements prepared by the Committee and its Subcommittees, but it is likely that the requirements come first and the PNIO, just happening to fit, comes after. The SIC has no overall program expressly to translate the PNIOs into research or collection activity.

The Committee until recently had concerned itself solely with current problems and review of past production. However, it now is considering the role it should play in the coordination of future research.

No resources are allocated directly by the SIC.

The Chairman feels the Committee is a useable management and coordination tool, but that operating officials are not making use of it. Central direction would be desirable. The following possibilities were suggested:

- a. A Committee of USIB Committee Chairmen
- b. A stronger USIB Secretariat
- c. DD/I direction that DD/I offices support USIB committees

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE: (EIC)

The EIC has played a major role in the coordination and direction of intelligence production and collection guidance concerned with economic intelligence since its creation in 1951. During the period 1951-1960 the Committee engaged in several comprehensive programs:

- a. a comprehensive survey of information needs and the publication of interrogation guides, collection manuals and other guidance material.

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


- c. In addition, the Committee sought to improve and coordinate State's economic reporting (CERP) and peripheral reporting.

The EIC concluded after several years experience that the PNIOs and the PNEIO, while generally useful, were so broad that judgment as to specific collection priorities had to be left to experts. Additionally, the Committee determined that the guidance and coordination efforts it was undertaking were inordinately time consuming and often duplicative of agency efforts.

In 1959 USIB agreed that the production of specialized PNIOs, such as PNEIOs, were authorized but not required. The EIC then agreed that USIB agencies would each review PNIOs in terms of their own missions and establish necessary economic research and collection priorities, rather than produce PNEIOs. At this time, member agencies place their priority economic intelligence collection requirements directly on the component or agency managing the guidance to collection resources (e.g., COMOR, SIGINT Committee, IPC).

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The EIC believes that individual agencies are aware of PNIOs and understand the concepts involved in translating objectives into agency collection guidance programs and that central direction and guidance by the Committee is no longer necessary.

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COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE: (COMOR)

COMOR seldom refers specifically to the PNIOs as a basis for substantive justification or for the determination of priority for reconnaissance requirements. COMOR assumes that in view of the level and qualifications of its membership, it is fully capable of judging the validity, priority and suitability of each requirement brought before it. However, PNIOs are a governing factor on long-range planning and, when necessary, are studied to assist in resolving conflicts between requirements.

Guidance and direction to the Committee comes from the White House, the DCI and from Committee membership. Requirements originating from the membership are thoroughly checked out with production elements within the agencies before submission to COMOR. The establishment of "community needs" is virtually essential to approval of any requirement, since new projects require preliminary USIB approval, and requirements on existing projects normally require Special Group approval.

Reconnaissance collection resources are allocated and tasked by the NRO and not by COMOR. COMOR must therefore consider the impact of its requirements on existing and projected NRO collection programs.

In view of the close direction by the DCI and USIB and its community membership, COMOR can see no need for additional central direction or for a central mechanism for providing guidance and direction.

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CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE: (CCPC)

According to its charter (DCID 2/2), the CCPC concerns itself with collection problems of community interest referred to it by USIB, a USIB committee or agency, or by the Committee itself, subject to prior approval by the DCI of the nature and scope of the study to be undertaken by the Committee. DIA and Defense agencies have requested deletion of the clause requiring DCI approval. In the past two years the Committee has reviewed fourteen major problems, eleven assigned by USIB or the DCI and three at the request of a USIB agency.

The Committee concerns itself with the collection of intelligence on critical problems. Each problem so far considered has related to one or another of the top PNIOs. This relationship is inherent in the Committee's work, but is also the result of active consideration by the Committee of gaps in information relating to the highest priority PNIOs.

The CCPC has maintained a very close relationship with GMAIC and has been briefed on a number of occasions on missile matters. With the expansion of the CCPC charter in 1962 (to include subjects other than missiles) the Committee has when necessary obtained the participation and consultation of analytic elements in its deliberations.

The CCPC does not actually allocate collection resources. However, in a few instances it has set up a working group or has itself dealt with the collection agency concerned in order to allocate assets, (e.g., Project [redacted] In addition, the Committee in effect managed Project [redacted] It has not, however, managed any programs, with the exception of [redacted] involving an aircraft built at the expense of millions, which the Committee and GMAIC concluded was being poorly run. In this case, the DDCI charged the two committees with setting up a panel of experts to review the entire management and operation of the program.

The Chairman feels, with respect to the question of increased central direction and guidance, that USIB seems to have been derelict in that it has not followed up on approved projects or on the performance of executive agents appointed to carry out programs and projects, or in many cases has failed to assess the quantity, quality or value of resultant intelligence products.

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